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Hegel's Philosophy of Right occupies a distinct position within
his philosophical system. Hegel claims to describe a complete and
comprehensive system of human practical freedom, of freedom actualized
in the practical life of man. Chapter One of the thesis describes Hegel's
method. It is shown that, according to Hegel, the only true method of
examining a philosophical position consists in revealing its internal
logical structure and determining whether the claims to truth advanced
by the system can be supported by and are consistent with the logic of
the system.
In Chapter Two I locate the Philosophy of Right within Hegel's
mature philosophical system. In Chapter Three I discuss Hegel's
"Introduction" to the Philosophy of Right and demonstrate that the
central concern of Hegel's political philosophy--the actualization of
human freedom--is introduced through an examination of the theoretical
and practical dimensions of human existence. In Chapters Four and Five
I try to demonstrate that, in his sections on "Abstract Right" and
"Morality", Hegel describes rival modern theories of freedom (contract
theory and morality) and shows each to be inadequate according to its own
standards of logical consistency and completeness.
In Chapter Six I discuss Hegel's philosophy of world-history
and try to demonstrate its importance to an understanding of Hegel's
discussion of ethical life in general and the rational state in particular.
The philosophy of world-history helps us to understand the apparently
abrupt transition to "Ethical Life". In Chapter Seven I argue that the
sub-sections of "Ethical Life"—the family, civil society and the state--
describe a hierarchial pattern of forms of rational human freedom.
In Chapter Eight I evaluate Hegel's work and argue that it
suffers from a fundamental flaw which is systemic, not accidental. True
freedom is predicated of the rational, self-conscious man. But only the
philosopher is rational and self-conscious. We are left with two
alternatives: the citizens of Hegel's rational state are philosophers;
or the citizens of the state exist for the philosopher who alone is free.
Neither alternative is satisfactory according to Hegel's own criteria in
the Philosophy of Right.
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I can recall when I decided to devote several years of my
life to the serious study of Hegel. As an undergraduate student
I had a lively interest in Marx. I was advised by a teacher that
some attention to Hegel's writings would expand considerably my
appreciation of and respect for Marx and, being a dutiful student,
I began to read the Philosophy of Right. I found the experience
intoxicating, although I must admit in retrospect that my reaction
probably owed more to an overwhelming sense of awe than to any
genuine understanding of the text. Whatever the reason, I decided
then that I would return to the study of Hegel at a later, more
appropriate time.
I use the word "appropriate" because, when I first read
Hegel, I did not have sufficient knowledge to grapple adequately
with his thought. Hegel's political philosophy is located within
a long tradition of political philosophy and must be understood
within that tradition. Also, Hegel's political philosophy is
thoroughlyintegrated into his philosophical system as a whole and
the whole must be understood if we are to understand its constituent
parts. Accordingly, as an M.A. student I devoted my time to the
study of many of the leading classic texts in the history of
political phi1osophy and wrote a thesis on Aristotle's concept of
justice. Therefore, when I enrolled as a Ph.D. student determined
to write a thesis on Hegel, I had some familiarity with the
primary categories and concerns of the tradition and heightened
appreciation of the way in which Hegel used these categories
and addressed these concerns.
Initial optimism was soon dissipated. Every time I
thought I had made a "breakthrough" a whole new set of problems
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appeared. Gradually, however, ideas took shape and something
resembling a "thesis" about Hegel's political philosophy developed.
I believed I had discovered a critical flaw in the Philosophy of
Right, a flaw which rests on Hegel's fundamental drive to
"complete" the history of philosophy. Having decided upon a thesis,
I then faced the problem of determining the best way of presenting
it. This proved very difficult.
Critical reflections on many of the commentaries and
discussions in the vast secondary literature devoted to the study
of Hegel revealed pitfalls which I wished to avoid. The easiest
to fall into involves the suspension of all critical faculties,
consequent upon an overwhelming respect for and admiration of the
sheer majesty of Hegel's thought. Too often, spirited and thought¬
ful defenses of Hegel against his critics suffer from a muddled
"softness" at their core, an inability or unwillingness to adopt
a critical stance towards Hegel. Perhaps this is a natural
reaction to the ignorant hostility towards Hegel which existed for
far too long in the English-speaking philosophical community: it
is, nevertheless, unsatisfactory.
A more complex problem is posed by works which assume the
reader is thoroughly familiar with both Hegel's philosophy and a
specific approach to the interpretation of Hegel. Many of these
works display deep scholarship and understanding, but they leave
the reader bewildered because he cannot understand how the author
reached his point of departure. This may be regarded as a
variant of the type of impenetrable critical enterprise which
Charles Taylor describes as causing the reader to "turn with relief
to the text in order to understand the commentary".
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A third approach—and the most unsatisfactory--i s seen in
those works which attempt to criticize Hegel from an "external"
standpoint. Standards are evoked against which Hegel's philosophy
is measured and found wanting. At times, these works are little
more than polemics, and Hegel has been accused of "crimes" ranging
from wilful obscurantism to sowing the intellectual seeds of
romantic nationalism which flowered into the lunatic doctrines of
National Socialism. There is, however, a serious problem here:
to what extent must a critic sympathetically attempt to enter into,
understand and explicate the thought of another before he can
establish the validity and integrity of his critique?
My search for the most satisfactory method of presenting
my thesis on Hegel's political philosophy was guided,not
surprisingly, by Hegel himself. In his "Introduction" to the
Phenomenology of Mind Hegel sets out, in its clearest and most
coherent statement, his idea of the true method of philosophical
criticism and speculation. He argues that a philosophical position
is developed according to a logic which is internal to the position
itself. When we confront a philosophical position or system we
must reveal its logical structure and discover whether the claims
to truth advanced by the system can be supported by and are consis¬
tent with the logic of the system. If we neglect this critical
demand then our conclusions about the merits of a philosophical
position—even if essentially correct—appear arbitrary and
based on simple prejudice.
I believe Hegel is right on the subject of philosophical
investigation and,therefore, my analysis of the problems and
limits of his political philosophy must proceed from a thorough
examination of the logical structure, arguments and claims of
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the Philosophy of Right. The next question is how far must one
"unravel" a system before one's conclusions about the system appear
valid and coherent. The more I examined the Philosophy of Right
the more convinced I became of the systematic unity of the work.
I have referred to my thesis that there is a fundamental flaw in
Hegel's political philosophy, a flaw which is systemic, not
accidental. It is my belief that if I am to demonstrate this
convincingly I must lay bare the logical, systematic structure of
the entire work; in other words, I must begin at the beginning.
Accordingly, Chapter One is devoted to a discussion of Hegel's
method. Although this discussion is based on Hegel's "Introduction"
to the Phenomenology of Mind, I believe his statements there apply
mutatis mutandis to the Philosophy of Right. Hegel's idea of
philosophical method is essential to our understanding of his
procedure and arguments in the Philosophy of Right. In Chapter Two,
I locate the Philosophy of Right within Hegel's mature philosophical
system as a whole.
In Chapter Three I begin my detailed examination of the
Philosophy of Right, with a discussion of Hegel's "Introduction".
It is in this chapter that the central concern of Hegel's political
philosophy--the actualization of human freedom—is introduced
through a discussion of the theoretical and practical dimensions
of human existence. Chapters Four and Five are devoted to the
examination of the sections of the Philosophy of Right titled,
respectively, "Abstract Right" and "Morality". I try to demonstrate
that these sections describe rival philosophies of freedom and how
each "rival" is shown to be inadequate by Hegel.
In Chapter Six I depart from Hegel's organization of the
Philosophy of Right and examine his lengthy introduction—
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published separately under the title Reason in History—to his
lectures on the philosophy of world-history. I do this because I
am convinced that the transition in the Philosophy of Right from
"Morality" to the section on ethical life is best understood
against the background of the philosophy of history. Indeed, I would
argue that some of the confusion over Hegel's political philosophy
stems from a disregard for the importance of the philosophy of
history to an understanding of Hegel's discussion of ethical life
in general and the rational state in particular. Chapter Seven
examines the three parts of the section on ethical life—the family,
civil society and the state.
The first seven chapters of the thesis have a primarily
expository tone, and I have said why I believe this procedure is
required. I believe there is much interesting material in these
chapters, and difficulties in the text are not avoided. Nevertheless,
it is true that the exposition proceeds, with few exceptions, in a
non-critical manner. That is, my intention is to explain what Hegel
is saying in the Philosophy of Right and why he says it in the way
he does. Whatever "critical fire" there is in the thesis is reserved
for Chapter Eight.
This was a deliberate decision. In Chapter Eight I try
to demonstrate that, ultimately, Hegel misjudges the nature of
politics and political life as a result of his attempt to absorb the
finitude of the political world into the infinity of
philosophical discourse. I do not try to "refute" Hegel on the
details of his analysis; rather, I try to show that his analysis of
modes of social and political organization is ultimately betrayed by
his drive for philosophical completeness. I believe the procedure
I have followed in the thesis enables me to establish my critical
vi
arguments on a solid base of sympathetic understanding. In this
i
way I hope I have, in a small way, remained true to the great
critical spirit of Hegel.
I have many fond memories of the years I spent at the
University of Edinburgh and I would like to thank Dr. Henry Drucker,
whose patient and helpful supervision contributed so much to the
congenial atmosphere I recall with such pleasure. I should also like
to thank two fellow students, Jay Bernstein and Richard Gunn, for
thier generous help and valuable advice. Finally, this work is
dedicated to my wife, Joanne; without her encouragement and editorial
assistance it would never have been completed.
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In the thesis, quotations from Hegel are frequently given. The
great majority are taken from a few works and, for ease of reference,
the source of the quotation is listed in parentheses immediately
following the quotation. Abbreviations used to refer to these works
are listed below. All footnotes in a chapter are placed together in
a "footnotes" section at the end of each chapter.
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1972.
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Oxford, 1970.
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J.N. Findlay. Oxford, 1971.
References are to paragraph numbers. "Remark"
refers to explanatory remarks which follow the main
text of some paragraphs.
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H.C.E. Heidegger, Martin. Hegel's Concept of Experience,
with a section from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit,
in the Kenley Royce Dove translation. New York, 1970.
References are to page numbers. References to
Hegel's "Introduction" to the Phenomenology of
Spirit are to the Kenley Royce Dove translation.
RH. Hegel, G.W.F. Lectures on the Philosophy of World
History - Introduction: Reason in History, trans,
by H.B. Nisbet, Introduction by Duncan Forbes.
Cambridge, 1975.
References are to page numbers.
CHAPTER ONE
THE DIALECTIC OF EXPERIENCE
Hegel's mature philosophical works pose many difficulties for
the reader. In addition to the almost legendary denseness of his prose
style, Hegel appears to organize each work in a manner which borders on
the wilful. The works are divided and sub-divided into sections and
sub-sections with little apparent regard for the reader who seeks to
understand the whole. Concepts appear in one section and then disappear,
only to reappear many sections later with seemingly different contents
than were attributed to them when they were originally introduced.
Transitions from one section to another often appear to owe more to
caprice than to any rigorous logic internal to the philosophical ar¬
gument under examination. The whole enterprise of reading Hegel is made
especially difficult because Hegel himself rarely justifies - or even
describes - the methodology he employs. The major significant exception
to the general absence of a coherent treatment of methodology by Hegel
is to be found in his "Introduction" to the Phenomenology of Spirit.
This chapter of the thesis will examine some of the methodol¬
ogical principles discussed by Hegel in that "Introduction". I believe
the methodological principles elucidated in the "Introduction" are found
in Hegel's other works and their discussion in this chapter will facil¬
itate considerably the subsequent examination in the thesis of Hegel's
political philosophy. It must be noted from the outset, however, that
all the methodological principles discussed by Hegel in the "Introduction"
cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to all other works in the Hegelian
corpus. The specific set of problems addressed in the Phenomenology
require a specific approach; nevertheless, the methodological sim¬
ilarities between the Phenomenology and Hegel's other works are significant
and, in my view, far outweigh the differences.
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In the Phenomenology Hegel seeks to establish his own idea
of true philosophical knowledge. He proceeds by way of an examina¬
tion of alternative claims to true knowledge. The examination proceeds
from the most basic and simple claims, through increasingly complex
ones to the most complex and complete claim - Absolute Knowledge as
described by Hegel. The examination exhibits a definite structure as
each claim in turn is examined and rejected in favour of a more complex
one.
But the significant point to grasp is that each claim yields
to a higher claim by virtue of a logic internal to the claim itself.
It is Hegel's contention that the progress of his examination is
informed through and through with the logic of necessity. This logical¬
ly necessary structure of development from simple to complex - or, in
Hegel's language, from abstract to concrete - is termed dialectical.
The dialectic of development is found in all of Hegel's mature works
and it is this methodological principle which he discusses in his
"Introduction" to the Phenomenology. It is for this reason that I
believe an extended treatment of Hegel's "Introduction" facilitates
the subsequent discussion of Hegel's political philosophy. It
presents and prepares the methodological foundation for the detailed
examination of the Philosophy of Right and other relevant texts which is
undertaken in the remainder of the thesis.
Similarly, it is useful to examine the way in which Hegel
presents alternative claims to his own philosophy of Absolute Knowledge.
Hegel does far more than set up easily-refuted "straw-men" in an effort
to establish his own position. He is concerned to illumine the
philosophical principles underpinning alternative positions and then
discover what is false and, equally important, what is true in each
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position. This procedure is as true of the Philosophy of Right as the
Phenomenology and so Hegel's discussion in the "Introduction" of the
procedure's methodological principles contributes to the examination
of Hegel's political philosophy.
Hegel does not hesitate in the "Introduction" to state clearly
that the proper subject of philosophy is the discovery and description
of the "actual knowledge of what truly is" (PhG. p.63; H.C.E. p.7).
That view of philosophy's "proper subject" is, however, opposed by the
dominant views of philosophy current in Hegel's time. Hegel cha¬
racterizes the philosophical opposition as sharing the conviction that,
before philosophy can investigate "what truly is" it must first address
the problem of the nature of knowledge itself. In other words, philos¬
ophy must first investigate the nature of knowledge and describe the
powers and limits of the human capacity to know anything at all, before
it can attempt to know "what truly is".
That conviction, which Hegel regards as quite "natural", is
shared by the tradition of "post-Cartesian" philosophy in general; when
we turn to particular philosophers within the tradition, however, we
discover that the shared conviction hides a multiplicity of radically
different philosophical positions. The differences between philosoph¬
ical positions on the nature of knowledge can be so great that, in
Hegel's view, the different positions become mutually exclusive. The
"exclusivity" of the positions implies that it becomes very difficult
for the "outsider", for the student of philosophy who is not committed
to one or another position, to make an intelligent choice among rival
positions. The problem of choosing between philosophical alternatives
may appear to be a "psuedo-problem". Surely, it may be argued, the
the student's indecision rests on inexperience; when the student has
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progressed, has studied the alternatives in greater detail, he will be
in a position to choose one philosophy over another because it is truer,
more complete than rival philosophies.
Hegel views the "puzzled student" with considerable sympathy.
Hegel contends that modern philosophies of knowledge rest au fond on
sets of assumptions or presuppositions which remain unproven. Accept¬
ance of one set of presuppositions over another leads to the adoption
of the philosophy built upon it. The difficulty experienced by the
student is genuine because there are no objective criteria for evaluat¬
ing basic ephistemological presuppositions. We can follow Hegel's
reasoning here by referring very briefly to the different epistemological
positions of Kant and Locke.
Kant's claim is that we only know objects through judgement.
To judge an object is to bring intuitions of the object under concepts.
Since judging is something persons cto, then the forms of judgement
(e.g. subject-predicate) must be functions of a judging consciousness.
The judging consciousness actively brings intuitions of the object
under concepts. It is for this reason that Hegel contends that, for
Kant, consciousness is actively involved in the act of knowledge and
knowledge (or, perhaps more accurately, the capacity to know) acts as
an "instrument" which fashions the brute object into a knowable object,
an object of knowledge, Locke, on the other hand, maintains that if an
object is to be known it must be presented to consciousness. When an
object is presented to consciousness what is immediately perceived
are affections of our senses (e.g. colour, shapes, sounds). For our
senses to be affected there must exist a causal relationship between
the object perceived and human sensibility. Consciousness for Locke
does not, as for Kant, actively impose the form of intelligibility
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and knowability on objects which could not otherwise be known at all.
It is for this reason that Hegel contends that, for Locke, knowledge
(or the capacity to know) acts as a passive "medium" through which
the object is presented to consciousness in the form of sensible affec¬
tions .
On Hegel's reading, therefore, the problem facing the stud¬
ent is not simply whether Kant or Locke presents a truer philosophy
of knowledge but whether knowledge itself is "active" or "passive",
"instrument" or "medium". Further, Locke and Kant are only paradigms
of a problem which exists throughout philosophy; namely, the basic
presuppositions of the different philosophical systems are not
supported by coherent and complete arguments for their truth. We
have already noted Hegel's statement of the proper subject of philos¬
ophy; he too, however, faces a problem similar to the one already
described in the philosophies of Kant and Locke. If he plunges
straight away into a description of Absolute Knowledge as he believes
it to be, he will only be presenting the "student" with one more
philosophical system to choose from among the many already before him.
If Hegel is to remain true to his own principles he must establish the
truth of his philosophical system without resort to a set of pre¬
suppositions which, while essential to his system, remain beyond the
reach of philosophical argument and suoport.
Can a system of philosophy be developed without resort to a
set of unsupported presuppositions? Charles Taylor, writing on the
opening arguments of the Phenomenology, suggests that Hegel's procedure
is similar to what, with reference to Kant, we call transcendental
argumentation. He writes: "By 'transcendental arguments' I mean
arguments that start from some putatively undeniable facet of our
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experience in order to conclude that this experience must have certain
features or be of a certain type, for otherwise this undeniable facet
could not be."^ Hegel, therefore, must begin his examination of knowl¬
edge with such basic elements that to deny them would render any discu¬
ssion at all of knowledge totally incomprehensible.2
We can distinguish three basic elements within the activity
of knowledge in general. Knowledge, in its most basic sense, requires
the representation of an object to a conscious subject. That which is
represented may be an object of sensory perception or it may be an
object of thought, will or emotion. Consciousness refers to the presence
of the subject in the act of representation, or knowledge. The object
is that which is represented to the conscious subject. When we speak
of a form or shape of knowledge we are referring to the mode in which
an object is represented to a conscious subject. As Heidegger points
out, Hegel uses the terms "consciousness" and "knowledge" almost inter¬
changeably since both terms, although capable of being distinguished
from each other, are inseparable aspects of a single activity--the
experience of knowledge. Heidegger writes: "The two explicate each
other. To be conscious means to be in the state of knowledge. Knowl¬
edge itself proposes, presents, and so determines the mode of 'being'
in being conscious. In that state (of knowledge) are especially:
that which is known--that is, what the knower immediately represents--
and the knower himself who represents, as well as the representing
which is his mode of conduct."3
The consequences of breaking the experience of knowledge
down into its most basic elements are significant when we attempt to
understand Hegel's approach to the problem of knowledge. In all con¬
scious experience there is an object which is represented to a subject.
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This object may be anything at all and may be present either sensibly
or non-sensibly. If there is no object at all, conscious experience
is impossible. We have already described knowledge in general as the
representation of an object to a conscious subject. The specific way
in which an object is represented to a conscious subject will determ¬
ine the specific form or shape of knowledge. But the specific shapes
of knowledge are a secondary concern at this point for it is clear
that when we break down the experience of knowledge into its most basic
elements knowledge and consciousness (conscious experience) may be
regarded as co-extensive. This co-extensivity of knowledge and con¬
sciousness holds for all possible forms or shapes of knowledge, for in
every shape there is an object represented to a conscious subject. We
can now understand what Hegel means when he says that we must set aside
all presuppositions. The type of presupposition which must be avoided
is the one which elevates, from the outset, one form of knowledge
above all the others, and maintains that this form alone is real, or
true, knowledge. Similarly, to presuppose an absolute dichotomy of
subject and object or a distinction between a phenomenal and noumenal
realm is to arbitrarily limit the possible forms of knowledge, i.e.
modes of representation of an object to a conscious subject. By reduc¬
ing the presuppositions necessary for the undertaking of an examination
of knowledge to the most basic elements possible Hegel is forced to
consider all forms of knowledge. That is, the examination of knowledge
must examine every possible way i,n which an object may be represented
to a conscious subject.
It is Hegel's contention that all previous philosophical
examinations of knowledge have invoked a standard against which the
"correctness" of knowledge may be measured. For example, modern
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natural science, considered as a rigorous set of principles, has been
related to phenomenal knowledge in some philosophies as a standard of
measurement against which phenomenal knowledge may be compared.
Hegel argues against the use of "science" in this way. Modern science
itself is one shape of knowledge among many and, as such, it too must
make its appearance. The presupposition of one notion of science prior
to an inquiry into phenomenal knowledge will dictate the results of that
inquiry. We have already seen how Hegel attempts to avoid such pre¬
suppositions. But this attempt creates a new problem for, if we
examine every possible shape of knowledge, we may be left without a
standard to guide our inquiry. Hegel's solution to this problem is one
of his greatest philosophical achievements.
Hegel is critical of the presupposition of a dichotomy between
the faculty of knowledge and truth which, in his view, underlies modern
epistemological investigations. This presupposition results from the
observation that consciousness "distinguishes from itself something to
which it at the same time relates itself "(PhOL p.70; H.C.E. p.19.)
This "something" is the object of consciousness, and as such it has
two sides. Insofar as it is an object for consciousness its mode of
being is "being-for-another" and is regarded as knowledge. That is,
the object is related to consciousness in a specific way and is thus
said to be known by consciousness according to this specific mode of
representation (knowledge). But the object is also regarded as having an
essence which is independent of its being known or not, and this
"being-in-itself", this essence, is the truth of the object.
Epistemology is directed towards determining the truth of knowledge.
This activity involves the establishment of standards against which
- 9 -
the adequacy of knowledge to the essential truth of an object could
be determined. The dualistic assumption necessitates various
correspondence theories of truth, since the truth of knowledge is
seen as a measure of the degree to which the object as known (knowledge)
corresponds to the essential, independent truth of the object-in-itself.
The philosopher who accepts the bifurcation of knowledge and truth must,
in Hegel's view, invoke standards from outside (e.g. Newtonian science)
in an effort to determine the correspondence between two distinct and
separate entities—the "being-for-another" and "being-in-itself" of
the object of consciousness.
On the basis of a "dualistic" correspondence theory, truth,
or "being-in-itself", is seen as an external limit or boundary to
possible knowledge. It is external because it exists outside the
relationship of "being-for-another", or real knowledge of the object
as it appears to consciousness (PhG. p.70; H.C.E. p. 19). In turn, this
approach determines the kinds of questions with which an epistemological
theory must be concerned, e.g. questions about the "limits of knowledge",
the "conditions necessary for knowledge", and the "relation between
knowledge and being".^ Further, truth is the "in-itself" of the object
and so the "truth of knowledge" must be "knowledge-in-itself". But
the philosopher examining the truth of knowledge only sees knowledge as
an object-for-another (i.e. for himself), and "...the 'in-itself' of
the object resulting from (his) investigation would not be the 'in-
itself' of knowledge but rather its being for (him). What (he) would
affirm as its essence would not really be its truth but only (his)
knowledge of it." (PhG. p.70; H.C.E. p.19).
Hegel, however, is not concerned with the traditional problem
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of the truth of knowledge. The Phenomenology is intended as a study
of knowledge as it appears. As we have seen, this approach embraces
every way in which an object may be represented to a consciousness.
Hegel argues that, since every shape of knowledge requires an object
which is represented to a consciousness and since it is those various
shapes of knowledge which constitute the object of the Phenomenology,
the distinction between subject and object, or knowledge and being,
falls within our object. That is, within each shape of knowledge,
consciousness itself distinguishes two moments: one moment is "being-
for-another" or its knowledge of the object; the other is "being in
itself" or what it deems the truth of the object. The abstract
distinction between subject and object (knowledge and truth) and the
presupposition of standards for measuring their correspondence are
unnecessary for us (the readers of the Phenomenology) because our
object - knowledge as it appears - contains both moments within itself
and effects its own distinctions without our intervention. As Dove
writes: "Our object is at once and inseparably both the object-knowing
subject and the object known-by-the-subject. Thus our object...contains
this subject-object distinction within itself and requires no further
distinction by us."5
Hegel then describes the way in which consciousness
establishes the standards of measurement. As we have seen, con¬
sciousness distinguishes two moments within its object. Further, con¬
sciousness is capable of forming a concept of either of these moments.
If it forms a concept of the object as it is for another then it
possesses a concept of the object as known. If it forms a concept of
the object-in-itself it possesses a concept of the object itself
independent of its being known. In the first case the concept is a
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concept qua knowledge in the second it is a concept qua object. The
distinction between the two types of concept rests on the distinction
which consciousness itself makes between the two moments of the object.
Consciousness, in seeking to determine whether its knowledge of the
object is true knowledge, must examine the degree of correspondence
between its knowledge of the object and the object-in-itself which is
the standard of truth. Therefore, if its concept is the concept of the
object as known, i.e. the concept qua knowledge, it must examine the
correspondence between the concept and the object-in-itself. If, on
the other hand, the concept is the concept of the object-in-itself then
it must examine the correspondence between the object as known and the
concept, i.e. between the object and its concept. Hegel maintains the
procedures for consciousness in both cases coincide, for both require a
comparison of the concept with its object. As to which procedure is to
be preferred, Hegel is clear and unambiguous. The selection of one
over the other is a matter for consciousness itself. Both are reas¬
onable methods and, depending on the shape of knowledge under examination,
one or the other will be chosen. But it will be chosen by consciousness
itself and not by the philosopher (Hegel) describing the experience of
consciousness, nor by the reader present at this description (PhG.p.71-
72; H.C.E. p.21).
Not only does consciousness select its own standards, but it
also carries out the comparison between its knowledge of an object and
the standard of truth it has selected. This is so because consciousness
is conscious in a double sense; it is conscious of an object and
conscious of itself knowing this object in a determinate way. "For
consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object and, on
the other, consciousness of its self; it is consciousness of what to
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it is the true, and consciousness of its knowledge of this truth."
Since both the knowledge of the object and the standard of truth are
for consciousness their comparison is "a matter for consciousness
itself" (PhG. p. 72; H.C.E. p.21). Although the observer (the reader)
of this comparison may declare that the standard of truth is for
consciousness and therefore the elevation by consciousness of this
standard to the level of the "in-itself" is a sham, this is an
irrelevant consideration. Such "intervention" neglects the putatively
undeniable fact that to consciousness the "being-in-itself" and the
"being-for-another" of the object are distinguished. The "being-in-
itsel f" of an object is the concept of objectivity which structures con¬
sciousness' idea of what an object, conceived in universal terms, is;
the "being-for-another" of an object is the representation of an
actual object to a consciousness which knows the object. "It is upon
this differentiation, which exists and is present at hand, that the
examination is grounded" (PhG. p. 72; H.C.E. p.22).
The examination consists in establishing a correspondence
between knowledge and truth; if such correspondence is found lacking,
consciousness must alter its concept of knowledge in an effort to
establish this correspondence. The alteration of the concept of knowl¬
edge, however, is nothing other than an alteration in the "being-for-
another" of the object, and an alteration in the "being-for-another" of
the object involves an alteration in the concept of the object itself.
But if the concept of the object of consciousness is altered the
concept of the object "in-itself" must also be reexamined; and this
reexamination may produce a change in the standard of truth which, as
we have seen, is based on consciousness' concept of the object "in-
itself". Thus an alteration in the concept of knowledge of an object
ultimately requires a change in the concept of the object "in-itself"
and in the standard of truth (Ph.G. p.72; H.C.E. p. 22-23). The
same procedure, but in reverse, occurs when consciousness begins with
the concept of the object.
This complex movement is best understood if we examine Hegel's
concept of experience. Hegel writes: "This dialectical movement, which
consciousness exercises on its self--on its knowledge as well as its
object--is, in so far as the new, true object emerges to consciousness
as the result of it, precisely that which is called experience (Ph.G.
p.73; H.C.E. p. 23). Experience refers to a concrete activity which
may be analysed into its distinct but inseparable elements. These
elements may, in turn, be described differently depending upon which
aspect of experience we wish to emphasize. In the broadest possible
terms, experience involves the "experiencing" and "what is experienced",®
or the experiencing "subject" and the "object" which is experienced.
These elements are inseparable because, within the concrete whole of
experience they are seen to be mutually interdependent. Except at the
most abstract level it is impossible to consider one side without
considering the other.
This interdependence may be explicated by referring to the
examination above of the basic elements of knowledge. There it was
shown that in every shape of knowledge an object is represented to a
subject and that the specific mode of representation determines the
specific shape of knowledge. The shapes of knowledge are as diverse
as the possible modes of representation and include not only cognitive
activities such as perception and scientific understanding but also
conative ones such as morality. Within each shape the three basic
elements—subject, object and mode of representation—are distinct but
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inseparable moments of one concrete whole--the activity of knowledge.^
It is this "activity of knowledge" which Hegel calls experience.
At first glance this appears to be an overly technical and restrictive
use of the term. On closer examination, however, Hegel's characterization
of experience is seen to stand in a determinate relation to the "common-
sense" view of experience. This latter view maintains that experience
arises out of man's conscious "being-in-the-world". The "world" consists
of nature, human institutions, other men, and the individual subject.
These factors create conditions and states of affairs, both physical and
mental, to which the individual is consciously subject. Further, the
individual's knowledge of the world is seen to be informed throughout
by this "subjectness". We should, however, avoid the belief that the
commonsense view implies a purely mechanistic description of the rela¬
tion between world, experience and knowledge. It is also a feature of
this view that the knowledge gained from experience allows man the
freedom to strike out in entirely new directions, to create new possibil¬
ities of experience and knowledge.
What is the connection between this view of experience and that
advanced by Hegel? The answer rests upon the use of the term "conscious"
to describe the subject of experience. It is clear that within the
common-sense notion of experience an object is represented to a conscious
subject. To the unphilosophical mind the very "giveness" of this situa¬
tion is such that it distinguishes between this mode of representation
(experience) and another, higher mode (knowledge). The philosopher,
however, recognizes throughout the three elements basic to the activity
of knowledge and any distinction between the different modes must fall
within knowledge and not between knowledge and another kind of conscious
activity (experience). In the Phenomenology Hegel has set himself the
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task of examining knowledge as it appears and this requires the examina¬
tion of every mode of representation of an object to a conscious subject.
It is for this reason that he collapses the common-sense distinction
between knowledge and experience; he is now free to investigate the
widest possible areas of human experience--including political and
social forms--in his investigation of claims to true knowledge.
We have now described in general that which Hegel wishes to
examine in the Phenomenology. We must now direct our attention to the
manner in which this examination is carried out. Each mode of represen¬
tation denotes a specific shape of consciousness--a determinate way of
knowing. Several factors, as we have seen, are involved in the claim
that an object is known. Determinate knowledge requires that those
factors themselves be determined in specific ways. If, for example,
the claim is advanced that true knowledge consists in the immediate
certainty of sensual apprehension, then necessarily this involves
further statements about concepts of "object-hood", of "subject-hood",
and of the way in which objects must be represented to subjects
(consciousness) if they are to be known truly. In the example of sense
certainty objects must be viewed as repositories of sense-data and the
human mind must be seen to know most truly when its "knowledge" is
immediate and uncontaminated by mediating categories of thought.
Similarly, other determinate shapes of consciousness, such as perception
or scientific observation, involve similarly determinate claims about
the basic elements involved in the activity of knowledge.
To the unphi1osophical consciousness these determinate claims
are only implicit. Its knowledge of the world appears "natural" and it
never seriously examines the claims which underlie its knowledge of the
world. It is the task of the philosopher to raise that which is merely
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implicit to the level of explicit philosophical principle. In so
doing the philosopher attempts to put forward a systematic, coherent
view of true knowledge. It is Hegel's contention that, at the time
of writing the Phenomenology, every possible shape of consciousness—
every possible mode of representation—had appeared and could be
expressed in philosophical terms. His examination of each shape of
consciousness consists in examining the most sophisticated coherent
statement of its philosophical principles. In many cases, the state¬
ments had been formulated by philosophical advocates of the shape
involved; in other cases Hegel himself elucidates the principles under¬
lying shapes which had not received coherent philosophical description
and justification.
This is the meaning of Hegel's statement that consciousness
invokes its own standards and carries out its own examination of those
standards . The standards are those principles which the philosopher
makes explicit. The examination of those standards proceeds in the
following manner: Hegel demands of each systematic treatment of knowl¬
edge that it apply its own standards of truth rigorously in support of
the claim that it represents true knowledge. Further, the claim of
true knowledge must be taken seriously for it is not permissible to
advocate something as true and then to back off from this claim by
stating that it is only partly true, or that it is true in some cases
and false in others. Hegel's procedure in the Phenomenology is to
state the various systematic claims which have been advanced and then
show how each breaks down internally as a result of its principles of
knowledge being unable to maintain its claims to truth. In sense-
certainty, for example, the claim to truth is shown to reduce, on its
own principles, to a radically incomplete and incoherent "truth" or
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else to a silent solipsism. But a claim to universal truth which rests
on solipsism is also incoherent and so the claims of sense-certainty
must be abandoned in favour of a more complete and coherent view. In a
similar way, every abandoned shape of consciousness is abandoned because
the principles which underlie it are insufficient for the maintenance of
the original claims to truth.
It is not difficult to grasp the sense in which the standards
of the examination are invoked by consciousness itself. It is far more
difficult to understand how Hegel can claim that consciousness itself
conducts the examination. This difficulty is magnified when we see that
the various shapes of consciousness are arranged in a determinate and
intricate structure. Indeed, Hegel writes: "The complete system of the
forms of unreal consciousness will present itself through the necessity
of the progression and inter-relatedness of the forms"(PhG. p.47; H.C.E.
p. 15). This "complete system" is determinately ordered and yet it is not
an order which is grasped by the consciousness whose experience is under
examination. "This way of observing the subject matter is our contribution;
it does not exist for the consciousness which we observe. But when viewed
in this way the sequence of experiences constituted by consciousness is
raised to the level of a scientific progression" (PhG. p.74; H.C.E. p.24).
The question we must answer is to what extent this "contribution"
interferes with the actual examination of knowledge "as it appears"?
Does consciousness really carry out its own examination or is this a
charade which obfuscates Hegel's actual procedure? This is one of the
central problems of the Phenomenology and any reader who wishes to
understand the book must eventually confront this complex issue. Any
answer put forward will directly influence not only the reading of the
Phenomenology but, indeed, all of Hegel's works. However, I wish to
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confine my discussion to the relatively narrow methodological concerns
at handJ0 My justification for this restriction of the issues is that
I am primarily concerned with providing an introduction to the reading
of the Philosophy of Right and a discussion of the wider implications
of Hegel's method for the Phenomenology is unnecessary for that task.
As we have seen the standards of each shape of consciousness
are actually made explicit by the philosopher and not by "natural"
consciousness. Further, there is no necessary contradiction between
this and the claim, by Hegel, that the standards are those of the con¬
sciousness itself which is being observed. The support for this claim
rests on the critical determination whether Hegel is representing truly
the various standards which have been advanced or is perverting them
to suit his own end. The examination of each shape consists in
determining whether the claims advanced for knowledge can support the
claim to truth. If there is no correspondence between knowledge and
truth within the shape then it must be abandoned as incomplete. The
actual examination is described by Hegel and, as in the situation
involving the explicit standards, his claim that the examination is
consciousness1 own must be determined a posteriori. That is, if Hegel
remains strictly within the bounds outlined by the philosophical
explication of the principles structuring determinate shapes of knowl¬
edge and, within them discovers irreconcilable contradictions, his
claim is maintained. In following through the standards of each shape
to their logical conclusion he is only doing what consciousness would
do if it were fully self-critical. There are no grounds for deciding
a priori that an accurate representation of the standards and the
subsequent internal critique are impossible. If this claim can,
a posteriori, be maintained then it is in this sense that both the
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standards and their examination may be said to be consciousness' own.
While Hegel's claim of non-interference may not be overly
problematic within each shape of consciousness the claim is most doubt¬
ful when we discover that the sequence of shapes exhibits an ordered,
determinate structure. This structure exists "for us, as it were,
behind (consciousness') back" (PhG. p.74; H.C.E. p.26).
The answer to this question provides us with a new insight
into Hegel's real project in the Phenomenology. Throughout the discu¬
ssion so far the problem has always been whether or not consciousness
could establish a correspondence between knowledge and truth, the
"being-for-another" of an object and its "being-in-itself". This
procedure requires philosophical principles which are reflected through¬
out the entire activity of knowledge. They explicitly set out both
the limitations to and the definition of all possible knowledge. This
in turn involves statements about the concepts of both subjects and
objects conceived in universal terms. Within any one shape of con¬
sciousness the attempt to establish correspondence between knowledge
and truth is grounded upon a philosophical system of principles
which structures this activity.
As we have seen, a claim of true knowledge must be unqualified,
and so any philosophical system of principles which makes this claim
must demonstrate that it is the whole and complete truth. To illustrate
this, let us look at Hegel's treatment of perception. After an
exhaustive examination we see that the percipient is unable to resolve
the contradiction between the unicity of the thing and the multipli¬
city of its properties. The only way out of the impasse is to adopt
the new view that the object is a nexus of causal relations. But this
resolution requires the interaction of subject and object (cognitive
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reflexivity) and this contradicts the basic principles of perception.
Therefore, the principles themselves must be reformulated and this
creates a new shape of consciousness. It is clear that the principles
of perception are incomplete with respect to the true nature of the
object and so, in quest of completeness, consciousness alters its
principles. A new conception of the object, of the subject and of
the proper mode of representation has arisen. But there is another,
more profound sense in which perception is incomplete. It is
incomplete because it is unable to account for itself as a philosoph¬
ical system.
What does it mean to describe perception as incomplete in
this sense? A fundamental principle of perception is that true knowl¬
edge consists in the passive apprehension of an object by the conscious
subject. But on what is this principle grounded? Since perception is
discovered to be an incomplete account of knowledge it is clear that
this principle must also be incomplete. However, if perception were
able to demonstrate conclusively that this principle is complete and
absolute, not only would the principle remain intact but also the
perceptual knowledge of an object based upon this principle would be
complete and true. Natural consciousness and, indeed, the incomplete
philosophical consciousness views incompleteness solely with respect
to the object which remains unknowable. But it is also clear that,
when a shape of consciousness breaks down, the presupposed principles
underlying that shape are incomplete with respect to themselves, i.e.
with respect to accounting for themselves as philosophical principles.
What are the implications of this distinction between two
types of incompleteness for the interpretation of Hegel? First of all,
it indicates concretely Hegel's notion of completeness. Completeness
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is not merely the complete knowledge of an object under scrutiny but,
more importantly, the complete knowledge of knowledge itself, includ¬
ing a complete philosophical account of the most basic principles
underlying the system.^ This, in turn, allows for the possibility
of different kinds of knowledge. For example, Kant set out to provide
the epistemological foundations for modern natural science. However,
he ultimately attempted to provide a complete account of the entirety
of human knowledge. This project resulted in the bifurcation of the
phenomenal and noumenal realms, the transcendental deduction of the
categories, the assignment of spatio-temporal concepts to human
subjectivity, the moral law, and so forth. Fichte was the first to
attempt to go beyond Kant with his deduction of the object from the
ego, thereby attempting to overcome the Kantian "thing-in-itself".
Schelling, in turn, attempted to establish, via aesthetic intuition,
an objective identity of thought and being in contradistinction to
what he perceived to be the dualism of Kant and Fichte. Fichte and
Schelling indicated, each in his own way, the lapses in Kant's system
which prevented it from being a complete account both of itself and
of its objects. Kant's failure, however, was not in attempting to
ground modern science but rather in trying to force this into a
complete view of all possible knowledge. Despite this, however, it is
possible that Kant did provide a correct foundation for modern science.
The emphasis is on correct rather than complete. That is, it is
possible to distinguish scientific knowledge from, say, sociological
knowledge on the basis of their different objects—nature and society--
and the kind of knowledge appropriate to each. Kant, therefore, may
have provided the correct epistemological foundation for scientific
knowledge, but his philosophy is incomplete as a universal epistemology
- 22 -
i
because it is incapable of being universalized to include within it
all knowledge, or of locating scientific knowledge properly within
the total hierarchy of knowledge. Hegel argues that this failure,
in turn, can be traced to the inability of Kant to provide an
absolutely complete and coherent account of the philosophical principles
of his system. (Hegel, of course, would argue that Kant's system
cannot be complete in the latter sense, since it is inadequate.) On
analogy with this example, there are several shapes of consciousness
which may be correct with respect to their specific objects but are
rejected because they claim completeness and cannot sustain this claim
against criticism.
This distinction is most important if we are to understand
what Hegel means by "Absolute Knowledge". It is this final stage of
the Phenomenology which has probably generated more controversy and
hostility among the readers of Hegel than any other passage from his
works. The road to Absolute Knowledge passes through the entire
spectrum of shapes of consciousness, each one of which is found to be
inadequate. Therefore, the reader awaits the passage on Absolute
Knowledge in the expectation of discovering therein the true view of
nature, of man, morality, political life, and so forth. None of this,
at least in the expected form, is to be found. Critics of Hegel are
not at all surprised by this for they regard as hubristic even the
attempt at such a feat. Equally disconcerting are those Hegelians
who claim, with almost mystical reverence, that Hegel accomplishes
this absolute union of all forms of knowledge. Such a view requires
that the absolutely wise man know everything and this is at best very
difficult to accept.
The mistake common to all these readers is the inability to
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make the distinction between a knowledge of the object and the knowl¬
edge which knows itself. The absolute knowledge described in the
Phenomenology is the knowledge of a consciousness which knows itself
absolutely; i.e. can offer a complete and coherent account of itself
as knowledge. This account is nothing other than the Phenomenology
of Spirit. In each shape consciousness attempts to discover the true
knowledge of an object. It is this pursuit which generates the variety
of shapes. But consciousness, unknown to itself, also requires an
absolute knowledge of itself in the form of a complete account of
itself. As pointed out in the example of Kant, there are several
points in the Phenomenology where consciousness discovers the correct
form of knowledge appropriate to a particular type of object. Its
failure, in every case, is that it attempts to universalize this
restricted form to include all possible knowledge. Absolute knowledge
is the knowledge by consciousness of this entire movement as its own
movement towards completion. It grasps the double necessity of
discovering the true knowledge of the various objects as well as the
true knowledge of itself. It knows the correctness of various shapes
and is able to provide them with an absolute foundation within the
hierarchical structure of complete knowledge. The coherence of
absolute knowledge is the coherence of a movement which is its own
becoming J 2
This movement, which Hegel terms experience, exhibits a
dialectical structure. As we have seen, Hegel views the Phenomenology
as a scientific account of the entire structure of knowledge. This
structure begins with the simplest, most abstract shape of con¬
sciousness—sense certainty--and culminates in the most concrete and
and complex shape. It is possible to regard this movement from simple
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to complex, from the abstract to the concrete, as systematic in itself.
But to say this is to say that Hegel arranged the shapes of consciousness
according to a pre-determined logic, a logic which is external to the
shapes themselves. This is often a charge made against Hegel and it
rests, I believe, on a misunderstanding of the concept of dialectic.
Rather than engage in lengthy debate about what the dialectic is not,
I would rather indicate briefly what it is.^
The nature of dialectic is most easily grasped in contrast to
what Hegel terms the logic of the understanding. "Thought, as under¬
standing, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from
one another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a sub¬
sistence and being of its own." (Enc. No. 80) The understanding
operates within the sphere of finitude; the most common example of its
deployment is in the analytic method of the empirical sciences. Its
primary principle is the logical law of identity. The understanding
seeks to apprehend objects in their distinct and separate specificity.
In the natural sciences, for example, the understanding distinguishes
and classifies the objects of the natural world according to their
specific natures and characteristics. The stability of this procedure
depends upon the self-identity of each of these objects for, if such
identity did not exist, the objects could not be held apart from each
other and attempts at classification would become chaotic. The
theoretical import of the understanding extends in Hegel's view, to
other fields as well, such as geometry and jurisprudence. The under¬
standing is also indispensable to practical activity. We pursue
definite ends and, in order not to be deflected from these, we must
necessarily exclude other possible concerns, at least in a limited
sense. Hegel cites the example of the judge who must stick to the
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law and not be subject to external pressures. The logic of the under¬
standing is of inestimable merit to philosophy which "never can get
on without the understanding". The merit lies "in the fact, that
apart from the understanding there is no fixity or accuracy in the
region either of theory or of practice". (Enc. No. 80, Remark)
Thought as understanding is therefore extremely valuable in
those areas where its logic holds good. The deficiencies of this mode
of thought become apparent only when it seeks to expand itself into the
methodology of philosophical science. Hegel criticizes philosophers
such as Spinoza, who attempted to apply the geometric method to the
problems of philosophy, for failing to grasp the essential limitedness
of this logic. "Hitherto philosophy had not found its method; it regarded
with envy the systematic structure of mathematics and...borrowed it or had
recourse to the method of sciences which are only amalgams of given
material, empirical propositions and thoughts - or even resorted to a
crude rejection of all method." (Log. p. 53) This underlines the point
made above that, in the Phenomenology, there are shapes of knowledge which
may be correct within a limited sphere but become false when expanded
to include the entire structure of knowledge. In opposition to these
misguided attempts, Hegel puts forward what he believes to be the true
method of philosophy, which is "the consciousness of the form of the
inner self-movement of the content of logic". (Log, p. 53) He
continues by stating that "in the Phenomenology of Spirit I have
expounded an example of this method in application to a more concrete
object, namely to consciousness", to which is appended the note "and
subsequently to other concrete objects and corresponding departments
of philosophy". (Log, p. 53-54) The "form" of self-movement is
nothing other than the dialectic. The proper "method" of philosophy
consists in the recognition of the dialectical movement of knowledge
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and truth. Thus Hegel does not impose a dialectical method but rather
attempts to give a descriptive account of a movement which is itself
dialectical. Hegel gives the following succinct statement of the
proper method of philosophical science:
"All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress -
and it is essential to strive to gain this quite
simple insight - is the recognition of the logical
principle that the negative is just as much positive,
or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve
itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness,
but essentially only into the negation of its
particular content, in other words, that such a
negation is not all and every negation but the
negation of a specific subject matter which resolves
itself, and consequently is a specific negation, and
therefore the result essentially contains that from
which it results; which strictly speaking is a
tautology, for otherwise it would be an immediacy,
not a result. Because the result, the negation, is
a specific negation it has a content. It is a fresh
notion but higher and richer than its predecessor;
for it is richer by the negation or opposite of the
latter, therefore contains it, but also something
more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite.
It is in this way that the system of Concepts as
such has to be formed - and has to complete itself
in a purely continuous course in which nothing
extraneous is introduced... it is the inwardness of
the content, the dialectic which it possesses within
itself, which is the mainspring of its advance. It
is clear that no expositions can be accepted as
scientifically valid which do not pursue the course
of this method and do not conform to its simple
rhythm, for this is the course of the subject matter
itself." (Log, p. 54)
Before discussing the implications of this method for the
Phenomenology we can further illuminate the method itself by employing
several terms borrowed from traditional logic. The logic of the under¬
standing was seen to depend upon the principle of identity. Following
from this principle are two other principles which are fundamental
tenets of this logic; the principle of contradiction which asserts
that no proposition can be both true and false, and the principle of
the excluded middle which asserts that of two contradictory propositions
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one or the other must be true since they cannot both be false. To
understand the last two principles we must define a contradiction.
A contradiction exists when two propositions which are contradictories
are brought together. Two propositions are said to be contradictories
if both cannot be true and both cannot be false. One of the two must
be wholly true and the other wholly false. For example, the state¬
ment that Hegel is over six feet tall is contradicted by the statement
that Hegel is not over six feet tall. Neither statement can be both
true and false and yet one must be true and the other false. There
are no alternatives.
We recall that in the example of perception a contradiction
arose between two sets of opposed claims (or propositions). There
seemed no way out of the impasse within the principles of perception
and so consciousness was forced on to another level, another shape.
Hegel wishes to argue that this new shape - "Force and Understanding" -
arises out of the contradiction of "perception" and resolves it.
Further, he claims that the two contradictories are preserved in a
non-contradictory way within the new shape, i.e. are synthesized in
some way. This is clearly at odds with the formal principles described
above, for those principles clearly and unambiguously assert the
impossibility of uniting two contradictories. Are we faced with an
irreconcilable contradiction between the basic principles of formal
logic and those of Hegel's system?
The way out of this problem is to introduce the notion of
propositions as contraries.^ Two propositions are said to be
contraries if they cannot both be true but may both be false. For
example, Hegel is over six feet tall and Hegel is under six feet tall
cannot both be true and yet, if Hegel is exactly six feet tall,
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may both be false. Therefore, if we view the apparently contradictory
propositions of "perception" as contrary propositions, a resolution
of the "contradiction" is possible. The resolution may now be seen
to arise out of the preceding contraries. Both statements may be
false and, through the determination of the nature of this falsity,
new propositions may emerge.
The resolution, however, does not obliterate that which
proceeded it. The resolution is a negation of the contrariety of the
previous propositions and, as such, is a determinate negation. It is
determinate because its specific form and content are determined by
the form and content of the preceding contrary propositions. We can
recapitulate the movement so far in the following way: specific claims
to truth are advanced in support of a specific shape of consciousness.
The experience constituted by this shape reveals problems and this
results in contradictory propositions being advanced about the object
of knowledge. The contradictory propositions are only apparently
contradictory and, in time, are revealed to be contrary propositions.
A resolution of the "contradiction" within a shape of consciousness
is effected and a new shape of consciousness makes its appearance.
The resolution by determinate negation of contrary proposi¬
tions defines the process which Hegel terms aufheben, most often translated
into English as "sublation". In its literal German sense, aufheben
brings together in one term the three distinct operations of
cancellation, preservation and raising to a higher level of prior
propositions. We have seen how the notion of contrariety allows for
"cancellation" without violation of the formal law of contradiction.
But Hegel also claims that the resolution represents a "unity of
opposites" i.e. a moment of "preservation". This is more difficult
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to grasp than "cancellation" since, if both propositions are rejected
as false, then in what sense may they be said to be "preserved"? The
most obvious answer is that they are preserved as pure negative
presence, i.e. as two propositions whose very absence is significant
for the new shape of consciousness. But this is unsatisfactory for the
same could be true of any proposition which is excluded from a set of
propositions deemed to be true. Indeed, Hegel, contrasting the concept
of a dialectic of experience with the common-sense notion writes that,
according to the latter "it seems that we somehow discover another
object in a manner quite accidental and extraneous and that we experience
in it the untruth of our first concept" (PhG. p. 73; H.C.E. p. 24).
Although the situation is slightly different from the moment of cancellation
of contraries, nonetheless there is nothing in this common-sense notion
which necessarily excludes the "preservation" of falsity in the form of
negative presence.
Although the concept of "negative presence" has some validity
for the notion of preservation it is insufficient to justify the
importance of this moment. The more complete notion of preservation may
be illuminated by examining one more notion from formal logic - the
notion of subcontraries. Propositions are said to be subcontraries if
they cannot both be false but may both be true. The following example
will illustrate the difference between contraries and sub-contraries J^
The two propositions "everything in Hegel's philosophy is true" and
"everything in Hegel's philosophy is false" are contrary propositions,
i.e. both cannot be true but both may be false. The two propositions
"some things in Hegel's philosophy are true" and "some things in Hegel's
philosophy are not true" are subcontrary propositions, i.e. both cannot
be false but both may be true. The difference between the two types
of proposition is that, while both differ as to quality, contraries
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involve universals while subcontraries involve particulars. If we
apply this distinction to the dialectic of experience we get the
following result: The falsification of contrary propositions
creates the possibility of resolution, and the propositions are
preserved as a "negative presence". But the dialectic is a dialectic
of experience, occurring in and through time, and in the course of
experience those particulars within each universal proposition which
are true are identified and preserved within the new shape of con¬
sciousness. Whereas the notion of contraries creates the possibility
of resolution of an apparent "contradiction", the notion of sub-
contraries creates the possibility of synthesis, i.e. the discovery
of the "unity of opposites".
Disregard for this distinction within the moment of
preservation can have serious consequences for the understanding of
Hegel. The distinction made earlier between correct and complete
forms of knowledge rests on the distinction between positive and
negative presence in the moment of "preservation". On the negative
side, the claim advanced on behalf of each shape as complete knowledge
is preserved as a memory of error. On the positive side, however,
the correctness of each shape within a limited sphere is preserved
and the concept of absolute knowledge as the absolute knowledge of
the structure and genesis of a differentiated system of knowledge is
made coherent.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit consciousness seeks to
discover the truth of the object as well as the form of true knowledge.
There is therefore, a double movement. The distinction between
"correct" and "complete" knowledge illuminates both the dynamic of
this movement and the nature of absolute knowledge. It is of
paramount importance that we understand that Hegel intended his discu¬
ssion of dialectic to be a description of the real movement of the
content and not of a method applied externally to this content. In
the Phenomenology "we are dealing with forms of consciousness each of
which in realizing itself at the same time resolves itself, has for its
result its own negation - and so passes into a higher form (Log. p.54).
This movement of consciousness is the object of the Phenomenology.
The movement may be described as the development, by consciousness,
of a complete form of knowledge in and through the succession of
incomplete forms. Complete knowledge, for Hegel, must be absolute and
infinite. It is infinite in contrast to all the finite forms which
preceeded it. To be finite is to be bounded by an other which is
external and imposes a limit. "The finite therefore subsists in
reference to its other, which is the negation and presents itself as
its 1imit"(Enc. No. 28). Every sublated shape of consciousness is
sublated precisely because it is finite and, therefore, incomplete.
There always exists an "other" which it cannot account for philosophically.
Infinity, for Hegel, has a very precise meaning. It must be
distinguished from that false notion which views infinity as some
"beyond" which exists at the end of a series. To be finite is to be
limited by an external other; to be infinite is to be related to an
other which is not external and thus does not impose an external
limit. The only object, Hegel argues, which is not external to
thought is thought itself. "Thought, as thought, therefore in its
unmixed nature involves no limits; it is finite only when it keeps
to limited categories, which it believes to be ultimate. Infinite
or speculative thought, on the contrary, while it no less defines,
does in the very act of limiting and defining make that defect vanish"
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(Enc. No. 28).
Absolute knowledge is infinite in this sense. It has as
its object the entire structure of knowledge. In grasping the
dialectic of experience it knows its own becoming, and it knows
this as a real movement. It is real because knowledge itself seeks
to overcome its own finitude. Therefore, it is forced out of
every incomplete shape because of its own real necessity. "When we
look more closely, we find that the limitations of the finite do
not merely come from without; that its own nature is the cause of
its abrogation, and that by its own act it passes into its counter¬
part" (Enc. No. 81, Remark). In the same section Hegel writes;
"We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and
ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly
what we mean by that dialectic of the finite, by which the finite,
as imp!icity other than what it is, is forced beyond its own
immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite."
We recall that natural consciousness distinguishes between the
being-in-itself (truth) and the being-for-another (knowledge) of
the object, and that true knowledge consists in the establishment
of their correspondence. But the very term "being-for-another"
indicates the finitude of these objects, and of the modes of knowl¬
edge which seek the truth in an "other" which is external.
This distinction between the "in-itself" and the "for-
another" may also be viewed as the distinction between essence and
existence, or phenomenal appearance, and is appropriate to knowledge
itself. Thus knowledge is held to have an essence, a truth, a being-
in-itself which, if discovered, will reveal the nature of true
knowledge. On the other side, knowledge is also seen to have an
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existence, a being in the world in the form of its various
phenomenal shapes. The truth of knowledge is revealed when its
essence is identical to its existence, i.e. when a phenomenal shape
of knowledge emerges which is identical to the essence of knowledge.
But this is precisely what Hegel claims for absolute knowledge.
Absolute knowledge is that shape of consciousness which has as its
object the truth of knowledge, i.e. it marks the identity of the
essence and existence of knowledge. Unlike incomplete shapes of
consciousness absolute knowledge is not directed towards something
external. The "other" of absolute knowledge is knowledge itself
and, therefore, the "being-for-another" of this object (knowledge)
is actually a "being-for-itself". Absolute knowledge may thus be
described as the "being-in-and-for-itself" of knowledge, i.e. the
identity between the essence and existence of knowledge. The
essence of knowledge is infinite self-knowledge. This essence is
given existence via the entire phenomenological development of
consciousness which culminates in absolute knowledge. This develop¬
ment is now seen to be a self-development, by consciousness itself.
Knowledge reveals itself discursively and this discursive revelation
is its own activity, its own "coming-to-be". Hegel concludes his
introduction to the Phenomenology with the following paragraph:
"The experience which consciousness makes of itself
can, according to the Concept of experience,
comprehend in itself nothing less than the whole
system of consciousness or the whole realm of the
truth of Spirit. The Concept of experience thus
entails that the moments of truth present themselves,
not as abstract, pure moments, but in the peculiar
determinateness of being as they are for consciousness,
or as this consciousness itself appears in its relation-
shiptothem. Presenting themselves in this way, the
moments of the whole are shapes of consciousness.
And in driving itself towards its true existence,
consciousness will reach a point at which it casts
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off the semblance of being burdened by something
alien to it, something which is only for it and
which exists as an other. In other words at
that point where its appearance becomes equal to
its essence, consciousness' presentation of
itself will therefore converge with this very same
point in the authentic science of Spirit. And,
finally, when consciousness itself grasps this
its essence, it will indicate the nature of
absolute knowledge itself." (PhG. p. 74-75; H.C.E.
P. 26)
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I
1. Charles Taylor, "The Opening Argument of the Phenomenology",
Hegel: a collection of critical essays, ed.Alasdair Mclntyre,
(Garden City, 1972), p. 156.
2. It should be pointed out that Taylor employs this argument for
slightly different purposes than I. I wish to limit it to a
discussion of how it is possible to embark on a phenomenological
description, i.e. to avoid the pitfalls posed by the adoption of
arbitrary presuppositions.
3. H.C.E., p. 55-56. Hegel's use of the concept "shape" (Gestalt)
of knowledge (or consciousness) is perplexing. The Phenomenology
is the only work where he uses the term extensively. We should
remember, however, that by "knowledge" he is referring to the
mode of activity of a conscious subject who knows". Those modes
of activity represent, as we shall see, different types of
experience. The use of the concept of "shapes" of experience is
less perplexing than shapes of knowledge. Indeed, Hegel anticipates
certain themes in modern psychology.
4. For an excellent idealist critique of the correspondence theory
of truth, see H.H. Joachim, The Nature of Truth, (London, 1939),
pp. 7-30.
5. Kenley Royce Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method", New Studies
in Hegel's Philosophy, ed. W. E. Steinkraus (New York, 1971), p.37.
6. C.f.ibid., p. 38.
7. PhG. p. 72. H.C.E., p. 21. This "consciousness of self" must not
be confused with "self-consciousness" as the second determinate
phase of the Phenomenology of Spirit. C.f. Dove, op.cit., p.39, n.10.
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8. cf. Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, (Cambridge, 1966),
pp. 9-11.
9. It should be noted that various claims have been advanced on
behalf of shapes of knowledge which are 'immediate', i.e. in which
a specific mode of representation which mediates the relation of
subject and object is absent. The two most common examples are
'sense-certainty' (Sinnliche Gewissheit) and 'intuition' (Anschauung).
The former is commonly described as 'pre-thought' while the latter
is regarded as 'beyond-thought'. Hegel's arguments dismissing the
claims of sense-certainty are found in the first chapter of the
Phenomenology while his arguments against intuition are most
evident in his various polemics against Schelling. Oakeshott also
argues forcefully against the immediacy of both shapes, cf. Oakshott,
op.cit.pp.11-26.
10. For a helpful survey of the prevailing opinions on this issue see
Dove, op.cit. pp.44-56. In general I agree with the view advanced
by Dove.
11. For a discussion of this point and its relation to formal logic see
Stanley Rosen, G.W.F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of
Wisdom, (New Haven, 1974), pp.36-43.
12. The coherence of Hegel's absolute knowledge must be distinguished
from the coherency theory of truth as advanced by modern idealists
such as Joachim, op.cit. and Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought,
(London, 1939). See especially B1anshard'sstatement of the theory
in Vol. 2, chapters 15-17. In arguing for coherency as the nature
of truth the theory fails to distinguish between the various kinds
of knowledge. The position thus reduces to a form of subjective
idealism which fails to distinguish between different kinds of
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object. The coherency of absolute knowledge, on the other hand,
is the coherency of the differentiated structure of knowledge.
13. There are several studies which attempt to clear up the many
confusions surrounding this topic. The following are among the
ones I have found most useful: Kenley Royce Dove, op.cit.;
Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, (New York,
1969), pp. 169-261; Eric Weil, "The Hegelian Dialectic",
Marquette Hegel Symposium, (The Hague, 1973), N. Hartmann, "Hegel
et le Probleme de la Dialectique du Reel", Revue de la Metaphysique
et de Morale, Vol. 38, (Paris, 1931).
14. Although it is beyond the scope of this study I would argue that
this descriptive method is most true of the Phenomenology and the
Philosophy of Right. In the Science of Logic and the Encyclopaedia
it is not possible to point to a 'consciousness' whose experience
is dialectical and proceeds unaided by external manipulations of
the philosopher. On this point see Hartmann, op.cit.
15. This discussion is suggested by an article by Michael Kosok, "The
Formalisation of Hegel's Dialectical Logic", Hegel: A Col lection
of Critical Essays, ed. Alasdair Maclntyre, (Garden City, 1972),
esp. pp.254-255. I disagree, however, with Kosok's transformation
of positive contraries into negative sub-contraries. The former
are universal statements which differ in quality, while the latter
are particular statements which differ in quality. There is no
simple logical operation such as negation which transforms
universals into particulars. The transformation must result from
experience, i.e. through the temporal discovery of what is true
and what is false in each statement.




THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY
Hegel's mature political thought is contained in the
Philosophy of Right, published in 1821. The Philosophy of Right
expands and elucidates the concepts outlined in that part of the
Philosophy of Mind which Hegel terms "Objective Mind". Within the
Philosophy of Mind Objective Mind is preceded by a section titled
"Subjective Mind" and succeeded by a section titled "Absolute Mind".
The Philosophy of Mind is the third section of Hegel's Enc.yclopaedia
of the Philosophical Sciences, of which the first two parts are the
Logic and the Philosophy of Nature. The Encyclopaedia was intended
as a complete account of the entire system of philosophy. Three
different editions were published in Hegel's lifetime, in 1817, 1827
and 1830. The second edition was almost twice as large as the first
while the third was only slightly larger than the second."* In each
of the later editions Hegel attempted to expand the scope and content
of his system without sacrificing the coherency of the principle upon
which the entire edifice of philosophical knowledge was constructed.^
The concept of an encyclopaedic system of philosophy is exceedingly
difficult. We can clarify the concept, however, through a considera¬
tion of some of the main points established by Hegel in the Phenomenology
of Spirit.
The Phenomenology assumes from the outset the opposition of
"subject" and "object". It examines the different modes of
representation of an object to a subject as they appear within a
systematic development towards "Absolute Knowledge". Throughout there
is a double movement; the explicit struggle to establish a correspondence
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between knowledge and the concept of the object in-itself and the
implicit struggle to establish a complete and coherent view of a knowl¬
edge which knows itself. The two movements are brought together in
absolute knowledge, wherein the original subject-object bifurcation is
overcome and is replaced by true knowledge of the whole. The
distinction between subject and object is comprehended within the
totality of absolute knowledge. This point is described by Alexandre
Kojeve as follows:
"Philosophy is not only a truth or a true
description; it is rather, or should be, a
description of the True. Now if Truth (Wahrheit)
is the correct and complete "revelation"
(- description) of Being and of the Real through
coherent Discourse (Logos), the True (das Wahre)
is Being-revealed-through-discourse-in-its-reality.
It is not enough therefore for the philosopher to
describe Being; he must also describe revealed-Being
[\ 'etre-revele7 and /must7 give an account of the
fact of the revelation of Being through Discourse.
The philosopher must describe the totality of what
is and exists. Now in fact this totality implies
Discourse and in particular philosophical discourse.
The philosopher therefore is concerned not only
with static-/and7 given-Being (Sein) or with
Substance, which is the Object of Discourse, but
with the Subject of Discourse and of philosophy.
It is not enough for him to speak of Being that is given
to him; he must also speak of himself and /must7 explain
himself to himself insofar as /Tie i£7 speaking of Being
and of himself."3
The Phenomenology is the record of the development to absolute
knowledge, to a knowledge of the True (Wahre) "not Zpnl^Z as Substance
but just as much as subject" (PhG. p.19; PhM. p. 80). This knowledge
must be shown to appear as the completion of the quest for true
knowledge. The Phenomenology is the systematic reconstruction of the
experience of incomplete forms of knowledge. The truth of absolute
knowledge can only be established in this way; any other method would
appear arbitrary, i.e. incapable of a complete self-account (Log. p.48-
49). The phenomenological coming-to-be of absolute knowledge is thus
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a necessary introduction to the complete science of philosophical
knowledge. It establishes the infinity and freedom of absolute knowl¬
edge. It demonstrates that philosophical knowledge consists of
nothing less than a true knowledge of the whole, an "adaequatio
intellectus et res, developed into a universal whole, each part of
which consists of a ratio of ratios, analysable downward in its
rational necessity to the least meaningful 1inking-together of the
basic parts of speech".^
The "universal whole" is the system of philosophical sciences,
and it is articulated by Hegel in the form of an Encylopaedia of the
Philosophical Sciences. The Encylopaedia begins with "Free Mind",
with Mind which has overcome all the oppositions which marked the
progress of the Phenomenology. "Thus pure science presupposes liberation
from the opposition of consciousness. It contains thought in so far as
this is just as much the object in its own self, or the object in its
own self in so far as it is equally pure thought" (Log. P. 49). That
is, the absolute separation of subject (thought) and object, which was
presupposed in the Phenomenology, has, as described in that work, been
overcome, and the Encyclopaedia assumes this from the outset. Therefore,
in the Encylopaedia, the discussion of any object is necessarily a
discussion of the thought of that object, and discussion of any categories
of thought is necessarily a discussion of the categories as objective.
The first part of the Encyclopaedia is the Logic. Logic is
the study of the development of the Idea, or development of the
completed system of philosophical thought in and for itself (Enc. No. 18).
The logic of Hegel is to be distinguished from the traditional logic
which stems from Aristotle. Traditional logic is concerned with the
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form, or laws, of thought divorced from specific content. It analyses
the formal processes of thought and distinguishes the formal elements
which then serve as the logical principles upon which a critical
examination of knowledge may be based. This procedure abstracts from the
material content of our judgements and concepts and concerns itself only
with their formal relations. Hegel explicitly rejects this separation
of form and content and yet maintains that the object of his Logic is
thought. If both Hegelian logic and traditional logic maintain that the
object of their investigations is "thought", then in what sense can
Hegel claim that his logic overcomes the separation of form and content
which, in Hegel's view, limits the traditional study?
The decisive difference is contained in the superficially
simple statement by Hegel that "Truth is the object of Logic" (Enc.
No. 19, Remark). The Phenomenoloq,y described the emergence of Truth
(in the sense used by Kojeve in the passage quoted above) out of the
systematic representation of the different modes of consciousness
culminating in absolute knowledge. The Logic presents Truth (here
given the logical term of "Idea") as a result of the development of the
categories of pure thought. The "purity" of pure thought, however, must
not be understood as an abstraction from all content, i.e. as forms or
laws of thought as conceived by traditional logic. The Logic assumes
the results of the Phenomenology expressed as the coherent unity of
thought and being.^ The categories of thought are, therefore, the
categories necessary for the revelation of different modes of being. In
turn, each mode of being is equally a mode of the thought of being. Each
stage in the Logic is a moment in the complete revelation of the Idea
expressed in terms of the unity of thought and being. The development
of the Idea is, therefore, distinguished from discursive revelation of
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particular aspects of the totality of Absolute Knowledge such as nature,
ethics, art or religion which arise later in the Encyclopaedia. Each
category of the Logic, as a determinate thought of being, is a moment in
the development of the absolute Idea, which is the complete and coherent
discursive revelation of the unity of thought and being. Each category
of logic, no matter how incomplete when viewed from the final perspective
of the Idea, is an intimation of the Idea since it presupposes the unity
of thought and being, albeit at a partial, or incomplete, level. The
emergence of the absolute Idea of the Logic requires nothing which lies
outside thought, since thought is immediately thought of being. The
development towards the absolute is thus an immanent one. "No subject
matter is so absolutely capable of being expounded with a strictly
immanent plasticity as is thought in its own necessary development" (Log,
p. 40).
The Logic affirms the capacity of thought to have itself as
its own object. "We must designate as the distinctive determinateness
of the Concept of mind, ideality, that is, the reduction of the Idea's
otherness to a moment, the process of returning—and the accomplished
return—into itself of the Idea from its Other... (Enc. No. 381, Remark).
But this "ideality" is still expressed only in the form of the Idea
and not yet as an Absolute with determinate content. "For the cognition
already contained in the simple logical Idea is only the concept of
cognition thought by us, not cognition existing on its own account, not
actual mind but merely its possibility" (ibid). The ideality of mind
must be shown to exist. That is, it must not remain at the level of
conceptual possibility but rather must be seen to emerge out of the
philosophical investigation of the objective realities of the natural
and human world. The Logic begins with the thought of abstract Being.
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It concludes with the complete and coherent revelation of Being through
discourse, albeit in the limited form of conceptual possibility.
Hegel's logical treatises may correctly be regarded as ontology.
Even if we regard his efforts as entirely successful we must recognize
that, in his own terms, he is still a long way from describing an "actual
knowledge of what truly is". The Logic may provide a complete account
of Being revealed discursively in thought but the "Being" of the Logic
has no determinate content. The Idea of the Logic may describe the
ontological structure of absolute knowledge, but it is not a complete
account of absolute knowledge. If Hegel is to provide real content for
the concept of absolute knowledge he must move beyond the Logic; if
absolute knowledge is to be "actual knowledge of what truly is" Hegel
must turn to the natural and human world for the objective content of
absolute knowledge. The Idea must move beyond ontological possibility
to become actual; that is, the Idea must become actual by revealing
itself as the ontological structure of the objective world of nature
and man. Hegel must now describe the actualization of the Idea in the
natural and human world. At the end of the Logic he states; "We began
with Being, abstract Being: where we now are we also have the Idea as
Being: but this Idea which has Being is Nature" (Enc. No. 244, Remark).
We have now moved beyond the Logic to the natural world.
The Philosophy of Nature traces the progress of the Idea as
it is actualized within the spatio-temporal world of physical nature.
Nature appears as the sphere of "self-externality". The objects of
nature appear to be external both to the human mind and to each other.
The empirical scientist seeks to impose order on this chaos. He
observes nature and formulates laws which account for the behaviour
of natural objects. He attempts to eliminate contingency by discover-
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ing within nature universally necessary and valid laws and forces. The
empirical scientist does not treat those universals as merely subjective
additions or external forms which organize an essentially unknowable
nature; for the scientist "objective reality is attributed to laws,
forces are immanent, and matter is the true nature of the thing itself"
(Enc. No. 246, Remark).
This "realism" of empirical science is, in Hegel's view, an
impressive achievement. The practical logic of this activity is the
logic of the understanding, where self-identity reigns as the fundamental
category (ibid). Within the strictly limited sphere of the rational
observation of nature the logic of the understanding provides a correct
foundation for the methodology of empirical science. It is insufficient,
however, for the true philosophical comprehension of nature. "What disting¬
uishes the philosophy of nature from physics is, more precisely, the kind
of metaphysics used by them both..." (ibid). As we have already seen,
in Hegel's view the mistake of philosophers who privide a philosophical
base for empirical science lies in their attempt to inflate their
philosophical positions into a philosophy of complete and coherent
know!edge.
For Hegel, a primary goal of philosophy is the description of
the development of knowledge to absolute knowledge. The philosophy of
nature must attempt to discover within the objective reality of nature
and natural science the immanent development of the absolute. It must
be emphasized that Hegel does not attempt to replace empirical science
with philosophy or to determine its results through a priori philosophical
speculation. The philosophy of nature "presupposes and is conditioned
by empirical physics (Enc. No. 246, Remark). It cannot ignore the
successful results of natural science. Nature itself is regarded by
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Hegel as a system of stages (Enc. No. 249) and each stage is investigated
by the appropriate branch of the empirical sciences. It is the task
of the philosophy of nature to penetrate through those stages and to
discover their significance for the development of the absolute. But
the development of the absolute is not abstract and formal (as, accord¬
ing to Hegel, was Schelling's philosophy of nature) but rather is
immanent within nature and empirical science. The empirical sciences
provide Hegel with the material upon which he constructs a philosophy of
nature. The philosophy of nature must discover within empirical
scientific knowledge a stable logical structure which demonstrates the
development of the absolute while remaining ever mindful of the variable
empirical content of science.
We must, however, guard against transforming Hegel's philos¬
ophy of nature into a philosophy of natural science. We can clarify
Hegel's concept of a philosophy of nature by briefly contrasting nature
with consciousness. Consciousness presupposes the relation of a subject
to an object. The development of consciousness is marked by the
struggle of the subject to overcome the "otherness" of the object, to
recognize the object as its own, and itself in the object. Subject and
object develop towards that level of philosophical thought where each
is seen in its truth as self-and-other-mediating. For nature, however,
this "self-development" is impossible. It is impossible precisely
because the subject-object dichotomy does not exist within nature.
Nature is self-external; any distinction between subject and object is
only implicit in nature. There is no subjectivity within nature and
so any distinction between subject and object can never be for nature
(i.e. nature cannot be self-conscious) but must always be for us, (the
philosopher of nature).
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The self-externality of nature does not place it outside the
realm of philosophical interest and speculation. As Mure writes:
"...to the philosopher the absence of a subject-object relation, the
self-externality of nature, is a determinate absence, a significant
privation.... Nature is, then, for philosophy not the simply non-
spiritual, but the pre-spiritual from which spirit must emerge. There
is in nature nothing positive which it does not possess by virtue of
its approximation to spirit." The natural scientist, on the other
hand, treats nature as a real and independant object of study. This
assumption of real independence amounts to the claim that nature is
non-spiritual rather than pre-spiritual.
The natural scientist investigates non-spiritual nature with
the intention of discovering therein an order which systematically
organizes the chaos of natural phenomena. The philosopher of nature
accepts the scientist's results and then seeks to reinterpret them. The
reinterpretation does not attempt to replace the results of natural
science but rather to discover within them the significance of nature
for the emergence of spirit.^ The philosopher utilizes the results of
natural science in an effort to transform the non-spiritual concept of
nature into a pre-spiritual one. The philosophy of nature must restrict
itself to the examination of nature as it is. Although nature continually
reappears in the development of spirit proper, as an object for a
subject (e.g. as a contrast to the moral will it does so as a spiritual
object, while in the philosophy of nature it appears as pre-spiritual.
For Hegel, pre-spiritual nature is ordered hierarchically according to
the degree to which it sheds its bare self-externality and approaches
spirit. Hence pre-spiritual nature ascends from the pure self-
externality of space and time (the lowest levels of mechanics) through
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physics to organics, culminating in animal life (Enc. No. 381, Remark).
The transition from the Philosophy of Nature to the
Philosophy of Mind is thus the transition from the pre-spiritual realm
to the realm of spirituality proper. The development towards spirit in
the philosophy of nature is a development for us. Nature itself "suffers
quite passively the idealization which thus falls to its lot" (ibid).
For mind, however, the relation of subject and object is not one of
passive externality:
"In this case, there no longer stands on the one
side, an activity external to the object, and
on the other side, a merely passive object: but
the spiritual activity is directed to an object
which is active in itself, an object which has
spontaneously worked itself up into the result to
be brought about by that activity, so that in the
activity and in the object, one and the same
content is present" (ibid).
This is a restatement of the result of the phenomenological description
of the dialectic of subject and object in the Phenomenology. Its
appearance at this point in the Encyclopaedia serves to underline the
fundamental distinction between Nature and Mind, or between the natural
and human worlds. The development of nature towards the spiritual world
is necessarily for another (the philosopher). The development of mind,
within mind or in itself, comes to be seen as a self-development, or
for itself. Man creates himself and the Philosophy of Mind traces this
process of self-creation. Similar to the Phenomenology, each stage is
simultaneously a development of the ideational powers of mind and a
step closer to the absolute comprehension of this development as a self-
development. We can see this reflected in the structure of the work.
The Philosophy of Mind is divided into three sections--subjective
mind, objective mind and absolute mind--which are arranged, respectively,
from the lowest to the highest stage of human development. Although
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there are a variety of ways in which we may characterize this develop¬
ment,® for our purposes it is most convenient to see it as the develop¬
ment towards freedom through an ascending series of relatively more
complete (i.e. freer) stages. The development as a whole is a
dialectical one in which each stage emerges out of the preceding one,
has it for its proximate matter, and is its fulfilment. This is the
case not only within the Philosophy of Mind but also in the transition
from the Philosophy of Nature to the Philosophy of Mind (i.e. nature is
pre-spiritual and mind is spiritual). This can be clarified through a
brief description of the structure of the Philosophy of Mind.
The first division of the work is subjective mind and it
begins with the section titled "Anthropology". The Anthropology traces
the development of the soul. The soul, although the first appearance
of spirit, is still immersed in nature. The soul does not distinguish
itself from the external world (nature) and so there can be no clear
notion of either subjectivity or objectivity. The anthropology of the
soul is prior to the distinction between subject and object. The soul
passively receives natural influences and absorbs them as required.
These natural inputs include its own natural physical attributes as
well as those influences such as climate to which the soul must adapt if
it is to achieve environmental stability. This capacity of the soul
to absorb and transform natural influences is still immediate. There
is, as yet, no sense of self, no awareness of subjectivity in opposition
to objectivity, no consciousness of the transformative powers of mind.
Gradually, however, through the stages of "feeling", the soul begins
to establish permanence through change, distinctions out of chaotic
flux. The ability to relate itself to its own natural embodiment, its
own corporeity, leads to the recognition that this is a self-relation.
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The soul thus establishes its own identity through difference, an
identity which overcomes the bifurcation of its own internal and
external sides (Enc. No. 411). It has become a self or, what is the
same thing at this stage, it has discovered its own subjectivity in
opposition to an objective world. The dialectic of mind's develop¬
ment has achieved the level of consciousness.
The next section of "Subjective Mind", titled the
'Phenomenology of Mind', takes up the development of mind from the
first, primitive division of the world into subjective and objective
spheres to the stage of development called 'Reason'. The section
reproduces, in highly condensed form, the general movement of the
opening three sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit, viz. Con¬
sciousness, Self-Consciousness and Reason. Mind develops out of the
primitive subject-object distinction of consciousness to the
universality of self-consciousness. This latter corresponds to the
Kantian transcendental unity of apperception, to the knowledge of the
self which is present in all judgements. In 'Reason' mind attempts
to establish the principle that reason permeates and comprehends the
world or, what is the same thing, that reason is not a subjective
concept alone but rather is the principle which comprehends both
objectivity and subjectivity and establishes their unity within human
knowledge. That "unity", however, remains only at the level of
"principle" and is not yet actual.
The third section of subjective mind is titled 'Psychology'
and it is itself subdivided into Theoretical Mind, Practical Mind and
Free Mind. Psychology has Reason for its proximate matter and the
dialectic of the section depicts the struggle to overcome the
bifurcation of subject and object. Theoretical Mind seeks to overcome
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the "giveness" of the objective world, to take up the objective world
into its own life and, ultimately, see it as the objectification of
its own implicit rationality. The development passes through three
stages. The first Hegel calls 'Intuition' and it refers to the
immediate relation between a subject and a particular material object.
The second stage, 'mental representation' refers to the withdrawal by
the subject from the immediacy (givenness) of this relation; it achieves
this "withdrawal" by relating the particular material object of intuition
to the universal of which it is a particular. This section includes
an interesting discussion of language.® In the third section, 'Thought',
Hegel presents the development of mind as "intelligence that comprehends
the concrete universal nature of objects, or thought in the specific
sense that what we think also is, also has objectivity" (Enc.No. 445,
Remark). From the theoretical standpoint, Mind has discovered that
human reason is the substantive principle of both subject and object
and constitutes their unity.
Theoretical Mind culminates, therefore, in the recognition
by mind of its capacity to freely determine its own content in
accordance with the principles of reason. But this capcity remains
theoretical only. The goal of the theoretical standpoint can only be
achieved through practical activity, through the practical trans¬
formation of the world into a rational world. Accordingly, in Practical
Mind, Hegel presents the development of the practical capacities of
Mind. Analogous to the development of Theoretical Mind, Practical
Mind advances from satisfying particular feelings, through the stage
of impulses and the exercise of choice, to the universal demand for
a full, self-sufficient happiness. In short, the development is from
particularity to universality or from particular acts necessary for
the satisfaction of needs determined by contingency to activity which
actualizes universal human reason. The theoretical and practical
aspects of mind may be distinguished conceptually, as is the case here,
but they cannot be separated absolutely. They are parts of one contin¬
uous process.^ Their unity constitutes the stage of development
which Hegel terms 'Free Mind1.
Free Mind completes the development of Subjective Mind which
began with the discussion of the soul. At this stage, however, freedom
is still an abstract idea. Mind has freedom for its object only as an
ideal, as an object of cognition. It must now create the world which
satisfies the demands of reason. Practical Mind demonstrates that
practical activity is directed towards the actualization of reason
through the transformation of the world. We must now turn to this
actual process of transformation. The dialectic therefore moves beyond
the realm of Subjective Mind, of cognition, and into the realm of
Objective Mind, of legal, moral and political reality. The concept of
freedom must be made actual. It is the dialectic of Objective Mind
which Hegel describes must fully in the Philosophy of Right and which
I will discuss in detail in succeeding chapters.
Objective Mind, however, is only the penultimate stage of
human freedom. Political freedom is "posited" in the world, and,
subject to contingency and finitude, can never be absolute. True freedom
is reserved for Absolute Mind. The "eternal truth" of Spirit can only
be freely grasped in its absoluteness in the three stages of Absolute
Mind, viz., Art, Revealed Religion and Philosophy. This "eternal truth"
is known immediately, or sensuously, in Art, representationally in the
form of Christian religion and as pure thought thinking itself in
Philosophy. The Enc.yclopaedia is very sketchy on the details of these
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"absolute" modes of knowledge and so it is necessary to look to
Hegel's lectures on these subjects in order to gain a fuller under¬
standing of his views. For my purposes, such detail is unnecessary.
I will however, return to the question of the "infinity" of the
absolute and its relation to the "finitude" of politics in a later
section.
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It is well known that Hegel's introductions to his works
are both philosophically interesting and important in their own
right as well as indispensable for the comprehension of the works
themselves. This is true of the Philosophy of Right and yet there
is surprisingly little discussion of the introduction in commentaries
devoted to the bookJ Several possible reasons for this omission
should be considered. First, the Philosophy of Right is correctly
regarded as containing Hegel's most extensive statement of his
mature political philosophy. This predisposes most commentators to
rush through to the most explicitly "political" section of the book,
namely the section on Ethical Life and, more particularly, the sub¬
section on the state. The assumption underlying this approach is
that Hegel's "political theory" is detachable from his "metaphysics".^
Serious consideration of the Introduction then becomes irrelevant to
the task at hand.
This attitude is reinforced by the actual subject matter
of the introduction. For the most part, Hegel confines himself to a
long and difficult discussion of human will. The concept of right is
discussed only briefly and there is almost no mention at all of
concepts which would normally be regarded as "political". The
standard view is that the "digression" on will may be "metaphysically"
significant, but it has little or no import for the political
doctrine strictly considered. The whole issue is complicated further
by the seemingly haphazard arrangement of the introduction, where the
basic structure of the section is very difficult to discern.
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In my view the "metaphysics" and the "political" concepts are
are bound up with each other and, therefore, to explicate one "set" of
concepts is to make significant progress towards elucidating the other.
The intricate connections between political concepts such as right and
freedom and the metaphysical ones of will and mind are crystallized in
paragraph 4 of the introduction where Hegel states:
"The basis of right is, in general, mind; its
precise place and point of origin is the will.
The will is free, so that freedom is both the
substance of right and its goal, while the
system of right is the realm of freedom made
actual, the world of mind brought forth out of
itself like a second nature." (PR. No. 4).
The rest of the introduction may be regarded as an expansion and
elucidation of the principles contained in that one paragraph. It is
my view that the paragraph compresses the general thrust and direction
which will determine the structure of development of the entire
Philosophy of Right. This cannot be maintained by assertion alone, how¬
ever, and so we must turn our attention to an examination of Hegel's
actual arguments which I believe support this view. In the course of
this examination I hope to establish the reasons why Hegel begins the
Philosophy of Right with a discussion of will and to indicate
provisionally^ the necessity of an understanding of this section to
the comprehension of the work as a whole. The more general problem
of the relation between metaphysics and politics in Hegel will be
addressed only indirectly at this stage through the analysis of the
particular problem of will.^
In the Encyclopaedia will is discussed under the general
title of "Practical Mind". Practical mind is that phase of mind's
development which makes its appearance after the exhaustion of the
possibilities inherent in thinking, the highest stage of "Theoretical
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Mind". This transition may be described in general terms as the
transition from theory to practice. In order to grasp the necessity
of the progression we must indicate the specific limits of theoret¬
ical mind; those limits, however, can only be understood within the
context of the development of theoretical mind.^
Theoretical mind is concerned with the development of
human cognitive power. Since cognition is only one aspect of
totality (excluding e.g. the conative aspect) it is necessarily
abstract (i.e. incomplete). Therefore, each specific moment in its
development is also abstract and is to be viewed as forms or modes of
limited or incomplete human experience. As we have already seen in
our discussion of the Phenomenology, it is precisely this abstractness,
this partiality, which necessitates the dialectical advance through
ever more complete forms of experience. For reasons of economy I
shall not concentrate on the details of this development but, rather,
indicate only its general structure.^
Theoretical mind begins with intuition, the most immediate
("undeveloped") form of cognition. In intuition an object is
represented to a subject immediately (i.e. without the mediation of
organizing concepts of thought). In Theoretical Mind Hegel is concerned
to demonstrate the development of cognitive reason; therefore, in
intuition, we must discern the first appearance of rationality. This
Hegel attempts to do by demonstrating that in intuition the subject
intuits particular objects as substantial and unique.^ The intuition
of the substantiality of the subject is, in Hegel's view, implicitly
rational but incomplete. It is incomplete because intuition "does not
attain to the immanent development of the substance of the subject-
matter but confines itself rather to seizing the unexplicated substance
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still wrapped up in the inessentials of the external and contingent"
(Enc. No. 449, Remark). The goal of rational cognition is to
comprehend the object as an "articulated, systematic totality" (ibid).
Intuition is abstract and incomplete because it is seen to
depend upon the immediate grasp of an object presented to a subject
under the contingent conditions of space and time. That is, the
object appears at a specific moment in time and at a specific place.
If the object does not present itself then there can be no cognitive
act. For cognition to advance the subject must be capable of freeing
itself from this immediacy, from this dependance upon the appearance
of an object within particular space-time coordinates. The
particularity of intuition renders impossible any coherent mental
processes over time since "all that happens possesses duration for
us only when it is taken up by ideating intelligence" (Enc. No. 452,
Remark). Unless this occurs mind is confined to lurching from one
particular object intuited "here and now" to another, with no
possibility of establishing "non-contingent" patterns of thought. The
development beyond the immediacy of intuition is accomplished by those
modes of experience which Hegel groups together under the general
title of "Representation".
There are three distinct stages of development within
Representation - Recollection, Imagination, and Memory. In
'Recollection' mind begins to "internalize" the content of Intuition.
The intuition is held by mind in the form of an image. The capacity
to create images lifts mind out of the contingent particularity of
space-time coordinates, for the image persists through time and
space and is held, therefore, within the spatio-temporal concepts
developed by mind itself. In 'Imagination' mind learns to operate
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with images. The lowest form of imagination, 'Reproductive
Imagination1, denotes the stage where mind is able to recall into
existence already-formed images. In 'Associative Imagination'
mind forms connections between images and forms new general images
which represent the newly-discovered connections. The development
is clearly away from the immediate sensuality of Intuition in the
direction of increasingly mental (or, in Hegel's terminology,
ideational) cognition. In 'Creative Imagination' mind continues
this development by learning to use symbols and signs. A symbol
involves the use of one image to represent another directly as in
the example presented by Hegel where the eagle is used to represent
the strength of Jupiter (Enc. No. 457, Remark). Signs have been
stripped of almost all immediate sensuality for they are the
arbitrary symbols out of which language is constructed. Hegel is
clear about the specific way in which he is discussing language and
acknowledges that a complete theory of language would require much
wider treatment and would include many elements absent from the
present section (Enc. No. 459).
The importance of language for the development under
examination is that it liberates mind from its excessive dependance
on sensual images. In 'Memory' the ability to retain linguistic
signs as names of things, as signs of the meaning of things, develops
into the ability to employ those signs without constant "external"
reference to the things, and their meanings, which they name. That
is, mind is now able to order its experience by means of non-sensual,
universal linguistic signs. Language is non-sensual in the special
sense that its use becomes so routinized that mind is able to employ
names without recourse to constant reference to sensual objects.
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The progressive development of the independance of mind
from the contingency of the objective world culminates in the last
stage of theoretical mind, 'Thinking1. Independenace must be under¬
stood in the special sense that mind is able to free itself from the
condition of being determined by contingent empirical reality. It
is free and independant in this sense in proportion to the extent to
which it can discover itself in reality and thus impose order and
necessity upon reality. Reason is the highest development of subjective
mind and Thinking, therefore, denotes that stage of mind's develop¬
ment wherein the real and the rational are identified with each other.
Hegel distinguishes three levels of Thinking—Understanding, Judgement
and Syllogism. In the section on Thinking in the Encyclopaedia Hegel
barely mentions each distinct level. For a much fuller treatment it
is necessary to look to the Science of Logic where Understanding arises
in the "Doctrine of Essence" and Judgement and Syllogism are given
extensive treatment in the section on the "Subjective Notion".
In Understanding, Mind discovers the concepts of essence
and existence, universal and particular, form and content and so forth,
and generates concepts such as species, genera, laws and forces in an
effort to explain the world in systematic, rational terms. The great
advance of Understanding is that it separates out all these important
concepts while its limitation, in Hegel's view, is that it is unable
to reintegrate them into a coherent and unified whole. In 'Judgement'
the unification process is begun, although the objective, real content
of Judgement is still only "given" to the (passive) subject who then
organizes it within necessary universal concepts. In Syllogism the
universality of thought becomes concrete as "laws of thought", and
thought, the activity of rational thinking, is seen to determine its
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content for itself out of its own rational and logical necessity.
The goal of Theoretical Mind is now attained, since Mind knows the
world as objectively rational. "Knowing now constitutes the
subjectivity of Reason, and objective Reason is posited as a
Knowing" (Enc. No. 467, Remark).
In Theoretical Mind the implicit identity of thought and
being has become explicit as universal Reason. The "being"of the
objective world, which first appears as an external "other" standing
over and against the human subject, is known by the subject as reason
embodied objectively. An identity is established between the
objective and subjective realms when Mind, in the process of coming
to know the objective world, comes to recognize the rationality of
the world as its own (Mind's) rationality. There is more than
correspondence between subject and object or Mind and world, for
the two are seen to thoroughly interpenetrate each other within the
universality of Reason. The being of the world is known by Mind as
explicitly rational, and the revelation of objective rationality is
mind's achievement.
But this "interpenetration" is limited. By discovering
the rational structure of the objective world Mind discovers its own
subjective rationality. The world known by Theoretical Mind is "given"
in the form of nature, and Mind, at this stage, adopts the observational
standpoint from which the rational identity of thought and being may
be established. The "observational" posture is limited, however,
since Mind is also active. Man acts in the world and through his
activity establishes a human world. Reason becomes objective to
Mind through the creation of a rational human world. This active
side Hegel terms "Practical Mind", and it denotes that aspect of Mind
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where Mind is not satisfied with only determining the rationality of
a given content (nature) but also seeks to create a world which
actualizes its own subjective reason.
In Theoretical Mind, the objective world (the rational
'being' of nature) is internalized as thought; in Practical Mind,
thought (subjective rationality) is translated into existence (the
human world). Expressed in this way it is to be hoped that
Theoretical Mind and Practical Mind may be seen as two distinct but
inseparable aspects of one, ultimately coherent, process. Indeed,
it is only when we recognize this "ultimate unity" that we can begin
to grasp Hegel's seemingly mysterious philosophical procedure. In
each major division within the Encyclopaedia Hegel develops the
section to its highest level before undertaking the next section.
Theoretical Mind, for example, culminates in the complex and rich
notion of Syllogism. The next section, for Practical Mind, begins
with the relatively primitive notion of Practical Sense. Hegel does
not suggest that Practical Sense is "higher" than Syllogism; rather
he is beginning a new line of development which, when complete, will
be seen to mark an advance in Mind's progress towards absolute
knowledge. For Hegel, the merit of this procedure is that the logic
of each position may be explored and developed in full before the
logic of another is investigated. Thus the logic of the theoretical
standpoint, of the rational internalization of the "otherness" of
the objective world (nature), can be developed all the way up to
Syllogism before exploring the logic of practice (Practical Mind)
which begins, in its lowest form, as Practical Sense. Syllogism,
for example, is seen as the "final result of the development of
Theoretical Mind through the stages, antecedent to pure thinking,
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of Intuition and Mental Representation" (Enc. No. 467, Remark). The
emphasic on the logic of the theoretical standpoint as such allows
Hegel to develop each stage out of the antecedent one and thus avoid,
for example, treating Intuition or Representation as "additions" to
Reason, separate although complementary. This approach does not deny
distinction but rather demonstrates that it is possible to distinguish
different modes of experience within a hierarchical integrated
totality.
In a similar manner, Theoretical and Practical Mind cannot
be separated absolutely. As we have already seen in the discussion
of Hegel's introduction to the Phenomenology the dialectic of Mind
is intended as a complete description of the dialectic of the real
development of thought and being to Absolute Knowledge. Mind is
forced beyond levels of incompleteness because it cannot be satisfied
with truth which it knows to be only partial or incomplete. But
this movement ultimately also comes to be seen in its truth as a
dialectical unfolding of the structure of Mind itself, i.e. as the
development of what is implicit (potential) in Mind to that level
where it becomes explicit as absolute, actual self-knowledge.
Theoretical Mind is partial because it is unable to provide an
account of the human world, of the self-conscious practical activity
of man. It is this latter activity (mode of experience) which Hegel
takes up in his discussion of Practical Mind.
Hegel opposes Practical Mind to Theoretical Mind in the
following abstract manner. Practical Mind presupposes the emergence
of thought as a self-conscious universal capacity. In Kantian terms
this is nothing other than the self-conscious recognition of the
"transcendental unity of apperception", of the ego which is present
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in all thought. This universality, however, is abstract becuase the
ego of this transcendental unity is still only "ego" in general.
The "1 of the Theoretical standpoint refers to any ego whatsoever.
It is universal at the expense of the particular, of this particular
ego situated within a specific spatio-temporal world. The ego
becomes particularized through specific acts of self-determination,
and it is those acts which constitute the subject matter of Practical
Mind. In determining the self the ego differentiates itself from
other egos and discovers itself in its spatio-temporal specificity.
Hegel expresses this activity of self-determination in this way:
"In so far as I am practical or active, i.e.
in so far as I do something, I determine
myself, and to determine myself simply means
to posit a difference. But these differences
which I posit are still mine all the same;
the determinate volitions are mine and the
aims which I struggle to realize belong to me.
If I now let these determinations and differences
go, i.e. if I posit them in the so-called external
world, they none the less still remain mine. They
are what I have done, what I have made; they bear
the trace of my mind." (PR_. No. 4, Remark)
The particularity of practical life may initially appear
to contradict, to stand in opposition to, the universality of the
"theoretical" ego. This view, however, is only apparent and, for
Hegel, to maintain this is to avoid the difficult task of discovering
philosophically the logic of human practical activity. What is
universal in Theoretical Mind is the rational structure of mind
itself, a structure which is seen to emerge dialectically in the
efforts of men to know the natural world. In a similar way, the
logic of practical activity is to be understood as a dialectical
emergence of the implicit rationality of Mind in the struggle by
particularized egos to act in rational ways. Reason is universal
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in the sense that it is a characteristic structure of Mind as such.
In Aristotelian terms we could describe reason as potential in all
men, as an essential attribute of the concept "man". For Hegel, this
essential rationality emerges over time, becomes actual in the world
through the struggle by man to discover ever more satisfactory and
comprehensive ways of knowing and doing. Theoretically, for Hegel,
this process can only be completed in Syllogism because all antecedent
forms are defective. Practically, the process is completed in the free
will since all lower forms are unable to actualize man's rational
search for practical satisfaction. The term "satisfaction" is itself
misleading, however, since it carries a sense of contingency. In
truth it describes a drive towards rationality, since from the
perspective of philosophy, only rational acts are fully satisfactory.
Although specific modes of practical activity may be rejected for
a multitude of "reasons", ultimately they are seen to be deficient
(unsatisfactory) because they are not fully rational. This drive
towards rationality, initially only implicit, becomes explicit at
the level of self-conscious free will. This is the logic of
practical activity and, as is the case throughout Hegel's work, it
is a logic which is discovered a posteriori, in this case through
reflection by the philosopher (Hegel) upon the history of human
practical activity.®
Thus we see that Theoretical and Practical Mind cannot
be separated. Their essential unity is evidenced in their respective
drives towards rational completion. The rationality of mind is
complex and is actualized in diverse ways, i.e. both theoretically
and practically. Ultimately the unity of diverse modes of
experience is established within Absolute Mind, imperfectly in
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Art and Religion , and perfectly in the mind of the philosopher
who is absolutely wise. Even at the more mundane levels of
imperfection, however, theory and practice are seen as mediating
aspects within one totality. Will is not activity simp!iciter,
but is always purposive and self-conscious. An animal acts, for
example, but it has no will in the Hegelian sense since it "does
not bring before its mind the object of its desire" (PR_. No. 4,
Addition). Purposive human activity, for Hegel, presupposes the
theoretical and contains it within itself. "The will determines
itself and this determination is in the first place something
inward, because what I will I hold before my mind as an idea; it is
the object of my thought" (ibid). A1so,theorizing is itself a kind
of activity, both in the sense that we must will ourselves to think
theoretically and in the sense of an active interplay between the
subject and object of Theoretical Mind. "The content of something
thought has the form of being; but this being is something mediated,
something established through our activity" (ibid). Of course, the
activity of theorizing is distinguished by Hegel from practical
activity strictly considered.
Hegel's treatment of the relation between theory and
practice conceals several difficulties. Heretofore we have treated
Theoretical Mind as that aspect of Mind which is concerned with the
internalization of the being of the "external" world (nature). Now
it is clear that Hegel also intends "theory" to include, in some
sense, the "human" world as well. Although the importance of this
equivocation will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 8 a
few words should be addressed to the problem now. Clearly one form
of human practical activity is concerned with man's relationship to
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nature and the struggle to overcome natural necessity. This activity
is enhanced to the extent that we can know nature, e.g. the practical
activity of farming is seen to progress in relation to the advance¬
ment of our knowledge of the natural world. But this type of knowl¬
edge (theoretical) is not linked as directly to other forms of
practical activity such as moral reasoning, politics and so on. In
what sense then are theory and practice linked in those areas of
practical activity where there does not exist an immediate relation
between nature and practical activity?
Hegel does not provide clear guidance on this point. It
is possible, however, to advance a provisional solution to the problem.
The goal of Theoretical Mind, as we have seen, is to internalize
the objective external world which, before the appearance of
practice, is defined as the natural world. Further, the very
externality of this world is seen to rest on its "givenness", its
"eternal presence" in opposition to the subjectivity of man. But
the human world of politics, morals, economics, culture and so on
also has an aspect of "givenness". The human world has a history and
individuals are born into this world and are forced to confront this
world as a historically determined "given". Indeed, the activities
themselves of human actors constitute a personal history for each
actor which cannot simply be "willed" away. The objectivity of this
world, its reality to the human actors, must be understood to some
degree if the actors, are to invest their activity with any
significance, either subjectively for themselves or objectively for
others or both. But this understanding is seen to depend on a
theoretical understanding of the human world, of the world presented
to the actor as a given historical reality. To the extent that this
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understanding grows we may describe it as a growth in the
theoretical knowledge of the human world. Further, specific acts
have specific results which create new understandings which, in
turn, create new possibilities for acting in specific ways. Our
theoretical understanding of the human world is seen to mediate
our practice which in turn mediates our theoretical understanding.
If we thus expand our conception of theory to include knowledge of
both the natural and human worlds, understood in their givenness
and objectivity, we can establish a relation between theory and
practice. It requires a departure from or at least expansion of,
what Hegel actually says on this matter, but it does not, I think,
go against the spirit of his discussion. Practice, therefore, is
seen as a mode of mediated immediacy in which purposive human
activity (with respect to both the natural and the human world)
is mediated by our theoretical knowledge of the given, objective
realms of nature and human activity.
The ultimate unity of theory and practice within Absolute
Mind is presented by Hegel as the actualization of universal reason
in the life of man. Rationality becomes explicit within two distinct
but inseparable modes of experience, namely Theoretical and Practical
Mind. We have seen what theoretical reason involves and now we must
investigate the concept of practical reason, or reason becoming
explicit and actual within the sphere of human purposive activity.
We may begin with Hegel's own statement that "what is
rational is actual and what is actual is rational" (PR. Preface).
This statement is undoubtedly one of the most controversial in the
entire Hegelian corpus. The controversy may be seen to rest on a
misunderstanding of the meaning of actual.^ First of all, Hegel's
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concept of actuality is to be distinguished from the vague notion
of "empirical existence", or "reality". For Hegel, what is actual
is the Idea (capitalized to distinguish it from the common sense
notion of an idea as any possible object of thought). In order to
comprehend what Hegel means by Idea we must turn to his distinction
between "essence" and "Concept". In the "Doctrine of Essence" in
the Science of Logic Hegel describes a specific mode of thinking
which he terms the "Understanding". At the level of Understanding,
distinctions between essence and existence, universal and particular,
necessary and contingent, phenomena and noumena, are made for the
first time. Although the Understanding marks a great advance over
all antecedent modes of thinking, it is still incomplete. Each of
the terms within each duality is considered to be self-identical,
i.e. self-subsistent. If this is the case, however, then the
relation between opposing terms becomes highly problematic. If
the universal essence of a collection of particular existents is
self-identical, then in what way can this essence relate to its
particulars without abandoning its self subsistence? If the relation
is of such a kind that the relation is itself an integral part of
the universal essence, then the essence is not self-identical and
self-subsistent. If the relation is not itself essential to the
concept of essence then the relation must be external to the concept
and it is extremely problematic, to say the least, to demonstrate
the necessity involved in the relation between a universal essence
and its particular existents.
In the Science of Logic Hegel discusses at length the
unsatisfactoriness of the various attempted resolutions of those
problems. For our purposes we need only point to his own resolution,
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which is contained in his description of the "Concept". The basic
defect of the Understanding is that it is unable to get beyond the
formal law of identity, according to which each thing is stable
only if it is self-identical and excludes all difference. Hegel's
great logical leap was to show that self-identity which excluded
all difference was an empty formal notion. True identity, for Hegel,
is established through difference and not in opposition to it. That
is, the universal essence determines itself through its particulars.
Viewed dynamically, the abstractly self-identical universal is seen
to determine its particular existents as its own necessary content,
as a content adequate to itself as concept. True identity is thus
the developed unity of identity (abstract universal) and difference
(particular existents). The logic of identity is temporal since
identity emerges over time as the concept actualizes itself through
the determination of an adequate content (particular existents).
This ultimate unity of the concept with its own necessary content is
termed the "Idea". The Idea is, therefore, the concrete (dialectical)
unity of essence and existence, universal and particular. Rationality
is identified with the Idea since the Idea of a thing is the thing
in its complete and absolute perfection. In the case of man, we
may describe this achieved perfection, the Idea of man, as complete
human freedom. More specifically, the rational will describes that
level of human activity in which man acts freely, that is, becomes a
free man through rational practical activity.
Hegel distinguishes between "realit/ (Realitat) and
"actuality"(Wirklichkeit). Reality denotes what is or what exists
at any particular time and, therefore, corresponds to our own common
notion of reality. Actuality, on the other hand, has a precise
philosophical content in Hegel's works; actuality refers to the state
of completed development of something. For example, human freedom is
actual only when man creates a human world in which he can live a free,
rational life. The teleological element of this notion of "actuality"
is clear; it is only when something has achieved its telos that it may,
in Hegel's eyes, be regarded as actual. Human reality may, through
history, be appalling at times and hardly rational. When (If) man
manages to create a world in which he can live freely then he will
have actualized his own implicit freedom. The Concept of man may be
freedom and this is implicitly rational. When man becomes free, when
the concept of human freedom becomes actual as "Idea", then reason
becomes explicit and actual. It is in this sense that "what is actual
is rational". Hegel most assuredly is not rationalizing away everything
that exists, is real.
We can now begin to examine Hegel's description of the will
as Concept. He distinguishes two abstract moments in the concept of
the will. Both moments are based on the capacity of Mind, through an
act of will, to bring before itself specific objects, i.e. to act in
specific ways in the world and to interact with the objects (including
other men) within that world. The first moment is that of abstract
universality in which this capacity,as pure potentiality, is itself
the object of Mind. Activity involves limitation and restriction in
the sense that to pursue one course of activity necessarily precludes
acting in other ways. Specific acts of will are viewed as finite
and a challenge to the freedom of the will. In order to preserve
the "infinite" freedom of the will Mind chooses not to act at all.
The capacity to choose to act is the only "true" freedom, while
specific acts are limits to this "freedom" and mark its negation.
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The second moment is that of determination through specific acts.
Mind, through its own agency as will, chooses to act and to determine
itself as a particular, finite ego.
The two moments are abstract. The first moment is abstract
universality. The "universal" which is the object of Mind at this
point is the pure potentiality of activity, a potentiality which is
viewed as inhering in the concept of man as such; the potentiality
of activity is unlimited and represents the purest form of human
freedom. It is abstract because it is purely formal, i.e. contentless.
It is nothing more than the form of universality, separate from all
particularlity. Regarded as representing the freedom of "Man", it
is unable to provide an account of the freedom of this man or that,
i.e. of real human individuals. As individuals we are necessarily
"in the world" and must act. Even the choice not to act at all is a
particular choice and a specific act. For Hegel, there is no such
thing as "Man" which exists separately from particular men. To talk
of the freedom of "Man" while ignoring the question of the freedom
of real individual men is to remain lost forever within a fog of
abstraction. The second moment is equally abstract. In focusing
solely on determinate acts of will it is unable to provide an account
of what persists through those determinate acts, i.e. what it is
which acts and informs those acts with human agency. The second
moment ignores the aspect of universality which is necessary to unite
together apparently discrete acts into a pattern of coherency and
intelligibility.
Each moment, although abstract, is instructive. The first
reminds us that any discussion of the will must not lose sight of what
is universal in human activity. At the same time it demonstrates
the impossibility of an adequate concept of will which ignores the
moment of particular acts. The second focuses on the necessity of
acting in particular ways while demonstrating the incoherence of a
view which loses sight of what is universal in human activity. We
appear to have arrived at the impasse of the Understanding which is
capable of separating universal and particular but is unable to re¬
unify them in order to overcome the deficiencies inherent in their
separation. In paragraph 7 of the Philosophy of Right Hegel refers
the reader to paragraphs 163-165 of the Encyclopaedia (third edition)
wherein he describes the resolution of the abstract separation of
universal and particular. The term he invokes for this logical
resolution is "Individuality" and it is nothing other than the
philosophically concrete "Concept" as described above. The concept
of the will is the unity of its two antecedent moments, the moments
of abstract universality (identity) and abstract particularity
(difference). Mind is seen to determine itself through its specific
acts. It does not lose itself in those acts, however, but rather
discovers its own universality and infinitude through them. The
concept of will describes the "self-determination of the ego (Mind),
which means that at one and the same time the ego posits itself as
its own negative, i.e. as restricted and determinate, and yet remains
by itself, i.e. in its self-identity and universality. It determines
itself and yet at the same time binds itself together with itself.
The ego determines itself in so far as it is the relating of
negativity to itself" (PR. No. 7).
The concept of will, therefore, refers to the dialectic of
practical activity in which the universal and particular elements of
practical activity are united within the actuality of the concretely
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free individual. The emphasis here must be on "dialectic" of
universal and particular, for there is a temptation to regard the
"universal" as a "subject or substratum... (which is)... complete
and universal prior to its determining itself and prior to its
superseding and idealizing this determination" (PR. No. 7, Remark).
That is, the universal must not be thought of as a completed form
which then "releases" itself into the world through particular acts.
Similarly, particular acts must not be thought of as rational only
to the extent that they approach, or "participate" in, the
rationality of a pre-established, universal, transcendental form.
This notion of a dialectic of universal and particular is extremely
complex and difficult to grasp, especially when it is discussed only
in very general terms. Further, we recall that the concept of
dialectic involves the concept of emergence over time. Individuality,
the concrete unity of universal and particular, must be viewed as a
result and not as an abstract atemporal formula from which diverse
conclusions may be deduced.
In the Philosophy of Right Hegel discusses various problems
in the dialectic of universal and particular (PR. No. 8-10). The
problem of starting point, for example, raises various complications.
Hegel maintains that it is possible to examine the dialectic from
either the side of universality or of particularity. If we begin
with universality we begin with the notion of pure activity and then
must discover the way in which this "abstract" universal realizes
itself concretely only through particular acts. From the perspective
of particularity we begin with the most immediate, particular acts
and examine the development towards increasingly greater levels of
self-conscious activity, culminating in the emergence of the concrete
universal through particular acts. In both cases will is implicitly
rational and free. The development to be examined is from implicit
rationality and freedom to their emergence as the explicit, rational
free will. Although both approaches demand a reconstruction of
experience (as discussed in the section on the Introduction to the
Phenomenology)»it is characteristic of Hegel that he chooses the
perspective of particularity since it corresponds more closely to
actual historical experience, i.e. to the historical development in
which men, performing particular acts, come to recognize their own
universal character as human actors. For our purposes, we need only
indicate briefly the general features of this development JO
The lowest, most immediate mode of practical activity is
titled Practical Feeling by Hegel. Practice is characterized at this
stage as appetite. The ego finds before itself a multiplicity of
objects, some of which satisfy its appetites and some which do not.
The ego does not exercise any control over these objects or over its
own needs. If a specific desire arises and the ego finds an object
which satisfies this desire, its appetite is fulfilled and it is
able to rest momentarily. The emphasis throughout is on fortuitous
agreement between an object and a subjective need. Objectively the
external world is a multiplicity of discrete objects, while
subjectively the ego is shattered into a series of disparate needs,
each satisfied in isolation from the others. At the most primitive
level, the only feelings experienced are pleasantness and unpleasant¬
ness which arise out of the agreement or disagreement of an object
with a subjective need. More complex feelings such as pleasure, joy,
hope, pain and fear gradually develop and signal the increasing
complexity of the practical life of the ego.
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Gradually the ego learns to direct its activity in
determinate ways. It is able to resolve on certain courses of
activity in order to satisfy certain specific desires. The ego
learns to discriminate amongst its variety of needs and to set
about satisfying them in an organized manner. Its needs, instead
of being simply there, an uncontrollable presence dependant upon
circumstances beyond the control of the ego, now assume the form
of impulses. Impulses in turn become further refined into passions,
which indicate the ability of the ego to concentrate all its
practical energy on the satisfaction of one particular need to the
exclusion of others which may also be demanding satisfaction.
Subjectively, the ego is discovering the self which persists through
different acts, while objectively the world begins to appear as an
organized whole which can be moulded in order to satisfy impulses
and passions originating in a self-conscious self. The culmination
of this stage is Choice.
In choice the above-discussed dichotomy between abstract
universality (pure activity as potentiality) and abstract particularity
(determinate, finite acts) becomes explicit. The ego is sufficiently
self-conscious to identify the transcendental unity of the self which
persists through its specific acts. Freedom is seen by the ego to
depend on acting in an adequate, organized way. The impossibility
of overcoming the abstract separation of universal and particular
within this stage of development (corresponding to the logic of
Understanding) rendersarbitrary the attempts by the ego to act
coherently. Judgement of the various possibilities for action which
are available to the ego ultimately depends on the subjective
inclinations of the ego and not on rational reflection. For example, moral
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theories which attempt to order human actions towards the good, and
yet accept this theory of human activity as complete, are forced
into the demand for the "purification of impulses" in order to free
human activity from its "subjectivity and contingency" (PR No. 19).
Hegel has Kant in mind here since, in his view, Kant ultimately
attempts to construct a moral theory based on the "arbitrary will"
(Will kur) J
If we do not hypostatize the notions of abstract universality
and abstract particularity, but rather press on with our investigation
of the development of the will, we discover that the ego itself
abandons the fixity of these polar notions. The ego, forced to reflect
on the variety of possible courses of action before it, develops
standards for choosing among them. At first, one act is preferable
to another because it brings more immediate satisfaction of some
felt need. Gradually, however, satisfaction itself becomes an abstract
goal of activity. Satisfaction in general, as a goal for ego, ultimately
is identified with a state of self-fulfillment or happiness. The
ego's activity is informed throughout by this universal goal. That
is, "reflection (on happiness as universal) invests this material
(specific acts) with abstract universality and in this external manner
purifies it from its crudity and barbarity" (PR No. 20). Implicit in
this development, however, is the concept of a self-determining
universal. That is, happiness as a stage of development marks the
dissolution of the absolute separation of universal and particular.
That separation is challenged in the real practical life of man,
where the ego recognizes that particular acts realize concretely the
abstract goal of activity in general (happiness) while at the




In presenting the development in this way Hegel accomplishes
several important tasks which are vital to the comprehension of his
political thought. First of all, he is able to demonstrate that the
separation of universal and particular is only a stage in the develop¬
ment of the will. It emerges out of the chaos of practical feeling
and is overcome in the practical struggle by the ego to inform its
activity with value and coherency. The three main stages are summarized
by Hegel as follows: 1) At the level of practical feeling the con¬
sciousness of the ego is bare sense-consciousness, in which it receives
impressions of pleasantness or unpleasantness from an "external"
object; 2) through practical activity the ego leans to discern the self
which persists through the variety of particular acts and so to
reflect on the infinite universality of pure activity in opposition to
the finite particularity of specific acts; and 3) further refinement
of reflection leads to recognition of the universal (happiness) as the
object of practical life realized only through specific satisfying
acts.
This summary establishes the second important conclusion for
Hegel, namely that the universal which is the object of self-consciousness
is a result of the development beyond the antecedent deficient stages
and has absorbed them into itself. The universal "is what it is
simply because it has absorbed in itself the immediacy of instinctive
desire and the particularity which is produced by reflection and with
which such desire eo ipso becomes imbued" (PR No. 21, Remark). (This
point will become critical in the attack on Kant's moral theory which
posited a pure will(Wille) in opposition to the impure, sensual will
(Willkur), an attack which Hegel advances in the section on Morality
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in the Philosophy of Right.) Hegel's method of examination allows him
to argue that the universal, rather than abolishing "inferior" desire,
transforms it into the desire for rational ends. That is, the rational
free life is itself desired and specific desires become ordered towards
this universal end (PR. No. 19).
The third point reminds us of the discussion of theory and
practice. The progress from incoherent desire to the recognition of
the universal which is realized through particular acts belies the
abstract separation of theory and practice into opposed faculties. The
dialectic of practical activity leads ineluctably to the transformation
of practice by thinking intelligence. "The self-consciousness which
purifies its object, content, and aim, and raises them to this
universality effects this as thinking getting its own way in the will.
Here is the point at which it becomes clear that it is only as thinking
intelligence that the will is genuinely a will and free" (PR.No. 21,
Remark). Hegel here revives his old polemic against the Romantics who
would substitute feeling for thought as the surest guide to freedom.
This unity of theoretical and Practical Mind Hegel titles "Free Mind".
Through practical activity the will discovers the universal but this
"universal ism the will has as its object and aim (exists for will) only
so far as it (will) thinks itself, knows this its concept, and is will
as free intelligence" (Enc. No. 481).
Free Mind, however, is only the final stage in the develop¬
ment of Subjective Mind. The ego has, in the form of happiness, grasped
the concrete universal which informs all practical activity. Practical
activity which has happiness as its object is nothing other than the
philosophical notion of the will and, therefore, the will is informed
throughout by happiness. Will itself is recognized as a universal
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which has itself for its object. That is, practical activity seeks to
actualize the universal (happiness) and so it has itself for its object
since happiness is the concept (universal) of will. The object of will
is to actualize itself as universal (happiness) through particular acts
(of will). This is the concept of will philosophically understood as
a concrete universal. Recalling that freedom, for Hegel, is equivalent
to perfection and complete self-fulfilment, happiness as universal is
identified as true freedom. The will, therefore, has freedom for its
object and, through activity, actualizes freedom in the world. Viewed
concretely, the free will does not refer to the freedom of a will to
choose to do this or that, but rather to a will which actualizes its
implicit freedom through determinate, rational, practical activity.
It is the demand for concreteness, however, which reveals
the essential limitedness of Free Mind and restricts it to the realm
of Subjective Mind. The entire force of the argument in favour of the
concrete universal is directed against the abstract separation of
universal and particular which, for convenience, we may here treat as
form and content. The concept of concreteness demands a content which
is adequate to the form, e.g. for particular acts which actualize
universal freedom. If the determination of which acts are adequate
is left to the ego acting alone then the entire process becomes
subjectively determined and open to the change of contingency and
arbitrariness. This danger is inherent in the identification of the
universal as happiness. Happiness is a vapid concept if left to the
deliberations of individuals acting on their own. One man's happiness
may clearly create misery for others. Happiness itself, the concrete
universal, becomes a subjective concept mired in contingency. Free
Mind recognizes the principle of freedom. It has before it a concept
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of will as freedom which is implicitly rational. It is only implicitly
rational because explicit rationality demands a content adequate to
itself as form. It is that content which Free Mind cannot generate
satisfactorily because it is still subjective. What is now imperative
is to examine specific contents and to determine their rationality in
terms of the form. In short, Free Mind has before it the concept of
free will. It is now necessary to determine the content adequate to
free will as concept, i.e. to discover the ways in which man must act
if he is to live a free and rational life. The unity of concept
(universal form) and content (particular acts) is the Idea, the Idea
of freedom.
The demand for a content which is adequate to the will as
concept creates a new tension between opposed notions, namely
subjective and objective modes of freedom. The terms "subjective" and
"objective" reflect a difference of emphasis in the treatment of the
development (emergence) of the Idea of freedom, although they actually
include within themselves the range of problems already discussed with
respect to the notions of universal and particular, form and content.
Subjective modes of freedom refer to those modes in which the individual
human actor becomes the sole arbiter of what content satisfies his
demand to be free. This "subjectivity" may assume various forms such as the
"abstract universal" or the pure "form" of the will as pure
undifferentiated capacity to act. In this form all determinate acts
including all demands placed upon the subject by other men, are regarded
as restrictions on infinite freedom. It may also appear in the form
of experience in which the necessity of acting in determinate ways is
recognized as the actualization of the concrete universal, but it is
the subject alone who judges the value of the acts. "In general,
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(subjectivity is) the one-sided form of the will for which the thing
willed, whatever its content, is but a content belonging to self-
consciousness (i.e. of an atomistic subject)..." (PR. No. 25). The
objective mode of freedom refers primarily to the absorption of the
subject by the object of his will. That is, the object of the will
appears as the repository of freedom, as its concrete embodiment, and
the freedom of the subject is secured to the extent that he appropriates
it. Although this type of "wilful" behaviour may appear to the
"external" observer as subjective activity, Hegel is adamant in
characterizing it as "objective" because the active subject loses
himself in the object. That is, the "universal" dimension of freedom
is lost in the frantic attempt to appropriate objects which represent
"real" freedom. The objective mode also refers to that type of
experience in which the actor doesn't act according to the dictates
of his own will at all, but rather obeys the will of another. This
type of activity characterizes the lives of slaves and citizens of a
totalitarian state.
Both moments, although abstract, contain a partial truth.
Subjectively, true freedom must be seen to accord with the self-
consciousness of the actors involved. That is, "everything which I am
to recognize has also the task of becoming mine and attaining its
validity in me" (PR^ No. 26, Addition). Objectively, freedom must become
actual in the world and not remain an empty, subjective "longing" for
freedom. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel attempts to describe the
development of the Idea of freedom in which those two demands are
synthesized. Free Mind, the highest stage of Subjective Mind, has as
its object the concept of freedom. The Philosophy of Right is concerned
with the development of freedom from concept to Idea, i.e. the
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"development of the substantive content of the Idea--a development
through which the concept determines the Idea, itself at first
abstract, until it becomes a systematized whole" (PR^ No. 28). The
book, at its most basic level, is about the will insofar as the
"will's activity consists in annulling the contradiction between
subjectivity and objectivity and giving its aims an objective instead
of a subjective character, while at the same time remaining by itself
even in objectivity" (ibid).
It is the development of freedom from Concept to Idea which
Hegel's terms "Objective Mind". The title, however, should not mislead
us into thinking that it is a development in opposition to Subjective
Mind. Rather it is the fulfilment of the development of the latter, a
fulfilment which cannot be attained within the limits of subjectivity
alone. In Objective Mind, freedom becomes objective as the rational
human world in which individuals are free. The individual is free,
and knows the objective human world of rights, duties, laws and so
forth as the substantive realm of its own freedom. Man does not lose
himself in this world but fulfils himself in and through it. This
complex unity of subjective and objective modes of freedom is a result
of a particular process of development, a process which may be described
as the search by man to create an objective world which actualizes his
subjective, implicitly rational demand to be free. We are beyond the
level of Subjective Mind since the ego recognizes the necessity to
create a free, objective human world. This does not mean, however, that
the line of development towards this world is direct and uncomplicated.
The completion of the development must be seen as a result, a result
which emerges out of antecedent deficient forms. The deficiency of
those forms rests on attempts to actualize freedom within inadequate
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or incomplete modes of experience. Although within each deficient
form there are a variety of factors at work which prevent the form
from being complete in and for itself, we may broadly group those
factors under the headings of subjectivity and objectivity. That is,
each major mode of experience examined in the Philosophy of Right
which is discovered to be inadequate may be seen as deficient because
it emphasizes one side of this dichotomy and more or less neglects
the other. The dialectical advance through deficient modes creates
increasingly complete forms of subjectivity and objectivity. Subject
and object will be seen to develop together dialectically as the
concept of freedom is actualized as Idea.
The development of Objective Mind may be regarded as a
development of the concept of right. Indeed, Hegel's use of the term
right (Recht) emphatically underlines the process of development of
the Concept towards Idea. Hegel defines right as an "existent of any
sort embodying the free will... Right therefore is by definition
freedom as Idea" (PR No. 29). The term "Recht" is difficult to
translate into English, for there is no corresponding single English
word which adequately conveys its meaning for German philosophy.
Ernest Barker, in a footnote to his English translation of Gierke's
Natural Law and the Theory of Society defines it as follows:
"The same word Recht means a) a system of law
existing objectively as an external norm for
persons, and b) a system of rights enjoyed by
those persons, as 'Subject' or owners of rights,
under and by virtue of that norm. The same thing
is both a system of law outside me, when I look
at it objectively, as obligatory upon me, and a
system of rights inside me, when I look at it
subjectively, as belonging to me and as giving
me a legal position. Objective Right is what
we call Law; subjective Right is what we call
rights. But the two are different sides of the
same thing, like the obverse and the reverse of
a coin."12
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Barker's definition adequately captures the double sense of
Recht and provides us with a starting point for our examination of the
specific way in which Hegel employs the term. To begin with, Barker
defines Recht in terms of a completed system of codified positive law
which confers rights on individuals and guarantees those rights.
Hegel's approach to right in the Philosophy of Right in a sense reverses
this relationship between objective and subjective right. Hegel seeks
to discover what is rational in the objective world and his answer, as
we have seen is that it is in the objective world that man actualizes
his substantive freedom. The development of objective institutions,
customs, laws and so forth are, from the perspective of reason, specific
developments of the substantive freedom of man. The concept of free
will declares that all men have the implicit right to be free and
demands the creation of a world in which human freedom is actualized.^
All institutions which advance this development advance this right to
freedom and hence are existential embodiments of free will. It is
this view of right which Hegel advances provisionally in paragraph 4
quoted at the beginning of this chapter, where he states that "the
system of right is the realm of freedom made actual whereas
Barker's definition emphasizes law as a guarantor of rights, Hegel's
approach regards law as a specific embodiment of right insofar as law
is a necessary stage in the development of the Idea. This does not
refute Barker but rather states that, in Hegel's view, law itself
must be understood as part of a rational development towards freedom,
a necessary stage although not sufficient in itself to actualize
freedom. Private property, for example, may ultimately be protected
by positive law but the rational significance of private property does
not flow from law but from the concept of freedom. Hegel writes:
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"Every stage in the development of the Idea
of freedom has its own special right, since
it is the embodiment of freedom in one of
its proper specific forms.... Morality,
ethical life, the interest of the state
each of these is a right of a special
character because each of them is a specific
form and embodiment of freedom" (PR. No. 30,
Remark).
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel attempts to investigate the entire
rational system of right considered as the development of freedom
from Concept to Idea. Further, in order to avoid a hopeless collision
of "rights" (e.g. property vs conscience) he will attempt to describe
the significance of different rights for the actualization of freedom
and, where necessary, subordinate one to another according to their
respective "degree" of rationality.
There are several points which must be raised now if we are
to avoid several serious misconceptions about Hegel's treatment of
Objective Mind. First of all, we have left the realm of psychology
and the individual subject. The Philosophy of Right is an investiga¬
tion of modes of experience which claim to be adequate for the
realization of freedom by all men qua men, and not for men qua birth
(Aristotle), or qua philosophers (Stoicism) or qua any other
particular category which excludes great sectors of the population at
large (Enc. No. 482). We are not looking for a theory which bases
its conception of freedom on the "will of a single person in his own
private self-will" but rather for that theory which bases freedom on
the "absolute or rational will" on "mind as it is in its truth"
(PR. No. 29, Remark). Secondly, we must reaffirm the fundamental
proposition that the Philosophy of Right does not merely add the
particular content to an already-completed form or universal. The
concept of free will is only implicitly complete. The development
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from Concept to Idea is to be seen as a dialectic of form and content,
subject and object, universal and particular. The two sides of each
duality develop together towards unity.
The method of the Philosophy of Right is similar to the
method described in my opening chapter on the Introduction to the
Phenomenology, modified slightly owing to the different object under
examination. The Philosophy of Right describes the development of the
concept of freedom, i.e. of determinate modes of human experience
which actualize human freedom. The development is from the most
immediate mode through increasingly complex ones culminating in the
complete existential embodiment of the concept in a determinate human
world. Inferior modes are inferior precisely because they are
incomplete i.e. they are inadequate to the concept of freedom. The
development throughout is an immanent one, in which each incomplete
form is incomplete according to its own criteria of completeness and
hence is forced to give way to more complete form. As in the
Phenomenology, the Philosophy of Right involves a reconstruction of
the different modes of experience and an examination of them according
to their own internal logic. Further, the principles advanced for each
stage correspond to some degree to positions adopted by political
philosophers prior to Hegel who sought to describe ways in which man
could be free. One of my goals in the thesis is to identify, where
appropriate, those positions in an effort to heighten our understand¬
ing and appreciation of Hegel's monumental examination of the problem
of human freedom.
At this point, we may note some of the problems involved in
detaching Hegel's political theory from his general philosophical
position. Hegel's intention in the Philosophy of Right is to discover
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the immanent rational development of freedom from Concept to Idea.
This chapter has described briefly some of the issues at stake in
this development. The notion of an immanent development is almost
meaningless unless we understand a few of the basic logical points
which were discussed in the first chapter. The Philosophy of Right
is intended by Hegel to provide more than a "rational" standard
for the evaluation of certain political phenomena. It may occasionally
be useful to regard Hegel's political philosophy as just such a
standard, but it would do violence to Hegel's own understanding of
his work. In his own terms, it would avoid the "hard task" of
philosophical comprehension which is directed towards a grasp of the
immanent development of the Concept. To neglect this is to regard
"reason" as a "universal form" external to all particular content.
"To consider a thing rationally means not to
bring reason to bear on the object from the
outside and so to tamper with it, but to
find that the object is rational on its own
account; here it is mind in its freedom, the
culmination of self-conscious reason, which
gives itself actuality and engenders itself
as an existing world. The sole task of
philosophic science is to bring into
consciousness this proper work of the reason of the
thing itself." (PR_. No. 31, Remark).'5
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
1. Hugh Reyburn, in The Ethical Theory of Hegel (Oxford, 1967)
pp.100-114, does have a brief albeit helpful discussion. See
also: Jacob F1eischmann, "Hegel's Theory of the Will", translated
from the Hebrew in Scripta Hierosolymitana, ed. by S. H. Bergman
(Jerusalem, 1960); Eugene Fleischmann, La Philosophie Politique
de Hegel (Paris, 1966); Bernard Quelquejeu, La Volonte dans la
Philosophie de Hegel (Paris, 1972), pp. 215-230.
2. The most succinct statement of this view is advanced by Z.A.
Pelczynski in his lengthy introductory essay to Hegel's Political
Writings, TR. by T.M. Knox, (Oxford, 1964). On page 136 he
writes that "Hegel's political thought can be read, understood,
and appreciated without having to come to terms with his
metaphysics". Shlomo Avineri's treatment in Hegel's Theory of
the Modern State (Cambridge, 1972) appears to assume this view.
Anthony Quinton, in a two-part review of new books on Hegel
explicitly endorses this view in "The Hegel Craze", New York
Review of Books, (May 29, 1975 and June 12, 1975). Raymond Plant
has explicitly rejected this view in his Hegel (London, 1973), p.184.
3. I say "provisionally" because the demonstration ultimately
depends on an analysis of the rest of the book.
4. The problem will be discussed in more general terms in the final
chapter of the thesis.
5. The concept of "Geist", which is so central in Hegel's thought,
is translated into English as either "mind" or "spirit". In my
view, neither English word satisfactorily conveys the full sense
of Geist as used by Hegel. In some contexts "mind" is preferable,
while in others "spirit" is the better translation. In the pages
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below on "Subjective Mind" I have decided to follow Wallace and
use "mind". Hegel uses Geist in this section as synonomous with
"consciousness" or the "conscious subject who seeks to know".
Mind seems to me to convey more adequately the "transcendental
subject" under investigation. Mind is capitalized to underline
its technical sense.
6. There is little discussion of subjective mind in general and
theoretical mind in particular in the secondary literature. See:
Malcolm Clark Logic and System (The Hague, 1972) for a full treat¬
ment of the transition from "Vorstellung" to "Thought"; G.R.G.
Mure "Hegel: How, and How Far is Philosophy Possible?" Beyond
Epistemology ed. F.G. Weiss (The Hague, 1974); Bernard Quelquejeu,
op.cit. pp. 160-173; Murray Greene, Hegel on the Soul: A
Speculative Anthropology (The Hague, 1972).
7. Hegel distinguishes "Institution" from "Sense Certainty" (the equally
immediate form of consciousness with which he begins the
Phenomenology) because in the former mind intuits a particular
object, while in the latter mind immediately is presented with a
"bombardment" of sense-data which it is unable to grasp in
substantial form.
8. The comment on the posteriori nature of Hegel's logical discoveries
is put forward only provisionally here. The subject will be
discussed in full in Chapter 6 of the thesis.
9. cf. Hegel's own discussion of this confusion in Enc- No. 6, where
he answers those critics who attacked the Philosophy of Right on
just this point.
10. The development of Practical Mind is described both in the
Encyclopaedia No. 469-482 and in the Philosophy of Right No. 11-21.
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11. I will discuss Kant's opposition between "arbitrary will"
(Wil1kur) and rational, holy will (Wille) in Chapter 5 of the
thesis.
12. Ernest Barker in Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of
Society 1500-1800, trans, with an introd. by E. Barker
(Cambridge, 1934), p. 39, Note.
13. cf. Enc. No. 482 where Hegel states that it is the specific
contribution of Christianity to world-civilization that it
declares that man as such is "implicitly destined to supreme
freedom". No other antecedent philosophy declared the
universality of freedom for all men. Although Christian doctrine
clearly refers to divine grace and "heavenly" freedom, Hegel in
the next line draws out the secular implications and translates
the universality into political terms.
14. Hegel's affinity to Aristotle is clear in paragraph 4 where he
describes the system of right and freedom as a "second nature"
emerging from mind. cf. Nichomachean Ethics, 1106a 10, where
Aristotle, after having shown that the virtues are not present
initially in our nature but rather are the result of training
and education, declares that they are states of character made
objective. Hegel would substitute "freedom" for "virtue" and
"implicit rationality" for "states of character".
15. Hegel discusses the invocation of reason as an "external" standard
in the Phenomenology in the sections on "Reason as Lawgiver" and




"Abstract Right" is the title of the first section of the
Philosophy of Right. Before proceeding with an analysis of this
section it would be useful to restate a few of the basic principles
which we have examined and which are assumed throughout the Philosophy
of Right by Hegel. First of all, the fundamental problem of the
Philosophy of Right is to discover the ways in which human activity
can create an objective order which actualizes human freedom. The
emphasis is on the "objectivity" of the order. Hegel is not concerned
here with those philosophical positions, such as stoicism, which deny
the necessity of a free objective order for a free manJ Second, the
activities or "modes of experience" under examination are those of
self-conscious actors who knowingly act for the sake of their freedom.
We are not concerned with the unintended consequences of actions
performed by actual historical persons who remained ignorant of their
role in advancing the actualization of the rational concept of freedom.2
Third, the concepts of freedom and reason are inextricably linked and
it would not be misleading to characterize the life lived rationally as
the concretely free life.
The fourth point concerns the methodology of the Philosophy
of Right and may be seen as drawing together the first three principles.
As we have seen the rationality of any one "mode of experience" depends
upon the completeness and coherency of that "mode" expressed as a
philosophical position. If the reality of any one position contradicts
the principles which explicitly structure it, then the position must
be abandoned in favour of a more "rational" one, i.e. one which can
take account of and resolve the contradictions of the antecedent position.
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As in the Phenomenology the immanent development is from the most
abstract (immediate or incomplete) level (mode) to the most concrete
(mediate or complete) level. In the Philosophy of Right the examina¬
tion of each "level" will involve a comparison of the systematic
principles advanced on behalf of a specific mode of practical human
activity aimed at actualizing freedom objectively with the "reality"
created by this activity. The "actors" at each level are philosophical
constructs whose practical activity is rigidly restricted to the
explicit principles of action under examination. The "reality" they
create is a philosophical construction based on a rational reflection
upon the types of activity open to them consistent with the relevant
principles. It is in this sense that the Philosophy of Right may be
viewed as an examination of the modes of experience directed towards
the creation of a free objective order. In all cases the question
Hegel asks is whether the real experience (in this special sense) of
the actors contradicts the claims to freedom which are advanced.
The examination of the principles structuring the mode of
experience titled "Abstract Right" initiates the critical task described
above. Abstract right refers to the principie that the individual, by
virtue of his personality alone, is the subject of rights. "Personality
essentially involves the capacity for rights and constitutes the concept
and the basis (itself abstract) of the system of abstract and therefore
formal right." (PR^ No. 36) The apparently clear connection between
personality and rights, however, may be misleading. While for us the
connection may appear unproblematic, indeed obvious, for Hegel it is
of profound importance. Unless we grasp this significance, Hegel's
treatment of abstract right will remain somewhat opaque. Our under¬
standing will be enhanced if we briefly trace the etymology of the
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word "personality" and the way in which the relation between personal¬
ity and rights has changed historically.-^
The English word "person" derives from the Latin word
"persona". The Latin word, in turn, is related to the Greek word
"prosopon". The Greeks used the word to describe the masks worn by
actors in the theatre and "prosopon" literally means "what is before
the face". The masks in Greek theatre represented the characters
portrayed by the actors, and the character represented in the mask
was always kept very distinct from the character of the actor playing
the part. In Latin, however, "persona" translates literally as
"through-sounder". It was a feature of such theatrical masks to
concentrate the sound of the actor's voice through the one available
aperture, thus allowing the actor's voice to carry clearly throughout
a wide and open theatrical space. But this latter designation of the
mask introduces an ambiguity absent from the Greek designation since
it refers both to the mask through which the sound is made as well as
to the actor who produces the original sound.
This ambiguity allows for different applications of the
word "persona". When it is restricted to identification of the mask
worn it can quite naturally develop into a term employed when one
wants to distinguish a specific role being played out by an individual
from the individual himself. (This usage, of course, need not be
restricted to the theatre.) On the other hand, "persona" came to
identify the real character of an individual with the role he assumed.
In theatre the actor, for example, becomes the character he is portray¬
ing, if only for a brief time. The role becomes, in a sense, real
and the actor steps into the reality of the role and becomes the part.
"Persona" comes to signify the very opposite of a mask, for the role
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being played out (not necessarily a theatrical role) is viewed as real.
Outside the theatre, "role" gradually becomes identified with status,
and a man's status is seen to be expressive of his nature, or at least
an essential aspect of it. The relation between the essential nature
of a man and his particular status increasingly becomes viewed as a
relation between roles. Thus Cicero writes:
"It is important to understand that each of us
has been assigned by nature two roles (personae).
One of these is common to all men in that we all
share in reason and in that preeminence by which
we are superior to the animals and from which all
rectitude (honestum) and propriety (decorum) derive,
and the rational procedure for discovering what our
duty is. The other role is assigned to each
individual... There are countless...differences
between men's natures and characters but these
differences are not blameworthy as such."^
This dualism, in itself, need not be problematic. In modern
times we speak quite naturally of a person's status, or character, as
expressive of something real about the person while retaining a
residual notion of the "person as such" which subsists despite
individual distinctiveness. The problems with this view of personality
arose when the Roman lawyers based the Roman system of law upon it.
A very brief survey of some of the main tenets of Roman law will indicate
precisely what Hegel objected to in Roman law and, concommitantly,
5
what he applauded in the modern break with this tradition. I realize
that what follows is most incomplete and cannot pretend to be an
adequate historical overview; however, my intention is strictly
limited to identifying certain elements of Roman law which will shed
light on Hegel's choice of starting point in "Abstract Right".
Similarly, I don't claim that Roman lawyers based their reasoning on a
consideration of the term "personality", but rather that the ambiguity
in the term is reflected in actual Roman law. The justification for
treating the two notions (personality and law) together rests
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obvious importance which Hegel attaches to their connection.®
Roman law embodied three distinct concepts of law. The
first of these is jus naturale and this referred to that body of
law which was imposed on all mankind by virtue of a common human
nature. There were varying interpretations of the scope of this
law. Some lawyers, most notably Ulpian in the third century,
treated it as a law which nature imparted to all animals including
man, while others regarded it as referring exclusively to man. As
Barker points out, jus naturale was not an actual body of law
enforceable in the courts but rather denoted a way of regarding
actual positive law, of providing a humane perspective from which
positive law could be evaluated. "It is, in its essence, the Stoic
ideal of a common law of all humanity, which is a law of Reason and
Nature."'' The jus naturale is timeless and therefore is free from
all considerations based on historical or contingent circumstances.
The second main division is called the jus gentium and it
is the most difficult one to specify precisely. Theoretically the
jus gentium referred to what was universal in all positive systems
of law, regardless of the particular characteristics which distinguished
the legal system of one nation from that of another. In so far as
jus gentium embodied a form of universal reason common to all men it
had a tenuous connection with jus naturale. Thus Gaius writes in the
second century; "whatever... natural reason has established among all
men, this is observed uniformly among all peoples and is called the
jus gentium, as a kind of law which all races employ."® By the
third century 111 pi an has widened the gap between jus naturale and jus
gentiurn. From this time on the latter refers to the set of positive
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laws which all nations had to establish as a result of actual
historical experience. In Gaius the emphasis on natural reason
suggests that, as a result of experience, nations were forced to
discover and codify a set of universal, rational laws, i.e. laws
which are, in some sense, natural. In Ulpian, however, the emphasis
is on the utility of these laws for the well-being of the nation
and he refers, therefore, primarily to the wisdom which accrues from
experience rather than to a pre-existent body of law which awaits
discovery by man. The view of Ulpian came to dominate Roman law.
Thus Hermogenian writes; "By this jus gentium wars were introduced,
nations marked off, realms established, rights of ownership distinguished,
bounds set to fields, houses built, traffic, purchase and sale, letting
Q
and hiring and all sorts of obligations instituted..." In practice
jus gentium was generally concerned with commercial transactions
centered on the notion of contract. The Roman courts enforced this
type of law equally and without distinction to both Roman citizens
and foreigners.
The final body of law is the jus civile. This type of law
referred exclusively to the positive laws enacted within individual
nations and applied to the citizens of that state. "Whatever any
people itself has established as law for it, this is confined to it
alone and is called the jus civile, as a kind of law peculiar to the
state..."'® The concept of jus civile remained relatively unchanged
in Roman law. Thus Ulpian, who differs significantly from Gaius on the
question of jus gentium writes; "The jus civile is a law which neither
departs entirely from natural law or the jus gentium nor wholly follows
it; and so when we add anything to or subtract it from the common law
(juri communi), we create a law of our own, that is the jus civile."^
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There is general agreement that Roman law, while a great
achievement in the history of civilization, was nonetheless rather
shallow philosophically. The tripartite division of law, for
example created a morass of philosophical problems despite its many
noble sentiments. This confusion is most acute when we examine the
legal treatment of slavery. From the time of Ulpian forward Roman
lawyers explicitly maintained that, according to jus naturale, all
men are born free and equal.^ Actual historical experience, however,
created the institution of slavery. This was codified and legally
maintained in the jus gentium. U1pi an, for example, discussing
slavery writes; "And though we should have been known by one natural
name as men, under the jus gentium three classes appeared, freemen,
slaves and a third class of freedmen who had ceased to be slaves".^
And in the Institutes the lawyer Florentinus is quoted as writing
that "...the freedom by which men are called free is one's natural
faculty of doing what is permissable for anyone to do provided he be
not prevented by force or by law. Servitude, on the other hand, is a
constitution (constitutio) of the jus gentium by which one is made
subject, against nature, to the dominion of another".^
Clearly a conflict exists between the natural equality of
jus naturale and the inequality and slavery of jus gentium. Historically,
this disparity may be seen to rest on convention and contingency. The
Roman lawyers, however, did not wish to reduce the rationale of jus
gentiurn to contingency and conventional arbitrariness alone. They are,
therefore, forced to maintain that although man by nature is free
it is rational that some men be slaves. It is this type of contradiction
which forced the Roman lawyers to subject the law to tortuous
manipulation. Hegel was most perspicuous on this matter, as when he
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writes; "Thus, in Roman law, for example, there could be no defini¬
tion of 'man', since 'slave' could not be brought under it--the
very status of slave indeed is an outrage on the conception of man
..." (PR. No. 2 Remark). The most salient feature of Roman law was
not that it justified slavery but that it justified it despite its
recognition of a universal human nature which contradicted this
justification. "Now it must be obvious that it is perverse to treat
the right of a specific person in his particular capacity before the
universal right of personality as such." (PR_. No. 40 Remark)
This "universal right of personality" must be more than an
empty demand. It must be grounded on something substantive and
universal in man. Further, it must be present in all men for if it
is restricted to only a few then we are mired in the same problems
and contradictions which plagued Roman law. This universality can
only be reached if we abandon the categories of Roman law, and it is
in light of this necessity that we must read Hegel's remarks to
paragraph 40 in the Philosophy of Right. There he attacks the Roman
classification of legal rights into jus ad personam, jus ad rem and
jus ad actiones; that is, into rights relating to persons, things and
actions respectively. His attack is carried out on two fronts. First,
while rights relating to things appear to be universal, rights relat¬
ing to persons depend on status. Thus, once again, we see how Roman
law elevated contingent particularity (status) over universality
(nature or reason). Second, and more interesting, Hegel tries to
demonstrate that jus ad personam is really only jus ad rem at base
anyway, and all attempts to maintain a separate identity for each
indicate confusion.
His argument in support of this is very brief and somewhat
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opaque but it is possible to give its general line of reasoning.
Rights become objective in the form of laws. But law is restricted
to regulation of the external actions of the legal subject, and
must remain indifferent to particular subjective dispositions, talents,
beliefs and so forth except as they are manifested in observable
acts. At this level of abstraction, where the only possible actor
is the legal person, all rights must be seen as rights relating to
something external to the person. Now it is Hegel's contention that,
from the legalistic perspective on rights, everything "external" to
the legal person possessing rights must be considered a "thing", i.e.
there can be no distinction between the right to a thing and the
right to a person. With "non-persons" (slaves) there is no problem
for they obviously exist as "things". The transformation, by Hegel,
of "persons" into "things" is more problematic but it can be achieved
in the following way. If a "person" has a right over the "personality"
of another then he can be regarded as having a right over the
totality of the other, in the sense that a master has a right over the
totality of the slave. But this lands us back in the contradictions
of Roman law which we have already examined. If his right does not
extend to the totality of the other but only to some aspect--such as
his labour power--then the nature of the right has changed. He now
has a right only to that which the other can alienate as a "thing".
This conclusion is embodied, for Hegel, in the concept of
contract. "Objectively considered, a right arising from a contract
is never a right over a person, but only a right over something
external to a person or something which he can alienate, always a
right over a thing." (PR. No. 40, Remark) Hegel's argument is that,
from the perspective of legality alone, people relate to each other as
"things". What is necessary is a set of customs, mores, ethical
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norms and so on which goes beyond abstract legalism, supplements
it, and generates a concept of persons as more than just
repositories of alienable "things". One of the primary aims of the
Philosophy of Right is to discover those "extra-legal" elements and
to determine the precise manner in which they contribute to the
actualization of human freedom.
What is Hegel's intention when he criticizes the natural
law tradition which has its origins in classical antiquity? To
answer this question is to indicate the reasons why Hegel begins the
main text of the Philosophy of Right with his discussion of abstract
right. Hegel's arguments against the classical Roman tradition point
toward the adoption of distinctively "modern" (as opposed to "classical")
notions of right and law. The argument against the identification of
personality with contingent status prepares the way for a concept of
personality which is universal; that is, which applies equally to
all men. The argument against transcendent "natural" systems of law
establishes the necessity of a system of right and law which can
survive the test of critical reason and has no recourse to appeals to
15
a transcendent realm supported only by a system of belief.
The rejection of those two primary tenets of the classical
tradition marked a decisive break in the history of political and
legal philosophy. It was Thomas Hobbes who first confronted the
classical assumptions and set out a philosophy of politics and law
which explicitly broke with the classical tradition. In Hegel's
view, the "modern" break with the classical tradition was a major
and significant event.16 It established certain basic principles
which are the foundation of modern thought, and any attempt to
construct a modern philosophy of politics and law must examine those
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basic principles, even if only to ultimately reject them. The
Philosophy of Right sets out to describe a philosophy of politics
and so it cannot ignore the modern break with the classical
tradition. Indeed, it is possible to regard the dialectic of
Abstract Right as rooted in the ground first cleared and marked
out by Thomas Hobbes.
In The Elements of Law Hobbes defines right in the follow¬
ing way: "It is not against reason that a man doth all he can to
preserve his own body and limbs, both from death and pain. And
that which is not against reason, men call Right, or jus, or
blameless liberty of using our own natural power and ability. It is
therefore a Right of Nature: that every man may preserve his own
life and limbs, with all the power he hath."^ We may set aside for
the moment the specific content of Hobbes1 natural right in order to
concentrate on two extremely important formal elements contained in
the definition. First, Hobbes makes a radical break with the
classical concept of nature as teleological. Nature, for Hobbes,
describes man's basic condition, the original, irreducible, immediate
facts of human existence. It does not, as in Aristotle, refer to
what is "highest" and most noble. Nor does it, as in the classical
tradition of natural law which goes back to the Stoics, refer to a
transcendent order which exists independant of human knowledge or
action. The right of nature, which "is not against reason", is
discovered through rational reflection on the natural, primitive
condition of man. By divesting nature of its teleology Hobbes
succeeds in separating nature from reason. Hobbes denies the
possibility of a transcendental, integrated total i ty of nature and
reason, wherein rational human ends may be regarded as continuous
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with the over-all structure of natural ends. Second, this notion
of nature applies equally to all men and, therefore, the right of
nature is universal and is a right of "every man". Thus Hobbes
denies the validity of all attempts to ground natural rights on
contingent status through his positing of a natural, albeit brutal,
egal itarianism J®
Hobbes' break with the classical notion of natural
teleology and his concomittant distinction between nature and reason
was of great importance for the subsequent development of political
philosophy. The ambiguity of the term "nature" was certainly
recognized by Hegel, and he emphasized the possible errors which
may arise as a result of confounding the different senses of the
term. In his lectures on the Philosophy of Right he states that
"on the one hand nature means our natural existence, us as we directly
know ourselves in our various facets, the immediate aspect of our
being. But over against this determination, and different from it,
nature is also the Concept. The nature of a thing is the concept
of a thing, what it is from the point of view of reason, and this
can be something quite other than merely natural. Natural right
is thus on the one hand the Right of nature, and on the other what
is Right in and for itself."^
Although it was Hobbes who first developed systematically
the implications of the modern concept of a nonteleological concept
of nature for political philosophy it is really the development of
content of natural right theory by John Locke which is of greater
significance for our understanding of Abstract Right. It is beyond
the scope of this thesis to give a detailed discussion of Locke's
theory of natural law and natural right. Further, we need not
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enter into the debates concerning Locke's relation to Hobbes.
For our purposes it is sufficient to merely list the main points
of Locke's theory of natural rights in order to indicate their
influence on Hegel's development of the principles of Abstract
Right.
Locke,like Hobbes before him, asserts the applicability
of his theory to all men. The equality of the state of nature,
however, serves liberty and not licence. The state of nature is
not, Locke claims, one of unrestricted right but rather of rights
and obligations. The law of nature should be regarded as taking
precedence over all natural rights and it enjoins obligation as
well as grants entitlement. The law of nature is discovered by
reason and is, itself, thoroughly rational. "Reason, which is that
law (of nature), teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independant, no one ought to harm another in
his Life, Health, Liberty, and Possessions." 21 The law of nature,
the apparent basis of all right and obligation in Locke, becomes for
Hegel the "imperative of right", which is to "be a person and respect
others as persons" (PR. No. 36). That Locke directly relates right and
obligation in the state of nature is generally taken as a major move
beyond the position of Hobbes, for in Locke rights are effective
while in Hobbes they are not, owing to the constant threat of
annihilation. Indeed, this connection between right and obligation
has dominated subsequent treatments of the issues surrounding
natural rights. Further, this obligation need not be a moral one
for the connection to be maintained. Kant, for example, maintains
the rational idea behind the connection while explicitly denying
its moral content. He writes:
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"Thus the universal law of right is as follows:
let your external actions be such that the free
application of your will can co-exist with the
freedom of everyone in accordance with a
universal law. And although this law imposes
an obligation on me, it does not mean that I am
in any way expected, far less required, to
restrict my freedom myself to these conditions
purely for the sake of this obligation. On the
contrary, reason merely says that individual
freedom is_ restricted in this way by virtue of
the idea behind it, and that it may also be
actively restricted by others; and it states this
as a postulate which does not admit of any
further proof. "22
Having posited the connection between right and obligation
Locke proceeds to specify the content of natural rights. The first
natural right is the right to the means necessary for self-
preservation. This natural right of man to make use of those things
"that were necessary or useful to his Being" Locke deduces from the
natural desire of all men to preserve their lives; this desire in
turn reflects the will of God.23 jhe second right of nature is the
right to freedom. Freedom is defined as the ability of men "to
order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons
as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without
OA
asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man." The
law of nature serves as a limit to the actions of men, since it
forbids interfering with the freedom of another person. It also
sanctions punishment of those who transgress the law of nature.
Hence the right to punish is sanctioned by Natural Law and is a
natural right, up to and including execution of the wrong-doer.25
The third major natural right in Locke is the right to
property. Property originally denotes those things which are
necessary for self-preservation such as food and, indeed, the
right to property is deduced from the right to self-preservation or
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life. For Hobbes, the right to the means necessary for survival is
unfettered by any possible constraints. For Hobbes, this right even
sanctions the taking of another man's life, for in the state of
nature there "can be no propriety (property), no dominion, no mine
and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get:
and for so long, as he can keep it. "26 In contrast Locke is most
concerned to establish limits to appropriation. In his early Essays
on the Law of Nature, Locke sets limits to the accumulation of private
property in the course of his denial that the law of nature is based
on the unchecked self-interest of individuals (Essay VIII). There he
states:
"Nature has provided a certain profusion of
goods for the use and convenience of men, ...
they have not been fortuitously produced nor
are they increasing in proportion with what
men need or covet... Whenever either the
desire or the need of property increases among
men, there is no extension, then and there, of
the world's limits... And so, when any man
snatches for himself as much as he can, he
takes away from another man's heap the amount
he adds to his own, and it is impossible for
anyone to grow rich except at the expense of
someone else."27
The limit to appropriation is a demand of natural law aris¬
ing from the finitude of resources necessary for self-preservation.
This is so despite Locke's recognition of the fact that men's needs
(or greed) may push them beyond the "limits" to appropriation. Indeed,
population increases may necessitate a reduction in each man's just
share of available goods. By the time of the treatises, however, Locke
had abandoned his attempts to set out the just limits to appropriation.
This he accomplished through his introduction of the concept of labour.
The relation between labour and property is described in the following
way in the Second Treatise:
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"... every man has a property in his own Person.
This no Body has any Right to but himself. The
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands,
we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then
he removes out of the State that Nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his
Labour with, and joyned to it something that is
his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It
being by him removed from the common state Nature
placed it in, hath by this Labour something
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of
other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable
Property of the Labourer no Man but he can have a
right to what that is once joyned to, at least
where there is enough, and as good left in common
for others."28
This does not, by itself, grant the individual the right of unlimited
appropriation. The last sentence indicates Locke's concern, first
expressed in his earlier essay quoted above, that the accumulation of
goods not be at the direct expense of other men. He gets around this
restriction, however, by claiming that labour, properly deployed,
increases the stock of available goods. The labourer "does not lessen
29
but increase the common stock of mankind." There is one further
obstacle which must be overcome before unlimited appropriation be
deemed a natural right, and this concerns the problem of wastage.
Since the right to property is deduced from the right to self-preservation
it is clear that the stock of property, even in its increased amount
must still be capable of providing the means to survival for all. If
a man appropriates greater and greater amounts of private property he
will have more than he could possibly use, and much of it would be
wasted through spoilage. This would be an offense against the will
of God, for God intended that the earth and all its products be used
to maintain the well-being of man, and so wastage would be contrary
to right. This problem Locke side-steps by arguing that man introduced
money for the sake of accumulation without wastage. Through labour
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and exchange man can accumulate more than he needs. Since the "exceed¬
ing of the bounds of his just property...(does not lie)...in the large¬
ness of his Possession, but (in) the perishing of any thing uselessly
30in it", man is faced with the problem of converting this "largeness"
into something durable which can serve as a store of value. Money fills
this role admirably since it does not spoil and "by mutual consent Men
would take (it) in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports
of Life.As MacPherson has shown, the introduction of the two
concepts of labour and money allowed Locke to remove the limits to
accumulation of private property.32 One more point which is relevant
here relates to the "covetousness" of man which Locke had once scorned.
In his discussion of money Locke blithely writes that "...in the Beginning,
before the desire of having more than Men needed had altered the intrinsic
value of things, which depends only on their Usefulness to the life of
Man "33 Man appropriated only what was necessary for self-preservation.
This is in marked contrast to the method of Hobbes, who sought to ground
political theory on a rigorous examination of the basic psychological
principles which determined human behaviour. Locke, on the other hand,
was not as rigorously consistent as Hobbes and this is nowhere made more
clear than in the above quote where he neatly alters human motivation
within the state of nature when such an alteration suits his purpose.
Man at one time only looked to the utility of things as a measure of
their value. Now he desires more for himself than is directly useful and
yet Locke ignores the psychological shift and focuses only on the effect
this shift of motivation has on the value of "things". The introduction
of money permits Locke to circumvent the problem of wastage and there
no longer exists a "natural" limit to appropriation within the state of
nature.
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It is the claims to freedom advanced by the proponents of
natural right and natural law theory which Hegel examines in Abstract
Right. More specifically, Hegel is concerned with the claim, made
most notably by Locke, that freedom consists in the ordered and peace¬
ful appropriation of the "things" of the world in the form of private
property. This is not to limit Hegel's treatment of private property
to an examination of Locke's doctrine, however, for Hegel does not
hesitate to re-arrange and even restate the main doctrinal principles
underlying the Lockean theory of private property. Despite this, I
believe it is important to have before us the natural right and law
context within which the right to property was first advanced in its
modern form. It is to be hoped that the actual examination of Abstract
Right will display the connections between Hegel and the modern theory
of natural rights and laws.
Before we begin the examination proper one more point must
be stressed. As we have seen, Hegel was well aware of the ambiguity
for the modern mind of the word "nature". In a way, this ambiguity is
heightened by the persistent reference in natural right theories to a
"state of nature", for such "states" could be seen as referring either
to the real, primitive condition of man or to a rationalist construction
of a sphere in which man is viewed as having only those rights which
could be attributed to him divorced from those rights which he could
secure as a result of the "artificial" conventions of an established
social and political order. The first interpretation is subject to
the "historical" criticism which denies the reality, at any time, of
such a state of nature and then proceeds to castigate all theories which
base themselves on such an illusion. The second interpretation involves
more substantive criticisms based on reflection upon institutions--such
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as private property—which only have reality in a social setting.
It argues that the rational individualistic notions which dominate
"state of nature" theories are fraudulent in so far as they read
social institutions back into a state which is pre-social.
Hegel's attitude to those two standard lines of attack is
interesting. With respect to the former, he too would clearly reject
any attempt to portray the state of nature as a real beginning, i.e.
as historically real. "In connection with the idea of a state of
nature in which freedom and justice are--or were—supposedly present
in perfect form, we have already remarked in general terms on how
the commencement of the history of Spirit should be interpreted in
relation to the concept which underlies it." (RH., p. 131-2) Thus
Hegel would reject any attempt to give an empirical, rather than a
conceptual, beginning to history—at least to any history which
purports to be a history of the development of human freedom.34
But Hegel does not think that this is the only way to regard a "state
of nature" as it relates to human freedom.
"If the word 'nature' denotes the being or concept
of a thing, then the state of nature or the law
of nature is that state or law which is appropriate
to man by virtue of his inherent concept and of
the inherent concept of Spirit. But this must not
be confused with what the Spirit is in its natural
condition; for the latter is a condition of servitude
in which man lives by the institutions of his senses."
(RH. p. 98)
Hegel clearly believes that, despite the apparent confusions on this
matter, the "states of nature" of modern theories of natural right
and law attempt to grapple with the "concept" of man and not with man
in his "natural condition".
Certainly this is the key to understanding the way in which
Hegel treats natural right and law in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel
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is examining how the concept of human freedom necessitates a specific
objective order if it is to become actual as Idea. He has already
demonstrated the necessity of an objective order. He has also accepted
the modern notion that freedom must be grounded in man as such and
not restrict itself to certain men on the basis of contingency.
Abstract Right discusses the claim that the appropriation of the things
of the world satisfies the requirements for objective human freedom.
Since all men must equally have the right to freedom or none may have
it, all men must equally have the right to private property, since
private property is nothing other than objectification of freedom.
Hegel does not refer to the right to private property as a natural
right since this raises once again the ambiguity of the term "nature".
The right to private property, for Hegel, is rooted in the philosophical
concept of personality and is, therefore, a right which embodies that
concept in an objective, determinate form. This does not conflict
with Locke's claim, but rather clarifies it. Similarly, Hegel is not
rejecting Locke's claims about the relationship between private property
and freedom when he rejects Locke's deduction of the right to property
from the prior right to self-preservation and the means to subsistence.
"That everyone ought to have subsistence enough for his needs is a
moral wish and thus vaguely expressed is well enough meant, but like
anything that is only well meant it lacks objectivity." (PR. No. 49,
Remark) Hegel here is only stating that the conceptual claim that
freedom becomes objective in property cannot be based on the moral
claim that men ought to survive. Locke here is only confusing the
issue since he obscures the logical gap between conceptual necessity
and moral belief. We might also add that, since Locke clearly
distinguishes bare survival from freedom, he cannot derive the
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latter from the former. Survival may be a pre-condition of freedom
but freedom must be more than just surviving comfortably if it is to
satisfy the demands of conceptual necessity.33 This is underlined
by the assumption of the Philosophy of Right, discussed above, that
we are examining the experience of the self-conscious efforts by man
to create a free objective order, and this assumption takes us far
beyond the examination of the experience of man as he struggles for
bare subsistence.
Our examination of the will demonstrated that freedom must
not remain locked in subjectivity if the individual is to become free.
From the perspective of the concept of freedom, and recalling the
various assumptions at work in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel states
that it is in the possession of property that man first "translates
his freedom into an external sphere". (PR. No. 41). Personality is
the most immediate, the most abstract determination of the individual
since it describes the individual solely as the bearer of rights which
permit him to act in certain ways in the world. It establishes an
equality between all men as "persons" and disregards entirely the
particulars which, from another perspective, serve as marks of
distinction and uniqueness. At this level of immediacy, the only
objects upon which the person may act are the "things" of the external
world. The obligation "to be a person and respect others as persons"
eliminates the possibility of extending the right to "things" to a
right over other men. The strict limits imposed on the conceptual
space in which man exists solely as a "person" eliminate, of course,
the possibility of the person having a right with respect to social
and political institutions. The abstract equality and conceptual
stringency of Abstract Right are brought together by Hegel when he
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writes; "...if at this stage we may speak of more persons than one,
although no such distinction has yet been made, then we may say that
in respect of their personality persons are equal". (PR. No. 49)
The "things" of the external world are similarly abstractly
equivalent. From the perspective of Abstract Right there can be no
qualitative difference between external "things" since all "things"
acquire their "thinghood" solely by virtue of their being objects of
personal right. Indeed, Hegel extends this "thinghood" even to
those particulars which are unique to specific subjects in so far as
they become objective in the external word. For example, personal
right is indifferent to the intelligence which a writer may possess
so long as that intelligence remains subjective. As soon as the
writer produces a book, however, and the intelligence becomes objective
in that book, it is a "thing" and embodies the rights of the writer
as a person. "Attainments, erudition, talents, and so forth, are,
of course, owned by free mind and are something internal and not
external to it, but even so, by expressing them it may embody them
in something external and alienate them (i.e. give them away or sell
them), and in this way they are put into the category of 'things'."
(PR. No. 43, Remark)
In Abstract Right the person alone has rights, while things
have no rights at all. The basic right of the person is described by
Hegel as the "right of putting his will into any and every thing and
thereby making it his...". (PR. No. 44). Since things have no rights
the person has a right to put his will into any thing he desires.
This is the "absolute right of appropriation which man has over
all 'things'", (ibid). This "absolute right" may itself be
taken in two ways. If we regard it from the prospective of the
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individual person who desires some thing, it grants him the right to
gratify his needs. This is the perspective of Hobbes and, in
mitigated form, of Locke for it can be seen as an expression of the
right to self-preservation. Hegel, as we have noted, is concerned to
reject this as the basis of the right to things. Instead he insists
that property represents the embodiment, albeit in an immediate way,
of the human will in an external form. That is, "from the standpoint
of freedom, property is the first embodiment of freedom and so is in
itself a substantive end". (PR. No. 45, Remark). Property is an
end in itself, and not merely a means to a further end, because in
property the will of the person becomes objective to himself for the
first time. Property must be private property, Hegel argues, for the
rationale of property is that it objectifies the will of each person
and hence must be seen as the embodiment of this exclusive will. Not
only would property held in common deny to each person the right to
see his particular will explicitly objectified, but its distribution
would also require constraints and structures which are beyond the
limits of the conceptual space described by Abstract Right. The
"absolute right of appropriation", based as it is on the prior claim
that things have no rights at all, may offend the modern "ecologically-
minded" consciousness; it must be seen, however, as entirely consistent
with the strict application of the principles of Abstract Right. Hegel
does state that the "specific characteristics pertaining to private
property may have to be subordinated to a higher sphere of right (e.g.
to a society or the state)... /but/ such exceptions to private property
cannot be grounded in chance, in private caprice, or private advantage,
but only in the rational organism of the state." (PIR. No. 46, Remark).
Prohibitions against tinkering with the concept of property apply also
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to any attempt to impose limits on the amount of private property a
person may possess. In Abstract Right men are equal but only as
persons, "that is, with respect only to the source from which
possession springs; the inference from this is that everyone must
have property... But this equality is something apart from the fixing
of particular amounts, from the question of how much I own." (PR.
No. 49, Addition). Such questions cannot be asked in Abstract Right,
but require principles of right which are more developed than those
which regard the right to property as an objective embodiment of
personality.
Hegel's actual treatment of property is quite conventional,
at least from the perspective of traditional legal theory. He
distinguishes three moments in the development of the concept of
property; taking possession of the thing, use of the thing, and
alienation of the thing. Each of those moments marks a modification
in the concept of property. What is specifically Hegelian in this
treatment is that each modification is "determined in the course of
the will's relation to the thing". (PR. No. 53). That is modifications
in the concept of property are related directly to stages in the
dialectical development of the will. The dialectical tension rests on
the contradiction between the universality of the will and the
particularity of the objects available to it; that is, between the
will's demand for universal satisfaction and its practical restriction
to particular objects. The three moments in the concept of property
are described by Hegel as, respectively, the "positive, negative and
infinite judgements of the will on the thing", (ibid) Those three
forms of judgement are grouped together in the Encyclopaedia Logic
under the general heading "Qualitative Judgement". (Enc. No. 172-173).
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It is not Hegel's practice to continually refer his readers to his
other writings in order to increase their comprehension of the work
before them. Because such cross-references could be made at almost
any point in Hegel's works it is odd that he should choose to do so
at this point. Whatever his motives for doing so, it is a welcome
reference since it sheds light on the dialectic of will with
respect to property and so I will employ it in the course of the
discussion of property.
Taking possession is the first modification of property.
Hegel writes: "Since property is the embodiment of personality, my
inward idea and will that something is to be mine is not enough to
make it my property; to secure this end occupancy is requisite. The
embodiment which my willing thereby attains involves its recognizabil
by others." (PR No. 51). There are three distinct ways to signify
occupancy. The first is through direct physical appropriation such
as the grasping of a tool or a weapon, or physically occupying a
parcel of land. The second way is through the imposition of a form
on something through the agency of human labour. This includes not
only the creation of objects out of inorganic materials but also the
formation of the organic, such as tilling the soil or raising animals
Unlike the first way, possession through formation does not depend on
the immediate physical presence of the owner. The alteration of the
form is an objective sign of the labour which created the new form
and this sign persists even when the owner is not directly present.
The third way is to mark the thing in such a way that the mark is
recognized as representing the will. Although all three ways involve
marking the thing in some way, the last mentioned is the most complex
since the mark employed only represents the will, whereas the first
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two ways involve the direct physical activity of the will. Hegel's
point may be somewhat obscure here, but it appears to state, simply,
that the capacity to signify ownership through an abstract mark
involves a more complex system of recognition and, therefore, of
self-consciousness^ than the other two.
This rather conventional description of the ways of "taking
possession" should not obscure the dialectic of the will as it
struggles to actualize freedom. Hegel describes "taking possession"
as the "positive judgement of the will on the thing". Positive
judgement is described in the Logic as the most immediate attempt to
attach a predicate to a subject. The problem with this type of
judgement is that it attempts to link a universal with a particular.
With respect to the possession of property, for example, the positive
judgement states that "the will is property". That is, the will exists
objectively as property. But property must be "this property" or
"that property". Property must always refer to particular property,
because the will could not occupy and possess property in general,
or property as abstract universal. The will on the other hand, even
though it is the will of this or that individual, is universal. There
may be particular acts of will, but the will itself, viewed as the
capacity37 to act practically in the world, cannot be exhausted in
any one act. The will, therefore, cannot be confined to a particular
piece of property and so the judgement can only express a partial
relation and not a truth. The predicate (property) can only relate
to one part of the subject (will). But the will, as universal, demands
a predicate which does not restrict itself to a particular. Since
according to the principles of Abstract Right, property is the
objective actualization of freedom, the will must seek a new relation
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to property. That is, it must establish a relation between itself
and property in which property is seen to be "congruous with...(its)
...concrete nature...(as)... subject". (Enc. No. 172) The dialectic
of the will in Abstract Right may be seen as propelled by the demand
of personality (as will) to discover a form of property which is
adequate to itself as universal concept, i.e. as free.
The second major modification of property is use. The use
of a thing requires the expenditure of labour, in some form, on the
thing in order to realize certain desired results. The emphasis
is on the utility of the thing to the person who expends his labour
upon it. There is nothing complicated or mysterious about this
characterization of the second stage in the development of property.
From the perspective of the dialectic of will, however, the use of a
thing assumes some complexity. In "use", will negates the limiting of
itself to a particular existent which results from the positive judge¬
ment of "taking possession". Property loses its character as the sub¬
stantive embodiment of the will. Property is now seen only as a locus
of specific utilities. The will is regarded as a locus of particular
needs, desires, inclinations and so forth. The particular demands of
the will are regarded as substantive and as ends in themselves, while
property loses its substantiveness and acquires the character of a
means to an end. Property has no significance other than as a means
to an end which is determined by the will. In using a thing the will
forces it to conform to its own demands and thereby negates the
original substantiveness of property as established in "taking
possession". This "negative judgement" accomplishes two things: first,
the universal will becomes particularized as a locus of specific demands;
second, property in general takes on the appearance of use-value in
general, i.e. it assumes a universal character of utility since each
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"thing" is "valuable" to the extent that it is useful in satisfying
a particular demand of the will. (PR_. No. 63)
The third modification described by Hegel is the "alienation
of property". Property is "possessed" (it assumes the form of private
property) when the will is put into it. Its character as private
property depends on the presence of the will of a person and, therefore,
when the will is withdrawn it loses its character as private, or as
belonging to a particular person. The withdrawal of the will from the
thing can occur through simple abandonment through renunciation, or
through an exchange whereby a person alienates the thing and allows it
to pass into the possession of an other person. Exchange generally
occurs voluntarily, but it is possible to alienate things under force,
even to the extent of alienating one's right to freedom (slavery).
Things capable of being alienated in a free and voluntary manner include
products of a particular "physical and mental skill and of (the)
power to act". (PR No. 67). Hegel emphasizes the point that alienation
of the power to act must be governed by considerations such as duration,
reward and so on. If no such considerations exist and the person
alienates all his power without restriction, then he is no more than
the property of another, i.e. a slave. The type of judgement the will
makes on the thing at this stage corresponds to infinite judgement.
Infinite judgement expresses the complete incompatibility of subject
and predicate. In alienation the will renounces the thing and returns
to itself. Infinite judgement, Hegel acknowledges, gets its place in
formal logic as a "nonsensical curiosity". (Enc. No. 173). Hegel
retains it because, he argues, it exhibits "the proximate result of the
dialectical process in the immediate judgements preceding (the
positive and simply negative), and distinctly displays their finitude
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and untruth", (ibid). With respect to property the infinite judgement
accomplishes this synthesis in the following manner: "it is negative
in that it involves spurning the thing altogether; it is positive
because it is only a thing completely mine which I can so spurn". (PR.
No. 65, Addition).
Although Hegel's introduction of qualitative judgement may
appear both capricious and forced, we would be wrong to condemn him
for it. The dialectic of will is propelled by the struggle for a free,
objective order. The protagonist (if this is not an inappropriate term
here) of this struggle is man considered as will. If will is to succeed
it must create a world adequate to itself. The limits of qualitative
judgement underline the limits of property as the objective embodiment
of the free will. The free will as subject cannot be forced into agree¬
ment with property as predicate. There will always be remainder, since
the free will is always more than a particular thing. We shall return
to this point later in the discussion of the transition from Abstract
Right to Morality. For now, it is worth emphasizing that Hegel's
introduction of terms from his Logic helps to clarify the dialectical
tension rather than obscure it. If we do not keep this tension clearly
before us then the Philosophy of Right will lose its dynamic character
and we will be unable to follow its path of development.
We have now examined the three modifications of private
property which result from the three distinct ways in which will relates
to its object (the "thing"). But the relations between an individual
will and its object (property) do not exhaust the possibilities open
to the will in Abstract Right. The very notion of private property,
of this thing as "mine", demands the presence of the will of an other
which is excluded from occupancy of the thing. Further, the security
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of private property demands the recognition by the will of the other
that the proprietor of the thing has a right to private ownership.
In other words, the security of private property depends on the prior
acceptance of the cardinal rule of Abstract Right to respect the rights
of others. This is clearly not a moral demand, for it can be justified
solely on the basis that without such recognition private property as
such becomes insecure and unstable.
This moment of recognition is made explicit in contract.
Contract at this stage (i.e. Abstract Right) is not a legal concept guaranteed
by a system of positive laws. Hegel restricts contract to its most
basic possible meaning. It refers to nothing more than the voluntary
decision by two or more persons to come together for the purpose of
exchanging private property. Indeed, it need not even involve exchange,
since Hegel includes a voluntary gift from one person to another under
the general category of contract. As we have seen, private property
involves a dialectic of will which may remain completely hidden to the
proprietor. Similarly, in contract the contractors may enter into an
agreement out of considerations based on personal greed, on gaining an
advantage over the other, on extending personal power and so forth.
There is no necessity for good feelings and benevolence between the
contractors. Nevertheless, contractual relationships involve a dialectic
of the will which advances the development towards freedom.
Contractual relationships are formed between two or more
proprietors of property. Before this is possible each contractor must
recognize the rights of the other. Let us look at the example in
which two landowners agree to exchange parcels of land. Each parcel
of land embodies positively the will of its owner. Each also embodies
negatively the will of the other, i.e. the status of each as private
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property rests on the recognition by the other persons (wills) that
it belongs to a person and, therefore, cannot be possessed. For
exchange to take place, each owner must alienate his own property and
take possession of the property of the other. From the perspective
of the dialectic of will, this formerly positively-embodied will is
now negatively-embodied since he has withdrawn his positive will from
the thing while, simultaneously, recognizing the right of the other to
embody positively his will in the thing. Conversely, the will of the
other, which was formerly negatively-embodied in the thing, now
becomes positively-embodied. For the exchange to take place an
identity must be established between the wills of the individual
contractors, that is, each contractor must will the exchange to take
place. This identity between the different wills can be regarded as
a willing common to both parties and in which they share equally. This
common will, however, is formed only for the purpose of the contract.
Indeed, the significance of contract is that it is the embodiment of
this common will. This is not inconsequential, however, for the
common will is binding on the contractors. The reciprocal recognition
which precedes a contract, and the obligations (non-moral) which it
imposes on the contractors, substantiate the rights of the person
with respect to others. A contract, however, cannot embody a true
universal will because the contractors only come together to exchange
a particular, external thing. (PR_. No. 75). They don't alienate
their entire beings (slavery) and so the contract can only express a
general agreement to exchange particulars. Neither is there any
universal moral or ethical content to a contract. We shall see later
how Hegel's strictly-limited concept of contract affects his view of
"social contract theories". Hegel's classification of contracts is
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clear and uncomplicated. He distinguishes between "formal" and
"real" contracts. In a formal contract one contractor alienates
his property and the other contractor takes possession of it. A
formal contract is, in fact, a gift. It may be a gift in the
conventional sense, or it may be a gift of some service for which
no remuneration is demanded. It may involve the loan of something
for which there is no charge—including, in the case of money,
interest charges. In a real contract private property is exchanged.
The contractors may exchange physical objects. They may exchange a
specific physical object for some universal store of value, i.e.
money. They may exchange the temporary use of a thing for money or some
other consideration, e.g. enter into a rental agreement. This latter
type of exchange would include a money loan on which interest is
paid. Finally, a real contract can include the selling of labour
for wages, monetary or otherwise. (PR. No. 80). In a real contract
the contractors exchange property but do not lose their status as
property-owners. Each seeks to at least maintain his position as a
property-owner, if not actually better it, as a result of entering
into a contract. Hegel points out that, in the case of real contracts,
each contractor is really calculating his advantage in terms of an
abstract universal concept, namely value. "Value is the universal in
which the subjects of the contract participate." (PR. No. 77).
But we should not be misled by the occasional references to
"universality" in connection with the discussion of contract. The
parties to a contract enter into an agreement as a result of their
individual calculations of self-interest. The contract "generalizes"
those particular calculations, in order that an exchange of some sort
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may take place. Because each party looks only to its own self-
interest, and is, at best, indifferent to the interests of other
parties, the whole notion of contract in Abstract Right is plagued
by arbitrariness and contingency. There are no grounds, in Abstract
Right, upon which a concrete notion of universality may be established.
The concept of universality demands a rational comprehension of what
is absolutely essential. With respect to the will, an adequate
concept of universality must include a rational grasp of what must
be present in human activity if that activity is to create a world
of human freedom. Abstract Right maintains the rights of personality
as the true universal. As we have already seen, the rights of
personality amount to no more than the mutual recognition of the
right to private property. Questions concerning the just distribution
of finite resources, the proper use of private property, the role
which contingency may play in the accumulation of wealth and similar
questions, are matters of indifference to the principles of Abstract
Right. Private calculation based on particular considerations is the
operative mode of reasoning in Abstract Right. It is the very
particularity of the practical reasoning in Abstract Right which
belies its claims to universality. The only mediation of the
particularity of private wills occurs in contract, but this is only a
posited mediation which comes into existence at a particular time and
place, concerns only one specific object, and passes away when the
terms of the contract have been fulfilled. Hegel states that "this
particularity of the will, taken by itself, is arbitrariness and
contingency, and in contract I have surrendered these only as arbitrar¬
iness in the case of a single thing and not as the arbitrariness and
contingency of the will itself". (PR_. No. 81, Remark).
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It is clear that contract cannot create a concrete universal.
For example, a contract cannot be seen as resting on the prior notion
of "promising" in the moral sense with its concomittant moral obligation
to fulfil the terms of a promise. Moral concepts are excluded by the
principles of Abstract Right. The only calculation prior to entering
into a contract is whether it furthers the particular interests of the
contracting parties. By extension, the only motive for fulfilling
contractual obligations is based on self-interested calculation. The
common will created by the contract appears to correspond to the
(apparently universal) principle of Abstract Right to respect the rights
of others. But that principle (and its respect) is similarly grounded
in self-interest. It bears only the most tenuous formal connections
with moral concepts, such as Kant's "categorical imperative". In
practice, it is always open to the challenge that obeisance to that
principle is a restriction of personal right. I choose to respect the
rights of others because of a calculation that this respect is the
best way of protecting my personal rights. But calculations of this
sort are inherently unstable. If I believe that I can get away with
abrogating another's personal rights--that is, suffer no personal
consequences whatsoever for this transgression--then I may choose to
do so and it is difficult to indicate what, if anything, could convince
me to do otherwise. Abstract Right does not, in itself, maintain
principles which overrule calculations based on self-interest. This
becomes glaringly apparent in contract when one of the parties chooses
not to fulfil his contractual obligations. Hegel terms this opposition
of the particular will to the common will established by contract
"wrong". Because the principle of practical activity in Abstract
Right is particular self-interest, Hegel states that contract
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constantly "remains at the mercy of wrong" (PR_. No. 81, Addition).
Despite these limitations, Abstract Right does maintain
that personal rights and the attendant principle of reciprocal
recognition are universal. Although the universality may be only
posited, and hence contingent, it does at least mark the first appearance
of universality in the sphere of practical activity. Appearance
(Erscheinung) is used here in the special sense of a limited, partial
expression of the universal. The true universal, which may also be
regarded as the essence or the concept, only becomes concrete as Idea.
Short of this absolute stage, however, it appears in a variety of
partial forms which may be ranked hierarchically with regard to their
relative completeness and comprehensiveness. Contract is one such
appearance and, although from the perspective of the Idea it is
radically incomplete, it nonetheless does mark an advance in the
progress of the concept. Even though the individual actor may choose
to respect contracts on the basis of a calculation grounded solely on
self-interest, the choice to respect them is better than the choice
not to do so. The correspondence between the particular wills of the
contracting parties and the principle of right embodied in the contract,
even though the correspondence may be purely fortuitous, indicates
a recognition of the limited universality of this principle of right.
In bluntest possible terms, the self-interest which justifies obedience
to the terms of a contract is higher than the self-interest which
justifies breaking those terms. In the former case the principle of
mutual self-interest is maintained between the parties, if only in a
limited sense, while in the latter case the principle is consciously
abrogated. Admittedly, the distinction is a rather fine one, but it
is sufficiently real for Hegel to introduce the concept of wrong based
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upon it. Indeed, the severity of the wrong is directly proportional
to the degree to which the individual will sets itself against the
limited universality of the principles of Abstract Right.
The first type of wrong discussed by Hegel is "non-malicious"
wrong. In simplest terms, non-malicious wrong describes those cases
in which a conflict of claims to property arise. The parties to such
a dispute act in good faith. Each believes his title to a specific
"thing" is legitimate. The disputants recognize the priority of the
principles of right; the conflict is not over the legitimacy of the
principle but rather over its application with respect to a specific
issue. It is this type of conflict which normally comprises the
"sphere of civil suits at law". (PR.No. 85). The invocation of the
term "civil suit" may be misleading. Hegel is not saying that, in
Abstract Right, non-malicious wrongs lead to civil suits decided by
courts of law. In Abstract Right there are no courts and, indeed,
there are no positive laws. Although the parties may recognize the
principle of right, there is no recognized, mediating institution
"of such a sort that in face of it the parties would have to renounce
their particular interests and points of view". (PR_. No. 86).
The second type of wrong is "fraud". Fraud may occur when
real contracts of exchange are made. As we have seen, a contract
posits a common will which mediates the exchange. What is common
between the parties may be viewed in two distinct but inseparable ways.
First, the parties must respect the principle of right if an exchange
of private property is to be possible. Second, the parties desire
to maintain their positions as property owners. Each agrees to the
exchange because he perceives the exchange as advantageous. For such
an exchange to take place the things to be exchanged must be made
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commensurable, and this is accomplished through the introduction of
the concept of value. Each represents his exchangeable item to the
other as valuable for one reason or another, and it is the concept
of abstract value which must be common to the parties if an exchange
is to be possible. In fraud, one party represents his property as
having a certain value, and then this claim of value is discovered
by the other party to be false. For example, a person could artificially
cover up the defects of his horse, present him as sound, and then
exchange him for something equal in value to a healthy horse. Hegel
labels this "fraud". An exchange has taken place, but it has been
accomplished under fraudulent circumstances. From the perspective of
right, Hegel claims that the wrong-doer, in perpetrating a fraud,
negates the limited universality posited by contract. He exhibits no
respect for what is posited as common between the parties, namely the
principle of right and the concept of abstract value. Pushing his
analysis further, Hegel maintains that, in fraud, the wrong-doer does
recognize the particular aspect of right in so far as he does transfer
some thing to the defrauded party. His status as a property owner is
left intact. Admittedly, this "recognition" may be very cynical, but
Hegel's point is that manipulation of the principles of right exhibits
some sort of recognition of the power and force of these principles.
Fraud cases would, under a system of positive law, be covered by
criminal prosecution; of course, as in the previous type of wrong, no
such system exists in Abstract Right.
The final stage of wrong Hegel labels "crime". The criminal
in some way injures or coerces the will of another person. The will
of the person, in Abstract Right, is embodied in private property. In
theft, for example, the criminal not only steals a particular thing,
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but he also negates the right of personality which is represented
by the embodiment of a particular will in the stolen thing. The
criminal, therefore, willfully negates the rights of his victim.
He does not even make a pretense of recognizing the principles of
right as was the case in fraud. He knowingly sets his own particular
will against the "universal" principles of right enshrined in Abstract
Right. In an apparently mystifying passage Hegel describes this
willfulness on the part of the criminal as a "positive" act. (PR.
No. 99). To understand this statement we must first of all contrast
it with what is negative in the act of the willful criminal. In a
criminal act, the criminal denies the rights of his victim. He
denies the victim's right to private property. In the most extreme
cases, he denies the victim's right to self-possession, i.e. to his
own life which the criminal negates through an act of murder. Through¬
out the emphasis is on the sheer negativity of the criminal act. There
is another side to the criminal act, however, and from the perspective
of the dialectic of the will it is of major significance.
In Abstract Right, the universality of the principles of
right is not substantive. The principles only have reality in the
particular wills of the particular actors. The immediacy of this one-
sidedness is evidenced most clearly in "taking possession" and "use".
In "contract", the particularity of single wills is partially mediated
through the positing of a common will. There is no necessity, no true
universality, in the common will because it is seen to depend on the
contingent and arbitrary wills of the contractors. In wrong, the
opposition between universal and particular becomes explicit. The
criminal, through his act, explicitly demonstrates that he believes
his particular will is the only thing that matters. In trampling
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over the rights of others, in denying their validity, he raises the
principles of Abstract Right to the level of explicit universality,
albeit as universals to be negated. The criminal's rejection of
right as such necessarily involves his negation of the entire concept
of right, of right as universal.
The opposition between universal and particular, which the
criminal brings to light through his criminal act, has profound
consequences for the principles of Abstract Right. Those consequences
emerge in Hegel's discussion of punishment. Once a criminal act has
transpired, the question of how to rectify the crime arises. The
criminal act negates both the particular private property of a
particular proprietor and the universal principle of right which is
embodied in the proprietor's right to his property. Recompense for
the victim is justified because of the particular harm he has suffered.
But the absolute right of punishment is ultimately dependant on the
recognition of the second moment of negation. In punishing the
criminal the universality of right is re-established in opposition to
the willful arbitrariness underlying a criminal's elevation of his
own particular desires over universal right. This retributive
element of punishment, in so far as it is a negation of the negation
(of universal right by the particular arbitrary will of the criminal),
is the ultimate justification of punishment.
But within Abstract Right it is precisely this universal
element of punishment which is missing. Hegel states that the
punishment of crime "in the sphere /Abstract Righf/ where right is
immediate is principally revenge" (PR. No. 102). It is revenge
because the party who punishes the criminal acts as a particular person
motivated by particular interests. There are no courts of law, no
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impartial policemen, judges or lawyers in the sphere of Abstract
Right. In a rational political society those institutions are seen
as representing the universal interests of the political society.
In Abstract Right, punishment is meted out either by the victim of
the crime or somebody else who has a vested interest in punishing
the criminal. Punishment in Abstract Right is always "an act of a
subjective will... whose justification, therefore, is in all cases
contingent..." (ibid). Hegel continues: "Hence revenge, because
it is a positive action of a particular will, becomes a new trans¬
gression; as thus contradictory in character, it falls into an infinite
progression and descends from one generation to another ad infinitum."
(ibid). Because there is no recognized legitimate, universal agency
of retribution which is seen to act on behalf of universal right and
not out of particular interest, justice cannot be seen to be done;
punishment appears arbitrary (revenge) and may even appear as a new
wrong (e.g. by friends or relatives of the criminal) demanding
punishment, especially if the punishment does not suit the crime.
Abstract Right was represented as a sphere in which human
freedom could be actualized. It contains a set of principles and it
must not step outside the limits of those principles if it is to
remain true to its original claims. The problem now facing advocates
of Abstract Right is how to deal with the problem of punishment as it
is posed by Hegel. There are two basic alternatives available at
this point. The first is to devise a way of dealing with the degeneration
of the sphere of activity based on personal right (criminal acts)
consistent with the principles which structure that sphere. The second
is to abandon the principles of Abstract Right and seek a more
complete system of principles within which freedom is possible.
- 132 -
Historically, the most important attempt to follow the
first alternative was made by John Locke. Further, it must be
emphasized that the anarchy of crime and its punishment which Hegel
describes follows closely the description which Locke advances of
the degeneration of the state of nature. Locke grants every man in
the state of nature the "Right to punish the Offender, and be
Executioner of the Law of Nature".38 Any man who acts against the
freedom of another man, and that includes any act which threatens
his life and private property, puts himself into "a State of War
with him".39 if one man does seek to act against another man's
freedom, he is subject to the most horrible punishment. The arbitrar¬
iness of punishment in the state of nature is not at all hidden by
Locke. He grants every man the right to punish another--even to the
point of taking his life--for offenses which may be relatively minor.
A thief, for example, may be executed even if he has not threatened
his victim's life in any manner. Locke maintains that a thief does
not respect the laws of nature and so he may be seen as entering a
state of war against his victim. But there are no defined limits to
a state of war and so the victim has the right to assume that the
thief may eventually seek to murder him and, therefore, to put the
thief, no matter how petty, to death.40 it is clear that even the
code of Draco could be seen as just according to such a notion of
wrong and its punishment. But at least the Draconian laws were
public and enforced equally. In the Lockean state of nature the
thief may or may not be put to death, depending on the will of his
captor. Punishment in the state of nature is, in truth, not punishment
at all, but rather always assumes the form of revenge.^ The
difference between "punishment" in the state of nature and punishment
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in civil society is clearly identified by Locke.
"For want of positive laws, and Judges with
Authority to appeal to, the State of War
once begun, continues... To avoid this
State of War...is one great reason of Men
putting themselves into Society, and
quitting the State of Nature. For where
there is an Authority, a Power on Earth,
from which relief can be had by appeal,
there the continuance of the State of War
is excluded, and the Controversie is
decided by that Power."42
Punishment of a crime in the State of Nature takes the form
of arbitrary private revenge; in civil society it assumes the form of
just punishment administered by a recognized, universal authority.
Locke and Hegel are in close agreement on this point. The problem
now is to get from a State of Nature to political society. It is here
that Locke moves from a state of nature to the creation of civil society.
The individuals in the State of Nature voluntarily decide to establish
a government and to entrust to that government the powers of enacting
legislation and enforcing positive laws through the monopolization of
the powers of enforcement, prosecution and punishment. The government
does not have absolute license in the area, for the citizens have the
right to rebellion if the government becomes oppressive. On the other
side every man who "has enter'd into civil Society, and is become a
member of any Commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish
Offenses against the Law of Nature, in prosecution of his own private
Judgement...
Locke's intention here is quite clear. The question,
however, is whether the fiduciary transfer of the right to punish
criminals from private individuals to civil government can be justified
philosophically. Hegel's answer is that it can not under any
circumstances, even if the transfer of right be accomplished through a
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contract. Locke claims that the individual renounces his right to
punishment. Hegel claims that the individual in the state of nature
cannot have such a right. Punishment can only be meted out by a
recognized, universal authority. The "natural" individual may have
the right to annul a crime, but such annulment is necessarily
arbitrary. In the state of nature, the only motivation for action
is particular self-interest. The universal has no concrete
embodiment in any recognized authority; it appears only in an
immediate and one-sided form as the particular wills of "natural"
persons. The right to defend one's property and to take action
against those who threaten or harm one's property, must be distinguished
from the right to punishment, for this latter right can only truly be
invested in a recognized universal authority. If this is the case then
the "natural" individuals in Locke's state of nature cannot accomplish
through the establishment of government what Locke claims for them,
namely the voluntary transfer to government of the right to punish
criminals. They cannot accomplish this because they do not have the
right to punish in the first place, i.e. in the state of nature. Locke
himself writes:
"For it being but the joynt power of every
member of the Society given up to that
Person, or Assembly, which is Legislator,
it can be no more than those persons had
in a State of Nature before they enter'd
into Society, and gave up to the Community.
For no Body can transfer to another more
power than he has in himself...
The state of nature, which is the sphere of Abstract Right,
cannot be maintained because it descends into an anarchic state of
war. The only resolution to this degeneration, within the principles
of Abstract Right, is the establishment of a universal authority by
means of a fiduciary or contractual agreement. But such an authority
is impossible since the particular wills which are party to its
creation cannot transfer to it a universality which they do not
possess. The only possible way out of this conceptual tangle is
to abandon the restrictive principles of Abstract Right. This
results from the recognition of the contradictions internal to
Abstract Right between its principles and its claims to represent
true freedom. Its principles cannot be stretched far enough to
support the steps which must be taken if the State of War is to be
ended. We must examine other principles to see if they can support
the claim that the reality which they structure objectifies human
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but that right to "self-defence" is not the right to punishment.
In other words, the distinction between punishment and revenge is




Abstract Right ultimately founders on the shoals of anarchic
particularity. In line with the way in which we have characterized
Hegel's methodology, we can describe the breakdown as the result of
the contradiction between the "reality" generated by the principles of
Abstract Right and the claims to freedom initially advanced on behalf
of those principles. The contradictions revealed by the examination
of Abstract Right cannot be resolved within the principles of Abstract
Right. But this does not entail the wholesale condemnation of all
that has been discovered to be inadequate. The dialectical advance
beyond Abstract Right has, as its proximate matter, the revealed
contradictions of Abstract Right. In the Philosophy of Right the
section titled "Morality" succeeds Abstract Right. As we have seen,
the Philosophy of Right describes the dialectic of the will in its
struggle to actualize freedom. Therefore, we can appreciate the transi¬
tion from Abstract Right to Morality more completely if we briefly
recapitulate the dialectic of the will to the point where Morality
first makes its appearance.
What is truly universal in the will is the concept of freedom.
Abstract Right maintains that this universality is embodied in the
rights of personality, i.e. individuals conceived in their particularity
as persons. The universal rights of personality are manifested in the
appropriative activity of particular property-owning persons. The
universal is in no sense mediated by the particular; rather it is
embodied immediately in particular acts of property appropriation.
Contract does represent the universal rights of personality, but only
in a partial form. As something common to both parties it is less
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particularistic than the private wills of each party. As posited,
however, it is subject to contingency and can never be more than an
appearance of the universal. In contract, the immediate fusion of
universal and particular which marked the stage of property is pried
apart, and we now have a distinction between particular wills and a
common will (i.e. an appearance of the universal will). In crime,
the universal rights of personality are explicitly challenged by the
particular will of the criminal. Universal and particular are in
explicit conflict and, as we have seen, the breach cannot be healed
within Abstract Right. The problem now is to discover a new set of
principles which will enable universal and particular to be brought
together in such a way that the result of this dialectical interplay
is the free individual.
Criminal activity is not merely the last gasp of Abstract
Right, for it also points the way forward beyond the limitations of
Abstract Right. The open conflict between universal and particular
reveals several important features. First of all, universal and
particular rights are equally abstract when conceived in isolation.
Second, their abstractness cannot be overcome because Abstract Right
does not contain principles which can create the conditions necessary
for mediation between universal and particular rights. Third, this
abstractness, this separation, leads to their ultimate collision and
conflict. Fourth, from the perspective of the particular person, the
universal principles of right appear as an external restriction upon
his right to self-satisfaction. The latent opposition between universal
and particular rights is made explicit by the criminal act where the
conflict between a particular demand and an external limit is resolved
on the side of the particular. We have already noted the necessity of
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establishing new principles of freedom within which universal and
particular elements of the implicitly free will may be brought
together. We now see that this is only possible if the particular
will does not perceive the universal as an external limit imposed
upon it arbitrarily.
The new set of principles establishes a new shape of
experience, which Hegel titles "Morality". In Morality the individual
appears as a subject. "Subject" is not used loosely here for it has a
specific meaning, especially in contrast with the notion of personality.
As we have seen, personality has "things" for its object and the rights
of personality refer only to the "external" activity of the person with
respect to both other persons and to things. The subjective disposi¬
tions, intentions, deliberations and so on are of no concern to the
rights of personality. In morality, however, it is this subjective
side of the individual which is considered important. The subject has
itself for its object, and not some external "thing". The primary
right of Morality is the right of the individual subject to determine
(actualize) itself as subjectivity.
The concept (universal) of self-determination is difficult to
specify in abstraction from particular attempts at self-determination.
When we come to examine the dialectic of the moral will the concept
will become more clear. We can, however, say a few general words about
this concept. In Abstract Right, freedom as universal came to be
identified with private property. Although this may be denied on the
grounds that Abstract Right only guaranteed the rights of personality, we
have seen that this denial cannot be maintained. Personal right in
practice is the right to private property. Private property objectifies
personal right and, thereby, objectifies freedom. But the result of
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this transformation is that private property becomes the measure of
freedom. Personal freedom has no reality unless the person owns
private property. For the propertyless, freedom remains only an
empty potentiality. But private property is subject to the arbitrar¬
iness and contingency of events such as natural disaster or crime.
Since freedom is embodied in private property, it too is subject to
arbitrariness. The problem facing the advocates of human freedom is the
discovery of a mode of freedom which is secure from the arbitrariness
suffered by the "persons" of Abstract Right. The response to this
dilemma was the formulation of a concept of freedom which was securely
embodied in moral subjectivity. The concept of freedom as self-
determination appears to satisfy the demand that freedom not be alienable
as a result of forces beyond the control of individual subjects.
The most basic presupposition of Morality is that there is a
sharp distinction between subject and object, or between the particular
moral subject and the world - natural and human - within which it must
act. All activity of the subject is grounded in this distinction.
Indeed, if this distinction did not exist, self-determination would be
impossible. This becomes clear when we contrast Morality with Abstract
Right. In Abstract Right individuals appeared only as property-owners.
Their particularity was immediately objectified in property. There was
no room for subjectivity within the principles of Abstract Right. The
specifics of personality were of no consequence. Each person existed
only to the extent that he was objectified in his private property.
There could be no self-determination because there was no "self" to be
determined. The self appears only as personality and personality
explicitly ignores all subjectivity. The claims of subjectivity, the
demands for subjective satisfaction, only emerge in the criminal act when
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the criminal declares his subjective (particular) interest in the face
of an abstract universal which is indifferent to such subjectivity.
In Morality the distinction between subject and object (world)
does not depend on the activity of the criminal. Rather it is the
basic presupposition of all free activity. The subject locates the
principle of freedom within himself. In doing so, he draws a distinction
between his subjectivity and the objective world which is "external"
to it. That is, he negates the demands of the objective world upon him
in order to ascertain the domain of subjectivity and to secure its
integrity against all forces which may seek to impinge upon it. The
limits which circumscribe subjectivity, however, are also a restriction
or barrier for the subject. Within the domain of subjectivity the
freedom of the moral subject is secure but empty. The subject must
"transcend this barrier" if it is to give its freedom existence, i.e.
actualize it as something objective and real in the world. In translating
subjectivity into objective actuality the subject is most concerned not
to lose itself in objectivity. It must maintain its integrity as a
free subject willing its own freedom. We can view this as the problem
of maintaining identity through difference. The identity of the self¬
consciously free subject is established initially as a self-identity
within the domain of subjectivity. The objective world lies outside
this self-identity; it is an explicit difference. The subject must act
in this world, i.e. it must abandon the certainty of self-identity and
act in a world which is different from itself. The challenge is to act
in such a way that the integrity of the self is not shattered. This is
accomplished through acting in such a way that the subjectivity of the
subject is recognizable within the objective act. What is both subjective
and capable of persisting through the objectivity of action is the
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"purpose" or "aim" of the willing subject J
The subject, secure within its subjectivity, determines a
course of action. This action is objective and yet, from the
perspective of the subject, it is not an objectivity which destroys
subjectivity. Rather, action is regarded as translating subjective
purpose into objectivity. Action is not a restriction of freedom if
the subject can keep its subjectively-determined purpose before itself
as its object. That is, the subject acts in order to give itself
objectivity and this objectivity is seen as a determination of the
self. The integrity of the self, its freedom, is extended through
activity, and not limited. The subject does not follow the rules of
an abstract "external" universal when it acts, as was the case in
Abstract Right; rather it recognizes the universal - freedom - as exist¬
ing within itself, and knows that it actualizes this universal when it
determines itself freely in the world. "The content as 'mine' has for
me this character: by virtue of its identity in subject and object it
enshrines for me my subjectivity, not merely as my inner purpose, but
also inasmuch as it has acquired outward existence" (PR.No. 110, Remark).
The integrity of the will as free subjectivity is maintained through the
recognition of the subjective purpose of the will in the objective act.
But this has a negative side as well, for the subject can disown any
objective thing or act which does not realize its subjective purpose.
Indeed, this provides us with the first general determination of the
content of the right of the moral subject.
"In accordance with this right (of the subjective
will) the will recognizes something and is some¬
thing, only in so far as the thing is its own and
as the will is present to itself there as something
subjective" (PR_. No. 107).
As the dialectic of the will progresses the moral subject will alter
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the basic terms of its moral right, but all such alterations will be
seen as attempts to hold true to the basic definition of moral right
quoted above.
The dichotomy between subjectivityand objectivity which is
presupposed in Morality can only be overcome through the activity of the
moral subject. It is through moral activity that the subject
transforms the objective world into the sphere of human freedom. To
remain inactive is to be locked within an empty subjectivity which
can only underline the subject's impotence and abstractness. Further,
inactivity does not banish the objective world and this world (of
nature and of man) will continue to flourish and to make demands upon
the impotent subject. Inactivity, therefore, results in a surrender
to forces beyond the subject's control, and this is precisely the
situation which the principles of Morality are designed to overcome.
The moral subject must act and in this activity we can distinguish
three determinate characteristics which designate the activity as
specifically moral. Hegel lists them as follows:
"a) in its externality it must be known to me
as my action;
b) it must bear essentially on the concept as
an 'ought';
c) it must have an essential bearing on the will of
others" (PR. No. 113).
Those three determinate characteristics are clearly formal
criteria which the moral subject sets out as necessarily present in
its activity if it is to regard this activity as moral. They are
formal because they do not specify any particular content to this
activity. The formality of the criteria, however, should not lead us
into underestimating their importance. The dialectic of the moral will
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must be understood as a search for a set of coherent principles which
establish a specific mode of moral activity, thereby actualizing these
formal criteria in particular moral acts. The true universal in the
Philosophy of Right is freedom; the dialectic of the will throughout
the book must be seen as a struggle to actualize this universal. In
Morality the claim is advanced that freedom is actualized through
activity which is consistent with the above-named formal criteria.
Before turning to the attempts to determine what specific content
satisfies this requirement we should examine the formal criteria in
greater detai1.
The first criterion should be quite clear. The abstract
"objectivity" of the principles of Abstract Right has forced the
particular individual to search within his own subjectivity for the
principle of freedom. We have seen that the moral subject must act and
that he maintains his subjectivity in the objective world by regarding
the objective act as an objectification of his subjectively determined
purpose or aim. The objective world is seen as the sphere of self-
determination, and anything in that world which doesn't satisfy this
demand is of no consequence to the moral subject. Hegel explicates this
first formal criterion as follows:
"The content of the subjective or moral will has
a specific character of its own, i.e. even if
it has acquired the form of objectivity, it must
still continue to enshrine my subjectivity, and
my act is to count as mine only if on its inward
side it has been determined by me, if it was my
purpose, my intention; Beyond what lay in my
subjective will I recognize nothing in its
expression as mine. What I wish to see in my
deed is my subjective consciousness over again."
(PR. No. 110, Addition).
The second criterion is always implicit in the moral will.
In the third sub-section of Morality it is raised to the level of an
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explicitly self-conscious principle. In that sub-section Hegel directs
his critique of Morality to the principles first enunciated by Kant,
and subsequently developed by various German philosophers and literary
figures, most notably, and importantly, Fichte. Hegel's characteriza¬
tion of the moral philosophies of Kant and Fichte as the philosophies
of what "ought-to-be" (Sollen) is well known, and I shall reserve my
analysis of this notion of moral experience for my discussion of sub¬
section three. However, at this point we can examine why, with varying
degrees of explicitness, moral activity always relates essentially to
the concept as an "ought". It is possible to do this at a general
level and refrain from examining specific moral theories.
This is most easily accomplished if we recall three general
points about Morality which have already been established. First,
Morality presupposes a dichotomy of subject and object. Second, the
moral subject determines for itself the specific principles which,
when translated into activity, will actualize freedom. To be free is to
act so as to actualize certain principles and, hence, the concept of
freedom becomes identified by the moral subject with the principles
which determine what kinds of action actualize freedom. For example,
if freedom is seen as the maximization of pleasure, then those acts
will be performed which are deemed pleasurable by the moral subject.
The concept of freedom is thus identified with the concept of pleasure,
for the act which produces pleasure actualizes freedom. Third, the
moral subject must act if he is not to remain impotent and, as we have
seen, oppressed by an alien objectivity.
When we combine the three points we can see why Hegel
characterizes all moral activity as involving an "ought" with respect
to its concept. The only possible mediation of the subject-object
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distinction is the moral activity of the moral subject. This activity
must always aim at the actualization of the concept of freedom as it
has been determined by the moral subject for himself, i.e. as pleasure,
the good, or whatever. But precisely because of the radical dichotomy
of subject and object, there can be no guarantee that the moral subject
will actualize his particular concept of freedom. As we shall see when
we examine the various attempts by the moral will to actualize freedom,
the objective world may prove obdurate and indifferent to those
attempts, i.e. the moral subject may fail in his attempts. Of course,
as we have seen in the passage quoted from Hegel as a summary of the
first criterion, the moral subject may only acknowledge those attempts
which are successful while disregarding the failures. However, this
only serves to underline the point that the moral subject, in
distinguishing successful from unsuccessful acts, is really demanding
that all acts ought to actualize freedom, even though this demand
may be thwarted. As Hegel writes, "...the content's adequacy to the
concept is still only something demanded, and hence this entails the
possibility that the content may not be adequate to the concept."
(PR. No. Ill, Remark). If the moral subject is unable to actualize
this concept of freedom then there are two courses open to him. He
can maintain the legitimacy and coherency of his principles and try
again and again to actualize them, regardless of the frustration he
may feel at constant failure. Alternatively, he can reexamine his
principles and alter them if he feels that they are deficient in
some way, i.e. if he believes that the source of failure lies in the
principles themselves and not in the obduracy of the objective world.
The dialectic of moral experience will be seen to develop as a result
of the adoption of this second alternative by the moral subject.
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The third criterion is the most important from the perspec¬
tive of Morality; that is, the presence of the third criterion is most
important if the action of a subject is to be regarded as moral. The
first criterion can be met by a willful subjectivity or a vicious
selfishness which lives only for itself. The second may express
nothing more than a constant and unabating desire that the world should
be as "I" want it to be. There is nothing specifically moral about this.
But the third criterion does invest the subject's action with moral
worth and rescues the first two criteria from the possible charges
against them. It is for this reason that the three criteria must
always be present together, for the absence of any one of them will
rob the action of its moral character.
In Abstract Right we saw that persons relate to each other as
property-owners. Without this mutual recognition the rights of
Abstract Right would be meaningless. The designation of a thing as
"mine" only makes sense in a world where the notion of "mine" (as
opposed to "thine") makes sense. Private property on a deserted island
is unnecessary, for there can be no claims against the stranded islander's
use of any thing.
In a populated area private property can only be a right if
the concept of personal appropriation and concommitant exclusion of all
other claims is recognized. Otherwise, the taking possession of a thing
may be viewed as a theft from the common stock of things. In summary,
a right can only be a right if there are other individuals involved and
if there is mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the right in question.
Similarly, the rights of the moral subject can only exist
within a context of mutual recognition. If rights are equally distributed
then the recognition involved in legitimating a right must be between
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equals. In Abstract Right, persons all equally possess the right to
private property and, therefore, the right to private property is
legitimated by an act of mutual recognition by persons (property-
owners). In a political state the rights of a citizen rest on the
recognition by citizens of the legitimacy of such rights. In the case
of unequal distribution of right, such as obtains in a master-slave
relationship, the equality of the participants need not be present.
But in such a case recognition is not based on free will, but rather
on some other factor such as power.2 Now, the Philosophy of Right is
concerned to follow the development of the free will as it struggles
to give itself existence. But the free will is a universal concept
and is not restricted to this or that class of individuals. We are
concerned here with human freedom and so we cannot impose arbitrary
or contingent distinctions between types of individual. The assump¬
tion throughout must be one of equality of distribution of rights.
We recall that Hegel applauded modern natural right theories for
assuming equality as their starting point. Therefore, the rights
of the moral subject must be distributed equally. As we have seen,
this requires the mutual recognition by equals of the legitimacy of
those rights. In the case of Morality the individuals relate to each
other as equal moral subjects and the rights of each moral subject are
grounded on the mutual recognition by moral subjects of the legitimacy
of those rights.
But what, precisely, transforms the activity of subjects
into moral subjects? The answer to this is stated by Hegel as follows;
"the achievement of my aim, therefore, implies this identity of my
will with the will of others, it has a positive bearing on the will of
others." (PR. No. 112). We have seen that the first two criteria may
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describe nothing more than selfishness. What distinguishes the moral
subject from the selfish man is that the moral subject does not act for
the sake of selfish reasons. When he does something, he does not say
(or believe): "I do it because I want to gain some personal advantage".
Rather the moral subject will say (and believe): "I do it because I
ought to do it, and I ought to do it because I have a human duty to
perform this act". The moral subject always acts for the sake of the
universal, even if this universal is discovered through subjective
reasoning and not through public discourse. That is, the concept of
freedom which the moral subject determines for himself imposes a duty
upon him to act in a certain way. It is a duty because the moral subject
ought to act in this way if he is to actualize human freedom. Of course,
in actualizing human freedom he is also actualizing his own freedom, but
this does not contradict the claim that he is acting unselfishly. The
actualization of his own freedom is only possible, from the perspective
of Morality, because he acts for the sake of universal human freedom.
Further, the moral subject does not live in a private universe. He
genuinely acts for the sake of the true universal (as he perceives it)
and so he regards himself as intimately involved in the welfare of
others. By his example, and possibly through his exhortations, he wishes
to demonstrate to others the truth of his moral vision. Hegel contrasts
this with Abstract Right, in which persons only relate to each other
negatively. In Abstract Right the negativity of interpersonal relations
is made explicit in the prohibition against interfering with the rights
of others. Each person is concerned only with his welfare. The welfare
of others is of no concern and it is a matter of indifference whether
one person's actions affect, either beneficially or adversely, the
welfare of other persons, subject always to the prohibition against
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infringing upon another's rights. In Morality, however, "the welfare
of others too is in question, and this positive bearing cannot come
on the scene before this point". (PR. No. 112, Addition).
When we take the three criteria together now we can see how
they specify a uniquely moral act. The moral subject determines for
himself the content of the universal concept of freedom. It is
universal because it represents true human freedom to the subject and
not merely subjective caprice. This concept of freedom in turn
specifies particular types of activity and these appear to the moral
subject as duties. He ought to act in a certain manner and the
objective world ought to conform to his subjectively-determined aims
because in this way human freedom is actualized. He must not lose
himself in his activity for he can only actualize this subjectively-
determined concept of freedom if he can realize his aim in the
objective world; and he cannot know whether he has done so unless he
can see his aim objectified before him. He retains the right to disown
anything which does not objectify his intentions, for actual freedom
is only possible if his intentions are objectified. Hence to renounce
anything which does not meet this standard is not an act of selfishness
but rather the courageous act of denying the validity of the sphere
of unfreedom and oppression by alien forces. Indeed, selfishness is
never a motive for the moral subject. On the contrary he cares deeply
for the welfare of others and is always concerned to impress upon them
his genuine desire to advance the cause of human freedom.
Before proceeding to an examination of the dialectic of the
moral will we should note a few features of the transition from Abstract
Right to Morality. We have already discussed at some length Hegel's
characteristic method. We recall that a balance must be struck between
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two opposite conceptions of this procedure. The first naively
maintains that Hegel is only sitting back and passively describing
the dialectical stream which flows before his eyes. The second
cynically asserts that Hegel consistently manipulates the material
before him in order to cram it into logical boxes constructed accord¬
ing to some mysterious a priori blueprint. The balanced view which
was outlined in the chapter on method can, I believe, account for the
difficulties encountered in the transition before us. Abstract Right
attempted to describe an objective mode of experience which could
satisfy the demand to actualize human freedom. It failed, but its
failure was not a complete loss. In the criminal act the latent
opposition between subject and object became explicit. Morality, or
the attempt to describe a subjective mode of experience which actualizes
freedom, is the result. How smooth is this transition?
It would be a mistake to trace the transition in terms of the
altered consciousness of the criminal. That is, the criminal opposes
his subjective desires to an abstract universal. With the discovery of
Morality, he realizes that universal freedom is the true substance of his
subjective will and is not to be found in the abstract and contingent
rights guaranteeing private property. The universal law which now
imposes a duty upon him is a law of his own making and in doing wrong he
breaks his own law and denies his own substantive freedom. This view of
the transition is reinforced by Hegel's discussion of punishment where
he maintains that the rightness of punishment requires the recognition
that the criminal denies his own freedom when he breaks the law. Such
recognition, as we have seen, is impossible within Abstract Right.
Morality therefore can be smoothly introduced as the attempt to discover
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this truth.
This portrait of the transition, while not wholly false, can
be seriously misleading. It is misleading because it appears to
present a change in metaphysical principles in terms of a psychological
shift undergone by the "criminal" of Abstract Right. The criminal
recognizes the error of his ways by discovering that the universal is
his own law of freedom and not something alien and abstract. But the
only law before the criminal in Abstract Right is the universal principle
of personal right as it affects private property. Therefore the transi¬
tion presented strictly from the perspective of the criminal can only
lead us to the point where he accepts the universal principles of
Abstract Right as the substantive basis of his freedom. Clearly this
gets us nowhere. It certainly precludes the possibility of moral
subjectivity as we have so far described it. Further, this view is forced to
present Morality as a development of the positive principles of Abstract
Right, for all we now have is an altered perspective from which to view
these principles.
It is much more helpful to view the transition as taking place
"via the path of the negative". Abstract Right develops the modes of
objective experience to their limit. The one-sided objectivity of Abstract
Right becomes explicit in the criminal act. Morality explores subjective
modes of experience. Rather than present this transition in terms of
the alteration in the consciousness of a criminal it is far more
accurate to regard it as necessitated by the movement of the concept
of freedom itself. The transition is not smooth positively, but it is
comprehensible negatively. The opposition between subject (the criminal)
and object (right as private property) which is the logical outcome of
the one-sided objectivity of Abstract Right demands a new set of
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principles to structure the mode of experience in which this opposi¬
tion can be overcome. The criminal act demonstrates the ever present
demand by the active will for recognition and fulfillment of
subjectively-determined needs and desires. It is, therefore, logically
defensible to search for principles which satisfy this demand. Morality
contains such principles. These must not be viewed as a simple
extension, or linear development of the principles of Abstract Right.
They are principles which explicitly negate the limitations of
Abstract Right. But this negation is a determinate one and we must
not forget that the principles arise as a projected solution to the
impasse reached as a result of the examination of the deficient
principles which preceded them.
When we present the transition in terms of the creative
determinate negation of Abstract Right we see that it is logically
defensible in so far as Morality opposes subjective modes of
experience as the sphere of freedom to the one-sided objectivity of
the modes of experience described by Abstract Right. We still have
the right, however, to ask where the new principles come from. We
have already rejected the notion that the criminal somehow creates them
for himself, since, at the very least, this is self-refuting.3 The
answer lies in Hegel's characteristic method of systematically order¬
ing the theories of freedom which have already appeared. In Abstract
Right his starting point was modern theories of natural rights and
laws. In Morality we are clearly on the terrain which was mapped so
thoroughly by Kant. We should be careful, however, not to identify
Kant alone as the protagonist of Morality. The Kantian theory of
moral self-determination does not appear until the third sub-section of
Morality. Hegel was miserly in identifying the actual philosophical
- 161 -
sources of the theories which he examined. When we examine the actual
dialectic of moral will we will have occasion to refer to some of the
more obvious theories which occupied Hegel's attention. At this
point, we need only note that the concept of freedom as moral self-
determination was widely propounded by Hegel's philosophic predecessors
and contemporaries. Philosophical debate was centred more on the
problem of what principles truly realized this concept rather than on
whether the concept of moral self-determination itself was valid.
Various theories of moral self-determination were formulated by
philosophers in an attempt to establish the formal criteria which must
be present in a mode of experience which could actualize human freedom.
Although philosophers differed in their views of which modes of
experience were adequate to the concept of freedom, there was general
agreement that freedom could only be regarded as actual through the
self-determining activity of the moral subject. The development of such
a concept of freedom is seen by Hegel as a real development. That is,
those philosophers had thought through the limitations of a one-sided
objectivity and were engaged in the important work of advancing the
concept of freedom itself. The subjective turn was a real advance in
the search for a true concept of freedom and Hegel presents it as such
in his transition from Abstract Right to Morality.
The first mode of experience of the moral will is described
by Hegel as "Purpose and Responsibility". The presupposed dichotomy of
subject and object is overcome through the purposive activity of the
moral will. The objective world is a "complex environment" which is
independent of the will of the moral subject. "Independence" in his sense
refers to the fact that many of the events and "states of affairs"(both
natural and "human") of the objective world are beyond the control of
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the particular moral subject. If this independence were insurmountable
the moral subject could never objectify his freedom. It is surmountable
only to the extent that the moral subject can alter the objective world
in order to actualize his subjectively determined purposes. Because
the dichotomy of subject and object can never be completely overcome,
the objective world can not be altered completely as a result of purposive
activity.^ This does not appear as an irreconcilable dilemma to the
moral subject for it is a fundamental principle of Morality that the
moral subject need only acknowledge those objective events which are
directly a result of his purposive activity. In general , the moral
subject "has responsibility...for its deed in so far as the abstract
predicate 'mine' belongs to the state of affairs so altered." (PR_. No.
115).
The relation between purpose and responsibility defines the
right of the moral subject in this mode of experience.
"The will's right...is to recognize as its action,
and to accept responsibility for, only those pre¬
suppositions of the deed of which it was conscious
in its aim and those aspects of the deed which were
contained in its purpose. The deed can be imputed
to me only if my will is responsible for it - this
is the right to know." (PR_. No. 117).
The question is whether activity based on this right can actualize
freedom. Hegel's answer is no, and he defends his view in the follow¬
ing way. The purpose of the moral subject is always particular to this
or that felt need. This particular purpose is translated immediately
into objectivity through action. This action, is itself particular
with respect to the objective world. That is, the action aims at
altering some particular aspect of the objective "complex environment".
But the complexity of this environment is not suspended as a result of
the subject's activity. It persists and the fact of its persistence
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negates the simple particularity of the act. The act, once committed,
enters into the complex environment and becomes part of it. The
subject cannot maintain the pristine purity of his activity for, in
its objectivity, it is vulnerable to an objective dynamic which is beyond
the subject's control. His act is subject to forces which may negate
it or, at least alter it. His act, once it is part of the objective
environment, may initiate new events which were not foreseen by the
subject. In short, the activity of the moral subject is affected by,
and has consequences for, the objective world in ways which are beyond
the subject's control. The attempt to determine the limits of
responsibility becomes impossible because of the particularity of each
purposive act. The subject is endlessly forced to accept responsibil¬
ity for this consequence of his action but deny responsibility for that
one - ad infinitum. The objective world appears as a chaotic play of
destructive forces; the subject is reduced to a frantic search for
what is truly its own in a world which appears to it as a denial of its
right to freedom. The impossibility of maintaining the particularity
of purposive action in an alien world requires the moral will to develop
a new set of principles.
The mode of experience which embodies new moral principles
is titled "Intention and Welfare". The particularity of purposes and
acts in the previous stage cannot be maintained because the "complex
environment" necessarily encroaches upon and ultimately destroys the
"purity" of the acts when they take their place in the objective world
as events. Since solipsistic retreat from this dilemma is not a
possible solution^ the only way forward for the moral will is to
attempt to impose some order on the chaos which oppresses it. The
complex environment of the previous stage is oppressive precisely
- 164 -
because it is not subject to some organizing principle - a principle
which is known by the moral subject. The moral subject in "Purpose
and Responsibility" had assumed the complexity of the world without
attempting to understand it. Therefore, any interplay between the
objective environment and the particular act is mysterious and marked
by contingency. The moral subject must overcome the alien and
arbitrary appearance of the objective world and it is Hegel's contention
that the principles of intention and welfare attempt to accomplish this
goal.
As we have seen, the chaos which appears to constitute the
reality of the objective world is mirrored in the chaos of subjective
confusion and frustration. Any attempt to establish order must,
therefore, be effective at both the subjective and objective levels.
Let us examine the attempt to organize the subjective purposes of the
moral subject into a coherent whole. Each purpose of the moral subject
of "Purpose and Responsibility" appears as a particular, divorced from
all other purposes. But each purpose implies two distinctive moments:
There is the specific content, such as the desire to satisfy this
particular need; and there is the abstract form, which is purposiveness
in general. This general form appears in all purposive activity. The
moral subject may regard "I will X" and "I will Y" as two distinct and
separate particular purposes, but they are not absolutely separate for
both embody the general principle of "willing" something. Recognition
of this universal form does not destroy particular purposive acts; rather
it is seen as that by virtue of which purposive activity has any sense
whatsoever. The universal concept of purposiveness informs particular
acts and invests them with a meaning for the moral subject which they
would not otherwise have. Hegel terms purposiveness - as-universal
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"intention", and he describes the transition from "purpose" to "intention"
as the recognition of the "universal which is conjoined" with the
"particular action". (PR,. No. 118 Addition). The recognition of
intention does not depend on the importation of an alien concept and
the subsequent grafting on of this concept to a complex of particulars.
Rather, the moral subject is forced to retreat from the chaos and
confusion generated by its attempt to find meaning in a series of discrete
particular acts and, in this retreat, is forced into a more profound
view of its own subjectivity. Hegel writes:
"The truth of the particular, however, is the
universal; and what explicitly gives action
its specific character is not an isolated
content limited to an external unit, but a
universal content, comprising in itself the
complex of connected parts. Purpose, as issuing
from a thinker, comprises more than the mere unit;
essentially it comprises that universal side of
the action, i.e. the intention. (PJR. No. 119).
Intention is the universal which is embodied in all purposive
activity. It is intention which invests all particular acts with a
coherency which they would otherwise lack. But intention is not an
empty, abstract universal. It expresses the universal concept of moral
activity for a particular moral subject. The use of the term "particular"
to describe the moral subject in this context reaffirms the first pre¬
supposition of the moral will, viz. to act in a way which actualizes his
own subjectivity. Intention expresses the universality and coherency
of moral action, but it is the particular moral subject who provides
the content for this universal. (PR. No. 121). For example, the moral
subject may determine that pleasure is the true end of activity, and
freedom consists in maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. The
concept of intention states that the particular moral subject self¬
consciously seeks to actualize a coherent plan of moral action - in
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this case, to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Coherent action
necessarily involves determining which acts advance this intention
and which retard or negate it. It requires subordinating some acts
and elevating others, i.e. establishing priorities for action and a
hierarchy of acts with respect to their importance for actualizing
the universal principle.
This in turn requires a different view of the objective
world than was held previously. The moral subject must attempt to
broaden its understanding of the objective world. It must attempt to
understand the way in which objective events interact. It must seek
to determine the wider consequences of particular acts, for those
consequences will undoubtedly affect future acts and the moral subject
is now concerned about the future implications of its acts, since it
is acting for the sake of a universal plan and not merely for the
satisfaction of isolated purposes. We can see how the recognition of
the universal within subjectivity is accompanied by a more profound
understanding of the objective world. On the basis of its new under¬
standing of both its own subjectivity and of the objective world, the
moral subject seeks to actualize its universal intention. The
universal informs particular acts and it is through the success of
particular acts that the universal is actualized in the world. The
objective acts are themselves successful to the extent that they
satisfy the universal intention of the moral subject. Intention,
however, is primarily a subjective term. To indicate the notion that
intention must be objectified Hegel introduces the term "welfare".
The concept of welfare emphasizes the necessity to transform the world
so as to actualize subjective intention. Each successful act contrib¬
utes to the welfare of the moral subject. Welfare is the universal
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concept which informs objective acts with their significance for the
moral subject's intention. To be sure, the ultimate source of the
value of objective acts and events is the subjectivity of the moral
subject expressed as its universal intention. The introduction of the
concept of welfare, however, emphasizes the objective moment in this
process of actualization and serves to remind us that the objective
world itself has its own dynamic which the moral subject must attempt
to understand.
When we examine Intention and Welfare in greater detail we
discover that there are three general features which structure the
type of activity appropriate to this mode of experience. Each of
those may be seen as particular specifications of the three general
criteria outlined above in the discussion of the general nature of
moral activity. The demand that the subject must recognize itself
in the objective world is embodied in the concept of welfare. The
subject-object dichotomy is overcome through the objectification of
subjective intentionality as welfare. The assumption of this dichotomy
decrees that the proximate matter upon which the subject acts is the
objective world. Through particular acts he satisfies particular
purposes, and thereby contributes to his general welfare. Therefore,
the first feature of "Intention and Welfare" is that each act must
be satisfying in some way for the subject. We can see that, to the
moral subject, particular acts assume the form of an "ought", i.e.
they "ought" to conform to the universal intention and contribute to
universal welfare. This demand carries the implication that all acts
have moral significance. The view that the moral subject acts only
for the sake of the universal end and disregards all means to this end
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or even ends which are not complete in themselves but contribute to
a further end is dismissed as nonsense by Hegel. The second feature
of this mode of moral experience is that the moral subject regards
his activity as a whole as morally significant. Hegel writes:
"What the subject is, is the series of his
actions. If these are a set of worthless
productions, then the subjectivity of his
willing is just as worthless. But if the
series of his deeds is of a substantive
nature, then the same is true also of the
individual's inner will." (PR_. No. 124).
Finally, the moral subject acts in the way it does not because it wishes
to satisfy its particular inclinations and whims, but because it
perceives this activity as universally necessary. That is, the moral
subject actualizes its intention as welfare because this is what man
must do if human freedom is to become actual. "This moment of
universality, posited first of all within this particular content itself,
is the welfare of others also, or, specified completely, though quite
emptily, the welfare of all." (PR_. No. 125).
Those three features summarize the mode of moral experience
described by Intention and Welfare. Hegel's criticism of this mode is
very brief, and not very satisfactory. The moral subject acts for the
sake of the universal. But the content of the universal is determined
subjectively by the moral subject. The "welfare of all" is, in truth,
only the particular subject's concept of welfare. But "my" concept of
welfare may differ from "your" concept and, within the principles of
Intention and Welfare, there is no way of mediating this difference.
As Hegel states:
"But since the absolutely universal, in distinction
from such a particular content, has not so far
been further determined than as 'the right', it
follows that these ends of particularity, differing
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as they do from the universal, may be in
conformity with it, but they also may not."
(PR. No. 125).
In short, there is nothing within Intention and Welfare to prevent
a clash of concepts of welfare and there are no principles available
to mediate such a clash should it occur. The retreat to the purity
of the moral subject's intention is no solution, for the demand for
objectivity precludes the exoneration of "bad men with well-meaning
hearts". The clash of moral wills cannot be circumvented by the attempt
to discover the purity of the moral subject's intentions, for this
denies the validity of looking to the consequences of actions. "The
result is that crime and the thoughts that lead to it, be they fancies
however trite and empty, or opinions however wild, are to be regarded
as right, rational, and excellent, simply because they issue from
men's hearts and enthusiasms.Hegel is clearly thinking of those
theorists who attempted to excuse acts contrary to established
positive law on the basis of the "pure intentions" of the criminal,
but his statement equally applies to the clash of moral wills as we
have described it, quite apart from any reference to an existing
positive legal code. The dilemma is inescapable and its resolution is
impossible.
When we analyse the source of the problem we soon discover
that the claims to universality, on the part of moral subjects,
however sincere they may be, are illusory. The moral subject looks
to itself as the embodiment of universal freedom. This is implicitly
rational, for the will must ultimately be the source of objective
human freedom. But this "infinite relation of the will to itself"
(PR. No. 128) is locked within subjectivity. There is no true
universality, for the "universality" which the moral subject has before
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it is only posited by it. It is for this reason that there can be a
clash of concepts of universality expressed as the clash of concepts
of welfare. We saw that in Abstract Right right is "the abstract
embodiment of freedom without embodying the particular person"; we
now see that "welfare (is) the sphere of the particular will without
the universality of right". (PR. No. 128). The problem for the moral
will is to discover principles of moral experience which satisfy the
demands of the moral subject to recognize itself in its activity while
at the same time satisfying the demand for universality in order to
avoid clashes of moral wills. In Intention and Welfare the moral wills
which clash are equally "moral"; they satisfy the formal requirements
of morality and yet are irreconcilable with respect to the question
of what content is appropriate to moral activity. If a truly universal
concept of moral activity can be discovered, then this problem no
longer exists. When wills clash there can be appeal to an objective
universal concept. It could then be seen whether one will is acting
in accordance with objective moral concepts while the other is not, or,
even whether both wills are "immoral". The awesome task of discovering
universal principles of moral activity was taken up by Immanuel Kant,
and his efforts are examined in the third sub-section of Morality,
titled "Good and Conscience".
Kant's general philosophical position is one of the most
complex in the history of philosophy. His vast output is made more
difficult because he underwent several changes of philosophical position
which had profound consequences. The major divide is usually described
as that between his pre-critical and post-critical writings. The three
great works of the latter stage are; 1) The Critique of Pure Reason,
1781 and 1787 (First Critique), 2) The Critique of Practical Reason,
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1787 (Second Critique, 3) Critique of Judgement, 1790 (Third Critique).
Although any comprehensive treatment of Kant's moral philosophy
requires examination of many other writings and published lectures, for
our purposes the most important of those other works is the Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785. It is beyond the scope of this
thesis to engage in a comprehensive examination of Kant's philosophy.
We are only interested in Kant as the most systematic moral philosopher
to present a theory of freedom as equivalent to moral self-determination.
Therefore, we need only describe the outlines of his theory. This
description will be both brief and uncritical. There is no reason to
present the arguments which Kant employed to establish his ultimate
principles. There are many excellent secondary articles and books
which examine the finer points of Kant's moral philosophy.'7
Every conative act requires an object. The will acts in a
determinate way for the sake of some object. Practical proportions
are those propositions which "contain a general determination of the
will",^ i.e. have a role in determining what actions the will chooses
to perform. A practical proposition is a practical principle if it
expresses a general determination of the will and if rules can
relate them to specific applications of the will according to the
circumstances which prevail. There are two types of practical principles.
If the subject regards the principle as applicable to himself alone
according to his own subjectively-determined preferences, the principle
is called a "maxim". If the principle is regarded as "valid for the
will of every rational being" then the principle is objective and
is regarded as a practical law.9 All practical principles involve
some degree of constraint upon the will of the subject unless, of
course, the subject always spontaneously does what he ought to.
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A practical principle always has some rational content, even if, at
its most subjective, it is only a "means-end" rationality. The
application of principles to specific circumstances requires rules
and those rules are called imperatives by Kant, e.g. I ought to do this
since, if I do it, I will achieve pleasure and avoid pain. In the case
of a maxim, where the motive for doing something is subjective, the
type of imperative which it gives rise to is a hypothetical imperative.
A hypothetical imperative states that if a subject has a certain desire
then he ought to act in some particular way if he is to satisfy this
desire. Of course, if the subject does not have this desire then the
hypothetical imperative is irrelevant and cannot have any authority
for the subject. A practical law, on the other hand, expresses a
practical principle which is valid for all subjects qua rational
subjects; the imperative which it establishes for the will of the subject
does not depend on the presence or absence of some desire. It
obligates all subjects if they are to be regarded as rational. This
type of imperative Kant calls a "categorical imperative".
There is one further distinction which must be made, viz.
that between formal and material practical principles. A material
principle has as its object a material object of desire; a formal
principle has as its object the form of understanding and reason. If
a principle presupposes a material object of desire, such as a desire
for happiness, then the principle is a material one. But the pre¬
supposition of a subjectively-determined desire, as we have seen, can
only lead to a maxim, and so any imperative which follows upon the
adoption of a material practical principle can never be categorical.
Therefore, categorical imperatives must follow practical laws, since
only practical laws do not presuppose some particular material object
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of desire. That is, categorical imperatives must be formal, and never
material. In summary, a material practical principle is a maxim and
can only give rise to hypothetical imperatives; a formal practical
principle is an objective practical law and gives rise to categorical
imperatives.
With the above definitions before us, let us turn to Kant's
analysis of freedom. We can begin with a consideration of the concept
of responsibility. We hold persons responsible for events and actions
when we attribute to those persons some power or agency which caused
these events or actions to take place. But if the person's actions
were themselves events of some antecedent cause, then responsibility
cannot be imputed to the person for the events which he caused, except
in the most mechanical sense of causation. We speak of responsibility
in the human (moral, legal, or political) sense when we believe that
the person, in some way, exercised freedom by choosing to do one
thing rather than another. If we can not attribute free agency, in
the sense of unconditioned free causality, to the person then any talk
of human responsibility necessary ends up in an endless regress.
This capacity to initiate a new causal series Kant titles
the "spontaneity of the will". The spontaneity of the will is
discovered through the transcendental deduction of those concepts
which must be presupposed if we are to give a rational account of
moral experience. In the case of spontaneity the experience to be
explained is moral obligation. We are aware, within ourselves, of
the fact of an obligation. That is, we are aware that we can
choose between rival courses of action and, therefore, that we are
not wholly determined in the way that merely natural entities are
determined, i.e. through mechanical causation.^ The capacity for
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spontaneous activity appears as freedom in the form of independence,
for the person is aware directly of his independence from the
"determining causes of the world". In exercising his spontaneity the
subject proceeds according to some principle, i.e. its choice of
volitional object is guided by certain principles which it has before
it. If the principles are material then, Kant argues, the subject is
acting freely but heteronomously. He is free because he is independant
of natural causation; it is heteronomous freedom because the principle
which guided the action, and the hypothetical imperative which is
subsumed under that material principle, is not fully rational.
We have seen that a material principle presupposes the desire
for some material object which the subject regards as of value or as a
"good". The hypothetical imperative gives the rule for realizing that
good. But if the good is presupposed in this way, what is its relation to the
will and freedom?. If the subject experiences the desire for this good
then it appears as the good for this subject alone. But the good may
not be desired by all persons and, therefore, is of no consequence for the
person who does not desire it. The relation between a good defined in
terms of the presence (possible) of some desire and the free will of a
subject is only a contingent one. It is not necessary because it does
not hold for all rational subjects, but rather only for those subjects
who have the requisite desire. The practical principle can never be
objective and universal in this case, and the imperative it contains can
never be categorical, because the desire for the predefined good (material)
depends on contingent empirical circumstances. This holds for any
material object of desire, for we can never demonstrate a priori the
objective universality of such desire, i.e. the desire for a material
object can never be demonstrated to be objective, but must always be
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related to a subject through a subjective maxim of a particular will.
The spontaneity which is exhibited even in heteronomous
actions ensures that such actions be considered as one mode of freedom.
But it is only negative freedom, for the subject has demonstrated only
a capacity to act independant of natural necessity. If a subject is
to be free positively, he must act autonomously. Autonomy refers to
the capacity of the subject to will in accordance with a universal,
objective and rational law. The practical principles which are capable
of being universal laws are formal. They cannot presuppose some material
good, but rather must conform to the formal criteria of validity for all
rational subjects. A formal principle is the only one capable of
universality. Universality is expressed in the desire by the moral
subject to act only according to those maxims which can be maxims for
all moral subjects. This imposes an obligation on the subject which is
expressed in the famous categorical imperative: "So act that the maxim
of your will could always hold at the same time as the principle
establishing universal law".^ This imperative is categorical because
it holds for all rational subjects. It specifies no particular material
object, but rather demands that all maxims of action be capable of
universalization. The practical principle of such action appears as a
universal law. In obeying this law the moral subject is not limiting
its freedom. The law is a universal principle of reason. In obeying
the law, the moral subject brings himself into full conformity with his
own implicit rationality. In Hegalian terms, we could say that the
subject actualizes his implicit rationality. This is not a limit to
freedom but rather its highest expression. The subject freely chooses
to act according to the law of its own reason. In this way the subject
is seen to act both spontaneously and autonomously. It is spontaneous
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because it freely chooses to act according to an imperative; it is
autonomous because that imperative is categorical and, therefore,
expresses most completely its human rationality. Heteronomous action,
although expressing a mode of freedom, is not positively free because
the subject is still under the domination of principles of natural,
material desire. Autonomous action, in the sense of self-legislation,
is completely free because the subject chooses to act according to
principles which are universal and independant of material desires.
This is not to say that the autonomous moral subject does not experience
desire. The subject certainly has desires of a sort similar to the ones
which serve as motives for heteronomous action. But the autonomous
subject organizes these desires not according to some material practical
principle but rather according to universal, practical law. The
subject never is motivated by material desires, although he is forced
to deal with desires and to act in a way which can satisfy some desires,
so long as such activity is consistent with the activity prescribed by
practical law.
It is important to remember that spontaneous activity and
autonomous activity are both modes of freedom. They are distinct modes,
but not absolutely separate ones. Nor can they in any way be regarded
as opposed modes of freedom. Spontaneity is perfectly consistent with
autonomy; spontaneous activity may be opposed, either knowingly or not,
to autonomous activity but this is not an opposition which is based on
anything more than contingency. In a similar fashion, Kant distinguishes
between two parts of the human will. That distinction corresponds to
the distinction between spontaneity and autonomy and an examination of
it will prepare the way for Hegel's critique of Kant in the Philosophy
of Right. Kant refers to the different parts of the will as Wi 11 kfJr
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and WilleJ? Translation of those technical terms into English raises
many problems. Rather than opt for one or another of the available
possible translations I will refer to them by their German names. I
hope that their meanings will become clear in the following discussion.
Wi11kUr refers to the capacity for spontaneous action
inherent in the concept of the human will. While Willktlr feels natural
desires it is not determined wholly by them. Willk(Jr is activity in
accordance with a maxim, or practical principle which determines the
proper conduct of the subject. Willktlr, therefore, is not blind animal
obedience to natural desires but rather denotes the spontaneous ability
of the subject to choose the maxims which will determine his actions.
Spontaneity preserves the notion that Wi 11 ktlr may be free even though
it acts primarily on the basis of desires for material objects. The
subject chooses to act in order to satisfy a desire and thus exercises
his freedom. It could equally choose to act for the sake of some other
desire, or even choose to act for the sake of something other than
material desire. When the subject chooses to act for the sake of some
desire it is acting freely but heteronomously. Kant maintains that,
unless we preserve the notion of a spontaneous Willkdr, we cannot hold
subjects responsible for their actions. The alternative is to maintain
that the subject is conditioned completely by antecedent causes and,
therefore, causality and responsibility for an action cannot be
attributed to himJ3
By itself, Wi11kOr refers only to the spontaneous freedom of
the will. As we have seen, spontaneity alone is insufficient if fully
rational freedom is to be actualized. Rational freedom demands that
the will also be autonomous, and autonomy of the will is described by
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Kant as the Mi 11e. Mi lie is pure practical reason. It can also be
regarded as the practical moral law or the law of moral freedom. If
all subjects spontaneously chose to act in accordance with the moral
law, then spontaneity and autonomy would signify the same thing -
rational human freedom. But this is not the case for moral subjects
are susceptible to the claims of material desire. Therefore, there
is a struggle on the part of the subject between what it desires and
what it perceives as its moral duty. Mi 11e does not act, for activity
is the sole preserve of MillkUr. It does, however, affect MillkUr
in so far as it represents the conditions which must be fulfilled if
the subject is to be truly free. Mi 11e serves as an incentive or
model for the Millkdr which desires freedom in the fully rational sense
of spontaneous autonomy. The practical rule which it gives to Millkdr
is the categorical imperative. The Millkllr which chooses to act
according to the categorical imperative acts autonomously as well as
spontaneously. The truly moral subject is the one who chooses to
act for the sake of the moral law. The moral law is the incentive of
its action and not material objects which are conditioned by natural
desires. The desire by Mi 11 kUr to submit to the law of Mi 1le is not an
abrogation of freedom. Kant's great advance was to recognize that
there is no contradiction between freedom and submission to a law, if
the law is a law of human reason.^ The moral law, or Mi 11 e, simply
is.^ It does not act but exists as a norm for Mil 1kdr. Millkdr ought
to act for the sake of the moral law. The activity of Mi 11kUr always
involves an ought, for no human will is spontaneously pure and free of
all natural desires. Morality always involves a struggle by the moral
subject to do that which it ought to do in order to approach the pure
rationality which it, in essence, is. Mi 11e is often characterized as
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the "holy will" and the "ought" of moral activity may be viewed as
encapsulating the struggle by the moral subject to act according to
the dictates of the categorical imperative in order to purify itself
and become holy.
This sketch of Kant's moral philosophy is necessary if we
are to understand Hegel's comments on "Good and Conscience". Indeed,
the position which Hegel is attacking is most obscure unless we are
aware that the object of attack is Kant. Hegel invokes his own
vocabulary to describe Kant's position and this adds to the confusion.
When we translate some of Hegel's terminology back into terms more
appropriate to Kant, much of this confusion is eliminated. For example,
Hegel describes the good as "the unity of the concept of the will with
the particular will". (PR. No. 129). In Kantian terms the good is
seen as the unity of Wi 11 e and Wi 11 ktir, even though this unity may
always be only ideal. Hegel, therefore, is reading Wilie as the concept
of the will. This is not mysterious when we recall that, for Hegel,
the concept of a thing always expresses its implicit, rational and
universal "nature" or "essence", and that Kant would regard the Wi11 e
in those terms J® The identification of Willkilr with the "particular
will" is also easily comprehended. The "particular will" in Morality is
the will of the moral subject as it struggles to actualize its own
freedom. This is clearly consistent with Kant's description of
Wi 11 kiLlr, although Hegel does not, at this point, introduce the
possibility of the spontaneous choice of heteronomous principles.^
The relation between the concept of the will and the
particular will is described in terms which are equally appropriate
to the relation of Wille and Willktir. Thus Hegel describes the good
as imposing an obligation on the particular will. The particular
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will "ought to make the good its aim and realize it completely"
because, for the moral subject, "the good and the good alone is the
essential, and the subjective will has value and dignity only in so
far as its insight and intention accord with the good". (PR. No. 131).
On the other hand since Kant views the Wilie as normative only and not
active, the good has "in the subjective will its only means of
stepping into actuality". (PR. No. 131).
The final point to be discussed is the centrality of the
concept of duty to the whole Kantian scheme. The moral law, or pure
practical reason, is the universal "concept of the will". If the moral
subject chooses (freely) to obey the moral law then it is seen to be
acting freely and rationally. This choice is not conditioned by
contingent empirical circumstances or desires, but rather proceeds from
a respect for the moral law as the law of its own freedom and rationality.
This respect for the moral law imposes an obligation upon the subject
who wishes to act morally. That obligation appears in the form of a
duty, for duty is defined as "the necessity of an action done from
respect for law"J8 For Kant, to be moral is to act solely out of
respect for the moral law. Therefore, moral duty is a constraint upon
the possibility of heteronomous activity for to perform one's duty is
to act solely out of respect for the moral lawJ^ When Hegel says that
the moral subject in "Good and Conscience" performs his duty "for
duty's sake" he clearly is thinking of Kant's description of duty and
its relation to autonomous freedom. (PR. No. 133). This is made
explicit in the addition to paragraph 133 of the Philosophy of Right
where Hegel praises Kant for the emphasis he placed on the meaning of
duty and its relation to freedom. To perform one's moral duty (in
the Kantian sense of a duty which flows from respect for the moral law
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of rational freedom) is to objectify one's implicit rationality, to
translate the concept of freedom into the Idea of freedom.
Hegel's critique of Kantian philosophy is diffuse and
complex. At various times in his philosophical career Hegel felt
obliged to set out his opposition to Kant's philosophical principles.
At times he emphasized one point of attack while on other occasions
he chose different points of emphasis. It is difficult, therefore,
to draw together all the separate strands and unify them into one
coherent critique. The matter is further complicated by Hegel's
often oblique references to rival philosophies which may or may not
be construed as references to Kant. Finally, Hegel is often loose
in his explicit references to Kant so that, for example, his citation
of the categorical imperative is very inaccurate. The result of all
this is a general level of confusion which often obscures the real
merits of both philosophical positions. Defenders of Kant point to
Hegel's seemingly cavalier treatment of Kant and labour away at
demonstrating the inappropriateness of Hegel's critique to Kant's
actual position. Often this carries with it the implication that Hegel
was less than honest in his treatment of Kant.20 Hegel's advocates,
on the other hand, are often too dismissive of Kant, and minimize his
great achievements. While this may appear to follow from Hegel's
treatment of Kant - which often borders on the contemptuous - it ignores
Hegel's obvious debt to Kant and, indeed, Hegel's frequent acknowledge¬
ment of that debt.
It is not necessary, for our purposes, to enter the
continuing debate. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel confines his
criticism to a few brief comments. They are so brief, however, as to
render them almost incomprehensible. If they are to be understood,
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then they must be supplemented by references to other works by Hegel
in which he examines Kant's philosophy. Hegel himself refers his
readers to the Phenomenology of Mind for a more detailed critique.
The straightforward presentation of Hegel 's critique of Kant does
involve us in some problems. For one thing, there is the problem of
organizing all the material into one coherent presentation. For
another, there is the recurrent problem of its appropriateness to
Kant's actual position. For reasons of both coherency and economy
I have decided to present Hegel's critique in the following manner.
I will present Hegel's position in the course of defending it against
an attack by John Silber on Hegel's critique of Kant. Silber's
article is titled "Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethicsand it is
a detailed and able defense of Kant against Hegel. I believe that
Silber's article brings into focus the differences between the two
positions, and that, by responding direct to the article, we can avoid
getting sidetracked into issues which are important but of only
subsidiary interest to the main concerns of the thesis.
Silber begins by acknowledging the old charge of formalism
which is traditionally hurled against Kant's ethics. He then
proceeds to argue for a very specific notion of formalism, namely
procedural formalism. In contradistinction to the procedural variety
Silber points to substantive formalism and logical formalism. He contends
that Hegel misinterprets Kant because he only recognizes the two latter
types of formalism, while all along Kant was really describing
procedural formalism. The Hegel text which he examines is the
Phenomenology of Mind. More specifically, Silber is concerned with
refuting Hegel's charges as presented in the sections titled,
respectively, "Reason as Lawgiver" and "Reason as Test of Laws".
(Ph.G. pp 301-312; PhM. pp 439-453)
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In "Reason as Lawgiver" Hegel criticizes the philosophical
position which maintains that Reason, considered as a pure universal,
can by itself determine specific moral duties. This position is
described by Silber as substantive formalism for it claims that Reason
alone can specify substantive laws regulating conduct without regard
to any circumstances which lie beyond its pure universality. Hegel
employs various examples to good effect in demolishing this view. He
concludes that it is incoherent because all duties are necessarily
specific, and the pure universal (reason) cannot successfully determine
the content of such specific duties. Either it loses itself in
contingency by trying to be specific, or it abolishes any specific
content in trying to be universal. It is unnecessary for us to follow
Hegel's presentation of the dialectic of substantive formalism,
especially since Silber accepts Hegel's critique of the position. While
accepting Hegel's critique of substantive formalism, however, Silber
denies that it is a legitimate critique of Kant. Silber maintains that
Kant never intended that his ethics be regarded as formal in the
substantive sense. He does admit that many of Kant's examples might
give this impression, but this is the result of haste and carelessness
on Kant's part and does not endanger his fundamental position.^2
Silber's defense of Kant against the charge of substantive
formalism is not of great interest, but we should note a few points.
First, Silber acknowledges the validity of the Hegelian critique of
substantive formalism. Second, although this critique may not properly
apply to Kant, Silber admits that Kant does leave himself open to the
charge because of his own carelessness. Third, it is arguable that
Hegel did not intend that this section be regarded as his main attack
on Kantian ethics. It is more correct, I believe, to regard this
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section as an attack on the type of rationalism exemplified by the
scholasticism of Christian Wolff. References to the examples from
Kant may be regarded as an attack on those examples alone and not an
attack on Kantian ethics proper, (i.e. against those Kantian examples
which Silber admits appear to be substantive determinations of a
pure universal). Also, Hegel's oblique reference in the Phenomenolog.y
to the categorical imperative may be seen as an introduction of the
principle which gets us beyond "Reason as Lawgiver" and into the next
section, and not as an example of substantive formalism. Finally, in
his later critiques of Kant in the Philosophy of Right and Lectures
on the History of Philosophy Hegel does not raise the same charges as
are on display in the section "Reason as Lawgiver". There are two
possible reasons for this: first, he did not regard the critique of
substantive formalism in the Phenomenology as a critique of Kant's true
position; second, the other charges he raised against Kant were
sufficiently powerful and he did not have to raise the more problematic
charge of substantive formalism against Kant.
In "Reason as Test of Laws" Silber sees Hegel as raising the
charge of logical formalism against Kant. Logical Formalism refers to
the claim that Reason can provide a logical test of the validity of any
particular duty or moral act. In Kant's ethics the criterion of
universalizability establishes the logical principle of non-contradiction
as the primary standard or test of moral worth. That is, if a
particular act is self-contradictory it cannot be universalized and
hence is not moral. The logical principle of non-contradiction, therefore,
provides a neat and infallible test for determining whether an act is,
or is not, moral. The problem with such a test, however, is that it is
indifferent to all content. For example, it is possible to maintain
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that private property must be respected and that theft of private
property cannot be permitted. This is non-contradictory and
capable of universalization. Conversely, it is possible to maintain
that, in theft, the thing stolen does not properly belong to the
person who originally had it in his possession. There is no
necessary inconsistency in this position, for the "thief" is not
taking into possession something which is legitimately the property
of another. Silber admits that Hegel's critique of logical formalism
is correct, for the logical principle of non-contradiction can admit
almost any content, depending on the presupposed opinions of a
particular moral subject. All particular content, because it can be
made to conform to this logical principle, can be admitted, and hence
there can be no acts whose moral worth can be regarded as based on
something more objective than subjective caprice. As in the first
case, however, Silber denies that the charge of logical formalism
can be laid against Kant.
Silber maintains that Kantian formalism is neither sub¬
stantive nor logical. Were it either, or both, Hegel's critique
would be damning. The answer to Hegel rests on the proposition that
Kant's formalism is procedural. Central to this proposition is the
role that judgement plays in Kantian philosophy. Judgement provides
the link between a theoretical principle and the practical world in
which that principle must be embodied. In the case of ethics the
moral law and the highest good are not, in themselves, guarantors of
moral practice. Kant writes:
"/They7 require in addition a power of judgement
sharpened by experience, partly in order to
distinguish cases to which they apply, partly
to produce for them admittance to the will of
man and influence over practice."23
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Judgement in ethics determines which situations are of proper moral
concern, what moral duties those situations impose on the subject,
and the best way of fulfilling those duties.
But judgement must not be understood as a set of rules
which apply a theoretical principle to actual practice. Were this
the case it would involve us in an infinite regress for we would
need rules to tell us which particular cases fall within the jurisdiction
of the first set of rules, and then a new set of rules to explain how
the second set relates to the first, and so on ad infinitum.24 There¬
fore, we must search for an alternative explanation for the role which
judgement plays in relating moral theory to moral practice. Silber
introduces his solution to this dilemma by stating that
"...moral theory does not pretend to offer a rule
for applying the moral law, but the moral law is
itself to be understood as a principle which
specifies the procedure of judgement in the act
of moral schematism. On this interpretation, the
correct application of the moral law would consist
in the fulfillment by judgement of a procedure
whereby a particular object or action is designated
in imagination as the embodiment of the highest
good for a particular act of moral volition, and in
the subsequent enactment by will of the action so
designated. 25
Silber maintains that Kant does not look to the objects of
volition or cognition as providing by themselves sufficient evidence
of a subject's rationality. We may, for any number of reasons, select
a proper (rational) object of volition but this may result from nothing
more than force of contingent circumstance or blind luck. True ra¬
tionality is embodied in the actual process of human thought and action,
in the way that we employ our reason in determining our practical
existence.^ if we can specify procedural norms for human reasoning
then we can distinguish between those human thoughts and actions which
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embody human rationality in its full sense and those which do not.
The procedures are normative in the sense that they specify the
standards of rationality against which any particular act of reason¬
ing may be compared and evaluated as to its (true) rationality. They
are formal because they apply to all particular acts of reasoning
regardless of their content. In the domain of ethics the moral law
specifies formal procedural norms which are appropriate to all
particular instances of moral reasoning.
Procedural norms exist for all types of human reasoning,
whether it be the reasoning employed in natural science, logic,
aesthetics or ethics. Each of the divisions of knowledge has its
special problems and, therefore, requires special norms, but there is
a formal similarity between all such norms.^ In ethics, Silber
contends, the procedural norms are supplied by the categorical imperative.
We have already encountered this imperative. From the perspective of
procedural norms, we now see that the categorical imperative establishes
universalizabi1ity as a procedural norm. This is often referred to as
the formula of universal law. But Kant further specifies the categorical
imperative. Each of those specifications, (which appear as practical
imperatives), serves to cover different types of considerations which
may enter into moral reasoning. Thus, for example, we have the formula
of the end in itself, the formula of the kingdom of ends, the formula
of the universal law of nature and so forth. Silber argues that any
attempt to set a limit to possible specifications of the categorical
imperative is wrongheaded because the formulations are intended as
norms to cover situations as they occur in the sensible, human world
where moral practice must occur. Hence their "number is as unlimited
as sensibility is diverse".28 The specifications of the categorical
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imperative do not conflict with each other; rather they must be regarded
as procedural norms which evolve in the effort to establish concretely
the standards of true rationality for moral reasoning. For example, if
the maxim of a subjective will is capable of being willed, by the
subject, as a universal law it meets the norm of universality. By
virtue of this, the subject wills his own autonomy. Therefore, he
meets the norm established by the practical imperative of autonomy. Those
two norms in turn establish the conditions for the formula (imperative)
29of the end in itself. Silber proceeds, in an impressive manner, to
demonstrate how the various formulations of the categorical imperative
establish a mosaic of procedural norms for moral reasoning. The moral
subject employs those norms in determining whether the maxim of his
will is rational or not. We have seen how Kant knits together the
concepts of practical reason and morality and so it is clear that, for
Kant, the subject is moral to the extent that he is rational, and he is
rational to the extent that he can satisfy the norms of moral reasoning
established by the formulations of the categorical imperative. I have
used judgement and moral reasoning interchangeably, since moral reason¬
ing is nothing other than judgement in the ethical domain. When judgement
proceeds according to the norms established by the categorical imperative,
the moral reasoning of the subject is rational. Silber summarizes this
conclusion:
"When judgement has fulfilled these procedures,
the concrete determination of the moral task is
achieved. And the moral task itself is completed
as soon as the will commits itself to action in
accordance with the maxim designated by judgement
at the outcome of its procedure. The complete
delineation of the maxim of moral volition is the
outcome of a process of judgement defined by the
moral law as the categorical imperative for a
finite rational being... Once judgement completes
the procedure for the determination of the moral
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maxim and the will acts on the basis of it,
the application of the categorical imperative
is complete."30
We must now determine whether Silber's description of
Kantian formalism as procedural rescues Kant from Hegel's critique.
Silber invokes the notion of procedural formalism primarily to rebut
Hegel's charge of logical formalism. ("Reason as test of laws").
Silber demonstrates that logical formalism rests upon the dichotomy of
reason and sensibility. The principle of non-contradiction is a
principle given by reason, and it stands over and against the world
of sensibility with its attendant "passions" and "irrational" desires.
If reason and sensibility are separated in this way, then it is easy
to show (as Hegel does) that sensibility is "superfluous" to moral
reasoning, since it is only the "contentless" law of non-contradiction
which determines the moral value of activity. As we have seen, almost
any content whatsoever can be made to accord with the law of non¬
contradiction. Silber does not contest this point.^
Silber does deny, however, that a radical separation of reason
and sensibility can be attributed to Kant. Silber contends that the
sensible and rational realms are not conceived of as opposed by Kant.
I think he is on shaky ground here. Granted, Kant states they are
distinguished but not opposed. He adds that the moral will need not
renounce happiness (sensible) in order to be moral. But he then adds
(and Silber, in quoting from Kant italicizes this!) that we take no
account of claims for sensible happiness whenever duty is in question.32
How are we to interpret this? If duty is not at stake, then we are not in
a moral situation. If duty is at stake but the moral subject spontan¬
eously performs its duty without even being tempted by sensible claims
to happiness, then we are witnessing the activity of a "holy will".
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If, on the other hand, sensible claims are compelling for the subject
but he rejects them and acts for the sake of duty, then we are in the
presence of a moral struggle in which virtue wins out over immorality
and evil. But in this last case the claims of duty are opposed to
those of sensible happiness. It is nonsense to think of these rival
claims as merely distinguished by the moral subject and not opposed to
each other. To think otherwise is either to regard the will of the
subject as holy or else to strip morality (as experienced by Wi11ktir)
of its dignity. Silber's attempt to link reason and sensibility by
denying their opposition is a failure. Hegel's point about logical
formalism is not that the two realms never interact, but rather that
morality depends on a law determined by one realm (reason) regardless
of the content of the other, (sensibility). If this were not the case
then the moral subject would accept or reject the claims to sensible
happiness on the basis of the content of those claims, and that
possibility Kant strictly denies. If he did not deny this, then he
would be forced to admit that the moral will can accept a heteronomous
principle as a maxim of moral activity, since claims to sensible
happiness are necessarily heteronomous.
Silber then pursues another argument intended to refute the
charge of logical formalism. It is in connection with this second
argument that the notion of procedural formalism assumes vital
importance. Silber argues that the notion of logical consistency, while
it is a necessary condition of moral willing, is not a sufficient
condition. Kant, he argues, also insists on volitional consistency.
Silber distinguishes the two types of consistency as follows:
"The categorical imperative prescribes more than
consistent thought; it prescribes what moral
judgement must do in order to will in a universal
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manner. It demands that willing be done, not
merely on the basis of mutually consistent
maxims, but on the basis of the universally
valid maxims. We are not obligated merely to
think about various possibilities that could
be consistent, but to will a state of nature
in which certain maxims would become laws of
nature. This transports us into a realm of
action in which content becomes determinate."33
Silber is arguing that, while a maxim may be thought of as
consistent with itself (logical consistency), it can be self-
contradictory in the actual world of human practice. If this is the
case, then the maxim does not meet the requirement of volitional
consistency. The distinction between logical and procedural formalism
becomes sharper if we look at Silber's attempt to refute Hegel's
'(justification" of theft. In the Phenomenology ("Reason as test of
law") Hegel argues that one can defend stolen property without
violating the law of contradiction. The "thief" can argue that, while
it is wrong to possess another's property against his will, by virtue
of the fact that the thing in question is now in the possession of the
"thief", it does not actually belong to the other. In other words, it
is not logically inconsistent to argue that "theft" is justified so
long as we look only to the fact of actual possession.
Silber denies the possibility of such casuistry within the
domain described by Kant's ethics. He agrees that while this defense
of theft is logically possible, it is volitionally impossible (inconsistent).
This is so because, Kant maintains, one cannot will in a universally
valid way unless one puts oneself in thought in the place of other
subjects. In this case, before I can justify my theft of another's
property, I must put myself into the position of the intended victim
(original proprietor).
"From his standpoint I cannot regard this property
in question as my possession. Rather, by taking
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his standpoint I see the situation from a
universal point of view in which the concept
of property cannot be manipulated. I cannot
shift the title to the property without reject¬
ing that enlarged perspective and thereby
exposing my failure to observe the procedures
of moral judgement."34
Silber believes he has refuted Hegel completely. By applying Kant's
procedural norms (universality, etc.) to a concrete practical situa¬
tion he has demonstrated that it is not possible to justify theft of
private property. But has he really accomplished his goal?
Let us look more closely at the notion of procedures. In
general, rules of procedure provide a set of formal rules which guide
the conduct of some business at hand, such as parliamentary debate,
legal proceedings, shareholders' meetings and so forth. In law courts,
for example, procedural laws may govern such matters as the gathering
and presentation of evidence, selection of jurors, judge's instructions,
methods of interrogation and cross-examination of witnesses and similar
matters. Those laws are distinguished from the actual substantive laws
of the civil and criminal codes. It does not seem unfair to regard
procedural norms and laws in this way when we turn our attention to
Silber's argument. In his counter-example to Hegel we see that Silber
assumes the absolute validity of the right to private property. Apply¬
ing Kant's procedural norms he declares theft unjustifiable, for it
destroys this absolute right. As he candidly states, we cannot justify
theft "simply by defining the meaning of ownership of property to suit
oneself". ^ But the application of procedural norms does not
legitimize the presupposed right of private property. Putting ourselves
in the position of another merely demonstrates that theft is a negation
of that which is presupposed as valid.
We can, therefore, demand of Silber that he provide a
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justification of his presuppositions. It is Hegel's contention that
such a justification is impossible within the limits of Kantian ethics.
"From this point of view (Kantian ethics), no immanent doctrine of
duties is possible; of course, material may be brought in from outside
and particular duties may be arrived at accordingly..." (PR.No. 135,
Remark). No "immanent doctrine" is possible because pure practical reason
is not substantive. Hegel here is clearly granting the point to Kant
which Silber was so intent to make against Hegel, viz. that the critique
of "Reason as Lawgiver" does not apply to Kant's ethics. But if reason
is not substantive, then where does the substantive material come from
for ethical judgement proceeding by way of formal norms? Silber's
answer it would seem, amounts to no more than simple conventionalism.
Hegel develops his point in this way:
"The absence of property contains in itself
just as 1ittle contradiction as the non¬
existence of this or that nation, family etc.,
or the death of the whole human race. But if
it is already established on other grounds and
presupposed that property and human life are to
exist and be respected, then indeed it is a
contradiction to commit theft or murder; a
contradiction must be a contradiction of some¬
thing, i.e. of some content presupposed from
the start as a fixed principle. It is to a
principle of that kind alone, therefore, that
an action can be related either by correspondence
or contradiction." (PR_. No. 135, Remark).
The key phrase here is "on other grounds". In "Abstract Right"
Hegel attempts to demonstrate the importance of private property while
denying it absolute pre-eminence. He would regard his defence of private
property as a justification for its inclusion as a right in any society
which claims to actualize rational human freedom. Regardless of what
we may ultimately think of Hegel's position on private property, it is
clear that he attempts to justify it in terms of the concept of freedom.
He does not resort to conventional opinion as does Silber (or Kant).
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The conventionalism of Silber's approach can be brought out
even more when we examine his defense of the volitional consistency
of the right to private property. There he argues that, by putting
oneself in the position of the other, we immediately recognize the
contradictions of theft. In effect, Silber is demanding that we not
merely put ourselves in the other's position, but that we actually
adopt his position. Silber would be on much firmer ground if he
demanded that we consider the position of the other. We could consider
the position of those that support the right to private property and
then still deny the validity of this right on the basis of a sincere
commitment to abolish all private property. There is nothing in this
which contradicts Kantian ethics unless we regard the right to private
property as a substantial determination of the pure practical reason,
a possibility which Kant, and Silber, deny. Consideration of the
beliefs of an other can be made a formal procedural rule for all rational
ethical positions; adoption of the other's position as an ethical
demand renders impotent any possible claim for a rational ethics.
Silber's defense of Kant only serves to muddy the waters.
Both Silber and Hegel deny that Kant is guilty of substantive formalism.
Silber denies that Kant is guilty of logical formalism, although he agrees
that, were this the case, Kantian ethics would be empty. But his defense
of Kant on the basis of procedural formalism simply does not work. On
the one hand, if procedural formalism is maintained, then he is forced
to accept as the basic material of ethics some set of conventional rights
and duties which cannot be justified philosophically within Kantian
ethics. If, on the other hand, he does claim absolute justification for
those conventions, then he is forced to regard Kantian ethics as a
substantive formalism since such justification can only proceed from the
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pure practical reason. We must agree, therefore, with Hegel that
Kantian ethics cannot accomplish the task it set for itself. It
cannot provide itself with rational content, and hence cannot actualize
human freedom, for such freedom must be more than an empty form.
The contract between logical formalism on the one hand and
procedural formalism on the other demands a resolution of some sort.
Clearly it is impossible to maintain that both can be viewed as co¬
existing harmoniously. In short, are we to accuse Kant of either an
empty logical formalism or an uncritical conventionalism? Hegel
indicates in the Philosophy of Right that the charge of logical
formalism is not only truer to Kant's actual intentions but also is of
greater historical import for the subsequent development of moral and
political philosophy. The introduction of the charge of conventionalism
really only serves to bolster the critique of Kantian ethics, for it
slams shut one possible escape hatch. That Hegel's real target is
logical formalism is evidenced by his discussion of moral conscience.
Hegel defines true conscience as "the disposition to will
what is absolutely good." (PR. No. 137). We have already noted the
distinction between heteronomous and autonomous freedoms. In connection
with the concept of conscience it is important to remember that the
autonomously free individual acts for the sake of the moral law, while
the subject who is free only heteronomously is motivated by sensuous,
material desires. It is Kant's contention that the subject gradually
establishes his preferences and orders his motives for action into a
coherent pattern. In other words, the subject develops his character
in one determinate way or another. By "character", I mean that the
subject self-conscio.usly establishes a coherent dispostion towards
acting in determinate ways. If the subject is disposed towards acting
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always for the sake of the moral law, then he is a moral subject. If,
on the other hand, the subject insists on disregarding any moral
imperatives if they interfere with its search for sensual pleasures,
then he is immoral. Between those two extremes there are several
intermediate positions which indicate different degrees of moral
struggle, i.e. the subject is torn between autonomous and heteronomous
motives for action, and is aware of this as a real dilemma.36 a
subject's disposition must be understood as the ultimate ground of his
activity in the world, and it provides the individual subject with his
unique identity as this subject.
Thus Hegel's definition of true conscience refers to the
self-consciousness of a subject who is disposed towards activity for the
sake of the moral law. It is necessary to regard conscience as a mode
of self-consciousness, for the conscientious subject perceives the moral
law as imposing an absolute duty upon him if he is to see himself as a
free, rational human being. But there is another reason for emphasizing
the self-consciousness of the conscientious subject and it is bound up
with the charge of logical formalism. If the ethical philosophy of
Kant cannot yield a set of determinate, objective duties-if it could
it would be guilty of substantive formalism - then the determination
of the content of particular duties must be the product of the judgement
of the particular moral subject. As we have seen, this determination
is not subject to any constraints other than logical consistency. But
if this is the case, then a subject who sincerely sets out to act only
according to principles which satisfy those formal requirements must be
regarded as moral. Because there can be no objective test of the
rightness or moral worth of an action the only criterion for judging
its rightness is logical consistency, and the only criterion for judging
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the morality of the subject is the conscientiousness with which he
seeks to act in a logically-consistent way. It doesn't matter if his
conscientiousness dictates that he remove someone else's property or
that he lay down his life in defense of the right to private property.
What counts is whether he did one or the other as a result of perceiv¬
ing it as an absolute duty regardless of his material preferences.
Kant writes:
"No doubt it is possible sometimes to err
in the objective judgement whether something
is a duty or not; but I cannot err in the
subjective /"judgement/ whether I have compared
it with my practical (here judicially acting)
reason for the purpose of that judgement...
When a man is conscious of having acted accord¬
ing to his conscience, then, as far as regards
guilt or innocence;, nothing more can be
required of him...
There are two points to be noted in this quote: first, Kant
clearly resorts to conventional mores, for what else could possibly
provide a standard against which logically consistent duties could be
measured for their truth or error?; second, even the conventional
standards of morality fall away if the subject genuinely believes that
his act satisfied the formal principles of morality and that his only
motive for action was respect for the moral law. The first point we
have discussed at length; the second provides Hegel with a wealth of
ammunition against the Kantian ethics. We recall that Kant wished to
overcome the subjectivism and heteronomy of negative freedom, and to
demonstrate the possibility of positive, autonomous action. Now we
see that this hoped-for objectivity is reduced to the subjective
certainty of the moral subject that what he is doing is right. Hegel,
too, believes that right and freedom must be objective and it is




"What is right and obligatory is the absolutely
rational element in the will's volitions and
therefore it is not in essence the particular
property of an individual, and its form is not
that of feeling or any other private (i.e.
sensuous) type of knowing, but essentially
that of universals determined by thought, i.e.
the form of laws and principles. Conscience
is therefore subject to the judgement of its
truth and falsity, and when it appeals only to
itself for a decision, it is directly at
variance with what it wishes to be, namely the
rule for a mode of conduct which is rational,
absolutely valid, and universal." (PR_. No. 137,
Remark).
Kantian ethics is unable to generate the very objectivity which it
originally established as the necessary goal of any ethical theory
which would claim to satisfy the demand for a system of rational, human
freedom.
The rest of the section on morality is concerned to examine
subsequent developments of this general ethical position. Hegel discusses
the way in which the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity
becomes widened by philosophers who elevate the claims of subjectivity
to dizzying heights. Kant attempted to achieve a genuine reconciliation
of the two opposed realms but failed. His successors tended to dissolve
the realities of claims of one (the objective world) while absolutizing
the claims of the other. There was no attempt at genuine reconciliation,
for the breach itself was taken as the mark of man's ultimately tragic
situation. We are now on the muddy terrain of Romanticism which Hegel
described so well in the Phenomenology. (Ph,G. pp. 434-473; Ph.M. pp.
628-679). It is not necessary for our purposes to examine the dialectic
of Romanticism. Hegel's intention in the Phenomenology required him to
pursue his critique of Romanticism right to the bitter end. In the
Philosophy of Right, however, he is only concerned to demonstrate the
inability of Moral principles to generate content adequate to itself.
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His discussion of rampant subjectivism is restricted to a lengthy
remark at the end of the section. One point which is worth noting
about Romanticism is that its ultimate logical development produces
a situation of moral anarchy analogous to criminal anarchy which
concluded Hegel's discussion of Abstract Right. Each moral subject
looks only to itself as a measure of right and wrong, and this
destroys any possibility of a coherent objective order in which
rational human freedom can be actualized. It is the search for that






1. PR. No. 109. cf. Etk. No. 92.
2. This, of course, is treated by Hegel in the famous dialectic of
master and slave in the Phenomenology of Mind, Chapter 4, Section A.
3. That is, he could not discover new rights but only a new attitude
to old ones.
4. This statement clearly has ontological implications. It is beyond
the scope of this thesis to examine Hegel's ontology in its complex¬
ity. As has been pointed out in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Hegel's
ontology is mostexplicitly set out in the Science of Logic and the
Encyclopaedia Logic. The subject-object dichotomy of morality is
treated ontologically in the "Doctrine of Essence", Book Two, of
the Science of Logic. The thinking appropriate to this stage of
development is characterized as the "Understanding". It is, in
Hegel's view, no mere coincidence that Kant, the most profound philos¬
opher of the Understanding, is also the most profound philosopher
of the moral mode of experience.
5. Such a retreat violates the presupposed necessity of transforming
the objective world. This presupposition was demonstrated in
"Subjective Mind" and is assumed throughout the Philosophy of Right.
6. PR. No. 126, Remark. Hegel regards such excesses as resting on
the "benevolence" theory of morality which is pre-Kantian, e.g.
Hutcheson's theory of moral sentiments. Later in the analysis we
shall see that this "mistake" reaches its most degenerate level in
the Romantic Theories of Hegel's own time e.g. in the writings of
Novalis.
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7. For my purposes the most beneficial writings on Kant's moral
philosophy are by John Silber and Lewis White Beck. Among
Silber's many articles see, in particular, "The Copernican
Revolution in Ethics: The Good Reexamined", Kant, a Collection
of Critical Essays, ed. by R. P. Wolff (London, 1968) pp. 266-
290; and "The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion" which is
Part II of Silber's 'Introduction' to Kant's Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson
(New York, 1960), pp. LXXIX - CXXXV. For Beck see his A Commentary
on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago, 1960). See also
H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (London, 1953) and R. P.
Wolff, The Autonomy of Reason (New York, 1973). The last two
works are primarily commentaries on Kant's Grundlegung Zur
Metaphisik der Sitten. For my exposition of Kant's principles I
have relied on the works of Silber and Beck.
8. I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, translated L. W. Beck
(New York, 1956). In his translation Beck includes in parentheses the
pagination from the Akademie edition. All references to this work
will include two page references, the first to the Akademie edition
the second to Beck's trans!atioa Also, for shorthand, the second
Critique will be referred to as KdpV which is its common abbreviation.
Thus, in this instance, KdpV, 19, 17.
9. ibid.
10. KdpV; 42, 43; cf. I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
trans. L. W. Beck (New York, 1959), pp. 66-70. Hereafter referred
to as Foundations.
11. KdpV, 30, 31. For a discussion of Kant's different formulations
of the categorical imperative in the Foundations, see Paton, op.cit.
- 202 -
12. I shall only refer to Wi11kUr and Wi11e since the issues which I
wish to raise here do not require an examination of disposition
(Gesinnung) which may also be seen as a part of the human will.
13. This is reminiscent of Aristotle's discussion of the responsibil¬
ity to be attributed to a man who acts while drunk. Although
drunkeness may eliminate the possibility of acting otherwise than
he did, the man is still responsible for the decision to put
himself into such a state in the first place. See Nicomachean
Ethics, 1110a-ll11b5.
14. This, of course, was the great original insight of Rousseau, but
it was Kant who systematized it and gave it a firm foundation,
cf. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chap. VIII.
15. In KdpV Kant states that the categorical imperative is the moral
law, or "Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason". This, of
course, is an imperative, not a law. In the Foundations, Kant
does state the moral law: "An absolutely good will is one whose
maxim can always include itself when regarded as a universal law",
(p. 447, 65). See Beck, op.cit, pp. 121-122.
16. For Hegel the concept of the will is freedom. In the Foundations
Kant states that "...a free will and a will under moral laws are
identical". Hegel is not twisting Kant's thought when he
translates the above sentiments into his own terms. Foundations,
447, 65.
17. Although Hegel does not invoke the terms "heteronomy" and
"autonomy", he clearly understood their importance for Kant.
Similarly, he is aware of the importance of the concept of
"spontaneity" and its central position in any theory of
imputability. See PR_. No. 139 and the Remark to that paragraph.
18 Kant, Foundations, 400,16.
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19. cf. Kant's hymn to duty in KdpV, 86, 89.
20. See, for example, Martial Gueroult, "Les 'deplacements1
(Verstellungen) de la Conscience Morale Kantienne selon Hegel",
Hommage A Jean Hyppolite (Paris, 1971), pp. 47-80.
21. John R. Silber, "Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics", The
Review of Metaphysics, (Vol. XXVIII, No. 2) (Dec. 1974), pp. 197-
236. All references to this article will be abbreviated to
"Silber".
22. Silber p. 227. cf. Silber's rejection of Kant's ill-judged and
misleading article "An Alleged Right to Lie", on p. 223 and
footnote 46.
23. Kant, Foundations, 389. Quoted in Silber, p. 198.
24. Silber, pp. 198-199.
25. Silber, p. 199.
26. Silber p. 201. This distinction in Kant between simple agreement
with rational principles and activity for the sake of those
principles can be seen in his distinction between legality and
morality. Only the latter consists of activity for the sake of
the moral law and, hence, is fully rational.
27. Silber, pp. 200-203. Kant's formulations which flow from the
categorical imperative are found in the Foundations, second
section.
28. Silber, p. 206.
29. Silber, p. 209.
30. Silber, p. 219.
31 . Silber, p. 229-230.
32. Silber, p. 231.
33. Silber, p. 232.
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)
34. Silber, p. 233.
35. Silber, p. 233.
36. John Silber represents this range concisely in a diagram in his
"Introduction"to Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, p. CXXVI.
37. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, quoted in Silber, p. 235.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE TRANSITION TO ETHICAL LIFE
I have noted at several points in this thesis that it is
misleading to regard Hegel's treatment of concepts of experience as a
smooth, linear progression from lowest to highest. This is so because
it demands that each transition from lower to higher concepts be seen
as a neat development of those principles which are immanent in the
former into the explicit principles of the latter. While some transi¬
tions may follow this line of development, others differ quite markedly.
I have attempted to describe dialectical transitions in terms of a
search for a coherent set of principles which can overcome the defi¬
ciencies of a lower stage of experience while advancing the general
claim under investigation - whether it be a claim to truth, or
practical freedom, or religious insight and so on. On this view, some
transitions will appear relatively smooth, requiring only slight modi¬
fications of the explicit principles which structured the lower stage,
while others will appear quite abrupt, requiring entire shifts of
perspective on the problem. An example of the former would be the
transition from "Stoicism" to "Skepticism" in the Phenomenology, while
the latter, abrupt shifts are to be seen in the transitions from
"Abstract Right" to "Morality" to "Ethical Life" in the Philosophy of
Right. We have already examined the transition from Abstract Right to
Morality; in this chapter I shall attempt to explain the transition
from Morality to Ethical Life.
We can dismiss any suggestion that Ethical Life marks Hegel's
attempt to provide the objective material for Kantian ethics which it,
as we have seen, was unable to provide for itself except by covert
appeals to conventional opinion. While such a view may claim to
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present the transition as a smooth development of the principles of
Morality, it is clearly false. Not only does it disregard the
entire section on Abstract Right (except as the proximate matter of
Morality) but it also maintains that the entire form of freedom can
be determined in isolation from its content. This clearly contradicts
Hegel's most basic logical principles with respect to the dialectic
of form and content.^ T. M. Knox, in a footnote to the transition as
Hegel presents it, provides a much more acceptable view of the develop¬
ment. He describes Ethical Life as the unity of the two prior moments.
Each moment is an abstraction, an incomplete embodiment of freedom.
Although Ethical Life appears as a development beyond the two prior
stages, in truth it is seen to be the concrete whole from which
Abstract Right and Morality have been abstracted. Ethical Life is,
therefore, the "ground" of the two abstract moments and "the advance
which we have been studying is a circle which now brings us back to
what was implicit at the start".^
This account is potentially misleading. First, one may
wonder why Hegel proceeds in this manner. Why doesn't he begin with
Ethical Life and, with this as his ground, develop the notions of
objective and subjective freedom out of it? Why does he begin with
abstractions and then return to the whole? Second, Knox presents
Abstract Right and Morality, the proximate matter of Ethical Life,
in terms of their abstract opposition to each other; objectivity and
universality on one side, subjectivity and particularity on the
other. Ethical Life, as their dialectical synthesis, brings together
the two abstract moments and welds them into a coherent whole which
is then seen as their true ground. But by emphasizing their
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opposition and difference in this way, Knox is unable to provide a
proper account of why Hegel can begin his examination of Ethical Life.
That is, what justifies Hegel's adoption of Ethical Life as the true
ground of Abstract Right and Morality? I believe the answer to this
question is more easily discovered if we look to what is common to
both Abstract Right and Morality, rather than to what radically
3
distinguishes them.
Certainly Knox is correct in labelling both Abstract Right
and Morality as "abstract". However, when we examine their abstract-
ness more closely we see that it rests, in both cases, on the
abstractness of their presupposed "starting points". Both Abstract
Right and Morality begin with a concept of a rational, asocial, and
ahistorical human being. To be sure, each position invokes its own
concept of reason and each emphasizes certain aspects of individuality
and minimizes or neglects others, but this should not obscure their
fundamental similarity. Hegel's contention is that, in both cases, the
notion of the rational individual is an abstraction. It follows that
any attempt to demonstrate the possibility of freedom for such an
abstraction will be limited by the abstractness of the presupposed starting
point. In other words, any concept of freedom which is based on abstract
individuality will itself be abstract, and can only result in a concept
of abstract freedom.
The use of the term "abstract individualism" raises a number
of interesting philosophical and methodological issues. Indeed,
the use of the word "individualism" often means different things to
4
different people. In recent years the debate between "methodological
individualism" and "methodological collectivism" or "holism" has
provoked a great number of articles and books which take up some of
5
the issues raised by the concept of abstract individualism. Although
those issues are important we need not involve ourselves directly in
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contemporary debates. This is so not only because they lie outside
the scope of this thesis, but also because Hegel himself has dem¬
onstrated, in a concrete way, the limits of the "abstract individualist"
approach. In analysing the transition to Ethical Life in the
Philosophy of Right I will touch on some of the issues which are
involved in the modern debate, but this will always be within the
context of Hegel's actual procedure.
Abstract Right and Morality both maintain specific claims
with respect to the nature of human freedom. Both assume that such
claims can be based on a consideration of the needs, interests, purposes
and so on of a rational individual abstracted from all social, political
and historical specificity. Both can be seen to fail precisely because
of the abstractness of their starting points. In Abstract Right, the
individual finds himself in a spiralling series of anarchic acts with
no acceptable universal mediation. The attempt to invoke such
mediation is incoherent unless we permit advocates of the position to
import conventional social notions into the anarchic situation. In
Morality the moral subject finds himself in a spiralling series of
anarchic acts, each one aimed at a subjectively determined (asocial)
concept of welfare. Kant's attempt at objectivity is either empty or
forced to appeal to a philosophically unjustified set of given social
conventions. In both stages, the abstract individual cannot actualize
his freedom because he cannot escape acting in an objective world where
other people may, with justification, thwart the subject's attempts to
actualize his freedom.
We can view the contradiction in another way. Freedom, in
both cases, is advanced as a universal concept. It is universal
because it is posited of all rational individuals. The rational
- 209 -
indidivudal conceived abstractly, however, is only a bare particular.
In theory, each individual represents immediately the concrete presence
of the universal in its own personality (Abstract Right) or moral
subjectivity (Morality). However, in practice each individual appears
as an unmediated particular to the other persons or subjects. The
universal must necessarily appear in an immediate way because there is
nothing other than the abstract individual which can represent it.
Individuals are unmediated particulars because there is no explicitly
universal structure which can mediate their particularity. The
necessity of such a structure is evidenced by, for example, the attempt
by Abstract Right theorists to create a system of justice which is seen
by particular persons to represent the concrete universal. Such
attempts are failures. Hegel's point is that any attempt to describe
a universal concept of freedom which bases that concept on the
practical activity of the abstract individual is doomed to failure.
The universal is immediately fragmented into the anarchy of un¬
mediated particular wills.
Hegel's long, arduous analysis of Abstract Right and
Morality is intended to demonstrate the self-contradiction involved
in any attempt to ground a universal concept of freedom in the activity
of abstract individuals. This is why Hegel does not begin with
Ethical Life, for he must first deal with rival starting points. In
introducing Ethical Life as the true realm of the Idea of freedom
Hegel states that the critique of rival positions has been his
intention. He writes:
"The fact that this Idea (i.e. Ethical Life) is
the truth of the concept of freedom is some¬
thing which in philosophy, must be proved, not
presupposed, not adopted from feeling or elsewhere.
This demonstration is contained only in the fact
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that right (i.e. Abstract Right) and the moral
self-consciousness (i.e. Morality) both display
in themselves their regression to this Idea as
their outcome. Those who hope to be able to
dispense with proof and demonstration in philos¬
ophy show thereby that they are still far from
knowing the first thing about what philosophy
is."6
We must now examine what distinguishes the presuppositions of Ethical
Life from those of Abstract Right and Morality.
The central notion to be grasped is Hegel's concept of
historicism. The term "historicism" provides the spring-board for
some of the most virulent debates in modern philosophy, particularly
in the philosophy of the social sciences.7 In connection with Hegel
we need note two distinct historicist claims. First is the weaker
claim which maintains that the truth, meaning and significance or
value of human actions, events and institutions can only be under¬
stood in terms of the history of those actions, events and institutions.
Second, and much more contentious, is the claim that a consideration
of world history from a genuinely philosophical point of view will
reveal that world history is a rational process.
Let us examine the second concept first. Hegel states that
we must begin with the recognition that world history "belongs to the
realm of the Spirit". (RH_. p.44). The term "Spirit" is exceedingly
difficult to grasp. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the interp¬
retation of this fundamental Hegelian concept will determine the
interpretation of every aspect of the system. Traditionally, Spirit
has been viewed as a transcendental subject. This is the basis of the
theological interpretation of Hegel. Recently, for example, Charles
Taylor has argued for a notion of Spirit as self-positing, as requir¬
ing a world as its other in order to come to full self-consciousness.
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I believe that this view reduces Hegel's concept of Spirit to a
version of Fichte's Ego which requires a non-ego as its other, and is,
thus, contrary to Hegel's actual position.8 The more traditional
version of that view of Hegel maintains that the entire system is a
deductive one, based on the a priori concept of God as transcendental
subject. Although this view of Spirit appears plausible and, indeed,
gains support from many passages in Hegel's works, I believe it is a
misleading view and that there are compelling reasons for rejecting
it. ^
In opposition to this view, I regard Spirit as universal
human rationality, or the Idea of reason and freedom. Idea is
important here, for we recall that the Idea of a thing is the concept
of the thing together with its concrete actualization in the world.
When I say that Spirit is the Idea of human reason and freedom, I
mean that the coming-to-be of Spirit is nothing other than the struggle
by man to actualize his implicit or essential rationality and freedom.
This notion of Spirit is analagous to Aristotle's concept of teleology
with two major qualifications: first the telos of Spirit refers to
the human world and excludes notions of natural teleology except in
so far as nature is pre-spiritual, it provides the proximate matter
for the actual appearance of Spirit in the human world; second, the
teleological coming-to-be of Spirit must be understood historically.
Hegel states that the essence of Spirit is self-consciousness.
(RH. p.51). But self-consciousness is only a formal notion capable of
different content. A man may be conscious of himself as a Stoic, as
an Athenian, as a natural scientist, as a Prussian. Different notions
of the self arise historically and pass away as a result of historical
development. It is Hegel's contention that at any given time the
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content of notions of the self is determinate and knowable. We can
understand different epochs as evidencing Weitanschauungen or world
views. Such a world view necessarily entails a concept of what it is
to be a human being. Even a "common-sense" look at history will
reveal an ebb and flow of different world-views. Notions such as the
"spirit of classical Greece", the "virtue of Republican Rome", or the
"Middle Ages" indicate the prevalence of such "spirit of the ages"
notions.
But Hegel takes this type of thinking much further than
anyone else. He argues that there is a logic to this historical ebb
and flow, and that he has discovered it. He maintains that human
history can be understood as the historical coming-to-be of Spirit.
In other words, each historical epoch must be understood philosoph¬
ically in its relation to the march of Spirit towards its own actualiz¬
ation. We are already familiar with the notion of a philosophical
concept of experience collapsing as a result of its own internal
contradictions; that is, of its inability to actualize its own claims,
whether they be to truth or freedom. Similarly, entire civilizations
and nations must be understood as collapsing under the weight of their
own internal contradictions. In Hegel's view, civilizations and nations
collapse when they are unable to maintain the validity and power of
the social and political principles which structure them. This view of
historical collapse may appear to apply most accurately to situations
of internal collapse and revolution, such as the French overthrow of
the monarchy. Hegel, however, extends it to include other major
historical changes wrought by "outside" forces. The gradual decline
and ultimate collapse of the Roman Empire results, on this view, from
the inescapable contradictions of Roman social and political life.
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The "barbarians" were victorious because Rome, for reasons internal
to its civilization, was unable to withstand them.
Since Spirit refers to what is universal in man, it cannot
be regarded as the exclusive property of this or that historical
individual. It may be true that in any nation or civilization there
are those individuals who are sufficiently wise and sensitive to be
capable of a more developed historical self-consciousness than their
fellow citizens. But if Spirit is to be actualized, then it must be
actualized as concrete "living" universal. It must become actual in
the life of a truly free civilization. From ancient times to the
modern age, history must be understood philosophically as the
collective struggle by men to create for themselves a world in which
they are truly free. This actual, historical struggle marks Spirit's
actualization in history; the historical study which describes Spirit's
actualization is titled "philosophical world history" by Hegel.
"The Spirit in history is an individual which
is both universal in nature and at the same
time determinate: in short, it is the nation
in general, and the Spirit we are concerned
with is the Spirit of the nation. But the
spirits of nations differ in their own concep¬
tions of themselves, in the relative super¬
ficiality or profundity with which they have
comprehended and penetrated the nature of
Spirit... Thus it is the conception of the
Spirit which is realized in history."
(RH. p.51).
If self-consciousness (understood as universal reason) is
the essence of Spirit, then philosophical world history, or the history
of Spirit, must be understood as a history of self-consciousness JO
But self-consciousness is not an empty form which, gradually over time,
receives more and more content. Hegel's description of the emergence
of Spirit should not hide the fact that, at any given moment in this
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development, everything may be in chaos. Indeed, it is often the
most savage events, in Hegel's view, which are the most significant
from the perspective of philosophical world history. The destruction
of an empire may herald the dawn of a new one with a more developed
notion of self-conscious individuality. The civilization of
imperial Rome may appear crude in comparison to that of classical
Athens, but this must not obscure the real spiritual achievements of
the Roman empire. As we have seen, the first systematic attempts
to define and codify the inalienable rights of the individual took
place in Rome, not Athens.
The various strands of Hegel's concept of philosophical
world history are not as disparate as they may appear to be on first
reading. O'Brien has suggested that Section B of Hegel's Introduction -
"The Realisation of Spirit in History" - may be regarded as a treat¬
ment of the main features of a history of Spirit in terms of Aristotle's
categories of causality. I agree with O'Brien that this is a useful
aid that does not do any violence to Hegel's thought. Indeed, Hegel's
lectures on the philosophy of world history contain many references
which can be construed as references to Aristotle's discussion of
causality. O'Brien treats each sub-section of Section B in terms of
one of Aristotle's four causes. The alignment of cause with sub¬
section is as follows:
"a) determination of spirit (final cause)
b) means of realisation (efficient cause)
c) material of realisation (material cause)
d) its reality (formal cause)"'!
Hegel defines freedom as the "substance of Spirit". History
is the process of development in time whereby Spirit completes itself
and its substance - freedom - becomes actual. "The end of the world
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Spirit is actualized in substance through the freedom of each individ¬
ual". (RH_. p.55). Freedom is the end (telos) of Spirit's development,
and is actualized in the free life of the citizens of a free nation.
But when Hegel states that freedom is the substance of Spirit, he
means that freedom is its implicit concept. Hence the actualization of
freedom in history is the development of this concept from the merely
implicit or potential to the explicit actual living principle of a free
nation. The succession of cultural and political epochs which Hegel
identifies in history has the significance, therefore, of advancing
this development from implicit to explicit. "The spirit of a nation
should thus be seen as the development of a principle; this principle
is at first bound up with an indistinct impulse which gradually works
its way out and seeks to attain objective reality." (RH_. p.55).
Freedom, therefore, is the final cause of Spirit and, since philosophical
world history is the elucidation of the historical coming-to-be of
Spirit, freedom is the final cause of history viewed philosophically.
The suggestion that freedom is the final cause of history
is analogous to Hegel's concept of Absolute Knowledge. I have already
discussed in some detail the concept of Absolute Knowledge. We saw
that Absolute Knowledge is not only the culmination of the development
of the various forms of knowledge which are correct within appropriate
spheres, but also that its very absoluteness is to be discovered in its
absolute self-consciousness of this structure as its own structure.
That is, Absolute Knowledge is the absolute self-conscious knowledge
of the entire development of the structure of knowledge and, in and
through the act of absolute comprehension, brings this development to
a close. The similarity between Absolute Knowledge as the telos of
-216-
the development of knowledge and freedom as the final cause of
history is made clear in the following statement by Hegel.
"World history...represents the development of
the Spirit's consciousness of its own freedom
and of the consequent actualisation of this
freedom. This development is by nature a gradual
progression, a series of successive determinations
of freedom which proceed from the concept of the
material in question, i.e. the nature of freedom
in its development towards self-consciousness.
The logical - and even more so the dialectical -
nature of the concept in general, i.e. the
fact that it determines itself, assumes successive
determinations which it progressively overcomes,
thereby attaining a positive, richer, and more
concrete determination - this necessity, and the
necessary series of pure abstract determinations
of the Concept, are comprehended by means of
philosophy. All that need be noted here is that
each step in the process, since it is different
from all the others, has its own peculiar determ¬
inate principle. In history, such principles
constitute the determinate characteristics of the
spirit of a nation. Each historical principle,
in its concrete form, expresses every aspect of
the nations' consciousness and will, and indeed
of its entire reality; it is the common denominator
of its religion, its political constitution, its
ethical life, its system of justice, its customs,
its learning, art, and technical skill, and the
whole direction of its industry. These special
peculiarities should be interpreted in the light
of the general peculiarity, the particular principles
of the nation in question, just as this general
peculiarity can be detected in the factual details
with which history presents us. The question of
whether this or that particular characteristic
actually constitutes the distinctive principle of
a nation is one which can only be approached
empirically and demonstrated by historical means."
(RH. p. 138).
Several points must be made in the light of this passage.
First, freedom is the final cause of Spirit and history. It is that
which informs the entire movement of history, and is seen to be its
final goal. Thus, it must be distinguished from, for example, Kant's
notion of freedom as the posited end of historical development.
Freedom is not a regulative idea which helps us to understand certain
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phenomena; rather it is a constitutive principle of history and must
be grasped as such by philosophy. Second, the concept of freedom as
final cause is, as with Absolute Knowledge in the Phenomenology,
discovered a posteriori. Hegel's philosophy of history can claim
what it does because it itself occupies a unique historical position.
Were Hegel's philosophy of history an a priori one, then he would be
forced to identify some transcendant subject which moves history
according to some pre-determined plan. Although this view accords
with some interpretations of Hegel, it seems to me to be highly
implausible. For one thing, such eschatalogical theories of history
point to a state of perfection or grace beyond the human world which
is somehow related to the human world. Hegel resolutely maintains
that Spirit is actualized in human history, and not beyond it.
"The realm of the Spirit consists in what is
produced by man. One may have all sorts of
ideas about the Kingdom of God; but it is
always a realm of Spirit to be realized and
brought about in man."^2
The a posteriori nature of the claim for a final cause of Spirit and
history cannot be refuted on a priori principles. Any such refutation
must challenge Hegel's ordering of the actual empirical materials of
history.
Third, Hegel's historicism is not a self-refuting relativism.
One of the arguments against historicism is that, since all knowledge
presupposes a historically-determined frame of reference, then there
are no grounds for choosing one frame of reference over another. Thus
Leo Strauss writes that "there is a variety of such comprehensive
views, each as legitimate as any other: we have to choose such a view
without any rational guidance... Our choice has no support but itself:
13
it is not supported by any objective or theoretical certainty...".
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Hegel clearly believes that his philosophical view is objective and
supportable. As already noted, the refutation of this view must
produce evidence, and this is a challenge which Hegel himself sets.
Far from arguing that there is no (absolute) truth - which Strauss
implies is a feature of historicism - Hegel argues that he has
discovered absolute truth. Although, no doubt, there are philosophers
who will defend radical relativism, this is not a necessary consequence
of historicism properly conceived. Even short of anchoring our
perspective from which we view history and the historical development
of forms of consciousness and knowledge upon the bed rock of absolute
knowledge or end of history, we need not accept Strauss' argument.
Hegel himself has shown how a critical attitude towards philosophical
positions can reveal incoherencies and contradictions according to
their own principles and standards. This "internal" critique can
include historicist considerations without falling into a bottomless
pit of relativism.
Having identified freedom as the final cause of history,
Hegel turns his attention to the manner in which this final cause is
actualized, that is, the "efficient cause" of history. As Hegel states,
freedom as final cause exists only as a possibility. "A second
moment is necessary before it can attain reality - that of actualization;
and its principle is the will, the activity of mankind in the world at
large. It is only by means of this activity that the original concepts
or implicit determinations are actualized." (RH. pp 69-70). Expressed
in this way, it would appear that Hegel is claiming that, historically,
individuals act for the sake of the universal concept of rational
freedom. Nothing could be further from what Hegel states is the
actual motive for human activity throughout history.
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"An initial survey of history, however, would
indicate that the actions of men are governed
by their needs, passions and interests, by the
attitudes and aims to which these give rise,
and by their own character and abilities; we
gain the impression that, in this scene of activity,
these needs passions and interests etc., are the
sole motive forces. Individuals do at times
pursue more general ends such as goodness, but the
good they pursue is invariably of a limited character
... We may well see the ends of reason realized in
the virtues of individual subjects and in their
sphere of influence; but these are only isolated
individuals who constitute but a small proportion
of the mass of mankind when we compare them with
all the others, and the extent to which their
virtues are effective is relatively limited."
(RH. p.68).
This appears as an irresolvable paradox. How is it possible
for universal freedom to be actualized by particular individuals who act
only out of passion with no regard for the universal? As a first step
towards resolution Hegel qualifies the notion of passion, and states
that he means no more by it than the "active interest" of those who
act in the world. "Passion is the subjective or formal aspect of the
energy of active volition-irrespective of its actual content or end-
and this distinction between form and content also applies to all
personal convictions, opinions and conscience. (RH. p.73). Therefore,
passion is not necessarily inimical to reason, but rather emphasizes
that individuals only act when they perceive that it is in their
interests to do so. I believe that the seeming paradox between freedom
and passion can be further resolved if we recognize that rational
freedom is not against the interests of the individual. To say that
individuals act for the sake of subjective interest need imply nothing
more than that individuals act in order to satisfy their needs.
Satisfaction of such needs - physical, intellectual, religious - can
appear as a type of freedom. But certain kinds of satisfaction are
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illusory, for they contain the seeds of their own negation. As a
simple example, to restrict political freedom to only a small class
of individuals is to prepare the way for the ultimate eruption of
dissatisfaction and resentment on the part of the excluded classes,
an eruption which will surely be chaotic and may even succeed in
destroying the privilege which was formerly viewed as the basis of
freedom. Therefore, from the perspective of the end of history
(Hegel), the relentless search for satisfaction can be seen as the
unconscious search for ever more adequate forms of experience in
which freedom can be actualized. Passion, therefore, can be seen as
the handmaiden of reason and freedom.
As we have seen, Spirit's determinate existence, for Hegel
is discovered in the nation. The hierarchical arrangement of
historical epochs is seen as the march of Spirit through history. It
is Hegel's contention that nations break up when they are unable to
contain the pressures for change building up within them. The
determinate shape of Spirit which informs the new nation is contained
in germ in the nation which is suffering decline.
"The higher universal /i.e. the new shape of
Spirit/ which supersedes it /(the lower or
antecedent shape/ is, so to speak, the next
variety of the previous species and is
already present within it, although it has
not yet come into its own; and it is this
which makes the present reality unstable and
fragmentary." (RH. p.82)J4
Great historical transformations, Hegel argues, must be seen in terms
of a transition to a new set of principles. Such transformations may
occur as a result of many different factors; some may be mysterious
or fortuitous, while others will be clear and unambiguous.
One of the features of such major historical upheavals Hegel
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terms the "world historical individual". At different times in
history great individuals harnessed all the available energies and
passions and effected great and irreversiblehistorical changes.
The particular talent of a Caesar or Napoleon is to grasp the
emergent self-consciousness of the age and to "make it their own end".
The world historical individual succeeds because he knows what the
age demands, what kinds of change the people want, and the ways to
effect what is perceived as necessary. Once again, it would be a
mistake to see the world historical individual as motivated by the
pure ideal of rational human freedom. The significance of those
individuals is that their personal motives - be they greed, lust,
power hunger - are best served by bringing into being what the
historical epoch demands. Although the true individuality of Spirit
is in the nation, at various moments in history the self-consciousness
of an age becomes identified within the visionary self-consciousness
of a great historical actor J 5
One other point must be made before we proceed. The port¬
rait I have given of passion and the world historical individual may
appear far too sanguine. It is possible to view this as a gloss over
the horror and suffering endured by actual individuals - whether
single persons or entire nations - in history. Certainly the
progressive structure here presented appears optimistic. Hegel him¬
self is well aware of this problem. Hegel's philosophy of history
consists of lectures he delivered to university students. In the
Introduction to those lectures, when discussing the role of passion
in history, he takes great care to point out the horrors of the past.
He argues that it is only with utmost "selfish complacency" that it is
possible to view the past with equanimity. But amid the confusion
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and wreckage there is a progressive pattern to be discerned. To
recognize this is not to ignore or justify the horrors of the past.
Philosophy must look for the truth and Hegel argues that he is
presenting the truth of history. Certainly, the sufferings of the
past may not have been necessary for freedom to become actual. This,
however, does not negate the fact that they did take place, and that
it was through such struggle that freedom did advance.
"But even as we look upon history as an altar
on which the happiness of nations, the wisdom
of states, and the virtue of individuals are
slaughtered, our thoughts inevitably impel us
to ask: to whom, or to what ultimate end have
these monstrous sacrifices been made?" (RH. p.69).
To answer that the cause of human freedom may have been advanced by
this monstrous history is not to diminish or justify the horrors of
the past; rather it may inform this history with a dignity it might
not otherwise have, and serves as a constant reminder of the high
cost of our present freedoms.
The material cause of Spirit's progress towards actualization
provides the "material which is available or which has to be procured
in order that the end may be realized." (RH_. p. 93). Hegel, there¬
fore must provide an answer to the question: "What is the material
in which the ultimate end of reason is realized?" (ibid). Hegel's
answer is clear and unambiguous; the material cause of the emergence
of Spirit is the state. After identifying the state as the material
cause Hegel proceeds to specify the way in which the state is "the
reality within which the individual has and enjoys his freedom, but
only in so far as he knows, believes in, and wills the universal".
(RH. p.93). This specification refers primarily to the Idea of the
state, or the state as absolutely rational. If the concept of the
state is that it is the substantive embodiment of the freedom of the
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individual, then the Idea of the state is that substantive nature made
actual as a living, actual state. Clearly Hegel's discussion of the
state in the Philosophy of History overlaps with much of what he says
in the Philosophy of Right. Therefore, I intend to reserve discussion of
the concept and Idea of the state for the examination of Ethical Life in
the next chapter.
There are, however, several points which can be made here
which are significant, both for understanding Hegel's philosophy of
history and for preparing the way for the discussion of Ethical Life.
We have already seen that philosophical world history can be regarded as
a history of self-consciousness. We have also noted Hegel's insistence
that the individuality of Spirit - its specific determinations in
history - is represented in the life of the nation. The relation
between those two elements provides the essential foundation for
comprehending Hegel's political philosophy as well as his philosophy
of history.
In the Phenomenology the section on self-consciousness is
introduced by the famous dialectic of master and slave. There are
numerous commentaries on this dialectic and it is not necessary for our
purposes to present a synopsis of the actual details of it."16 The
significance of this dialectic is that self-consciousness can only
emerge within a social context, in this case the struggle for dominance
and recognition which necessarily involves at least two persons. In the
master-slave dialectic the self-consciousness which emerges is that of
a specific individual, this master or that slave. The slave, for
example knows himself not only as a slave in general (servitude as a
universal), but as this particular slave who is the slave of that
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particular master (who represents in himself a particular embodiment
of mastership as universal). In the preceding discussion in the
Phenomenology of consciousness Hegel demonstrates that the "I" of
epistemology can never be the specific and individual. The "I" of
Descartes' cogito is a pure universal. It is not a concept which is
capable of specifying this particular "I". Kant's "knower" of the
critical writings is a "transcendental ego" and not any individual.
But the slave is an individual in a way that the abstract, cognizing
subject of epistemology can never be. And this individuality only
emerges as a result of a struggle for recognition which requires a
social context.
We have already discussed Hegel's concept of individuality
as the mediated unity of universal and particular. Now, it is Hegel's
contention that human individuality as a concrete reality can only
emerge within the social context. Individuality without self-
consciousness is an empty abstraction and self-consciousness is only
possible in the context of an explicit dialectic of self and other.
This is the conclusion of the analysi s of the emergence of self-
consciousness in the Phenomenology. But the Phenomenology is only
concerned with what, minimally, must be present if self-consciousness
is to emerge. When we turn to actual history the problem is somewhat
different. We cannot point to a specific event and claim that it marks
the beginning of human history. At best, we can only indicate concep¬
tually what must be present if there is to be a history of man at all.
This minimal condition for the possibility of human history is the
emergence of self-consciousness.
Once again, the master-slave dialectic provides the key
to understanding this claim. The slave is what he is as a result of a
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struggle with an other (the master). His consciousness of himself is
mediated by the past because he knows himself as a slave and is a
slave precisely because of his capitulation to the master. This
struggle, this "past", is constitutive of what he is in the present -
a slave. His present sense of self, his self-consciousness, is mediated
by the process which brought him to his present state of servitude.
His self-consciousness is not atemporal and ahistorical. The history
of the struggle which resulted in his capitulation is not peripheral
or inessential to his concept of self. His self-consciousness is
historical. He cannot conceive of himself as a specific individual
at all unless he has some knowledge of the past, of his history.
It may appear that I am presenting self-consciousness as
a product of history, in contradiction to my original claim that
history is only possible if there is self-consciousness. This is
incorrect, however, for what I am attempting to demonstrate is that,
for Hegel, history and self-consciousness emerge together dialectically.
History and self-consciousness are each self-and-other mediating
concepts. The slave, for example, conceives of himself historically.
The historical struggle which produced his condition of servitude
mediates his self-consciousness and circumscribes limits to his future
possibilities. That is, the fear of the other which caused him to
capitulate now enslaves him to the master. His memory of this fear
precludes revolt against the master. But as he works for the master
he begins to discover his own powers, his own value. This discovery
must be regarded as a shift in his concept of himself. But this
discovery emerges over time as he labours for the master, and it becomes
part of the slave's history. That is, the history of his fear and
capitulation is gradually displaced by his history as a valuable and
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productive worker, albeit in the service of another. The history of
his value as a productive slave displaces the history which resulted
in his initial condition of servitude. This can also be represented
in terms of his changing concept of self, for from abject worthless-
ness he is now developing a self-consciousness of his own value. The
history of the slave and the self-consciousness of the slave develop
together as two distinct but inseparable elements of a dialectical
totality.
Now, the master-slave dialectic indicates the conceptual
link between self-consciousness and history. But it may look as if
this relation is essentially one-sided. That is, the discussion so
far has focused on the self-consciousness of the slave and the
importance of the history of the slave to his self-consciousness.
Further, developments in this self-consciousness may appear to be
structured within the subjectivity of the slave. But we should not
overlook the objectivity of the master-slave relation. The slave may
regard himself as a valuable human being, and even as a more valuable
individual than his "parasitic" master. But he is still, objectively,
the possession of an other will. Until he is willing to reject his own
servitude and challenge the master he may think of himself in whatever
manner he please but he remains a slave. The examination of stoicism
in the Phenomenology focuses on just this subjectivism and demonstrates
its falsity as a concept of freedom. The social context is concep¬
tually prior to self-consciousness and we cannot deny the importance
of this contextin its substantive objectivity. The claims of
subjectivity can never deny the substantive nature of the objective
order in which the subject finds himself and must live his life.
Indeed, at a more profound level, the denial of the objective world is
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itself contextually determined J?
When we turn from the analysis of the conceptual link
between self-consciousness and history to the actual material of
philosophical world history, a different range of problems emerges.
We know why Hegel characterizes history as a history of self-
consciousness. We can also understand the epochal nature of this
history, for different epochs involve different modes of self-
consciousness. But we may ask, with justice, why Hegel introduces the
state and the nation as the proper material for this history. What is
there about the state and nation which makes it a worthy object of
philosophical world history?
Given the historical dialectic of self-consciousness within
a determinate social context, Hegel's argument is that the concept of
a nation provides us with the most meaningful concept of a determinate
social context. Hegel writes:
"A nation's religion, its laws, its ethical life,
the state of its knowledge, its arts, its
judiciary, its other particular aptitudes and
the industry by which it satisfies its needs,
its entire destiny, and its relations with its
neighbours in war and peace - all these are
intimately connected."'8
It is this totality of distinct but inseparable parts which Hegel
describes as the nation.
Hegel pushes this point as far as he can, for he argues that
this totality of distinct elements - the nation - can be grasped in
spiritual terms. He argues that, in all the constituent elements of
the nation, there runs one principle which is
"basic to them all, the spirit of their
determinate character which permeates every
one of them. This principle is the nation's
self-consciousness, the active force in the
destinies of all nations." (RH_. p. 102).
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The nation, or state,is an individual embodiment of spirit. The
concept which a nation has of itself constitutes its self-consciousness.
This spirit of a nation, its self-consciousness, is a result of many
different factors which can include such seemingly disparate elements
as geography, climate, good fortune, possession of particular natural
resources, and so on. Not least, by any means, is a nation's awareness
of its own history, in a manner analogous to the slave's recognition
of his history. A nation's history not only tells the story of how it
developed to its present stage, but also structures the possibilities
available to it for further development.
We should guard against viewing the state as an autonomous,
transcendant entity with a spirit independant of its citizens.
Nothing could be further from Hegel's intentions. The self-consciousness
of the citizens of a nation and the spirit of that nation (which Hegel
describes as the self-consciousness of the nation) are dialectically
connected, and develop together. The emphasis on the self-consciousness
of the nation is intended to undercut attempts to reduce the spirit of
a nation to the self-consciousness of its citizens considered as abstract
individuals. In the master-slave dialectic we saw that the self-
consciousness of the slave emerges within the context of the master-
slave relationship itself. This relationship, this context, cannot be
reduced to the self-consciousness of either the master or the slave.
The self-consciousness of the master and slave is, respectively, that
of a master who is master of a slave or a slave who is a slave of a
master. The self-consciousness of each is structured by the context
which envelops both of them. Similarly, the self-consciousness of
the citizen cannot be separated from that of the state of which he is
a citizen.
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"The individuals (citizens) belong to this
spirit (of the nation); each of them is the
son of his nation, and also, in so far as
the state to which he belongs is still
developing, the son of his age - for no one
can remain behind the age he lives in, let
alone transcend it. This spiritual being is
his being, and he is its representative; he
arises out of it and exists within it."
(RH. p. 103).
Historically, there have been individuals who have risen
above the spirit of their age. The argument for the importance of
world historical individuals rests on the ability which some great
men have had to grasp the spirit of the coming age and to translate
this into actions of great historical consequence. But Hegel would
argue that even such historical "breaks" must be understood as
arising out of the spirit of the previous age. We are familiar with
Hegel's argument that all negation is determinate negation. The
struggle to create a new concept of the self is a determinate negation
of the old concept. The determinate negation of the "old spirit", of
old structures, can only make sense if we recognize the context in
which it occurs. It is in this sense that even rebels and visionaries
are "sons" of their nation.
What is true of individual citizens applies equally to other
groups within the totality of the state. Families, for example,
differ conceptually from one nation to another. The "extended family"
may exist "naturally" in some nations while it would be regarded as
intolerable in others. The domain of individual rights and spheres
of activity will also depend on the wider context of the state. Hegel
argues that even the natural sciences are contextually determined and
limited. We may, in modern times, regard this last claim as suspect,
but we need only reflect on the fact that, in certain epochs, whole
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areas may be considered closed off to natural scientific investiga¬
tion. Conversely, subjects such as phrenology or alchemy are not
considered genuinely scientific now, but at one time were highly-
regarded sciences. The widest possible net which can include all of
those "spiritual" elements is the state or the nation. The spirit or
self-consciousness of this unit is the primary object of a history of
the development of spirit or self-consciousness. It is for this reason
that Hegel describes the state as the material in which the ultimate
end of Spirit is actualized.
The use of the term "state" is not without problems. It may
appear that the real answer to the question "what is the material
cause of history?" is "everything" and, for the sake of clarity and
intellectual respectability we will call that "everything" the "state".
That appearance is supported by the seeming interchangeability of the
terms "state", "nation", "people", "culture" and "civilization". It
is true that different terms are used to describe what appears to be
a unitary concept, namely the appearance of Spirit at a determinate
stage of development. Despite the problems, I believe the identifica¬
tion of the state as the material cause of history is defensible in
Hegelian terms.
Freedom, as we have seen, cannot become actual until the
human world is transformed through human activity. The state is the
objective embodiment of the free will (the discussion of Abstract
Right and Morality prepares the way; as we shall see, for the
introduction of the state as the true ground of human freedom).
Philosophical world history is concerned with the developments of
freedom from Concept to Idea and, therefore, must examine the efforts
by man to transform the world in accordance with his demand to live
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a free,rational life. That struggle is not merely subjective; it
must not be seen as a series of attempts to alter self-consciousness
in abstraction from the world. The struggle has an objective moment,
since the objective world must be transformed if freedom is to become
actual. The term "state" - including as it does the widest possible
range of objective institutions - captures most completely the
objective moment of spiritual development.
It is true, of course, that Absolute Mind - Art, Religion,
and Philosophy - is higher than Objective Mind and marks the highest
development of Spirit. But even the philosopher has the state as his
proximate matter and can no sooner leave his own spiritual age than
a man can "leave his skin". Although it may be possible to write a
history of Spirit in terms of a history of philosophy it would be
misleading. The self-consciousness of the philosopher is intimately
bound up with the spirit of his age. The most objective evidence of
the spirit of an age is found in the objective structures of the state.
(Family law, for example, is an objective statement, in Hegel's view,
of the spiritual reality of the family in a given historical epoch.
As such, it is of greater value than questionable statements about the
subjective dispositions of particular family members.) In the case of
the philosopher he must be regarded as within the totality of the
state even though his wisdom may appear to place him beyond the state.
The domain of objectivity which Hegel terms the "state"
appears to be much wider than the domain of objectivity which he
includes within the "state" in the Philosophy of Right. Before we
leap to that conclusion, however, we should remember that the state
in the Philosophy of Right has as its proximate matter the entire range
of Subjective Mind, Objective Mind and the historically-overcome states
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which had previously appeared. In the Philosophy of Right the state
is an extremely wide concept, although its actual description may
appear limited. The state is objective and embodies in substantive
form the self-consciousness of its citizens. Hegel's use of the
term "state" to describe the material cause of philosophical world
history underlines for us the important notion that the Concept of
freedom demands objectivity if it is to become actual.
The last cause to be discussed is the formal cause. The
first three causes discussed were all, in a sense, abstract. Although
they specify certain features of philosophical world history in general,
they are unable to identify precisely what distinguishes one state from
another. The formal cause of Spirit is intended to accomplish the
"concretization" of differences between the various world historical
states.
"The points hitherto discussed (i.e. the final,
efficient and material causes) have concerned
the abstract moments which occur within the
concept of the state. But it is the Constitution
which puts this concept into execution and adopts
measures to ensure that all that happens within
the state is in accord with its nature." (RH. p. 116). u
Hegel here is using "constitution" in a way similar to Aristotle's
use of Politeia in the PoliticsHegel does not mean by constitu¬
tion the abstract rules of government; rather he regards the
constitution as embodying concretely the ends of a particular state.
Those ends, in turn, inform the entire life of the state, both its
objective institutions, modes of production and so on as well as its
cultural life, ethical norms and expectations of the citizens. In
short, the constitution of a state embodies objectively the self-
consciousness of the state and, hence, its citizens.
Therefore, it is to the constitution of a state that we must
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look if we wish to discover the specific embodiment of Spirit in
that state. Philosophical world history looks to the constitu¬
tions of actual historical states in order to identify the path of
Spirit's emergence. From the perspective of the Hegelian absolute,
or "post-historical" perspective, those constitutions exhibit a
hierarchy of ever more complete embodiments of the principle of
freedom.
"The constitutions of states, however, vary
according to the form which the totality
assumes. The state is rationality made
manifest in the world, and the various
constitutions accordingly succeed one another,
each with its distinct principle; and it
invariably happens that the earlier forms are
superseded by those which follow them."
(RH. p. 120).
The hierarchy of forms of states is signficant because it exhibits
Spirit's emergence. Hegel is adamant that historically superseded
forms are significant only in that historical sense. They are of no
value in determining modern constitutions, that is, of providing models
for modern constitutions. This is a theme which Hegel constantly
returns to in an effort to counteract both a romanticism which yearns
for antecedent political forms and a rationalism which seeks to create
wholly new ones (utopias) which can then be grafted onto modern
reality. Both positions refuse to recognize the reality, the power, of
Spirit. That is, present reality is a result of historical development
and exhibits entrenched features which no amount of wishing can
disperse. I shall return to this point in the next chapter, but it
is worth noting that what is often taken to be conservatism in Hegel
is often nothing other than a deeply considered, philosophically
justified realism.
The teleology which Hegel claims to have discovered in human
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history is one of the main points of contention within his entire
system. In the final chapter of this thesis I intend to raise some
problems concerning the relation between Hegel 's philosophy of
history and the theory advanced in the Philosophy of Right. For now,
however, it is worth mentioning that many of the charges raised
against Hegel rest on a misunderstanding of what he actually says about
history. First of all, his notion of freedom as a final cause does not
entail an a priori construction of history. In fact, the reverse is
true for the very notion of history which Hegel sets out is inimical to such
constructions. Hegel is writing about the past, about actual history
philosophically considered. Hegel only claims to have discovered what
is already present in that history but has not yet been identified. He
is the first to do so not because he is more brilliant than Aristotle or
St. Thomas or Descartes, but because he himself is writing at a
particular moment in history, a moment when the emergence of Spirit in
and through history is complete. Aristotle could not have recognized
this precisely because the emergence is historical, and history was
"incomplete" when Aristotle was alive. It follows from this that
Hegel's historicism has nothing whatever to do with Popper's notion of
historicism as a "predictive" science.22
Second, Hegel's philosophy of history need not explain
every historical fact, nor relate every historical fact to Spirit's
emergence. History need not have happened exactly as it did for
Spirit to have emerged. Indeed, were man a different sort of being
then there may not have been any history at all, at least in the sense
in which we distinguish human history from natural history. But, Hegel
maintains, man is what he is and Spirit did emerge in this way. We
may think of less bloody ways in which Spirit could emerge but this is
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only empty wishing. Much of what has been may not only have been
otherwise but may not even be fully comprehensible from the perspective
of philosophical world history. For example, passion may be the
efficient cause of spiritual development but this does not entail that
every passionate act is equally comprehensible. Many different motives
may lie behind specific acts, and those motives may always remain
hidden. Contingent circumstances may have dictated certain actions,
and contingency can never be explained away. Similarly, the motives
of world historical individuals may always remain opaque. None of
this is a direct challenge to Hegel for he does not claim to explain
history in this way. He is, rather, arguing that the great sweep of
history exhibits a logic of development. Indeed that logic can never
provide a complete account of the subjective motives for an act. For
example, the exact motives of Luther, his particular psychological
make-up as well as his own view of his historical mission is ultimately
irrelevant to the development which Hegel claims to have discovered.
The significance of the Protestant reformation is far greater than
could ever be explained by its characterisation as a doctrinal dispute
within the Christian church. It certainly did involve such a dispute
and this dispute may have dominated the consciousness of the principal
historical actors involved, but its significance for Spirit was far
greater than this.
Hegel does not rationalize, in the sense of explain away,
every event in history. He claims only to identify the rational
kernel within the seeming chaos of history. But this grand historical
scenario does imply that any significant explanation of phenomena must
take account of the history of that phenomenon which is to be explained.
This, of course, is historicism in the weaker sense. Hegel can only
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support his larger claims about Spirit if the lesser claim that each
civilization (cultural, political) exhibits its own historically-
determined structural forms holds good. If there are no unifying
structural principles within a state then it is impossible to iden¬
tify historical development from one state to another. Development,
in Hegel's sense, requires change in the principles which structure
spiritual entities. But change in the structural principles of a
state presupposes the existence of a state which is so structured,
that is, it presupposes political and cultural unity. Once again, such
a claim is not a priori but rather depends on an examination of actual
history. This is an empirical matter and is subject to empirical
falsification. Hegel does present his evidence for such a claim in
the main body of his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.
There he argues for the unity of actual historical states as well as
identifying the significance of each state for the emergence of Spirit.
Although it runs counter to Hegel's intentions, it is
possible to separate the two types of historicism. Most historians
would defend what I have called the "weaker" version of historicism
while very few would defend the stronger one (i.e. the one attacked
by Popper). (In the social sciences, the "historical" understanding
of social and political phenomena is "making a comeback" after several
decades of derision by those social scientists who took the methods
(as they conceived them) of natural science as their model for social
science.) Of course, it is possible to accept the notion of cultural
and political unity and the necessity of explaining social and political
phenomena within this context without accepting the tenets of
historicism. Increasingly, however, the principle that the dynamics
of a political society must be grasped in their historical development
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is gaining acceptance.^3 This weaker version certainly owes a great
debt to Hegel, although he would regard it as an evasion of the "hard
task" of philosophy whose proper object of examination is the histo¬
rical "coming-to-be" of Spirit.
Finally, and perhaps most important for our study of the
Philosophy of Right, the emergence of Spirit is nothing less than the
emergence of human rationality and freedom. Hegel does not separate
human "nature" from the objective institutions which embody Spirit.
The examination of world history from a philosophical point of view
is not to be understood as a search for those objective institutions
which are most adequate to a fixed human "essence". (This type of
philosophy of history was a feature of eighteenth century enlighten¬
ment. 24) Hegel "historicizes" not only the state but also human
rationality itself. The point about the concept of Spirit is precise¬
ly that those two developments (state and man) must be regarded as
developing together dialectically. We have examined the way in which
Spirit is said to inform the entire civilization of a people. We
have also seen that the very concepts of self-consciousness, of
rationality, are informed by the "spirit of the age". The final point
which must be made is that Spirit is the objective, universal moment
of human rationality.
We are familiar with Hegel's discussion of the individual
as the concrete unity of universal and particular. When we turn our
attention to the broad canvas of world history we see that those
concepts are of great importance for the philosophical comprehension
of history. What is truly universal in Spirit is freedom and human
reason. But the universal, by itself, is an empty abstraction. The
content for the universal is discovered in the life of a cultural and
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political entity which Hegel, depending on the context, alternatively
terms a "state", or a "nation" or a "people". That is, the different
states examined by Hegel are each particular embodiments of Spirit.
Now,within each particular state persons are born, live active lives,
and die. They produce goods and artifacts, worship in determinate
ways, create beautiful objects and philosophize. The totality of
particular acts is understood as the Spirit of the state, or the nation
or the people. Spirit is not a simple summation of particular acts but
is understood as the set of principles which inform the entire life of
the people and makes coherent the variety of particular acts and events.
Now, to the people of any particular state, the spirit of
their state may remain somewhat obscure. Even if the "people", or
some individuals within the state, recognize the existence of some¬
thing called the spirit of their state, this spirit will appear
different to them than to "us", the "philosophical world historians".
This is so because we bring to bear an understanding of the totality
of Spirit, of its development in and through history. To each
antecedent particular state, the spirit which informs it is regarded
by its citizens as, in some sense, unique and separate. The people
within a particular age cannot regard itself as a particular embodiment
of universal Spirit, for the development of this universal qua
universal can only be discovered at its end, i.e. the discovery of
reason in history, of world Spirit, is itself a "post-historical"
discovery. To be more precise, that discovery brings the development
of Spirit to an end.
From the perspective of the end of the development of
Spirit we can discover what is universal in world history, namely
human reason and freedom. Further, we can see that each historically
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significant state is signficant precisely because it advances the
development of the universal. Therefore, each cultural epoch, each
state, is not seen as unique in and for itself, but rather is seen
as a particular stage within a universal process. But this requires
abandoning ideas about the discrete particularity of different
states. We now must regard each culture as embodying, in a deficient
form, the universal. Universal and particular are not separate. The
particular is significant because of its dialectical relation to the
universal. In Hegel's logical terms, each state is an individual
because it is a particular embodiment of the universal. To be sure,
the only truly concrete individual is the final state which actualizes
Spirit absolutely. But to regard each antecedent state as an individ¬
ual, albeit a deficient one, serves as a constant reminder that
philosophical world history looks to the historical succession of
actual states for the development of the actual content of universal
freedom and reason.
When we turn from the notion of the state as a spiritual
individual to the individuality of its citizens we can discover the
relation between human individuals and Spirit. Similar to the
discussion of Spirit, what is universal in man is human reason and
freedom. But also each man is a particular person with particular
needs, dispositions and talents located within a particular spatio-
temporal state. Universality by itself is empty, while unchecked
particularity is both heteronomous (in Kant's sense) and, when we
look to the social and political world, anarchic. The resolution is
the concept of the concrete individual in which the particular
activities of the individual are informed throughout by reason. It
is the concrete individual who is free in the full-blown, rational
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sense of freedom. But where, we may rightfully inquire, does this
universal come from? The answer to this question supplies the corner¬
stone of Hegel's political philosophy.
In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right Hegel
discusses the universal and particular moments involved in human
volition. The individual is aware of his capacity as a thinking,
willing human being to choose between various possibilities. By itself,
this universality is empty, an "unrestricted infinity of absolute
abstraction or universality, the pure thought of oneself". (PR. No. 5).
Particularity refers to the necessity to act and to thereby choose one
course of action rather than an other one. But this stepping "into
determinate existence" involves a loss of the freedom of pure
universality, for the person no longer has before him an indefinite
series of possibilities. The resol ution of the conflict between
universal and particular is possible only with the introduction of the
concept of individuality. The individual realizes that his particular
acts do not conflict with his universality, but rather actualize it.
"It is the self-determination of the ego, which
means that at one and the same time the ego
posits itself as its own negative, i.e. as
restricted and determinate, and yet remains by
itself, i.e, in its self-identity and
universality." (PR. No. 7).
But this dialectical resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy
is highly abstract. We still have the right to ask where the content
comes from. Hegel's answer to this question is Spirit and its emergence
in and through history.
We have already examined the relation between Spirit and
self-consciousness. This relation provides us with an answer to the
major question before us. Universal and particular are not free-
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floating notions fluttering eternally above the maelstrom of history.
An individual's sense of self, his notion of his powers, capacities,
needs, possibilities is intimately bound up with the spirit of the
state in which he lives. When we speak, for example, of the spirit
of classical Athens we think of vigorous participation in public life
by free men as well as the fact that such public virtue was based on
a system of slavery. The free Athenian clearly viewed his world and
his duties and possibilities within that world in a manner quite
distinct from our view of our place in the modern world. The outrage
that fills us when we think of slavery, for example, would have
perplexed even so noble a thinker as Aristotle. The recognition that
citizens of different states with widely varying cultures have different
concepts of the self and the world is, I think, beyond dispute. This
is not to argue against structural similarities between disparate
cultures; rather only that the content of those formal similarities
is very different. Indeed, the notion of self-consciousness would be
one such formal structure for Hegel, although the different contents
of self-consciousness is precisely what is under investigation.
Once we see that self-consciousness, if it is to be viewed
concretely, requires historical understanding, then we must follow
this through until we recognize that the universal and particular
moments within individuality are also historically determined. For
example, the free citizen of classical Athens thinks of himself as an
Athenian, with all the attendant rights and duties. This self-concept
does not exist outside him; it is not an external set of constraints.
Rather he exists for himself as an Athenian, i.e. as a determinate
person with determinate rights and duties. This self concept is a
universal for it establishes explicit principles which inform his
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entire life. Particular acts are performed by him as an Athenian and
there can be no absolute separation of his particular acts from his
universal concept of himself as an Athenian. In other words, the
Athenian is an individual in Hegel's sense of the term. In a similar
way, individuals within all civilizations have concepts of the self -
whether it be as a Roman citizen-soldier, a medieval monk, a British
trade unionist - which are intimately bound up with the dominant modes
of self-consciousness of their time.
But this leads us directly to Spirit, for Spirit can be
properly regarded as developing modes of self-consciousness grasped
historically. The content of the universal moment of the Athenian's
self-consciousness is provided by the spirit of classical Athens.
Particular acts and thoughts are subject to any number of influences
but, if the Athenian is to remain well integrated with his world, they
will be informed throughout by the universal. Of course, the individ¬
ual citizen may question the very "givenness" of the spirit of his
state. He may even reject it and seek to overthrow the state and
the spirit which sustains it. This act of critical reflection by
citizens is one of the primary causes of historical change. But even
this act of rejection must be understood within the context of the
universal content provided by Spirit.
Spirit achieves individuality in the historical state. The
individuality of the state, expressing as it does the dominance of one
stage of Spirit or "national" self-consciousness, provides the content
for the universal moment within the self-consciousness of its individ¬
ual citizens. The history of Spirit is not a history of political
states which are more or less adequate to the requirements of a
universal and eternal human nature. The history of Spirit is the
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history of the development of the content of universal self-
consciousness. The hierarchy of stages of self-consciousness in
history describes the development of increasingly complete concepts
of the self. But concepts of the self are not independant of
political, social and cultural development. The two strands of
development emerge together dialectically in and through history. An
adequate concept of the self is only possible in a state in which
reason and freedom are actual. For example, the self-concept of the
Athenian citizen has, as its universal, the self-consciousness of
Athens itself. The pressures which ultimately decay and destroy
Athens destroy the self-concepts of individual Athenians as well.
The displacement of the old order involves an alteration in self-
consciousness expressed as a development of Spirit. Concommitantly,
that spiritual development provides a new universal content for the
self-concept of the citizen of the new state. The only point of rest
for this dialectic of Spirit and individual citizen is at the end of
this process, in the rational state in which the individual knows
himself to be free and knows that the objective rational order of the
state is the substantive, universal moment of this freedom. It is a
point of rest, an end, because all citizens of a rational state know
themselves as free individuals, and know that their individuality is
the concrete unity of the universal rationality of the state of which
they are citizens and their particular needs, capacities and desires
which mark their own uniqueness within the rational order.
The transition in the Philosophy of Right to Ethical Life can only
be properly understood against the background of Hegel's philosophy of
world history. Ethical Life is not the simple combination of antecedent
moments. Abstract Right and Morality are themselves abstract embod-
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iments of Spirit. Both positions presuppose an abstract, rational
individual. Not only is this a logical abstraction and a historical
impossibility, but the very presupposition itself emerges historically
and collectively. Both positions reflect the historically-generated
demand that true freedom must be seen as a right of the individual.
But Hegel's philosophy of history demonstrates that individuality
itself - the self-consciousness of actual, living human beings - can
only be grasped within the social and political context of the history
of Spirit. Individual freedom is a legitimate demand but it can only
be actualized concretely when we have a developed concept of individ¬
uality. If we do not recognize the spiritual, collective (i.e. social
and political) aspects of individuality, the demand for individual
freedom remains abstract.
Hegel does not undertake a historical justification of
Ethical Life in the Philosophy of Right. In his own mind he may have
believed this was accomplished quite completely in his lectures on
history; nevertheless, its absence in the Philosophy of Right has had
unfortunate consequences. First, the transition from the individualistic
starting points of Abstract Right and Morality to the collective start¬
ing point of Ethical Life appears to be both too abrupt and too easily
accomplished. I have tried, in this chapter, to indicate the back¬
ground to Hegel's remark that both positions "display in themselves
their regression to this Idea as their outcome". (PR_. No. 141, Remark).
Ultimately, the Idea that they regress to is freedom conceived as
Spirit, for both positions are themselves embodiments of Spirit and
it is only as such that they have meaning.
Secondly, the abruptness of the transition obscures the
reasons why Abstract Right and Morality are important. The arguments
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raised against those positions are not intended to obliterate them,
but rather indicate their essential limits, their ultimate self-
contradictoriness. In Hegel's view concepts such as private property,
moral autonomy, self-development, duty are great achievements of the
modern age. The transition to Ethical Life is not based on the denial
of this achievement; rather Hegel contends that those achievements
are essentially spiritual ones which have emerged out of the collective
history of mankind. The transition to Ethical Life underlines this
and is intended to show that those achievements can only be made actual
within the life of a spiritual community. It is not the case that the
state is significant only as the guarantor of those achievements;
rather those achievements are what they are only because of the
objective development of universal reason which informs them and gives
them their rational power. To deny this universal, objective, rational
element (i.e. their spiritual aspect) is to strip those achievements
of their substantive base. The result is the self-contradictory theories
of Abstract Right and Morality. The rights of the individual can only
became actual if they are seen, in their truth, as the concrete rights
of the spiritual individual. But the spiritual individual is only
possible within the spiritual totality of a state. Therefore, rights
can only be actual within the state. The Lectures on the Phi 1osophy
of World History presents those rights as a historical achievement.
The modern state is the formal cause of Spirit which actualizes
freedom as the final cause of Spirit. In Ethical Life Hegel presents
the philosophical outline of the spiritual reality of the modern state,
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Enc. No. 133-134.
2. PR. Knox translation, "Translator's Notes", Note 61, pp.345-346.
3. I should point out that Knox does not present his footnotes as a
commentary on the Philosophy of Right. He restricts himself to
occasional explications of obscure terms and passages in the book.
The explanation for the transition which I shall present requires
moving considerably beyond the Philosophy of Right and Knox
cannot be faulted for not doing the same, since it would involve
him in a labour which lies outside his stated intentions.
4. In this connection see Stephen Lukes, Individualism (New York,
1973). Lukes'monograph usefully distinguishes various concepts of
individualism and shows where they relate to each other. In this
chapter, I am most concerned with the notion of individualism which
he labels "The Abstract Individual", pp. 73-78.
5. The literature is indeed vast. A recent collection of some of the
main writings has been edited by John O'Neill under the title
Modes of Individualism and Collectivism, London, 1973. This book
also contains an extensive bibliography of relevant works. Lukes,
op.cit., has a brief account of the debate.
6. PR_. No. 141, Remark. The words in brackets have been added by me
in order to maintain consistency between the quote and the terms
I have been using.
7. The most famous attack in modern times on "historicist" philoso¬
phies was waged by Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism
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(London, 1961). Popper is using the term in a very select way,
however, for he terms "historicist" any philosophy which claims
to be able to predict future historical events on the basis of
an alleged grasp of historical laws. Such predictive powers
Popper restricts to certain narrow areas of natural science.
Much of what he says is sensible. Against him, however, are lined
up the many varieties of historicism which make no such claims
for predictive power. The literature is vast on this debate.
O'Neill's collection, op.cit., contains articles which illuminate
the debate. See O'Neill's own article, "Scientism, Historicism
and the Problem of Rationality", pp. 3-27.
8. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 76-127. Taylor denies
that he regards Hegel's system as "Panentheistic" but does not show
why this denial is justified. I believe that his view does entail
this. It is useful to compare Taylor's view with that of Robert
C. Whittemore who does argue that Hegel is a panentheist. See his
"Hegel as Panentheist", Studies in Hegel, Tulane Studies in
Philosophy, Vol. ix, (The Hague, 1960), pp. 134-164.
9. One of the strongest critiques of this position is to be found in
Emil Fackenheiir^ The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Boston,
1970), pp. 75-116. Fackenheim argues that this "right" interpreta¬
tion reduces nature and the human world to the status of
"participants" in a transcendentally complete, ontological realm
as described in the Logic. I agree with Fackenheim's attack on
that view of Hegel.
10. cf. George Dennis O'Brien, Hegel on Reason and History: A
Contemporary Interpretation (Chicago, 1975), pp. 11-36. This is
an excellent analysis of the connection between self-consciousness
and historiography.
- 248 -
11. ibid., p. 101.
12. RH., p. 44. Quoted in O'Brien, op.cit. , p. 107. O'Brien
presents a strong argument against the import of a theology,
particularly a Christian one, into Hegel's philosophy. See
pp. 104-107. He argues that a theological view cannot account
for the distinction between the natural and human (historical)
world which Hegel insisted on throughout his work.
13. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1968), p. 27.
14. Additions in brackets are mine.
15. See RH_. pp. 83-85 cf. PR. No. 348. Hegel's notion of the
"world historical individual" is confusing, not least because
Hegel appears to describe their actions and, more importantly,
motives for action in conflicting ways. On this problem see
S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge,
1972) pp. 230-234. I believe it is correct to describe the
relationship between the world historical individual and the
Idea of freedom in the following way: world historical
individuals may act for a variety of reasons, but what
constitutes their "greatness" for philosophical world history
is that their actions resulted in an advance in the actualiza¬
tion of freedom. Rational universal freedom in its full
complexity, cannot be the motive for their actions because, as
Idea, freedom emerges over time and is only fully apparent at
the "end of history". From the perspective of the end of history
it is possible to say that, to the extent their actions advanced
the progress of freedom, the Idea of freedom was implicit in
their actions. The Idea, however, can never be the explicit
motive for the world historical individual. This is true even
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when historical actors have acted for the sake of actualizing
freedom as they perceived it (in distinction from wealth,
power or some equally "subjective" motive). The freedom for
which they acted is limited or deficient, in comparison with
the true Idea of freedom and so it is correct, in such cases,
to maintain that the Idea was not the explicit motive for action.
16. The most stimulating commentary is that of Alexandre Kojeve,
"In Place of an Introduction" op.cit. Kojeve demonstrates
what is unique in Hegel's analysis of the emergence of self-
consciousness. I believe, however, that in his commentary on
the Phenomenology as a whole he tends to utilize in far too
literal a fashion the figures of master and slave. For a more
balanced view, see G. A. Kelly, "Notes on Hegel's'Lordship and
Bondage'", in Maclntyre, op.cit. pp. 189-217.
17. On this point it is worth recalling Hegel's analysis of the
relation between rampant, unbridled subjectivity and the reign
of terror in the French Revolution. See PhG. pp. 413-423;
PhM. pp. 599-610.
18. RH. pp. 101-102. Hegel, in this passage credits Montesquieu
for his insight into, and investigation of, the totality of
distinct but inseparable moments which forms the state.
19. I use nation and state interchangeably in this section. If we
regard the state as a set of objective institutions only, then
the nation must be distinguished clearly from the state. The
nation refers to a people, its civilization, mores, laws, art
and so forth. This is obviously a wider concept than the state.
However, as we shall see, Hegel defines the state in far wider
terms than is conventionally the case. The nation in its
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widest cultural and social sense is the proximate matter of
the state and is included within the state. The state is the
"totalizing" moment of objective life and its highest
expression. Since the state, in Hegel, presupposes and subsumes
the nation and orders the life of the nation through a set of
identifiable, objective institutions I believe it is a more
useful term to employ in order to convey the sense of the
material cause of history. Also, Hegel uses "state" in the
Philosophy of Right in the sense in which I use it here, and so
the use of "state" in this chapter provides continuity between
the Philosophy of Right and the philosophy of history. Hegel
himself uses "state" in this sense in the philosophy of history.
In his discussion of the material of Spirit's realization he
states; "...the unity of the subjective will and the universal
is the ethical whole, and its concrete manifestation is the
state" and then further defines the state as "the focal point
of all the other concrete aspects of the Spirit, such as
justice, art, ethics and the amenities of existence". (RH_. p. 93).
20. RH_. p. 116. Additions in brackets are mine.
21. See Aristotle, Politics, 1289 b 27 - 1290 a 13.
22. See Herbert Marcuse, "Karl Popper and the Problem of Historical
Laws", Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston, 1973), pp. 191-208.
23. The debates about social science methodology are seemingly end¬
less. I realize that my statements here reflect my own
"prejudice" on the matter, although I think my view is defensible.
Declarations about the "state of the discipline" are, of course,
subject to all kinds of qualifications. I do believe, however,
that the debates about methodology are shifting in favour of
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"historicism". One of the charges which seems most telling
against rival theories is that, presupposing a static social
reality, they are unable to account for change. Not only are
such presuppositions biased towards the status quo but they
avoid some of the most important contemporary issues of social
and political concern, issues which centre on the notion of
change.
24. See O'Brien's discussion of this view, with particular reference




Ethical Life is the third and concluding section of the
Philosophy of Right. Hegel describes Ethical Life as the "Idea of
freedom" which is to say that it is the "concept of freedom developed
into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness". (PR.
No. 142). Recalling Hegel's identification of rationality and freedom
we see that Ethical Life is intended as a description of an objective,
rational existent order, an order in which human freedom is actualized.
But it is also extremely important to remember that freedom and ra¬
tionality must be seen as results of a development over time. In all
of Hegel's mature philosophical works he proceeds from a starting
point of immediacy and radical incompleteness, through increasingly
complex "shapes" or "stages", to a final non-contradictory, coherent
position of completeness. In the first chapter of the thesis I
examined Hegel's "Introduction" to the Phenomenology as the most
explicit and concise statement of his characteristic philosophic method.
"Absolute Knowledge" was there described as the completion of the entire
development traced in the book, and was regarded as the shape of
consciousness which comprehended the entire structure of knowledge. It
is not only regarded as the completion of this development but is also,
ultimately, seen to be the absolute ground which informs this develop¬
ment with its systematic coherency.
In a similar way Ethical Life completes the development which
has been described in Abstract Right and Morality. It is not a simple
addition to an almost complete system of rights, nor is it a forced
attempt to pull together two disparate lines of development. Ethical
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Life completes the development towards political freedom to the extent
that it overcomes and resolves all the contradictions which defeated
prior theories of freedom. As with Absolute Knowledge it does this
not by denying the validity or correctness of prior stages but rather
by providing a structure within which what is valid is preserved and
what is contradictory is cancelled.
In Chapter 6 Hegel 's philosophy of history was introduced as
a key to the understanding of Ethical Life. The spirit of a nation was
seen to provide the context within which social and political events
must be located if they are to be understood concretely. But this claim
is widened to include theoretical statements about the nature of social
and political reality; that is, specific social and political theories,
if they are to be grasped, must be located within the spirit of the
time when they were first set out. Ultimately, Hegel's philosophy of
history demands that we regard the spirit of a nation as the concrete
universal which grounds individual self-consciousness.
In an attempt to avoid the abstractness of the philosophical
theories examined in the first two sections of the Philosophy of Right
Hegel insists on regarding the human individual as a member of a
spiritual collectivity. Spirit is not merely an aid to our understand¬
ing, a heuristic device which deepens our perceptions of human individ¬
uality. I believe that we must conceive of Spirit in a manner
analogous to Kant's transcendental categories; the human individual
cannot achieve self-consciousness except within the collective
structure which Hegel calls Spirit. The reference to transcendental
categories underlines the fact that self-consciousness would be
impossible except for the existence of a spiritual totality within
which the individual achieves self-consciousness. But the
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transcendental character of Spirit must not obscure the historicity
of Hegel's concept of Spirit. The actual contentof Spirit changes
over time and, hence, the self-consciousness of individuals in different
historical epochs will differ accordingly. But the status of Spirit as
a constitutive category of self-consciousness is trans-historical.
Abstract Right and Morality presuppose the abstract rational
individual as their base. But this presupposition is comprehensible
within Hegel's concept of Spirit for the notion of the individual as a
rational "atom" is itself a result of historical development. The
necessity of Hegel's concept of the spiritual collective as con¬
stitutive of self-consciousness is demonstrated in the ultimate appeal
by both theories to existent social and political conventions, whether
in the form of a system of justice or as a set of socially accepted
mores and ethical norms. Hegel's great philosophical achievement is
to recognize the conceptual priority of the spiritual collectivity over
the rationality of the individual.
Thus the specifically modern notion that all men, qua men,
must be regarded as having equal political rights must be understood
within the development of Spirit. Similarly, the conception of man
which gives rise to the demand that the individual has a right to self-
fulfillment and autonomy from coercive forces is an achievement of the
modern age. The self-consciousness which underlies those modern demands
must be understood within the spiritual totality of the modern state J
It is for this reason that we must be wary of describing the
ethical state as the guarantor of the rights of personality and moral
subjectivity. Such a description presupposes the existence of such
rights and then searches for the state which most adequately secures
them. Such an approach involves us in the many problems we have
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already discussed in the chapters on Abstract Right and Morality. In
a sense, Hegel reverses this procedure. Rather than looking to the
individual who is the bearer of such rights in abstraction from the
spiritual collective, Hegel examines the spiritual collective itself
in order to identify the genesis of the concept of the individual who
has rights. Ethical Life is not Hegel's attempt to weld together the
two antecedent phases of Abstract Right and Morality. The dialectic
of Ethical Life presupposes the concept of Spirit as prior to that of
individuality. Ethical Life is the specifically modern spiritual
totality within which the individual can actualize his implicit ra¬
tionality and freedom. The Philosophy of Right begins with an
examination of the human will; the dialectic of Ethical Life traces
the individuation of that will which actualizes concretely its implicit
freedom.
Ethical Life, as the Idea of freedom, is intended as a
complete description of human freedom. Hegel is not concerned to
describe freedom in the abstract. Were this the case, he would
necessarily restrict himself to a description of the concept of
freedom and would be unable to describe Ethical Life as Idea. This
claim illuminates Hegel's actual treatment of the institutions of
Ethical Life. The claim for completeness, for systematic coherency,
cannot be mitigated by special pleading. Ethical Life must be regarded
as a description of the same sort as that which Hegel presents at the
conclusion to the Phenomenoloq.y; that is, it must be seen as absolute,
for if there were any remainder, it could not claim to be a presenta¬
tion of the Idea of freedom but only of one of its antecedent moments.
As absolute, Ethical Life must be read as an attempt, by
Hegel, to describe that objective order in which all the unresolved,
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contradictory dichotomies which defeated rival theories of freedom
are sublated. We have already had occasion to discuss Hegel's use
of the term "individual" to signify the concrete sublation or
resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy. As developed in
the Philosophy of Right what is universal is seen to be objective
and what is particular is seen to be subjective. Therefore, the free
individual can also be regarded as the concrete sublation or resolu¬
tion of the objective-subjective dichotomy. Ethical Life must be a
presentation of the social and political institutions which create
an objective order within which the rational individual actualizes
his freedom. There is no sleight of hand involved in discussing
individuality in terms of the free human individual. In the Logic,
individuality may appear as a purely logical category, as the
synthesis of universal and particular. But when we look to the
actual life of men, those categories lose their formal, logical
sense and are invested with determinate content. What is universal
is the concept of reason and freedom, a concept implicit in man qua
man. What is particular is the specific person, a historical being
who exists in a particular state or nation. Individuality is not a
formal synthesis alone, for it has for its determinate content the
free citizen within a rational social and political order. Ethical
Life must be a complete account of this free individual.
We can see Hegel's desire to present Ethical Life as a
complete account of the rational order of freedom in the opening
paragraphs of the third part of the Philosophy of Right. There he
presents Ethical Life as the totality of subjective and objective
moments of freedom. The "objective ethical order" is nothing other
than the "absolutely valid laws and institutions" of the rational
- 257 -
state. (PR. No. 144). Historically, those laws and institutions can
be seen as the culmination of the development of Spirit. In abstract
logical terms they can be understood as concrete, existential embod¬
iments of the concept of freedom, i.e. as the self-differentiation
and actualization of the concept itself. Although those laws and
institutions are objective embodiments of the universal concept of
freedom, they cannot be separated from the individuals whose freedom
they substantiate. "To these powers individuals are related as
accidents to substance, and it is in individuals that these powers
are represented, have the shape of appearance, and become actualised."
(PR. No. 145). Rather than be regarded as self-subsistent universal
entities, political laws and institutions only become actual through
the self-conscious activity of the citizens of a state. Laws and
institutions are relatively independent of and indifferent to the
whims of particular individuals considered only in their particularity.
But this must not obscure the necessity of conceiving of the free
people, the citizens, of a rational state as related essentially to
the objective order.
From the perspective of subjectivity - of the individual
citizen - the relation between subjectivity and objectivity is
equally essential. The objective laws and institutions do not
represent some alien power which stands in a coercive relationship
to the free will of the subject. We have already discussed in the
previous chapter the way in which the state, as the spiritual
individual, informs the universal moment in human self-consciousness.
Hegel states this succinctly:
"his (the subject's) spirit bears witness to
them (objective laws and institutions) as to
its own essence, the essence in which he has
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a feeling of selfhood, and in which he lives
as in his own element which is not distinguished
from himself. The subject is thus directly
linked to the ethical order by a relation which
is more like an identity than even the relation
of faith or trust." (PR. No. 147).
The presentation is slightly misleading, for it may appear
as if Hegel is describing two distinct totalities which become
identified. Indeed, he appears to be stating this as his explicit
intention. (PR. No. 143). In fact, however, each of the moments
describes the exact same thing. Each represents the totality of
Ethical Life expressed as the synthesis of object and subject, of
laws and institutions on one hand and particular citizens on the
other. The distinction between the two presentations is one of
emphasis. When we emphasize the objective moment of the totality we
see that laws and institutions can only be actualized in the self-
conscious activity of the citizens whose freedom they substantiate.
When we emphasize the subjective moment we see that self-conscious
activity has, as its essential moment of universality, those laws
and institutions. Hegel's "dual" presentation of this one totality
serves to bring out its complexity and to highlight the necessity of
regarding both subject and object as self-and-other mediating moments
within a single totality. It must be noted that we could substitute
the terms universal and particular for objective and subjective
respectively and the analysis would be the same.
Hegel makes several other points in his introduction to
Ethical Life which are best understood in their relation to the philosoph¬
ical positions of Kant and Aristotle. Hegel's statement that there
is no contradiction between duty and freedom clearly has a Kantian
ring to it. Kant's condemnation of heteronomous freedom is echoed
in the following passage:
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"The bond of duty can appear as a restriction
only on the indeterminate subjectivity or
abstract freedom, and on the impulses either
of the natural will or of the moral will which
determines its indeterminate good arbitrarily."
(PR. No. 149).
For Kant, true autonomy consists in obedience to the rational legisla¬
tion of the pure practical reason. Practical law imposes an obligation
on the free will and the degree to which the moral subject perceives
the practical law as imposing an absolute duty to obey its dictates
is a measure of the autonomous freedom of that individual. Hegel
always applauded Kant's insight into the relation between duty on the
one hand and reason on the other.
"In doing my duty, I am by myself and free.
To have emphasized this meaning of duty has
constituted the merit of Kant's moral philos¬
ophy and its loftiness of outlook." (PR_. No.
133, Addition).
We have seen how Kant introduces the concept of pure practical
reason in an effort to provide an objective theory of freedom, and
how this noble attempt founders on the abstractness of his presupposed
starting point. Hegel does not abandon the attempt to discover the
nature of autonomous freedom; we may properly assume that Kant's
attacks on heteronomy were, with some reservations, decisive for Hegel .2
What Hegel does attempt to do is discover a locus of objective reason
which is more concrete than Kant's notion of pure practical reason.
It is clear from the discussion so far that the locus of objectivity
is Ethical Life. The emergence of Spirit is the story of the historical
development of a rational, objective order which satisfies the demand
for a freedom which is not subject to heteronomous and contingent
pressures.
"As substantive in character, these laws and
institutions are duties binding on the will
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of the individual, because as subjective, as
inherently undetermined, or determined as
particular, he distinguishes himself from them
as to the substance of his own being...an
immanent and logical "doctrine of duties" can
be nothing except the serial exposition of the
relationships which are necessitated by the
Idea of freedom and are therefore actual in their
entirety, to wit in the state." (PR. No. 148
and Remark).
Hegel's attempt to "expand" Kant's concept of practical
reason necessitates a radical break with the modern tradition of
political thought. His rejection of the "abstract individual" as a
starting point requires a new sort of investigation, one which seeks
to discover the logic of rational individuality and freedom within
the spiritual community.
"Ethical Life is not abstract like the good but
is intensely actual. Spirit has actuality,
and individuals are accidents of this actuality.
Thus in dealing with Ethical Life, only two views
are possible: either we start from the substan¬
tiality of the ethical order or else we proceed
atomistically and build on the basis of single
individuals. This second point of view excludes
Spirit because it leads only to a juxtaposition.
Spirit, however, is not something single but is
the unity of the particular and the universal."
(PR. No. 156, Addition).
"Juxtaposition" here refers to the externality of the social and
political order to the essential rationality of the "persons" and
"subjects" of modern political theories. The juxtaposition is seen
to be unstable and illusory when we pursue the logic of abstract
individualism and witness its slide into the anarchies of property
owners and moral fanatics.
In the last chapter I discussed Hegel's discovery of the
concept of Spirit and the significance of this discovery for his
political thought. In the opening passages of Ethical Life Hegel
explicitly relates this discovery to certain aspects of classical
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Greek political philosophy, in particular to the political thought of
Aristotle. In the next chapter I shall discuss this relation in
greater detail. For now, however, I should like to briefly point out
a few features of this relation which may help to illuminate Hegel's
discussion of Ethical Life. Before this, however, one note of caution
must be sounded. We must not think that Hegel is trying to recapture
the wonder of classical Athens. Ethical Life is no exercise in
romantic nostalgia. While in his youth Hegel shared in the contemporary
passion for all things classical, he soon moved far beyond such
romanticism. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel is seeking to discover
the logic of the social and political community. He establishes his
starting point in Ethical Life through a critical examination of the
dialectic of rival theories, and not through a historical flight of
fancy. Further, Hegel constantly reminds us of both the defects of
classical life (and theories of that life) and the great merits of
the modern age. In short, we may say that, in order to preserve the
great achievements of the modern age, Hegel is forced to reconsider
some of the features of the classical one and to argue that those
features are necessary for any modern political theory which seeks to
describe the nature of actual, rational freedom.
The first feature concerns the relation between virtue and
politics. In modern terms this is the distinction between morals and
politics. In the classical age this was usually treated as a distinc¬
tion between the good man and the good citizen; philosophy asked
whether such a distinction could legitimately be made and, if so, what
was the relation between the two concepts. We can distinguish three
main approaches to this problem. First, the conventionalist view
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which maintained that the good citizen was a good man. "Good man"
here is a relativistic concept the content of which is determined by
the conventions of particular regimes. Any man who serves the
interests of his polis is a good citizen and, hence, a good man.
"Good man" is thus no more than a kind of warrant which is invoked to
lend greater respectability to good citizens, even though a citizen
of a deficient or perverse regime is "good" only to the extent that
he serves that "bad" regime.
In contrast to this is the moral absolutism of Socrates
and his followers. The ultimate unity of virtue for which Socrates
argued cannot accommodate a radical break between the good man and
the good citizen. At the same time, his search for what is right by
nature cannot grant the priority of conventionalism in determining
the context of the "goodness" of the good man. The Socratic answer
is that the virtues of the good citizen and the good man are ultimately
identified with each other, with one major reservation; the good man
will not serve unquestioningly the dictates of a bad regime. The
implication of this is that the notion of a good citizen falls away.
It becomes only a special case of being a good man, viz. being a good
man in a good regime. There are no virtues of citizenship as such,
for being a good citizen of a tyranny conflicts with the "goodness"
of a man who is good "by nature".3
Aristotle seeks, as usual, to establish a position intermed¬
iate between the two extremes. He grants that there is a virtue to
be attributed to good citizenship as such, even if a man is a good
citizen of a bad regime. Good citizenship consists in contributing
to the maintenance of the existing constitution. Hence there are as
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many types of good citizenship as there are types of regime. The
virtue of citizenship is thus determined relative to the regime
under consideration. But Aristotle also agreed with the Socratic
doctrine that the goodness of a good man exists by nature. Therefore,
the virtue of a good man is eternal and unchanging, and we can
distinguish the virtues of a good citizen and a good man thereby
preserving the merits of both the conventionalist and Socratic
doctrines of virtue. But there is one case for Aristotle where the
virtues of the good citizen and the good man are identical, and that
is in the case where the good man is a good citizen of the best
regime. Phronesis, or practical wisdom, which is an architectonic
virtue of the good man can, in this case, also be attributed to the
good citizen of the best regime for, in the best regime, the good
citizen employs practical wisdom in order to rule wisely and justly
according to nature.^
Hegel never really faces this problem directly and so it
is difficult to specify his answer to it. We can begin by stating,
with certainty, that he rejects the conventionalist approach, for
this entails a relativism which denies the emergence of increasingly
complete and rational forms of social and political communities. But
from this, we cannot simply state that he follows either Socrates or
Aristotle. In the Philosophy of Right his description of Ethical
Life appears to conform to Aristotle's description of the best
regime, i.e. in the rational state the good citizen is identical to
the good (free) man. But Hegel takes this much further than Aristotle
(or Plato). Both Aristotle and Plato were concerned to describe the
goodness of a good man in abstraction from specific political constitu-
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tions and then to relate their conclusions to political life and
citizenship. Hegel will not allow such an abstract analysis to
take place.
"The right of individuals to be subjectively
destined to freedom is fulfilled when they
belong to an actual ethical order, because
their conviction of their freedom finds its
truth in such an objective order, and it is
in an ethical order that they are actually
in possession of their own essence or their
own inner universality." (PR. No. 153).
Now, Hegel here is not trying to establish the general
Aristotelian principle that man is a "political animal" and only a
beast or a God can live outside the Pol is.5 He is introducing in
this section a detailed description of the constitution of the best
(most rational) state. Further, he is arguing that it is only as a
citizen of that state that man can actualize his implicit rationality
and be free. If he were only defending the general principle that
man is a "political animal" then, on this basis, he would not have to
distinguish between the freedom and rationality of the ancient polis
and that of a modern constitutional monarchy, and this is a
distinction he repeatedly makes.
How can we understand Hegel 's strange statement quoted
above, especially as it appears to deny the validity of a distinction
which has been so important for Western political thought? The
answer to this is implicit in our discussion of Hegel's theory of
Spirit in the last chapter. There we saw that Hegel argues for the
essential historicity of self-consciousness. Aristotle's distinction
between the good man and the good citizen must deny this historicity,
for it depends on the possibility of full self-consciousness indepen¬
dent of the particular social and political circumstances in which
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the good man finds himself. It is for this reason that Hegel cha¬
racterizes such an Aristotelian doctrine of virtues as a "natural
history of mind". (PR. No. 150, Remark). It is a "natural" history
in contrast to social and political history. But it is the latter
"history" which is decisive for Hegel's concept of Spirit. The
history of Spirit's emergence is forged in the actual social and
political history of man. But Spirit's emergence is also the history
of the development of human self-consciousness. Therefore, to detach
self-consciousness from history and to treat it as, in some sense, a
natural phenomenon is to obscure its essential historicity. It is
for this reason that Hegel denies the possibility of rational freedom
independent of the rational, free social and political world and does
not concern himself with a description of the "good man" (in contrast
to the "good citizen" except as a historical phenomenon.
This is not to deny that, historically, there have been
individuals who have managed to rise above the limits of their age.
We have already discussed this possibility with reference to world-
historical individuals. There are many historical examples of, for
example, martyrs who refused to participate in events which they
considered immoral. But this must not obscure the fact that a free,
rational life can only be lived in a free, rational ethical order.
The "personal genius" of such individuals decreases in significance
to the extent that free rationality becomes objective in the social
and political life of a free people. (PR_. No. 150, Remark). Were
this not the case then we would be presented with the paradox that a
good man requires an unjust, corrupt world in which to demonstrate
his virtue and freedom, and that such a man, desiring to be virtuous,
must hope for injustice and vice as the "other" which he surmounts
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through an act of moral courage. Indeed, this paradox is clearly in
Hegel's mind when he distinguishes the "moral" attitude to virtue
from his own theory of the ethical community. We can read the follow¬
ing quote as a polemic against the "moralism" of German Romanticism.
"In an ethical community, it is easy to say
what a man must do, what are the duties he
has to fulfil in order to be virtuous: he
has simply to follow the well-known and explicit
rules of his own situation. Rectitude is the
general character which may be demanded of him
by law or custom. But from the standpoint of
morality, rectitude often seems to be something
comparatively inferior, something beyond which
still higher demands must be made on oneself
and others, because the craving to be something
special is not satisfied with what is absolute
and universal; it finds consciousness of
peculiarity only in what is exceptional."
(PR. No. 150, Remark).
In the next chapter I shall discuss some of the implications
of Hegel's dismissal of the problems which rest on the traditional
distinction between the good man and the good citizen. Despite that
dismissal, Hegel's treatment of Ethical Life shares some remarkable
features with classical Greek theories of political life, particularly
as developed in Aristotle's discussion of the nature of political life.
I believe that an understanding of those shared features illuminates
Hegel's discussion of Ethical Life.
The first point is a linguistic one. Hegel employs the
term "das Sittliche" to denote that phase of objective existence which
we translate as "ethical life".6 The term "das Sittliche" is clearly
connected to the word "Sitte" which we translate as "custom". Hegel
intends the use of Sitte and das Sittliche to produce the connection
to reproduce the connection found in classical Greek between "ethos"
and "ethikos". There do not exist words in English which convey
clearly the connection between the customs of a people and what we
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refer to as ethics.^
We can, however, attempt to capture Hegel's meaning. By
"ethics" or "the ethical" we mean that set of principles or body of
doctrine which systematically sets out what a man ought to do if he
is to be a good man or live a free, rational life. We have already
seen how, particularly in the work of Kant, goodness, freedom and
rationality come to signify different aspects of the same ethical
totality for the modern age. Perhaps more than any other philosopher
Hegel strengthens the connection between those concepts, to the point
where they eventually become virtually interchangeable terms to
describe the same state of completeness or "perfection".
We have discussed Hegel's rejection of Kant's ethical
theory. We have seen how Hegel's concept of Spirit is intended as
the concrete resolution of the problems which Kant's theory identified
but could not resolve, viz. the inescapable dichotomy between "what
ought to be" and "what is" the case, or between an abstract pure
practical reason and the real, imperfect human world. Spirit's
emergence is nothing other than the historical synthesis of "ought"
and "is", the development in the real world of the modes of objective
existence necessary for the actualization of man's implicit freedom
and reason. The emergence of Spirit is completed on the social and
political plane in the life of a free people, understood as the
citizenery of a rational state.8 This is the arena - the real,
historical arena of Spirit's emergence - in which the importance
of custom becomes crucial. The citizens of states live their lives
in an orderly way, a way which is structured at its most profound
level by a system of accepted norms of behaviour and customary ways
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of acting. Investigations of significant historical changes, of
important cultural, social and political changes, attempt to
discover the changes in those deep structures. Indeed, historical
events may often be regarded as being precipitated by crises within
those value systems.
Hegel's point is that we must look to the prevailing
norms of behaviour, to the customs of a people, if we are to make
sense of historical events. This applies equally to the larger
question of spiritual development, for the progress of Spirit is
reflected in the changes in normative structures in history. The
ultimate significance of those changes is apparent only from the
perspective of the end of this development. But this should not
obscure the necessity of those structures for actual historical
"peoples". Within each historical epoch the normative systems which
structure activity inform acts with their coherency and intelligibil¬
ity not merely for us (the philosopher) but for the historical
actors themselves. However, the actors need not be fully conscious
of the power and significance of those norms and customs; indeed,
they may not even be fully aware of the explicit existence of those
structures. Nonetheless, those norms are effective. A person may
perform some duty for no more developed reason than that it is what
is expected, or it has always been done in that way. Hegel describes
this as a "general mode of conduct" which is so deeply ingrained in
the consciousness of a people that the "habitual practice of
ethical living appears as a second nature". (PR. No. 151). In the
rational state the duties and rights necessary for the living of a
free, rational life are deeply embedded in the consciousness of the
citizens of that state and may be regarded as "second nature" to them.
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This, of course, is reminiscent of Aristotle's political
theory. Aristotle distinguishes between the various regimes on
the basis of their different ends. Those ends in turn permeate the
entire life of the Polis and are seen to structure the very ethos
of the citizens of the Polis. For both Aristotle and Hegel the role
of education is vital. Education here must not be understood as the
acquisition of a basic set of skills or body of knowledge which are
necessary for the performance of certain limited tasks. Education
includes the entire process of character formation, of acquisition
of the basic norms which structure human activity within a determ¬
inate social and political order. In modern English we would describe
this as the entire process of "socialization", as well as "education"
in its more narrow, conventional sense.
The similarity between Hegel and Aristotle with respect to
the role of custom and ethics on one hand and cultural development
on the other is made most explicit in their discussions of social
and political institutions. Hegel distinguishes three main areas
within Ethical Life; the family, civil society, and the state. Each
area is further broken down into its most significant component parts.
The relation between those different elements is extremely complex,
and yet the meaning of Hegel's treatment of Ethical Life depends on
comprehending that complex relation. One common interpretation is
to regard Ethical Life as a genetic history of the state, beginning
with the most primitive social organization - the family. Hegel 's
procedure has even been linked directly to the attempt by Aristotle
to seek "...the origin of the state in the simplest forms of human
community, and then...(to trace)...the gradual development of the
political community out of these elementary forms."9 I believe this
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interpretation is, at best, misleading and creates more problems than
it solves. In the above quote I think a misleading view of Aristotle
is also presented, and I hope that a more correct view of Aristotle
will shed light on Hegel's procedure in "Ethical Life".
Aristotle begins the Politics with the following passage:
"Every state (Polis) is an association (Koinonia)
of some kind, and every association is established
with a view to some good; for mankind always acts
in order to obtain that which they think good. But,
if all associations aim at some good, the state or
political association, which is the highest of all,
and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a
higher degree than any other, and at the highest
good. 0
A complete analysis of this passage is beyond the scope of this thesis.
I would, however, like to point out a few basic ideas in this quote.
Harry Jaffa has written that the passage consists of the following
syllogism: Every Pol is is an association (Koinonia); every association
aims at some good; therefore every Polis aims at some good. Further,
the minor premise is itself the conclusion of a prior syllogism: Every
association is constituted by common action; every action (including
common action) aims at some good; therefore every association aims at
some good J"'
Aristotle then proceeds to provide an account of the origins
of the state. Man and woman unite to form the most primitive association.
From this union the family emerges. When various families organize
themselves together the village results, and the first state arises with
the organization of several villages into a common association. The
motive for the development is material well-being, including security.
But this "historical" account is only part of the story. Aristotle's
concept of teleology leads him to argue that, from the perspective of
truth, the state is prior to the village, the family, and even the
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individual. This is so because the truth of a thing (its nature) can
only be revealed if we look to the thing in its highest developments,
and it is only in the Polis that man actualizes his true potential.
Although historically the state arises as a result of the struggle for
survival, its truth is that in it alone man is capable of actualizing
his highest goodJ2 Although the Pol is is the most architectonic
human association, it does not eliminate the need for lesser forms of
association. As stated in the opening passage of the Politics, all
associations aim at some good. The "goods" may range from the most
basic material necessities to highly developed forms of religious
observance, cultural activity and so forth. In the Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle argues that some goods may be both ends in themselves and
means to a higher end.^ For example, food necessary for nourishment
is an end in itself, since without food we would perish. But nou¬
rishment is also a means to higher goods, since we must maintain a
basic level of subsistence if we are to pursue other, and higher, goods.
Aristotle's treatment of associations in general is characterized by an
investigation of the ends appropriate to each specific form of associa¬
tion. A family, for example, has a different end by nature than does
a commercial partnership.
Now, what makes Aristotle's treatment of associations so
remarkable is his concern to preserve the diversity of associations
within a single totality - the Polis. The diversity of ends - such as
material satisfaction, security, religious observance, recreation,
education - require diverse associations for their realization. Associa¬
tions such as the family, religious groups, business partnerships and
so on are necessary and can and must be distinguished from the
architectonic association of the PolisJ^ Aristotle's polemic against
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Plato's theory of communism in the Republic is based on his contention
that Plato sacrifices all the advantages to be gained by a plurality
of associations in favour of maintaining the absolute supremacy of one
single principle. The result is an undifferentiated conformity among
the citizens, a conformity which denies the possibility of noble human
achievement.'5 Aristotle consistently maintained that the Polis is the
most architectonic form of human association which comprehends within
it a hierarchy of distinct forms of association. Of course, deformed
regimes could attempt to destroy this pluralistic polity, but in doing
so they would be acting against the true natural ends of human life.
The best regimes seek to preserve the diversity of human associations.
It is within the context of Aristotelian pluralism that we
should understand Hegel's discussion of Ethical Life. The family, civil
society and the state each have an integrity which cannot be sacrificed
to one supreme principle. On the contrary, it is only through the self-
conscious recognition of the diversity of ends that we can actualize
human freedom. Aristotle links the different Koinonia through the
principle of justice. The relationships which obtain in a family can
be described, by analogy with the Polis, in terms of justice. Similarly,
friendships and social organizations exhibit justice and injustice.
True justice is really only found in the Pol is, but the other forms of
Koinonia exhibit features which allow us to treat them as just or unjust
within certain well-defined limits. Hegel links his "moments" of
Ethical Life in terms of freedom and rationality. The family and civil
society are incomplete because they are unable to generate out of
themselves a satisfactory (i.e. complete and non-contradictory) Idea of
freedom. And yet they are absolutely essential to the eventual emergence
of that Idea, for the rational state cannot exist without the family and
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civil society as its proximate matter.
This diversity must inform the discussion of Ethical Life. We
must read it as Hegel's attempt to develop a theory of the modern state
which can resolve the problems which he has generated so far in the
Philosophy of Right. Ethical Life must complete the development of the
objective mode of being necessary for the actualization of freedom. It
must overcome the dichotomies of subject and object, particular and
universal. It must retain the spiritual advances of the modern age,
especially those of universal rights and moral subjectivity. The
examination of Ethical Life which follows will employ those problems
as guides to our understanding. The emphasis will be on the complex
way in which the seemingly disparate strands of Hegel's argument are
woven together into a unified whole without sacrificing their unique
importance for the Idea of freedom. Criticism of Ethical Life will be
reserved for the next chapter. I prefer to do this for two reasons:
first, criticism of specific points within Ethical Life may obscure the
complexity of Hegel's structure and I believe a straightforward
uncritical account of that structure is the best way of presenting
Hegel's theory; second, the specific criticisms of that structure will
be seen to develop into a structural critique of Hegel's political
theory, and I believe the separation of this critique from the presenta¬
tion of Hegel's theory will emphasize its structural unity.
The Family
The first major division of Ethical Life is the family. We
have seen how the critique of abstract individualism necessitates a new
starting point for political theory, one which begins with the concept
of community. As with everything else subjected to analysis by Hegel,
the movement is from the most immediate (abstract) to most complex
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(concrete). The family is regarded by Hegel as the most immediate form
of community, or collective life, and so it is with the family that the
analysis of Ethical Life begins. The concept of family which Hegel
examines is thoroughly modern and bourgeois. This is not to say that
the concept of family is limited to bourgeois society; rather that the
specific form of family which Hegel examines only becomes pre-eminent in
bourgeois society. In Hegel's own terms this is not a condemnation for
the concept of the family emerges historically and the bourgeois family
can be regarded as the rational fulfilment of that development. That is,
the bourgeois family is the Idea of the family.
There are several reasons why the family is presented as the
most immediate form of Ethical community. First, the family does indeed
exhibit the features of a community. The members of a family think of
themselves as members of a larger association and whatever individuality
they may have is thoroughly mediated by the fact of that membership.
One's self-consciousness is mediated by the relation of the self to
other members of the family, so that being a son or a daughter, a
brother, a sister, a mother or a father informs one's self-consciousness.
Even the ostentatious rejection of such ties does not eliminate their
informing power, but rather only recasts it in the form of negativity.
The immediacy of this form of community, at least with
respect to civil society and the state, results from several features
unique to the family. The first is that the family is "specifically
characterized by love, which is Spirit's feeling of its own unity".
(PR. No. 158). While love is not irrational, it nevertheless involves
emotion and natural feeling. Contingent considerations such as
physical appearance, the sound of one's voice, the way one laughs or
cries may all be of great importance in matters of love. For Hegel
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the fully rational is necessary and purged of contingency. The love
which characterizes a family is never fully rational in this sense.
We may note that, for Hegel, the patriotic love for one's country is
distinguished from family love.
Secondly, the rights of family members are deficient when
compared to the rights of members in civil society and the state. To
be sure, the laws which govern the last two extend into the family
unit as well. In fact, specific laws may apply only to the family.
But within the family the rights of family members can never be fully
explicit nor guaranteed by positive law. It may be rational to demand
that parents love their children and love them equally, but we cannot
codify this demand even though we may regard loving care as the proper
right of every child. Indeed, the child itself is incapable, because
of its immaturity, of being regarded as a true subject of rights.
Whatever rights the child has are given him either by the legal system
or by its family. The child is unable to know itself as the rational
subject of rights. Because so much of family life lies beyond the
reach of positive law, the question of right must always be somewhat
contingent. As the child develops into adulthood, it then may acquire
more substantive rights, such as the right to education or a share of
the family wealth. But, paradoxically, the more that right can be
attributed to family members the less the area covered by right belongs
to the concept of a family. Inheritance, for example, is concerned
with wealth and, although this is an important family matter, it is
some distance from the notion of love which characterizes the concept
of a family. The contingency which marks both the substantive basis
of the family (love) and the rights of its members leads us to regard
it as the most immediate moment of Ethical Life.
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Hegel distinguishes three phases of the family; marriage,
family property and capital , and the education of children and the
dissolution of the family. We have seen that the family is the most
immediate moment of Ethical Life. Within the family itself I believe that
Hegel looks for the same development from immediacy to mediated complex¬
ity. Rather than present all the details of Hegel's analysis I will
concentrate on those features of the phases of family life which exhibit
this structural development.
Marriage is the first phase of the family, and Hegel's
discussion of marriage reflects throughout the modern belief that love
must be the substantive basis for marriage. To be sure, there is a
physical basis for marriage, viz. the propagation of the species. While
important, this purely physical side of marriage is not sufficient to
qualify as the ethical foundation. Although Hegel does not mention it
(perhaps it would be too shocking for his public!) breeding farms could
perhaps fulfill this physical necessity more efficiently than family
units. Similarly, marriages based solely on considerations of wealth
or "breeding" are deficient, for there are other and (perhaps) better
ways of achieving those ends. Love, therefore, is the only possible
ethical basis for marriage which is appropriate to the marriage bond as
such. This must be qualified somewhat since, as we have already noted,
there may be any number of contingent factors which can affect the
love between two people. But the subjective factor cannot obscure what
is objective and rational in a marriage based on love. Hegel describes
this objective and rational moment as follows:
"Love means in general terms the consciousness
of my unity with another, so that I am not in
selfish isolation but win my self-consciousness
only as the renunciation of my independence
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and through knowing myself as the unity of
myself with another and of the other with me...
The first moment in love is that I do not wish
to be a self-subsistent and independent person
and that, if I were, then I would feel defective
and incomplete. The second moment is that I
find myself in another person, that I count for
something in the other, while the other in turn
comes to count for something in me." (PR. No.
158, Addition).
This notion of love constitutes the ethical basis of marriage
or, as Hegel says, "...the ethical aspect of marriage consists in the
parties' consciousness of this unity as their substantive aim..." (PR.
No. 163). All other aspects of marriage are subservient to that
substantive ethical principle. Sexual passion, for example, while
important does not constitute the absolute base of marriage. Similarly,
contractual obligations entered into by the parties do not constitute
the ethical aim of true marriage.^ Indeed, all of Hegel's comments on
the various aspects of marriage must be seen as attempts to maintain
the principle that love is the ethical basis of marriage J'7
It is Hegel's insistence on the inviolability of this
principle which provides the key to our understanding of the section.
The objective moment of love is its embodiment of the commitment to the
unity (as described in the long passage quoted above). This objective
moment is universal. It overrides subjectivity and contingency for,
regardless of the initial motives underlying the parties' commitment,
if this commitment is not genuine then the marriage is not truly ethical.
From the perspective of psychology or biology love may appear particular¬
istic and contingent. But out of this emotional tangle Hegel elicits
a universal principle which is subject to rational analysis and
evaluation. Love is seen as the embodiment of the universal moment
of family life for, if love in Hegel's sense is absent, then the family
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cannot be regarded as truly ethical. Of course, families can exist
and be recognized in the eyes of the law even if this principle is
absent. But in Ethical Life Hegel is concerned only with what is
rational in the social and political world and so he can restrict
his analysis to the description of the rational and ignore all the
possible deviations from rationality. In the family the universal
moment of rationality, that moment which must be present if the family
is to be rational (i.e. ethical), is embodied in the love of the
parties to the marriage.
The particular moment of the ethical family is embodied in
the capital wealth of the family. Capital here refers to the family
stock of secure and durable goods which, taken together, constitute the
wealth of the family. At first reading, this appears to be a strange
notion and Hegel is not very helpful in specifying his exact meaning
in this section. There are, I believe, two distinct reasons for Hegel's
position. First, the newly-wed couple must secure a measure of
independence from their respective family groups if it is to take its
place in the world as a thriving family unit. This independence is only
possible if the couple is economically self-sufficient; otherwise they
will never break the ties of dependence on the "extended family".
Implicit in this, of course, is Hegel's rejection of the extended family
as a true ethical unit. Although this reflects his modern bourgeois
bias Hegel would presumably defend it on the grounds that the commitment
between the parties to a marriage, their quest for unity, cannot be
secured within the extended family. Second, and consequent upon the
first, the goal of economic independence requires careful management of
a family's common stock of wealth. The husband must secure gainful
employment. The wife must run the household carefully in order to live
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within the income provided by the husband. Money must be set aside
for the care and education of children. Those needs are the partic¬
ular needs of family life and, without it, the family would disappear.
Love must be present if the family is to satisfy the demands of
universal rationality, but careful financial management leading to
economic independence and self-sufficiency is also necessary if the
particular family is to survive intact. This particular existential
necessity invests the concept of family capital with its ethical
significance. In the actual social and political world love is
insufficient for the survival of real families. Family capital
ensures this survival.
This individuality of the family is actualized in the children.
Hegel writes:
"In substance marriage is a unity though only
a unity of inwardness or disposition; in out¬
ward existence, however, the unity is sundered
in the two parties. It is only in the children
that the unity exists externally, objectively,
and explicitly as a unity, because the parents
love the children as their love, as the
embodiment of their own substance." (PR_. No. 173).
We should remember that, logically, the concept of individuality is the
concrete unity of universality and particularity. In the above quote
we can identify the presence of universality in the child. We could,
of course, claim that very few couples actually regard their child in
this way. Once again, it is Hegel's intention to analyse what is truly
rational and ethical in family life. Also, the identification of the
child as the living embodiment of the love of the parents underlies
Hegel's contention, discussed earlier, that procreation as such is not
the true basis of family life. A family becomes a real family only
when a child is produced, but the rationality of this claim is only
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defensible on the grounds that the child is the offspring of a loving
marriage. Procreation as such does not require this important proviso.
Although Hegel does not address the problem directly I believe
he would not condemn the childless marriage as unethical. Hegel is
examining, in Ethical Life, the social and political institutions which
constitute a rational objective order. For this reason the proper
object of analysis in this section is the family. A childless couple
may be devoted to each other and love each other in a way which Hegel
would approve of. However, he would argue that such a marriage never
properly becomes a family, at least a family which is a significant unit
from the perspective of Ethical Life. Clearly children must be born
and raised if the rational objective order is to persist beyond the
life span of one generation. In his analysis of the family Hegel is
concerned to describe the rationality of the family unit within which
the raising of successive generations takes place. If Ethical Life is
to remain ethical then the family must be seen as grounded on the
substantive principle of love. If this is not the case then there
will be successive generations to be sure, but they will not be ethical
(rational). The childless couple, therefore, is insignificant from the
perspective of Ethical Life even though it may be grounded on the
highest principles of love.
On the side of particularity the children "have the right
to maintenance and education at the expense of the family's common
capital". (PR. No. 174). Once again, love is not enough. The child
must be fed, clothed, housed and educated. This requires some measure
of family capital. As noted before, the concept of family capital
entails care and rational management, and the child is to be raised
with an eye towards educating him into family responsibility, includ-
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ing concern for the family's welfare - material as well as spiritual.
Hegel's bourgeois prejudices are very marked here, for he doesn't even
consider the possibility that a family may be too poor to provide
properly for its children. However, here we are restricting ourselves
to the concept of a family; in the section on civil society Hegel
addresses himself directly to the problem of poverty.
The child, therefore, embodies the principle of individuality
in the family and herein lies the essential limitedness of the family
as ethical institution. The child is loved by the parents and, because
of their love, they nourish him and raise him to adulthood. The
effective proof of their love is the rational adult who can stand on
his own feet and take his proper place within the wider social and
political world. We might say that, from the perspective of this wider
arena, the child only becomes a rational individual when he is capable
of living independent of his family. In other words, the implicitly
rational individuality of the child is only actualized when he ceases
to be dependant on the family which raised him. But in the process of
this actualization the individuality of the family, embodied in the
dependant child, disappears. Of course, it is possible to argue that
the child, even when it grows into adulthood, always embodies a family's
individuality. But this would be wrong, for the adult now has
responsibilities, which conflictwith the responsibilities which ordered
his life as a young child. Indeed, the adult in turn marries and begins
a new family and this imposes new responsibilities.
The family can, therefore, never be a completely self-
sufficient ethical institution, i.e. an institution which satisfies all
demands of Ethical Life. The aim of Ethical Life is rational freedom,
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and this is only possible if a fully-developed concept of individuality
can be actualized. The family cannot accomplish this because the
individuality of the family conflicts with the concept of personal
individuality which is the aim of the development of the child. The
family is a stable and significant institution of Ethical Life. The
principle of love which unites the partners has a rational, objective
element. The accumulation of family capital encourages thrift and
rational financial management and this contributes to social and
political life. The child is loved and cared for within the family and
receives his first education into the ethical customs which inform the
ethical order. All of this is of great significance for the actualization
of a rational, ethical order. But the family can never be an ethical
institution which exists for itself alone, for this ignores its
essential, ethical limitations.
One more point should be noted before we move on to an
examination of Hegel's analysis of civil society. Right and morality,
the primary objects of analysis in the opening sections of the Phi 1osophy
of Right, reappear in a more concrete form in Ethical Life. There is
not a simple correspondence between any particular section of Ethical
Life and those two concepts. Both right and morality develop together
within the ethical totality and are seen to inform all spheres of this
totality. Nevertheless, certain sections of Ethical Life can be regarded
as emphasizing one line of development over another. That is, either
right or morality may be seen as the pre-eminent concept in one or
another section of Ethical Life. It is only in the state that the two
concepts are finally brought together as fully explicit moments within
a differentiated, complex totality.
In the family, it is clear that the concept of morality is of
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greater importance than the concept of right. The family, as ethical
institution, imposes obligations on its members. Those obligations
must be fulfilled if the family is to remain stable. The obligations,
although they may restrict action in one sense, are not seen as
restrictions on the freedom of family members. Within the family a man
is not simply a man, abstractly considered as an atomistic unit. A man
is a husband, a father, a son and each of those relations is a concrete
determination of his specific actuality, of his "being-in-the-world".
The obligations imposed upon him by those concrete determinations must
be fulfilled if he is to be a proper husband or father. In the section
on Morality we saw that the dialectic of morality develops to the
concept of the good whereby a man is good (i.e. free) to the extent
that he does that which he ought to do if he is to be a rational,
autonomous individual. The family, for Hegel, is a rational institution
and the obligations generated by the family are rational obligations.
The man who meets his family obligations, therefore, actualizes his
implicit rationality. This extends, of course, to all the members of a
family.
The love which unites a family is explicit for the members of
the family. The obligations of family life may be met willingly for
the sake of this love, i.e. for the good of the family as a whole.
There need not be complex philosophical reflections on the nature of
moral autonomy prior to the fulfillment of family obligations for those
actions to be done freely. Relatively simple feelings of love may be
motive enough. In fact, love as the motive for moral activity is
characteristic of the family as an ethical institution. The more
complex moral judgements suggested by Kant's theory of moral autonomy,
while of interest to the philosophical spectator of family life, are
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of almost no significance for the family members themselves.
It is here that the great virtues as well as defects of the
family become most obvious. The family is an ethical institution
grounded in the universal principle of love. The power of love is such
that members of a family freely acknowledge and fulfil the obligations
arising out of family life. This is clearly a case of individuals
doing what they ought to do and is an example of moral activity. But
love, implicitly rational, is always partly emotional. For Hegel, this
is equivalent to saying that love is always, to some extent, contingent
and subject to the vicissitudes of unpredictable passion. Complete
rationality - and freedom - lies beyond the sphere of contingency.
Therefore, the family can never be completely rational and the obliga¬
tions created by family life and the motives for fulfilling them can
never be completely rational. The family is the ethical institution
in which the concept of morality, of what one ought to do, is of
greater importance than the concept of right. Aside from the immediate
satisfaction gained from fulfilling one's obligations, the family
member is educated in the ethical practices vital for the survival of
the fully rational ethical totality. He is educated into the knowledge
that there is no necessary contradiction between the fulfillment of
obligations imposed upon one by an institution (family, commercial,
political etc.) of which one is a member and individual freedom.
Civil Society
Civil society is the next stage of Ethical Life examined by
Hegel. The term "civil society" denotes that area of social and
political life described more commonly as the economy, or economic
sphere, of a nation. In Hegel's time the discipline of political
economy was rapidly developing the analytical tools necessary for the
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scientific study of economic affairs. Hegel adopted, with some very
important differences, the views of economic organization advanced by
the tradition of liberal political economy which originated in the
works of the Scottish political economists, most notably Adam Smith
and James Steuart.'^ More specifically, he accepted the view that the
active pursuit of selfish ends by individuals resulted in a general
increase in the wealth of nations.
The liberal theory of economic development fitted neatly into
Hegel's philosophical system. The rational economic unit is the
particular individual actively pursuing his own selfish ends. Particular
economic actors are most rational when they look only to their own
advantage with no thoughts about the economic circumstances of their
fellow men. But this activity is not nearly as chaotic as it appears.
The great achievement of political economy had been to discover the
general features of economic activity, and to systematize those features
into a set of laws of economic activity. Thus Adam Smith's concept of
the "invisible hand" was discovered as a result of a brilliant analysis
of the apparent chaos of economic activity, and was raised to the level
of a general law of political economy. The tradition of modern
political economy was preoccupied with discovering such general laws
of economics. Debates between rival economic interests and doctrines
revolved around appeals to the theoretical constructs of the new science
for support. The "cornlaw" debate in England is one of the most
famous and important debates of this kind.
Modern political economy was undoubtedly a major intellectual
achievement. For Hegel, it provided insight into the efficient
organization of economic life, so imporant for a stable social and
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political order. But also, as noted above, it complemented his
philosophical system. Modern political economy had, in a sense,
developed a two-sided analysis. On the one hand it examined the
particular micro-economic activities of individual workers and
capitalists. On the other it described the macro-economic laws which
knitted together the welter of activity into a coherent whole. In
other words - i.e. in Hegel's words - it looked to both the particular
and universal aspects of economic activity. It also established a
connection between the two sides, for the universal interests of
society at large were best served by unfettered private entrepreneurial
activity. On the other hand, particular economic actors gained most
when the macro-economic order was permitted to function smoothly and
without manipulation.
Modern political economy, therefore, could be seen as
scientifically describing particular and universal categories of
economic activity and discovering a link between the two. We have
already examined Hegel's logical concept of individuality as the
concrete unity of universal and particular. We have also seen how the
"logic of the Understanding" distinguishes between universal and
particular, identifies each moment abstractly, and yet is incapable of
developing this insight up to the level of complex unity, i.e.
individuality. Universal and particular are only linked together,
in a manner which Hegel calls "external". In the example of political
economy entrepreneurs look to the universal only as the guarantor of
personal interest. Personal particular ends are always primary, while
universal ends are recognized as legitimate only to the extent that
they serve the particular.
- 287 -
This brings out the contrast between the family and civil
society. In the former, the universal institution of the family was
substantive and the particular being of the family members, qua members,
was derivative. In civil society particularity in the guise of personal
interest is substantive and the universal is derivative, a generalization
of what is important in particular activity. The primacy of the
particular activity of the rational economic unit is the key to under¬
standing why civil society is introduced after the family in the
Philosophy of Right. The rational economic unit must be capable of
acting responsibly and with foresight. This ability is, properly,
predicatedof adults alone. Children are not expected to be capable of
so acting and, indeed, it is a major aim of child-rearing to ensure
that the child does develop to this level of rationality. This
"educational" responsibility rests primarily with the family. The
product of this education, the rational adult capable of leading a
responsible life, is the basic unit of civil society, and so the family
is seen as prior to civil society.
There is one other important distinction between the family
and civil society. With reference to the two opening sections of the
book on right and morality we saw that the family was overwhelmingly
a moral institution, i.e. obligation was of greater importance than
right. There were several reasons why right was relatively unimportant.
The first is that modern notions of right demand equality of right,
i.e. rights must accrue to man qua man and not depend on contingent
factors such as status. In the family, there can be no such equality
for status within the family is of extreme importance and it would
be wrong to regard the father and his child as having equal rights
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with respect to each other. Second, the concept of right requires that
rights must be capable of being protected and, in the family, much of
what transpires is beyond the reach of the law or of enforcement agencies.
This is not to say that family members have no rights in the eyes of the
law but only that major areas of family life are not subject to such
scrutiny.
The reverse is true of civil society. The rational economic
actors are regarded as possessing equal rights. There is also a legal
system to back up those rights and to hear appeals for redress when a
citizen believes his rights have been infringed. Because civil society
is concerned with economic activity, the rights of civil society refer
primarily to economic matters, to questions of life and property. This
is not surprising, since it is really only possible to establish a
system of rights and positive laws when the actions covered by that
system are specific and have determinate, objective content. It is a
relatively easy matter to discover whether a man's right to property has
been infringed, in contrast to determining whether a father really loves
his son. Civil society, therefore emphasizes the concept of right.
But it would be a mistake to regard civil society as a simple
restatement of the theories examined in Abstract Right. In civil society
we have present the very institutions of the social world - most
importantly an extant legal system - which were lacking in Abstract
Right, thereby condemning Abstract Right to self-contradiction. In
Abstract Right we traced the dialectic of a theoretically constituted
experience based solely on the actions of individuals qua particular
persons. In civil society we are concerned with the development from
the particular interest of "economic man" to the consciousness by the
"citizen" of universal interest. This development Hegel calls
"education", for it consists in educating particular economic actors
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to an appreciation and respect for the universal interests of the
whole of civil society. The institutions of civil society serve as
a check on the excessive pursuit of selfish ends, occasionally bring¬
ing to bear the full weight of the law and its sanctions. But those
institutions should not have merely this negative restraining effect.
They should also educate the particular individual and demonstrate to
him that the universal interests of civil society are not of minor or
secondary importance but rather are real and substantive. In the
family, fulfillment of obligations ultimately led to the development
of the capacity to have rights. In civil society, concern for rights
leads ultimately to the recognition that the universal interests of
society also have rights which obligate the citizens of that society;
that is, personal rights, if they are to be effective, must be seen
to entail certain moral notions such as obligation.
The first major division of Civil Society is titled "The
System of Needs". The section treats of the economic organization of
Ethical Life. There is nothing in this section which adds to the
stock of economic knowledge current in Hegel's time. Hegel adopts
the position of liberal political economy which regards the wealth of
nations as increasing in proportion to the freedom allowed to the
individual entrepreneur to maximize his own advantage. What is of
some interest is Hegel's attempt to organize this accepted doctrine
according to his own logical principles. Civil society is the sphere
of Ethical Life in which material welfare is paramount. But material
welfare, by itself, is at the very least antipathetic to the demands
of Ethical Life as envisaged by Hegel. Modern political economy
heightens the opposition by insisting that the material welfare of all
is best secured by the pursuit of selfish ends by each member of
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society. Hegel hoped to alter this conclusion while still preserving
the basic notions of economic organization advanced by the political
economists. The agent of reform would be the process of education
(Bildung) which would lead individuals out of their isolated partic¬
ularity and inculcate in them the ethical norms necessary for the
rational organization of public life. Hegel's invocation of the
categories of his logic must be understood against the background of
this educational imperative.
"The System of Needs" is divided into three parts. The first
part examines the concept of need, which is appropriate since any
examination of economic organization presupposes that there are needs
which demand satisfaction. At first, need appears to be extremely
particularistic, for we think of needs in terms of the felt needs of
a particular individual in abstraction from those of other particular
individuals. But the concept of need reveals a universal element as
well, and Hegel examines this universal element. "Natural" needs such
as food, shelter and clothing apply in general to all men. But also,
as human ability develops, the capacity to generate new needs develops;
that is, what may once have appeared to be a luxury now appears as a
necessity. Examination of this developing complex of needs reveals
its social nature, for individuals are socially conditioned to demand
new material goods. We cannot reduce the developing complex of needs
down to the notion of "natural" necessity without lapsing into nonsense.
The social dimension to need is identified by Hegel as abstract
universality. Further the complex of needs is accompanied by a complex
of productive means necessary for their satisfaction. The demand for
the satisfaction of needs requires increasingly complex productive
processes and this entails the social organization of labour. The
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social organization of labour cannot be reduced to the demand for
satisfaction of strictly particular needs, for the social organization
of labour has as its object the satisfaction of need in general. That
is, the degree of organization necessary to build a house for "X" to
live in cannot be seen as a complex organization which came into being
and exists only for the sake of "X" in abstraction from society at
large. It comes into being in order to build houses in general and "X"
is able to take advantage of this and can engage the socially-
generated services to satisfy his particular housing needs. But his
particular housing needs can only be satisfied by the house-building
organization because the universal (i.e. social) need for houses of a
certain quality has been made explicit and been recognized. Thus,
from the notion of particular need, we pass over into the notion of
general needs typical of civil society.
This treatment of need immediately suggests the second part
of the "System of Needs", devoted to a description of the kind of work
typical of civil society. To satisfy a particular material need we
must engage in a particular type of work appropriate to the satisfaction
of that need. But as needs develop, so the kinds of work required
develop accordingly. Individuals no longer satisfy their needs
directly through their own labour, but rather rely on the social
organization of labour for this satisfaction; that is, we do not build
a house with our own labour but rather hire a construction firm. A
system of determining the value of labour in the abstract is necessary
if the social organization of labour is to survive. The division of
labour is the result. A man receives so much for performing a specific
task and then turns around and purchases the products of the labour
of others with a universal unit of exchange (money). The notion of
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labour itself has become abstract and universal.
The relation between the universal and the particular elements
of both need and work is highly abstract, a reality more for the
political economist than for the member of a social order. Hegel's treat¬
ment of the concept of class division is intended to make the relation
more concrete, to indicate how the relation becomes evident to the man
in civil society and not merely for the theorist of civil society. This
intention explains Hegel's rather curious treatment of class and its
departure from classical economic theory.
Classical political economy sees class divisions arising
out of the distinction between the three great factors of production -
land, labour, and capital. Thus,we have a landowning class, an
industrial working class, and a capitalist class. Hegel, however,
treats class divisions in terms of sectors of the economy. Accordingly,
he posits an agricultural class and an industrial or business class.
Within each sector there are no further divisions. While this is not
entirely novel with respect to agriculture, since class divisions
therein are often blurred, it is quite remarkable to ignore completely
the distinction between workers and capitalists in the industrial
sector. In our own time this latter division is often obscured by talk
of a managerial class, of shareholders who are also workers, of a
technocratic class and so forth; in Hegel's time, however, the division
was quite clear. Indeed, even bourgeois economists who strongly
defended capitalism did not deny the division and even defended it as
a cornerstone of economic development. Finally, Hegel introduces a
third class - the class of civil servants - and this is a class
division which is absent from traditional economic theory.
How are we to understand Hegel's description of the class
- 293 -
structure of modern society? The clue is given by the terms he uses
to introduce his three classes. I have referred to an agricultural,
a business and a civil service class, but Hegel does not use these
terms in his introduction of the concept of class. Instead he refers
to them, respectively, as the substantial or immediate class
(agricultural), the formal or reflecting class (business), and the
universal class (civil service). The connections between the logical
terms and the mode of activity appropriate to each class should be
clear. The agricultural class is tied to the rhythm of nature and to
the traditional ways of life which stretch back countless generations.
Like the member of a family, the member of the agricultural class is
born into a stable substantial order, the norms of which are sanctified
more by tradition than reason. The business class is the class most
in keeping with the new demands created by bourgeois society. The
emphasis here is on quick-acting intelligence and energy. Competition
ensures that the slow-witted fall behind and lose out in the rush for
material prosperity. The member of the business class must harness
his own energy and abilities to those of other men in order to survive.
Prosperity demands intelligence and reflection on the needs, demands
and productive capacity of society at large. The universal class has
for its object the welfare of the entire society. This welfare is its
avowed aim, unlike the business class which creates wealth for all
through pursuit of particular ends. The civil servant, supported
materially either by personal wealth or by the public purse, finds his
personal satisfaction in the successful pursuit of those goals which
advance the rational aims of the society understood as a living totality.
Hegel does not explain why he attempts to transform traditional
economic class divisions into logical concepts, but I think it is
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possible to advance several reasons for this. First, modern political
economy has an overwhelmingly utilitarian bias. Class divisions are
justifiable, despite the obvious drawbacks, because they best serve
the declared aim of economic development, an aim which ultimately
benefits everyone. As we have seen, Hegel's concept of reason and
freedom is opposed to such utilitarian views.^ By invoking the
logical concepts, Hegel hoped to deflect the utilitarian emphasis of
modern political economy and to demonstrate that economic divisions
could have a wider significance than mere economic welfare. In Hegel's
analysis, class divisions reflect different ways of life and
modes of thought. Hegel no doubt believed that, from the perspective
of philosophy, those differences were far more important than the
strictly economic ones of economic theory. Not only did Hegel's
analysis look to modes of thought and activity rather than to productive
relations alone, but it also accorded the members of a class greater
dignity than would be the case if they were regarded solely as units of
production within a great macro-economic mechanistic model.
This last point becomes significant when we examine the state.
Each of the classes of civil society assumes a political role in the
state. Indeed, the German word for classes (die Stclnde) can also
signify estates and, as Hegel points out, this is of philosophical
importance (PR_. No. 303, Remark). The economic classes of civil
society become the political estates of the state. By emphasizing the
logical importance of each class Hegel can then demonstrate that, at
the level of the political organization of the state, each class can
be regarded as an estate which is capable of fulfilling a vital
political role. Those political roles, if they are fulfilled by
economic classes strictly considered, are reduced to the economic
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deliberations appropriate to civil society and not the state. Hegel's
desire to specify class distinctions not only in economic terms but
also in terms of logical modes of thought may be seen as an attempt to
avoid that kind of reductionism. I shall examine his attempt to avoid
reductionism in the next chapter of the thesis.
Finally, Hegel's analysis of class is clearly intended to
minimize class conflict. Classical political economy recognized the
competitive nature of bourgeois society and allowed it free reign.
There was competition not only between capitalist and capitalist for
market advantage but also between capitalist and worker for a share of
the wealth produced. As the debate between Mai thus and Ricardo on the
issue of corn importation demonstrated, landowner and capitalist could
also compete in earnest for economic advantage. Hegel saw all this as
socially divisive even if it did serve the ultimate material interests
of society. Against this competitive model, Hegel offered his own
version of harmony. The civil service would selflessly serve the
interests of society at large. The agricultural and industrial sectors
would each recognize the importance of the other and seek, no doubt
under the guidance of the civil service, to harmonize their respective
interests. Within each class, the members of that class would regard
themselves as involved in the economic goals of all the other members.
Each member would regard his membership in a class as evidence of his
particular abilities and would seize the opportunity to maximize those
abilities within the accepted constraints imposed by the class to which
he belonged. Each member of a class is, therefore, obligated by the
demands of his class and owes his loyalty to the class as a whole for
providing him with the opportunity to maximize his talents. I shall
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comment on this at a later point but for now it is worth quoting Hegel
on this identification of self interest with class interest.
"A man actualises himself only in becoming
something definite i.e. something specifically
particularised; this means restricting himself
exclusively to one of the particular spheres of
need. In this class-system, the ethical frame
of mind therefore is rectitude and esprit de corps,
i.e. the disposition to make oneself a member of
one of the moments of civil society by one's own
act, through one's energy, industry, and skill,
to maintain oneself in this position, and to fend
for oneself only through this process of mediating
oneself with the universal while in this way
gaining recognition both in one's own eyes and in
the eyes of others." (PR. No. 207).
In the "system of needs" Hegel examines the universal and
particular elements involved in the notion of complex economic inter¬
dependence. The object of economic activity is material prosperity.
In bourgeois political economy private property occupies a central
role in the pursuit of this objective. Hegel certainly would not
argue against the legitimacy of private property. Indeed, as we have
already seen in the examination of Abstract Right, Hegel assigns to
private property an importance which goes beyond the strictly utilitarian
considerations which are often introduced in its defense. His analysis
of private property in terms of the objectification of the will in an
external object which is "mine" (i.e. private) introduces an ontological
dimension to private property. In the "system of needs" Hegel does
not bring in this ontological dimension, presumably because it has
already received attention in the earlier section. But he does
reintroduce the concept of rights which become objective in private
property. Whether from the utilitarian perspective of bourgeois
political economy or the ontological perspective of Hegel's philosophy
of practical will, the concept of private property is seen to
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generate a complex of rights. In a social situation, rights require
recognition by the members of that society if they are to be effective.
Recognition of that sort entails a complex of duties and obligations
corresponding to the complex of rights and ensuring their effective¬
ness. In Abstract Right this recognition was contingent and the
punishment of "criminal" transgressions of right was equally contingent.
We have examined this in some detail. But in civil society we are
already within a social world which recognizes the legitimacy of public
authority. We don't have to generate a legal and judicial system out
of a non-social, anarchic situation. Hegel's task in the section on
civil society is to examine the logic of the concept of a legal and
judicial system and to identify those factors which must be present
if that system is to satisfy the demands of reason. He titles this
sub-section of civil society the "administration of justice".
The first moment in the "administration of justice" is
titled "right as law". Hegel describes this topic in the following
way:
"The principle of rightness becomes the law
when, in its objective existence, it is
posited i.e. when thinking makes it determinate
for consciousness and makes it known as what is
right and valid; and in acquiring this determinate
character, the right becomes positive law in
general." (P1R. No. 211).
This appears straightforward enough and non-controversial. On closer
inspection, however, it does reveal certain features which are potential
sources of conflict in legal philosophy, particularly with that branch
of legal philosophy loosely termed "positivist". I shall not run
through all the possible arguments which may be raised against Hegel;
rather I shall restrict myself to a brief description of the more
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contentious aspects of his legal philosophy and indicate their
divergence from several rival schools of thought.
First of all, law for Hegel is the positive systematization
of rights. A legal system is only possible within an authoritative
social and political order. At this point Hegel does not raise the
issue of coercive force - reserving this for the third moment of the
sub-section - but clearly the monopolization of coercive power by a
recognized public authority is necessary if the legal system is to
function properly. Now, Hegel's discussion of civil society is nothing
other than an examination of the most important institutions which,
taken together, constitute a rational social order. Hegel's introduc¬
tion of the concept of a legal system at this point in his analysis
of civil society is significant, preceded as it is by his analysis
of the family and the basic constituent elements of economic organiza¬
tion. How does his ordering of the institutions of civil society
relate to the statement that law is the positive systematization of
right?
We have seen that the family has only a marginal relation
to the concept of legal right. The "system of needs", on the other
hand, as one of its most important presuppositions the relationship
between right and private property discussed in Abstract Right. In
contrast to Abstract Right, the right of private property in civil
society
"...is no longer merely implicit but has attained
its recognized actuality as the protection of
property through the administration of justice."
(PR. No. 208).
But the right of private property is not contingent. It secures the
ontologically necessary conditions for objectification of the human
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will. Therefore, the law which guarantees that right has its basis
in ontological necessity and is not merely useful to a flourishing
economy. This applies equally to those rights of the family which
can be guaranteed by positive law. The "administration of justice"
occurs when it does in the Philosophy of Right because Hegel's
concept of positive law presupposes the concept of human rights
grounded in ontological necessity.
What are the implications of such a view? Hegel's concept
of law clearly points to the conclusion that, in principle, systems
of law can be examined against the standard of reason. "Good" laws
would be those laws which embody the ontological principles of right,
while "bad" laws would be those which ignore or contradict such
principles. This view appears to reproduce the views of traditional
natural law theory, but such a judgement would be premature. There
is nothing in Hegel to suggest that such "rational" law is known
through divine revelation or through reflection on the nature of the
cosmic order. If we must relate Hegel's concept of law to a tradi¬
tion of legal speculation, it would be more correct to see it as a
version of natural right theory, as exemplified in the writings of
Aristotle.^ (Of course, Hegel's philosophy of history denies the
classical notion of continuity between the natural and human world.)
Hegel maintains that law, if it is to be considered fully rational,
must be seen as a guarantor of ontologically-grounded human rights.
Hegel's concept of law contrasts sharply with the general
concepts advanced by two major modern schools of legal philosophy.
The positivist approach to law excludes all explicitly moral or
ethical questions from the consideration of what a law is in fact.
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Legal positivists look primarily to the mechanism whereby a law
becomes recognized - and authoritative for a community. They argue
that ethical considerations are irrelevant to this examination for
the immorality of a specific law (even if such a thing could be
clearly demonstrated) is not sufficient, by itself, to declare that
law null and void. The positivist view is a response to those
natural law theorists who would seek to declare some positive laws
null and void because they contradict or violate natural law. The
legal positivist, even though he may agree with the specific moral
views advanced by natural law theorists, maintains that those views
cannot be used as a standard for determining whether specific
positive laws are to be considered as actual laws.21 The legal
positivist can declare a positive law ultra vires, but not for moral
reasons; he could, for example, declare that a specific positive law
contradicts another positive law which is recognized as primary.
The other philosophical school of law I would like to
mention is referred to explicitly by Hegel. This is the historical
school of law, and it was a major force in Hegel's time. The
historical school of law studied the historical evolution of laws
and legal systems. This historical study as such does not conflict
with the positivist concept of law, and is not sufficient, by itself,
to constitute an independent school of law. Where it does depart
from legal positivism, and from Hegel as well, is in its claim that
historical pedigree by itself is a measure of the rightness of a
law. Hegel's savage attack on Professor Hugo is an indication of
his contempt for the simple-minded equation of tradition with
rationality.22
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The relation between Hegel's concept of law and those two
alternative concepts is not easy to determine with precision. Although
Hegel's position differs from both, he also adopts some of their
features. This can be indicated quite clearly with respect to the
historical school, for Hegel refers to that school explicitly in his
writings. We have already examined Hegel's concept of philosophical
history. In the introduction to his Philosophy of World-History he
describes the historical school of law as a variety of specialized
history, which is itself a sub-section of reflective history. (RH.
p. 23). Reflective history, although it does not look to history
as the actualization of Spirit, is of great value. The historical
school of law can even approach the "genuinely philosophical position"
of a Montesquieu who recognized that "legislation both in general and
in in its particular provisions is to be treated not as something
isolated and abstract but rather as a subordinate moment in a whole,
interconnected with all the other features which make up the character
of a nation and an epoch". (PR_. No. 3, Remark). The historical
study of law, therefore, greatly augments our understanding of human
history. Indeed, it may be a necessary prerequisite to the
philosophical grasp of history. But it cannot, by itself, discover
the ultimate rationality or irrationality of positive law, for this
is the "hard task of philosophy".
The relation to positivist legal philosophy is more difficult
to ascertain, not least because Hegel does not address himself
directly to the problems raised by that school of thought. This is not
surprising since, as a definite school of legal philosophy, it developed
after Hegel's death. We can, however, discern in Hegel's comments
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several which are pertinent to the issues raised by legal positivism.
Hegel would agree with the positivists that laws exist regardless of
our moral judgements. The machinery which legislates and the laws
which it produces are, in some sense, independent of moral discourse,
at least with respect to their validity as legislators and positive
laws. His conservative instincts were repelled by revolutionary calls
to break the law. Despite this, he maintains that any legal system
must be seen as enshrining certain basic rights. We can work backward
from the positive legal code to those basic rights.
"The science of positive law has not only
the right, but even the inescapable duty
to study given laws, to deduce from its
positive data their progress in history,
their application and subdivisions, down
to the last detail, and to exhibit their
implications." (PR. No. 212, Remark).
In this way legal science can discover our basic legal rights which
underpin the entire legal code.
Thus far, there is little to which the committed legal
positivist could object. Hegel, however, does not curtail his
demands of legal science at this point. He insists that we can also
question whether a specific law is rational, even though this question
"may seem perverse to those who are busied with these pursuits".
(ibid). There are two ways of understanding this problem. First,
it is possible to examine a specific positive law in order to determine
if it contradicts a legal right which is accepted as primary. That is,
does a specific positive law contradict its own basis of legality.
Second, are the legal rights which positive legal science lays bare
themselves rational? For example, is a law which abolishes private
property rational? Hegel would argue no, for such a law denies the
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right to private property, a right which is grounded in ontological
necessity. Any right or law which denies the right to private
property must be seen as an obstacle to the living of a free, rational
life since, from the perspective of ontology, rational freedom
requires private property. Hence such a law or right is, by Hegel's
standards, irrational. Legal positivism could, I believe, accept
the first "modest" test of rationality, since it is really nothing
more than a demand for internal consistency within a legal code.
But as we saw in Hegel's critique of Kant, internal consistency by
itself is not necessarily good. I believe that Hegel's invocation of
"rationality" is aimed at the second type of questioning, and it is
clear that this approach to law is anathema to legal positivism.
Law must be seen, Hegel maintains, as the systematization
of rights. The philosopher must demonstrate which rights satisfy the
demands of reason. Reason, in Hegel's sense of the term, is the
ultimate criterion of whether a law is "good" or "bad". A "bad" law
is one that is irrational, even though this does not necessarily strip
it of its status as a valid positive law. Despite the possible
"discrepancy between the content of the law and the principle of
rightness" (PR. No. 212 ), the philosopher must not abandon his search
for the rational basis of positive law. "It is only because of this
identity between its implicit and posited character that positive law
has obligatory force in virtue of its rightness". (ibid). When there
is a discrepancy between right and law other "forces" may obligate
the citizen; by examining the ontological foundations of right the
philosopher can point the way to a legal system in which obligation
is fully rational because the laws secure rational rights.
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The remaining two sub-sections of the "administration of
justice" are relatively straightforward and unobjectionable, regard¬
less of one's philosophical orientation. After the sub-section on
"right as law" Hegel discusses "law determinate^ existent". In the
former section Hegel is concerned to demonstrate that rational
positive law, in its universality, presupposes the concept of rational
right. But law, of course, cannot remain at the level of universality
if it is to be effective. In "law determinately existent" Hegel
discusses law in its particularity, i.e. the particular laws contained
in the civil and criminal legal codes. Two points only need be noted
here. The first is that Hegel emphasizes the necessity of publicizing
the laws. He favours an explicit code of positive laws over a common
law system requiring extensive professional knowledge of legal
precedents. The more accessible the legal code the greater the respect
for it and the greater the possibility that the citizens will observe
its statutes. The second point is that legal systems must be open to
change and adaptation when required. The dream of a complete and
closed set of laws is vain since it ignores the continual changes and
alterations in the conditions which a legal system is intended to cover.
Additionally, legislators may simply be in error in framing a
particular law and should be prepared to rescind or alter it if the
rationality of the law is to be maintained. The principle of right
informs the concept of law and, where discrepancies between right and
positive law occur, law must be prepared to change. Hegel's attitude
here is not unlike Aristotle's in his treatment of equity.^ The
spirit of the law (right) is more important than any particular
positive law.
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The third sub-section is titled - the "court of justice"
and is concerned with the courts of law in which civil and criminal
cases are tried. Hegel offers us the conventional wisdom that trials
must be public and that laws must be explicit in their determination
of proper court procedures such as the arraignment of the accused,
the presentation of evidence and similar procedures. The most interest¬
ing point about law courts for our purposes comes out in the contrast
between revenge and punishment. Revenge was discussed in Abstract
Right, in the discussion of crime. As opposed to this subjectivity
and abstractness which marred any attempt to redress crime in that
section, we now have reached a level of development where punishment
proper assumes its proper role. Right is now made objective as law.
Particular laws receive their validity and power because they are
particular expressions of the objective universality of right as law.
The court of law is a "public authority" in which civil disputes and
criminal acts may be tried and the decisions reached therein have a
validity and objectivity which would otherwise be lacking. Because
right is now objective, a particular wrong is not a wrong against the
subjectively-held right of a particular person (Abstract Right);
rather it is a wrong against the right which is now universal and
objective as law. Punishment of a wrong restores the primacy of
universal right in contrast to revenge which can never rise above
subjective particularity. As Hegel writes, in civil society it is
the "injured universal" which must be restored and not the "injured
party" (PR. No. 220). In the court of law the universal and
particular elements of law are brought together explicitly. Punish¬
ment of a particular crime (i.e. an infringement of a particular law)
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is rational only by virtue of the universality of right as objectified
in the positive legal code.
The primary objective of the type of social organization
described in Civil Society is material welfare. This objective is
the base upon which Hegel builds his analysis of civil society. It
is not sufficient to regard material welfare as incidental or contingent
to economic activity; it is the principle which informs this entire
mode of human experience and invests it with the form of rationality.^4
But if this is the case then it is obvious that material welfare must
be attainable - in some reasonable degree - by all the members of
civil society. If material welfare is restricted to only a few then
it cannot be maintained as a universal principle. This does not
necessarily entail economic equality but rather only that no one
suffer severe material deprivation in comparison with his fellow
citizens.
We can look at this from a different angle. We recall that
Hegel applauded the achievement of modern natural law theory because
it demolished the idea that right could be based on status or some
other contingent consideration. If the right to private property
includes the right to material welfare then, if this right is to be
rational, it must be a right for all. Further, if a right is
incapable of actualization, then it is wholly abstract and meaning¬
less. Therefore, the right to material welfare can only be rational
and concrete if, in the actual life of a community, all members
achieve a reasonable level of material well-being. If this is not
the case then this right remains universal only at the level of
theory and is shown by actual practice to be empty and abstract, a
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fiction only. It does not require a great deal of imagination to
see that this fiction may fulfill a useful ideological purpose, viz.
to describe as universal that which is in fact partial and restricted.
Hegel attempts to confront this problem directly in the
third sub-section of civil society titled "the police and the
corporation". In the "system of needs" the ultimate identity of
universal welfare and particular welfare is described. This, of
course, is a central tenet of liberal economic theory. But this
identity was only posited. A clear-sighted view of actual economic
activity revealed to Hegel a great discrepancy between theory and
practice. In practice Hegel saw about him great poverty and misery.
Although he would never deny that talent ought to be rewarded, he was
adamant that lack of ability, or good fortune, should not be so
desperately punished. This offended not only his sensibilities but
also his desire to base right on a firm foundation of universality
and rationality. Actual economic life contradicted this latter demand.
Nor was the right to material welfare for all secured by the
administration of justice. The courts could only seek to redress
wrongs committed against persons or property. In so doing, they only
reaffirmed the existing principles of right. It was beyond their
jurisdication to ensure that every citizen enjoyed his rights in
practice. The person who owned property and had his right to this
property infringed could seek redress, but the propertyless person
could not use the judicial system to redress his poverty. Here too
the universal and particular moments of the right to material
welfare diverged. If this divergence were to be overcome it would
require different sorts of public institutions from the ones already
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described. Hegel writes:
"But the right actually present in the
particular requires, first, that accidental
hindrances to one aim or another be removed,
and undisturbed safety of person and property
be attained; and secondly, that the securing
of every single person's livelihood and
welfare be treated and actualized as a right,
i.e. that particular welfare as such be so
treated." (PR. No. 230)
The police and the corporation were the two public institutions which
Hegel judged to be capable of bridging the gap between universal and
particular, of ensuring that everyone actualized his right to material
welfare.
By "police" Hegel means a wide range of public authorities.25
These authorities are concerned with the general regulation of the
activity of civil society as well as the amelioration of the various
social problems which may arise. There are many areas in which the
public authorities are necessary if civil society is to function at
all smoothly. First of all, there is the sphere of activity which
we associate with the modern concept of a police force, viz. the
prevention of crime and the pursuit and arrest of lawbreakers. Then
there are areas such as health care, sewage disposal, factory inspec¬
tion, trade regulation, commercial standards, and similar matters
which are increasingly accepted in the modern state as properly
under the jurisdiction of public authorities. Hegel also maintains
that it is the responsibility of public authorities to provide "public
educational facilities so far as is practicable" since "education bears
upon the child's capacity to become a member of society". (PR. No.239).
The public authorities clearly must perform those tasks which are
essential to the well-being of society and yet can not be fulfilled
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by private endeavour.
The public authorities also have welfare responsibilities.
This is most true with respect to poverty, and Hegel's remarks on
this subject are of interest. He begins by arguing that poverty may
result from "contingencies, physical conditions and factors grounded
in external circumstances". (PR. No. 241). This list may lead one
to believe that poverty results from personal failings of one sort or
another (e.g. low intelligence, lack of discipline) or external
factors (e.g. crop failures, poor land, distance from necessary
markets). But Hegel then proceeds to describe how the dialectic of
economic development results in massive concentrations of wealth in
a few hands accompanied by mass poverty. He does not set this out in
any more than an impressionistic manner, yet we can easily see that,
in the time in which he wrote, such impressions were so close to hand
that one could regard poverty as the result of ineluctable tendencies
without feeling the necessity to base this judgement on a full-blown
economic theory.
Although Hegel may not have realized that he was outlining
two rival theories of the cause of poverty, he is in no doubt about
which course the public authorities should follow if poverty were to
be eliminated. Private acts of charity aimed at helping particular
individuals may be worthy and noble but
"(s)ubjective aid, however, both in itself and
in its operation, is dependant on contingency
and consequently society struggles to make it
less necessary, by discovering the general
causes of penury and general means of its
relief, and by organizing relief accordingly."
(PR. No. 242).
Hegel does not regard poverty as, essentially, the result of private
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failing but rather points to its source in the economic organization
of society. The personality "defects" of the poor are not the cause
of poverty but its result.^ At this point, concerning the "abolition"
of poverty, Hegel's analysis collapses. He identifies two possible
remedies and finds both wanting. The first, direct transfer payments
from the rich to the poor, not only would be opposed by the former
as contrary to the principles of civil society but would also result
in the loss of dignity by the latter. The second, job creation for
the poor, would result in a market glut since production would race
ahead of consumption, the two only achieving a state of equilibrium
when market forces could operate independent of public intervention.
The only possible solution which Hegel advances is economic imperialism,
a drive by bourgeois society to expand its markets in order to absorb
surplus production. Hegel's analysis of poverty is strikingly weak.^7
In Hegel's defense we can point to the lack of analysis by the
economists of his time of this problem. Were a more satisfactory
analysis of poverty available it is a moot point whether Hegel would
have accepted its conclusions, especially if they conflicted with the
right to private property which he defends on ontological grounds.
But it must be emphasized that Hegel was not content to simply stand
back and witness the misery of poverty while defending the theory of
economic laissez-faire as such. He was fully prepared to intervene in
the market economy if such intervention could be shown to be effective.
The dominant class of civil society is the business class.
Its mode of activity, the subject of bourgeois political economy, was
the overwhelmingly important feature of emergent capitalist society.
This Hegel clearly grasped, and it was not a fact which could be erased
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through romantic philosophical yearnings. The task of philosophy was
to confront it, understand it, and discover the principle or rationality
which lay therein.
The great achievement of the business class was the expansion
of economic activity and the creation of vast pools of wealth which
had never before been thought possible. Its great defect was that the
creation of wealth depended on ruthless competition, on aggressive
behaviour which looked only to self-interest. The business class
achieved its economic breakthrough at the expense of social harmony.
Hegel's problem then, was to discover a way whereby the economic
advances could be retained while the excessive self-interest which made
them possible could be negated. The institutional solution to this
problem is contained in his theory of the corporation.
Hegel's theory of the corporation is extremely suggestive.
Historically, the legal theory of corporations - whether trade,
religious, educational, political, military - has been extremely
controversial. From Roman law, through late-Roman and Medieval legal
theories, to modern Natural Law theories, the status of the corporation
- its rights, duties and sovereignty - has been a subject of great
legal debate. Investigation of this history lies outside the scope
of this thesis.Also, in the section on the state, Hegel details
the important political role of the corporations. I shall reserve
discussion of the political function of the corporation to my
discussion of this theory of the state. For now, I wish to point out
only the general features of the corporation as it affects the life
of civil society.
The particularism of the business class is potentially
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destructive of the social and political order. To ignore this is to
be plunged back into the anarchy of Abstract Right. To oppose it too
strongly is to destroy the energy and creativity which has generated
modern wealth and comfort and which has made possible the compara¬
tively wider distribution of material welfare throughout the popula¬
tion. The abstract identity of particular and universal, posited by
liberal political economy, was too abstract to be effective. It was
an identity for the economist and not for the productive, impoverished
citizen. Hegel's response was to describe an institution which,
arising out of self-interest, ultimately moderates self-interest to the
point where social and political harmony could be established.
Hegel's theory requires each sector within the business class
to form organizations to advance the interests of its members. Those
organizations - the corporations - are to regulate the standards of
their respective industries, promote the welfare of their members,
provide members with security against misfortune, and educate young
persons into the skills and responsibilities which full corporate
membership demands. (PR. No. 252). Hegel is not specific about what,
precisely, constitutes an economic sector capable of forming a
corporation. We are led to believe that corporations would correspond
roughly to what we understand by the term economic sector. For
example, the textile industry would be one such sector. It is possible
that this could be further divided into e.g. cottons and woolens
industries. There may be divisions between spinning and weaving
industries. Hegel gives us no idea how to decide where to draw the
line. It is possible that each industry I have named is capable of
forming a corporation with umbrella organizations within which their
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activities could be coordinated. One very important point is that
divisions between corporations are to be, so to speak, vertical
rather than horizontal. That is, all the members of an industry -
capitalist as well as worker - are members of the same corporation.
Hegel's intention in the theory of corporations is clear.
He sees the corporations as moderating the anarchic effects of harsh,
economic competition. The corporation may, initially, appeal to its
membership only as a means to advancing their interests. The
individual joins the corporation because he thinks it will benefit
him. The corporation serves the interests of an entire industrial
sector and, as one member of that sector, his self-interest is bound
up with the interests of the sector as a whole. This, of course, is
not always the case but, once an individual joins a corporation he is
bound by its corporate decisions. In this way, individuals learn to
accept decisions which, while not in their immediate interests, serve
their long-term interests. Hegel's belief here is that each
corporation will educate its members to the wider interests which it
represents. The hope is that members will not always be tied to the
calculus of immediate self-interest but may eventually understand
the problems which face the corporation (industry) as a whole. Beyond
each corporation lie the problems and concerns of other corporations,
of the whole business class (in Hegel's sense), of other classes and
of the social and political order which is their ultimate ground. In
the section on the state we shall see that the lower house of the
legislature is made up of representatives from the business class,
elected indirectly through corporations. The corporation is the
ethical institution which educates men beyond their particular
- 314 -
interests towards the wider responsibilities of political activity.
We have seen that the family is the substantial embodiment
of universality, albeit in an immediate form. The development of the
family points beyond itself because its result - the educated,
responsible son or daughter - leaves the family behind. In civil
society, particularity is the dominant principle. As civil society
develops into more complex levels of activity, particularity yields
somewhat. We have already described the emergence of universal
interests. The corporation is the most developed institution of civil
society because, in it, universal and particular are most clearly
brought together. But the corporate universal is, at best, only the
universal interests of one business sector. The corporation cannot
actualize the true, concrete universal because it is essentially
limited. It does, however, demonstrate to its members the necessity
of moving beyond particularity, and bare self-interest. Like the
family, its success points beyond itself. The corporation points to
that moment of Ethical Life in which the concrete universal can
become actual, that is, the corporation points to the state.
The State
We arrive now at the third section of Ethical Life which
Hegel titles "the state". The state is the culmination of the develop¬
ment of the practical will. We have seen that the dialectic of the
will describes the struggle of the will to create the conditions
necessary for its actualization; that is, to create a human world in
which man can lead a rational, free life. The concept of the will,
rational freedom, becomes the Idea of the will when it creates the
conditions for its own actualization. With the emergence of the
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rational state this development of the will is complete and the
state is "the actuality of the ethical Idea". (PR_. No. 257).
In Chapter 6 I discussed Hegel's concepts of the state,
history and Spirit. There I emphasized that the state is the active
universal moment of human self-consciousness. It is not a passive
medium within which the individual achieves self-consciousness qua
"atomistic" individual. Still less is it a utilitarian convenience
which is only a means to human material prosperity. On the other
hand, the state is not a divine entity divorced from human concerns.
As a universal it must, according to Hegel's logical demands,
actualize itself in the concrete individual. The concrete individual,
for Hegel, is the free citizen of a rational state. Particularity
is not lost in this concept of the mediated individual, for each
citizen has particular characteristics which are his alone and which
serve to distinguish him in some measure, from his fellow citizens.
The task which Hegel sets himself is to describe free
individuality as a concrete, mediated unity of universal and particular.
In the family and civil society no such individual could emerge because
of the incompleteness of each phase. It is Hegel's contention that
this is only possible in the rational state.
The shortcomings of the two previous phases of Ethical Life
are analogous to the shortcomings of two major schools of thought
within the history of political philosophy. The family represents
universality as pre-eminent. It appears as the immediate, natural
form of community. In Hegel's eyes this is similar to the immediacy
and naturalness of the Polis in the classical political
philosophy of Plato and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle. The hostility
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of this "natural" universality to the claims of particularity, and the
inevitable clash in the classical world between them, is in Hegel's
view most poignantly presented in the drama of Antigone.39 in civil
society particularity dominates and universality can only be posited,
primarily in the form of the Corporations. This is similar to the
standpoint of modern contract theory. For example, Hegel applauds
Rousseau for "adducing the will as the principle of the state" (PR.
No. 258, Remark). But Rousseau
"takes the will only in a determinate form as
the individual will, and he regards the universal
will not as the absolutely rational element in
the will, but only as a 'general'will which
proceeds out of this individual will as out of a
conscious will."30
The truly universal moment of the will is the state and not something
posited as common to a plurality of self-contained individual wills.
In the section on the state Hegel tries to pull together all
the disparate strands of analysis which have already appeared in the
Philosophy of Right. He attempts to describe a state in which the
legitimate claims of particularity are recognized while their excesses
are curbed, a state in which the citizens recognize that the state is
not a limit to personal freedom but its objective embodiment. In
discussing this section I shall present Hegel's views in a brief and
straightforward manner, attempting to demonstrate the significance
for Hegel's political thought of the moments of the state. I will
reserve criticism for the next chapter of the thesis.
"In the state everything depends on the unity of universal
and particular." (PR. No. 261, Addition). This, in abstract logical
terms, expresses the dominant theme of Hegel's theory of the state.
- 317 -
Everything in the state is considered from the perspective of unity
and the state assumes its importance because of the role it fulfils
in actualizing unity. The first concrete description of this unity is
given by Hegel in his treatment of rights and duties within the rational
state. He contrasts the relationship of rights and duties in the
rational state with the one which, in Hegel's view, has dominated modern
political theory. In general, the rival position states that
"(d)uty is primarily a relation to something
which from my point of view is substantive,
absolutely universal. A right, on the other
hand, is simply the embodiment of this substance
and thus is the particular aspect of it and
enshrines my particular freedom. Hence at
abstract levels, right and duty appear parcelled
out on different sides or in different persons."
(PR. No. 261, Remark).
The problem, then, is to discover some way of bringing right and duty
together. In Abstract Right the rights of the person and the duty to
observe those rights in other persons have only a contingent relation¬
ship. The persons of Abstract Right do not recognize the necessity of
fulfilling their obligations. In Morality, duty obliges with universal
power and "necessity" but each subject has the right to determine the
content of his duties. Thus the universality of duty is only a show,
an appearance.
The stages of Ethical Life represent increasingly successful
attempts to unify rights and duties. In the family, as a substantial
universal association, duty is primary and rights are secondary, assum¬
ing their full role only with the "dissolution" of the family. In
civil society (the sphere of personal material welfare) personal rights
are primary and duties assume importance only in the posited, relatively
universal institutions of the police and the corporations. But
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"in the State, as something ethical, as the
interpenetration of the substantive and the
particular, my obligation to what is sub¬
stantive is at the same time the embodiment
of my particular freedom. This means that in
the state duty and right are united in one and the
same relation. But further, since none the less
the distinct moments acquire in the state the
shape and reality peculiar to each, and since
therefore the distinction between right and duty
enters here once again, it follows that while
implicitly, i.e. in form, identical, they at the
same time differ in content." (PFL No. 261,
Remark).
How are we to interpret this passage? The problem which Hegel
addresses in the Philosophy of Right is the problem of human freedom,
of the mode of activity which actualizes freedom. The long journey
through Abstract Right and Morality demonstrates the necessity of a
rationally organized community for this actualization. The family and
civil society, through necessary forms of ethical association, are by
themselves insufficient. It is the state alone, Hegel contends, which
can satisfy the demand for freedom. I have already discussed, in
Chapter 6, the way in which Hegel conceives of the state as the concrete
universal moment in the life of the free individual.
Now, if the right to freedom is a universal human right -
and clearly, on Hegel's criteria, it must be universal if it is
to be considered a right - then the state as the moment of concrete
universality is necessary if the universal right to freedom is to
be actualized. But if the state is to exist as a stable, living
community it must impose certain obligations upon its citizens. To
the self-conscious citizen of a rational state those political obligations,
those duties, are not the dictates of an alien organization external
to his essential interest. In fulfilling his political obligations
the citizen strengthens the living, universal embodiment of his
own freedom. The rational state is necessary for the actualization of his
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right to freedom and in fulfilling his political obligations he actualizes
that right.
This does not mean that the citizen abandons himself to the
will of the state. Hegel is adamant about this, as we can see in his
insistence that the rational state must recognize the claims of
particularity.
"Duty, taken concretely as Idea, reveals the
moment of particularity as itself essential
and so regards its satisfaction as indisputably
necessary. In whatever way an individual may
fulfil his duty, he must at the same time find
his account therein and attain his personal
interest and satisfaction. Out of his position
in the state, a right must accrue to him whereby
public affairs shall be his own particular affair.
Particular interests should in fact not be set
aside or completely suppressed; instead they
should be put in correspondence with the
universal, and thereby both they and the universal
are upheld." (PR. No. 261, Remark).
The state cannot regulate, nor ought it to try to regulate, the entire
lives of its citizenry. Each citizen has particular interests which
are beyond the proper reach of the state. If those interests are not
in conflict with the broad interests of the state then the state must
recognize and protect the rights of its citizens to satisfy their
particular interest. This is why the content of rights and duties
cannot be identical. In broad terms the form of right and duty is
identical, two sides of the same coin. In practice (i.e. in content)
they will differ. But we should not lose sight of the fact that this
difference itself depends on the formal identity of right and duty.
It is only in fulfilling the political obligations imposed upon him
by the rational state that the citizen secures his right to particular
satisfaction. It is in the differentiated unity of right and duty,
the harmonization of content and form, that the citizen becomes a free
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individual. All this expresses in different terms the proposition
that we began with, viz. that in the state the unity of universal and
particular, of state and citizen, is everything. Throughout the
discussion of the state, however, we must keep absolutely clear the
fact that, for Hegel, this unity is a differentiated one in which each
moment which contributes to the concrete actualization of freedom
retains its essential features and does not simply surrender them to
the other moments.
There is one more point which, must be raised before we
proceed to the discussion of the political institutions of the State.
In the previous chapter on Hegel's philosophy of history I discussed
the relation between individual self-consciousness and the historical
development of the objective, human world of laws, institutions, forms
of association and so forth. History, as the history of the march of
Spirit in the world, of the progress of human freedom, is completed
when freedom becomes Idea. This is only possible with the actualiza¬
tion of the rational state. The emergence of the rational state is
conterminous with the emergence of rational human self-consciousness.
The state is the universal moment of human self-consciousness and so the
emergence of the rational state and of rational human self-consciousness
are two sides of the same historical development. There can be no comple¬
tely rational (i.e. complete) human self-consciousness unless there exists
a rational state. But equally, the rational state can only exist
through the self-conscious activity of its citizens. To deny the former
is to argue that human self-consciousness can be complete before,
or independent of, the completion of its universal moment. To
deny the latter is to argue that the state is a superhuman entity which,
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as a universal, can exist independent of its particular moment.
The relation of the state to human self-consciousness must be
grasped dialectically. Each side is seen to mediate the other and to
mediate itself through the other. Each by itself, is abstract and
incomplete; the concept of self-and-other mediation recognizes abstract
incompleteness and conceives of its being overcome dialectically. The
state and human self-consciousness develop together towards complete¬
ness. The result of this dialectic is the free, rational individual.
This is the concept which underlies Hegel's discussion of
patriotism. He explicitly argues against the perverse notions of
patriotism which are so often advanced. In his own time his primary
object of attack was the German Romantics who tried to forge a
German nation through emotional appeals to patriotic sentiments. In
our own time we are often witnesses to the most base appeals for
"exceptional sacrifices and actions" for the sake of the "Fatherland"
or some other such "superhuman" entity. In the various perverse
appeals to patriotic sentiment there is a common thread which unites
them; they all attempt, through the manipulation of emotions, to
impose some semblance of order on a chaotic political situation.
This is in sharp contrast to Hegel's use of the term.
Patriotism, for Hegel
"essentially...is the sentiment which, in the
relationships of our daily life and under
ordinary conditions, habitually recognize that
the community is one's substantive groundwork
and end... If...this genuine patriotism is
looked upon as that which may begin of itself
and arise from subjective ideas and thoughts,
it is being confused with opinion, because so
regarded patriotism is deprived of its true
ground, objective reality." (PR_. No. 268, Remark).
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Patriotism is, then,essentially an act of recognition. The citizen
recognizes the necessity of the state to his own freedom. He recognizes
that the state is the objective, universal moment of human freedom.
The coercive powers of the state are necessary because they secure
the order necessary for freedom. Coercion is perhaps the wrong term
for it implies a limit to the will imposed from without. But the state,
seen in its truth, is not external to the will of its citizens. The
limits to activity imposed by the state are recognized by the self-
conscious citizen to be the limits imposed upon particularly by the
objective embodiment of the universal moment of his own rational will.
This concept of patriotism may be unsettling unless we keep
before us Hegel's philosophy of history. When Hegel discusses the
state he does not mean any set of political institutions whatsoever.
His concept of historical development as progressive points to a
complete or rational state. It is only within the rational state that
patriotism is fully rational. I have described the relation between
self-consciousness and the state and have tried to indicate the way in
which this relation develops historically. It need only be added now
that the rational state and its self-conscious citizens are products
of this development.
In the Philosophy of World-History the state is seen to be
more than just the objective political institutions which exist at
any given time. The state in its broadest sense points to the ethical
totality which is present at every stage of historical development,
even though the specific content of each historical totality differs
from the content of every other one. In the Philosophy of Right, in
the section on the state, Hegel describes a determinate set of
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political institutions. The totality of Ethical Life is not expressed
in those institutions taken by themselves. The ethical community
must be structured. It must exhibit an order which satisfies the
demands of reason. The political institutions of the rational state
are the most developed objective structures which can secure and
maintain that order. But those institutions are not complete in
themselves. They gain their ethical character because they are
necessary for the actualization of the ethical order within which
human freedom is actualized. Similar to Aristotle, the political
institutions express a state of ethical development which goes beyond
the more narrowly conceived political role of those institutions. The
ethical dimension of the state is not separate from the political
institutions of the state. Bad political institutions cannot secure
a good ethical totality. But good political institutions are never,
qua institutions, complete and self-subsistent in themselves. Their
value must always be seen within the context of the totality of
Ethical Life. Hegel is not sufficiently clear on this point. Some¬
times he refers to the state in the more narrow sense of a set of
political institutions; on other occasions he uses the term as if it
were synonymous with the totality of Ethical Life - including even
Absolute Mind. Many of the more misleading interpretations of Hegel
rest on the confusion of those two distinct but inseparable uses of
the term "state". Hegel's intended use can often only be inferred
from the context in which it is used. It is important, however, to
make the effort to ferret out the precise sense in which the term is
being used if we are to avoid error.^
The need to keep both senses of "state" before us is
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exemplified in Hegel's discussion of the internal constitution of the
state. The constitution sets out the division of powers between the
various institutions of political life. Indeed, it defines the nature,
scope and limits of those institutions. It may, or may not, separate
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. It
may establish a series of political checks and balances or it may
ignore the opportunity to set those out in a precise manner. In short,
the internal constitution of a state establishes the system of basic
principles upon which a body politic is organized as well as the
political institutions necessary for the maintenance of the body
politic according to those principles.
This description of a political constitution is exceedingly
abstract. It can only become concrete when we discuss actual political
principles and institutions. Such discussions can take a variety of
forms. Most obviously, there are discussions of the political
constitutions of actual states, whether contemporary ones or historically
superseded ones is unimportant. There are comparative analyses of
different political constitutions. There are also discussions which,
although based on empirical observations of actual states, attempt to
establish a comparative typology or classification of political constitu¬
tions. Up to Hegel's time the two most notable attempts at this last
variety of analysis are found in Aristotle's Politics and Montesquieu's
Spirit of the Laws.
It is not an easy matter to decide which approach Hegel
favours. At various times in his career he attempts different sorts
of political analysis according to the circumstances and intentions
which prevailed at the time. In the Philosophy of Right he clearly
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intends to describe what Aristotle would call the "best" constitution.
In a sense, we could argue that Hegel's discussion of the constitution
of the rational state presupposes all the various approaches to constitu¬
tional analysis. For our purposes, in order to draw out the connection
between the political and ethical aspects of Hegel's analysis of the
rational state, it is perhaps most important to recall the major
contributions of Aristotle and Montesquieu to the formation of Hegel's
political thought.
Both Aristotle and Montesquieu attempted to establish the
links between the political arrangements of a state and the ethical
character of that state. In Aristotle, for example, an oligarchy is
not merely rule by the wealthy but it also indicates that the pursuit
of wealth dominates the entire life of the state. That is, the
pursuit of wealth is the overriding principle which informs the entire
character of the state. Montesquieu similarly attempted to demonstrate
that particular political constitutions are intimately bound up with
particular ethical values and characteristics of the people of the state
considered as a whole. For example, Montesquieu pointed to Republican
virtue as the ethical principle which informs the life of the people
in a political democracy. If such virtue is absent then democracy
quickly degenerates into a state where the political institutions
become the vehicles of greedy and corrupt men.
Of the two analyses Montesquieu's was perhaps the more
important for Hegel's mature political thought.32 First of all,
Montesquieu's analysis focused on political constitutions much closer
in time to the period when Hegel was active. Not only did this
ensure that the actual political institutions which he discussed were
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more relevant to Hegel but also Montesquieu was examining the emerg¬
ing huge nation - state rather than the small city - state which was
the object of Aristotle's analysis. Second, and more important,
implied throughout Montesquieu's analysis is the intimate connection
between political constitutions and historical development which
Hegel later systematizes in his own philosophy. In the discussion of
democracy, for example, it is clear that, even if democracy is a
theoretically desirable form of political organization, it is disastrous
if the people are not ready for it. By "ready for it" I mean that
the people are not, in Montesquieu's phrase, sufficiently "virtuous"
to create a stable democracy or even to benefit from its imposition
by an external force or from above by, for example, a coup d'etat.
A people becomes "ready" for a specific political constitution as a
result of its own historical development. It was Hegel's great
achievement to attempt to go beyond Montesquieu and discover the logic
of historical development itself.
It is within this context that we must understand both the
ethical and the political aspects of the state and the manner in
which they are brought together in Hegel's discussion of the constitution
of the rational state. The political institutions established and
guaranteed by the constitution of the rational state are only possible
if the historical evolution of the ethos (spirit) of a people reaches
the level of development adequate to such institutions. Of course,
Hegel maintains that ethical and political developments in history
cannot be treated separately. But we can distinguish the more
narrowly political institutional order from the general ethical order
as conceived by Hegel. In the Philosophy of Right the political
institutions enshrined in the constitution presuppose the self-
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conscious recognition of several vital points: a respect for personal
rights and for the positive laws which guarantee those rights; recogni¬
tion right to moral judgement; respect for the family unit and for love
as the principle of the family; a vigorous bourgeois society in which
personal rewards for initiative are tempered by a concern for the
welfare of others; the recognition of the necessity of a pluralistic
order in which social and political unity can be achieved through
diversity and not despite it; the recognition that personal freedom is
only possible within a rational objective ethical and political state;
the recognition that there is no necessary conflict between the obliga¬
tions imposed upon the individual by this state and the individual's
right to freedom and material welfare. This level of development is
reached only through long historical development. The struggle to
achieve that level of development is the story of the emergence of
Spirit, of the Idea of freedom.
"A constitution is not just something manufactured;
it is the work of centuries, it is the Idea, the
consciousness of rationality so far as that
consciousness is developed in a particular nation."
(PR. No. 274, Addition).
The constitutional organization which Hegel describes as
explicitly rational is a modern constitutional monarchy. He identifies
three essential moments of constitutional monarchy and explicitly
identifies each with one of the logical moments of universality (the
legislature), particularity (the executive), and individuality (the
monarch). Each constitutional organ of the state must be grasped
dialectically; that is, each must be seen as a differentiated aspect
of a single whole, the rational state. The concept which Hegel employs
to indicate the nature of this differentiated unity is the explicitly
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political one of sovereignty.
I have frequently referred to individuality as the key
concept of dialectical logic. There are many ways of presenting this
concept, and the method of presentation will vary according to the
context within which the concept is presented. Most frequently,
individuality has been presented as the concrete, differentiated
unity of universal and particular or, alternatively, of object and
subject. We should also remember that individuality may be regarded
as the unity of identity and difference as described in Chapter 3
above. The sovereignty of the rational state must be grasped as the
concrete unity of each of those dichotomies. Of course, this does
not mean that there are three different unities; there is only the
one, but it can be regarded as a unity of different sets of opposed
moments depending on our point of reference or emphasis.
The notion of the sovereign state as an "individual" is not
realy so mysterious as it appears. I can indicate this briefly with
reference to the three sets of dialectical opposites listed above.
The state is an entity which, at its most abstract level, can be
regarded as self-identical. The modern political science concept of
the political system as a recognized, authoritative allocator of
values for the members of that system may be regarded, in Hegelian
terms, as emphasizing the abstract self-identity of the state. The
political system persists so long as it is able to continue to
authoritatively allocate values (i.e. it maintains its identity as a
political system). At such a level of abstraction the question of
which values are allocated or how they are allocated is a second
order problem. We could also characterize the authoritative allocation
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of values as the most abstractly universal moment which must be present
if a state can be said to exist at all. Identity and universality may
be seen to specify the same thing although, from the perspective of a
system's persistence through time, identity brings out the idea of the
persistence of any given political system through time more directly.
On the other hand, the concept of universality highlights directly the
features which all states must have if they are to be states at all. The
self-identity and universality of any political system qua system can be
regarded as objective. The notion of "authoritative" certainly implies
subjective recognition, but the nature of that recognition is irrelevant
to the concept of the political system strictly considered. That the
system may be said to exist at all is a statement of its objectivity; it
is irrelevant whether it exists as a result of despotic terror against
its subjects or on the basis of freely-given consent.
The level of abstraction achieved by such a concept of the
political system, while of some merit, severely limits its usefulness.
It is surely not misplaced antiquarianism to demand that political
analysis probe more deeply and address itself to the nature of the values
which a given system allocates and to the method whereby they are
allocated. But when we attempt to go further in this direction we are
immediately faced with the problem of specifying what distinguishes one
political system from another. This may be done either explicitly as
in a comparative analysis of different political systems, or it may be
done implicitly by employing certain terms - such as authoritarian or
democratic, socialist or capitalist - which by their nature invoke
comparison with other terms of political discourse.
When we address those questions we must analyse the features
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of political systems which allow us to distinguish between political
systems. We must examine the particular values which obtain in a
particular political system. We must analyse the particular institu¬
tions which together differentiate the system as a whole from other
systems. In short, we must examine the features of a political system
which correspond to the opposite poles (subjectivity, particularity,
difference) of the logical dichotomies which I have identified if we
are to distinguish between political systems. Each state - considered
as an individual and distinct state - embodies the unity of the abstract
moments described above.
But this may be somewhat misleading when we turn our attention
to Hegel's rational state. Although questions of particularity, of
difference and of subjectivity certainly serve to distinguish between
political systems, we must not lose sight of their significance within
a political system as well. For example, a state may be recognized by
its citizens as an entity which authoritatively allocates certain
acceptable values. In order to effect its tasks the state requires a
political organization. The political organs of the state each have
specific functions, and each may be regarded as differentiated from the
others. The way in which this internal differentiation is achieved is
a matter of great significance. A judiciary which is subject to the
arbitrary dictates of a monarch, or a parliament, or a single political
party is decidedly different from one which is independent of such
arbitrary coercion. A state may claim for itself absolute priority over
any possible matters of conscience on the part of its citizens or it may
decree that matters of conscience must always have a fair hearing when
they conflict with positive laws. Clearly matters of internal organization
distinguish one political system from another and affect the lives of
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the members of each system in different ways. Nor should we ignore
the fact that geographic, climatic, historical, religious and similar
features may distinguish quite markedly the ethical nature of one state
from that of another despite great similarity between both their
professed ideals and their internal political organization.
Finally, it may seem odd to speak of logical dischotomies in
terms of the political constitution. At various times throughout this
thesis those dichotomies have been used to describe opposed elements of
a non-political nature. (In Morality, for example, I discussed the
abstract good for all and the particular perception of this good by the
abstract moral subject.) This is not as confusing as it may appear.
First, the logical dichotomies are, precisely because of their logical
character, not confined to only one set of concrete discursive terms.
Second, the problem of the Philosophy of Right is the problem of rational
freedom. Each section of the text marks a stage in the development of
this problem towards its eventual solution. Abstract Right and Morality
demonstrate the necessity of a rational community for the actualization
of freedom. But in the section on the state we are not confronted
simply with a wholly abstract community on the one hand and the atomistic
individual on the other and the problem of somehow bringing them
together. We have already examined a variety of forms of community and
of individual activity which have moved our concepts of both the
individual and the community considerably beyond the abstract point at
which they were originally discussed. In the state Hegel will attempt
to complete this process. When we talk, therefore, of the universality
and particularity of political institutions we are talking about a
different sort of particularity than was the case in Abstract Right.
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For example, particular demands as discussed in the state are the
demands raised in the legislature by the elected representatives of
particular corporations within civil society. We are a long way away
from the unmediated particularity of the "person" of Abstract Right.
Hegel begins his discussion of sovereignty by defining it as
the unity of universal and particular elements of the State.^3
"Particular" here refers to the specific political institutions of the
state - such as the legislature and the executive - and the activities
carried out by them and by others under their authority. The "Universal"
element is somewhat more difficult to conceptualize. Hegel refers to
it as the "substantial unity" of the state, or as the "ideality" of the
particular institutions of the state. In an effort to present this
concept more concretely Hegel employs a variety of metaphors which
attempt to portray the state as a living organism. Within a living
organism each part of the organism can only be understood in terms of
the organic whole. To separate a part from the whole and then attempt
to understand it in isolation inevitably results in abstraction and a
false understanding of both the part and the dynamic nature of the
organism which sustains it. By analogy, each political institution can
only be understood within the context of the political whole. The
substantial unity which is the universal moment in the state is that
which sustains each particular institution and binds each institution
to other institutions within a coherent political totality.
The organic metaphor, while useful, is limited and potentially
misleading, not least because of its "vitalistic" and "naturalistic"
implications. I believe it is more informative if we recall the
discussion in Chapter 1 of Absolute Knowledge. There I maintained that
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Absolute Knowledge is a knowledge of the entire structure of knowledge
and of the place that specific forms of knowledge occupy within that
structure. Those forms are correct within a limited range of objects
but are not complete in and for themselves. Within the hierarchic
structure of forms of knowledge as known by Absolute Knowledge each
form achieves a coherency which it is unable to achieve for itself.
Similarly, in the state each particular institution has
responsibility over a certain domain of political activity. Taken by
itself in isolation (in and for itself) each institution appears
abstract and partial. It is only within the totality of political life
that each political institution and activity achieves coherency. The
coherency results from its fulfilling its proper role within a
structured totality. This totality is not something separate from its
parts, from particular institutions. The particulars of political life,
analogous to the forms of knowledge in the Phenomenology, are united
ultimately within one coherent, structured totality. The universal
element in the state is the substantial unity, the abstract political
identity of the state, which can only be actualized through the
particular political institutions of the state.
Absolute Knowledge is the knowlege of the differentiated
structure of knowledge. The structure is ideal; we cannot point to one
form of knowledge among many and claim that it comprehends all the others
within it. The structure is one, but it is immediately differentiated
into all the forms of knowledge which are comprehended within it, for
if it were not so differentiated the structure would be empty and
meaningless; that is, it would not be the structure of any thing at
all. Sovereignty, like Absolute Knowledge, is a knowledge of the
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relation between the universal structure (substantial political unity)
and the parts (political institutions) which it comprehends within it.
The two moments cannot be separated if they are to be known concretely.
But the relation between universal and particular can only be grasped
ideally, whether in Absolute Knowledge as described in the Phenomenology
or in sovereignty as described in the Philosophy of Right. The true
sovereignty of a rational state is an ideal concept which is known by
the self-conscious citizen of that state.
This concept of sovereignty as the ideal unity of the diverse
moments in the political community is consistent with Hegel's philosophical
idealism, with the attempt by mind to penetrate the finitude of appearance
and to discover the infinite actuality which is its truth. Having said
this, it is all the more surprising to find Hegel backing down almost
immediately from this position. He writes that
"sovereignty, at first simply the thought of
this ideality, comes into existence only as
subjectivity sure of itself, as the will's
abstract and to that extent ungrounded self-
determination in which the finality of decision
is rooted. This is the strictly individual
aspect of the state, and in virtue of this
alone is the state one...this absolutely
decisive moment of the whole is not individuality
in general, but a single individual, the
monarch." (PR. No. 279).
Hegel here has moved in a new direction. He justifies himself
by arguing that "individuality in general" is too abstract a concept to
satisfy the demands of political life. We must move to concrete
individuality, and this he identifies in the person of the monarch. The
monarch, as the apex of the constitution, unifies all the apparently
disparate elements of the state in his person.
The illegitimacy of this move should be clear. We have not
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been discussing "individuality in general". As a logical concept
individuality is the proper study of the Science of Logic and it is
there that we can discover discussion of "individuality in general".
Throughout the Philosophy of Right the logical concept of individuality
has always been employed in the discussion of freedom. Far from being
of mere "general" interest, individuality has always referred to the
struggle to actualize human freedom. The true individual is nothing
other than the free citizen of a rational state. In the Phi 1osophy
of Right there is no "individuality in general" which can be separated
from the concept of the free man or, as we have come to see, of the
free citizen. The sovereignty which is the unity of all disparate
moments of political life, which is concrete individuality, exists only
in and through the self-consciousness of the free citizens of a rational
state.
Hegel's displacement of sovereignty to the person of the
monarch raises a serious problem to which he never properly addresses
himself. Before the introduction of the monarch in the Philosophy of
Right sovereignty was predicated of the rational constitution as a
whole. The sovereign unity of the constitution existed ideally for the
self-conscious citizen. Now, however, sovereignty exists physically in
the person of the monarch. Individuality exists in the monarch as an
individual and not in the thought of political unity.
At this point we can bring out the fundamental ambivalence of
Hegel's treatment of sovereignty. If sovereignty is predicated of the
constitution as a whole and exists concretely only in the thought of
its self-conscious citizens, then the monarch is only one moment in the
whole. Hegel could then argue that the monarch fulfills only a
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representational role. There would be constitutional limits to his
powers which, in effect, amount to no more than representing in his
person the ideal unity which is conceptually distinct from his person.
This appears to be Hegel's view when he discusses the monarch as the
person who "dots the i", whose power is formal and not substantive.
(PR. No. 281, Addition). If, on the other hand, sovereign individual¬
ity exists concretely in the monarch and is not merely represented by
him, then the relation between the whole and its parts is reversed.
The will of the individual monarch becomes the whole (unity) and the
other moments of the constitution - the legislature and the executive -
become its constituent moments. Hegel appears to support this view
when he writes of the.unity which exists in the person of the monarch
that "in this unity lies the actual unity of the state" (PR_. No. 281).
Note that he describes this as the actual unity and not as representative
of the actual unity.
Earlier in this chapter it was stated that the concept of
sovereignty is the predicated unity of the entire constitution. That
is, the whole is predicated of its parts. But that unity is dialectical
and so it is equally true to state that the parts are predicated of
the whole. Dialectical unity always signifies the dynamic inter¬
relationship of a whole and its parts.34 The dialectical concept of
unity becomes problematic for the second aspect of monarchical
sovereignty in which the parts must be predicable of the whole. If
the legislature and the executive are predicates of the sovereign will
of the monarch then what is their ultimate political status? Does
the monarch have the right, as actual sovereignty, to dictate to the
institutions? Can he reduce them to mere adjuncts to his will? These
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questions arise because of Hegel's identification of actual political
sovereignty with the will of the monarch. It is no good arguing that
the monarch probably would not act autocratically in a modern state,
for that makes the whole issue contingent on the character of the
monarch. Hegel's whole structure, developed laboriously in the pages
of the Philosophy of Right, is designed explicitly to banish such
contingency from political life. The monarch may not treat the
legislature and executive this way, but he certainly appears to have
the power to do so and, were he to do so, he would not infringe in
any way the political sovereignty of the state.
The question why Hegel displaces sovereignty in this way
may perhaps be answered by reference to the political environment in
which he wrote. His attempt to justify the existing political
institutions of his day has been discussed at length in the Hegel-
literature. For now, I wish to push this point no further. In the
next chapter I will raise the issue once more and, I hope, indicate
the more profound philosophical reasons for his doing so as well as
draw out the wider philosophical implications of the displacement for
his political philosophy as a whole.
Once Hegel has abandoned the rigorous logic of development
described in the Philosophy of Right he opens the gates to a flood of
silly "deductions" about monarchy. The most famous is Hegel's
demonstration of the rationality of the hereditary monarchy. The
monarch is a person, with an idiosyncratic character. But he is also
a monarch and, as a monarch he is majestic and dignified. There can
be no separation between the two; "this man" is immediately "the
monarch". A separation would create political uncertainty or, at
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least, scepticism about the majesty of the monarch. The identifica¬
tion of "this man" with "the monarch" is achieved immediately through
birth. Hereditary succession guarantees the immediacy of that
identification. It is possible that Hegel here is relying on the
force of his organic metaphors to carry the point. Also, it may
reinforce the notion that freedom is like a "second nature". Whatever
his inner thoughts, the deduction as stated is ludicrous. Further,
his appeals to the avoidance of possible factionalism and court
intriques about succession are based on contingent considerations and
wholly out of keeping with his expressed claim to stick rigidly to
the realm of rational necessity.
Hegel has almost nothing to say about the duties and
activities of the monarch.35 The monarch, as concrete individuality,
unifies in his person the two moments of universality and particularity
in the state. The constitution (i.e. the institutional structure)
and the laws of the state are, taken together, the universal moment,
while the current political "business" of the state, in its myriad
detail, is the particular moment. Hegel then attempts to describe
how each of these moments itself has a subjective and objective aspect.
Objectively, the universal moment is embodied in the existing
structures and laws of the state while subjectively it exists in the
conscience of the monarch. The particular moment requires a mediating
institution - the supreme council - for it to achieve objectivity.
The surpreme council consists of advisors appointed at the pleasure
of the monarch who advise him on the current concerns and affairs
(and their background) of the state. In this way, Hegel argues, the
affairs of state become objective. The particular moment finds its
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subjective embodiment in the final decision reached by the monarch
on items raised with him by his supreme council.
Hegel's efforts here strike me as a rather desparate attempt
to shore up his notion of the monarch as concrete individual by
trotting out the logical categories which are the proximate matter of the
logical category of individuality. His efforts raise many more questions
than they answer. For example, what does it mean to say that the
objectively universal structures and laws of the state find their
subjective embodiment in the conscience of the monarch? Does this
mean that the objective universality of the state exists only by the
will of the monarch and the monarch, knowing this to be the case, feels
morally obliged to act wisely and observe the dictates of his conscience
and not arbitrary desires? But as we saw in the section on Morality,
conscience itself can be arbitrary. Also, what if the monarch chooses
not to act morally and responsibly? Is there an institutional check on
monarchical wilfulness? Hegel has no answers to those questions.
Finally, the supreme council appears to fill a role which, as we shall see,
Hegel reserves for the legislature, viz. raising particular political
matters to the level of universality and objectivity. Is Hegel, in
effect, suggesting that the supreme council performs parallel to the
legislature? In that case, whose deliberations take precedence? Can
the monarch, on the advice of the council, disallow legislation or
direct that new legislation be passed? Hegel does not answer any
of those questions. His silence may rightly be taken as an indication
of the fundamental weaknesses of his description of the monarch as the
"actual unity" of the state.
The second major institution of the political community is
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theexectuive or civil service. Hegel describes the executive's role
as "subsuming the particular under the universal". (PR. No. 287).
This is accomplished in two ways. First, the executive is responsible
for translating legislation into action, for establishing the administra¬
tive machinery necessary for the efficient management of government
programs, and for applying universal laws and programs to the particular
cases which fall within their jurisdiction. Second, the executive
must supervise the activities of the more particularistic institutions
of civil society, such as the corporations, and ensure that they
harmonize their activities with the universal interests of the community
as a whole. This is not merely an advisory function, for the executive
is ultimately responsible for ratifying the appointment of corporation
officers. That is, members of a corporation may elect or otherwise
decide upon its officers, but final approval of those officers rests
with the executive of the state.
At first sight Hegel appears to be describing a very
authoritarian structure. But that view exaggerates the degree to which
Hegel allows political power to be centralized in the rational state.
With remarkable prescience Hegel describes in the section on the
executive the necessity of a competent, responsible bureaucracy for
the emerging, complex, modern nation-state. The modern state requires
a skilled bureaucracy to carry out legislative programs designed to
benefit the nation as a whole. This requirement demands a centralized
authority. But Hegel also seeks to balance the impetus to centraliza¬
tion in various ways. While corporation executives must be approved
by the central government, the wishes of the members of a corporation
are allowed expression through the corporate electoral process, and
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it follows that an executive must be very careful before it vetoes that
process. Ratification in most cases is probably more symbolic than any¬
thing else, serving to emphasize the importance of avoiding excessive
particularism in opposition to the wider interests of the state as a
whole.
Second, Hegel allows for local political officers to be
elected locally, in contrast to, for example, the Napoleonic practice of
centrally appointing local political officers such as mayors. (PR_. No.
290, Addition). Local politicians are vital to the smooth administration
of central programs. Lack of local cooperation can seriously hamper
even the most enlightened policies of the central government. Hegel
clearly intends that such cooperation be secured on the basis of
consultation and trust rather than insensitive coercion. But this means
that local politicians, who are much closer to the particular interests
and needs of their constituents, have influence over central policy.
Indeed, Hegel explicitly points to discretionary power of local officials
as a check to bureaucratic bungling. (PR. No. 295). He does not set
out the procedures which must be followed if bureaucratic incompetence
or arrogance are to be challenged, but presumably they would include
various mechanisms of appeal as well as, possibly, judicial hearings
in a court of law. There is certainly nothing in Hegel's analysis of
the executive which precludes in principle such appeals and checks on
executive power.
Finally we should note that the members of the executive
branch of government constitute the universal class described in civil
society. In his discussion of the executive Hegel also describes civil
servants as composing "the greater part of the middle class, the class
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in which the consciousness of right and the developed intelligence of
the mass of the people is found." (PR. No. 297). The mention of
class is not very illuminating. It appears it is by virtue of being
a member of the executive that a civil servant is a member of the
universal class, and not the other way around. Middle class is an
even more confused notion. Certainly Hegel does not mean that the
civil service must restrict its recruitment to members of an economic
middle class, since he explicitly argues that talent alone is the
proper criterion of entry into the civil service and talent is not
restricted as such to any one class. (PR. No. 291). Perhaps he means
that, in fact, most able people will be discovered within the middle
class. But middle class, as a separate class, was never mentioned in
the section on class divisions in civil society. I think it most
likely that Hegel here thinks of middle class in a primarily ethical
manner. Certainly the middle class lies economically between the self-
indulgent rich on the one side and the insufficiently educated and
culturally "deficient" poor on the other. But more importantly, the
members of Hegel's middle class are relatively free of the partic¬
ularistic notions inimical to good government. Although civil
servants are the greater part of the middle class, they are not its
entirety as is the case with the universal class. Presumably, Hegel
would include people such as teachers, doctors and other professionals
in his concept of middle class. The emphasis on "professional" is
underlined by Hegel's insistence on a trained and salaried civil
service. For Hegel, the term "middle class" denotes a public-
spirited vigour which is lacking elsewhere in society. This is a
traditional theme in political theory which can be traced back to
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Aristotle's discussion of "polity" as the best practicable constitu¬
tion for a polis.
The third major political institution is the legislature.
The legislature passes new laws and revises and extends old ones. In
general it is responsible for determining the positive laws for the state
as a whole. Its end, in the widest possible terms, is to provide for
the well-being and happiness of the citizens of the state. It is also
empowered to exact services from the citizens. This latter takes the
form primarily of tax levying although it could include military
conscription and public service of different sorts according to the
particular circumstances of the time.
In its primary function as a law-making body the legislature
must consider the views of as wide a section of the citizen body as
possible. It is for this reason that Hegel supports the idea of an
elected assembly (although, as we shall see, elections are held only
for the lower house). The public debates of the legislature serve to
bring out the views, not merely of the legislators, but of the sections
of the population which they represent.
This sounds straightforward enough, and seems to agree with
modern liberal-democratic thinking. But on the issue of representation
and public elections Hegel adds his own distinctive touch. The
legislature is bicameral. The upper house is composed of members of
the aristocratic landed class, similar to the British House of Lords
at one time. The lower house is composed of the elected representatives
of the business class. Each house fulfils a special role within Hegel's
constitutional scheme.
In the lower house the interests of the business class are
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represented. Members are elected indirectly through corporations,
special societies and similar organizations. It will be recalled
that such organizations belong, more properly, to civil society.
There Hegel had allocated to them the vital task of mediating
between the particular divergent interests of their members. As the
corporations, for example, overcome the differences between their
members they can begin to establish some points which are common to
all their members. This is a difficult task, but Hegel regards it as
essential to an ethical society, since rampant particularism is
inimical to public order and welfare. When it comes to the elections
to the legislature (lower house) of the representatives of the
business class Hegel seeks to preserve the achievements of the business
class. Therefore, he maintains that elections be held indirectly.
Legislative representatives stand for election within corporations or
similar societies and are elected to represent their corporations by
the membership alone of the corporation. There are no elections out¬
side those organizations; that is, there is no direct electoral appeal
to the voter qua citizen. Similarly, the citizen does not have a vote
except as a member of a corporation.
Indirect elections emphasize Hegel's concern to mediate the
particularity which is both the strength and the weakness of modern
bourgeois society. It is his belief that indirect elections through
the corporations will go a long way in this direction. Public debate
within the lower house will further this mediation since individual
representatives, representing different interests and perspectives,
will have to hammer out a consensus among themselves capable of becoming
state law. Hegel also insists that representatives, once elected,
are not expected to slavishly follow the demands of their respective
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electorates. The corporation votes for a man because it believes in
his ability and trusts his judgement. But he is also expected to
contribute to the legislative process and to the strength and vitality
of the state as a whole. When the interests of the state conflict
with the specific interests of his corporation, the good representative
must choose for the state and against his corporation. The public
debates of the legislature have value precisely because representatives
can learn other points of view and members can "deliberate in common
and reciprocally instruct and convince each other". (PR_. No. 309).
In this way Hegel seeks the transformation of the business
class from a purely economic class to a politically conscious one.
We can see this in his adoption of different terms. The business
class of civil society becomes an "estate" of political state. Estate
here has an explicit political sense in a way that class - at least
for Hegel - does not. But the political education of the business
class is not to be wholly trusted and it is for this reason that Hegel
introduces the upper legislative house. Members of the upper house
come from the land-owning class and take their seats through birth
and not through elections. Although Hegel is vague about the details,
it appears that this house serves as a check on the activities of the
lower one. Hegel's defense of the upper house is that its members
necessarily have more universal interests than members of the lower
one. He introduces several unconvincing arguments in support of this,
such as their closeness to nature and the fact that succession to a
seat through inheritance reaffirms the ethical notion of the family
in its immediate universality. This is nonsense, not least because
the immediate universality of the family is different from the
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universal interests of the rational state.
Hegel here appears to assume that universality has the same
content regardless of the context in which it appears and this
contradicts everything we have seen in the Philosophy of Right. The
occupational division of the legislature, on the basis of the division
between agricultural class and business class, is unfortunate. Much
more satisfactory would have been the allocation of some lower house
seats to agricultural representatives; the ensuing debates within the
lower house among all economic and productive sectors of the state
would represent the full range of interests. There are no rational
grounds for arguing that agricultural interests are a priori more
universal than business interests; it may be true to say that, in
some essential respects, they are quite different but this is a
considerable departure from Hegel's position. There is no simple
continuum from particularity to universality, along which the business
class can carry particular interests so far, at which point the
agricultural class steps in and ensures the journey's completion.
The true universal must result from the mediation of all interests -
including business and agricultural - and is not the property of any
one interest group. Also the members of a corporation are drawn from
all levels within the industry, labour as well as management.
Presumably all members have some say in electing representatives to the
lower house. For the agricultural labourer, however, there is no
similar role to play. The representatives of his class - if it
makes any sense at all to talk of landowner and peasant as members
of the same class - are not elected and so he is barred from any
political participation.
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There is one more point I would like to discuss in connec¬
tion with Hegel's analysis of the legislature. We have already
examined the mediative role of the legislature insofar as it mediates
among the particular interests of the business and agricultural
classes; the legislature also mediates between the "people" or the
"Many" on one side and the monarch and executive on the other. This
mediative role is not simply mechanical; Hegel constantly refers,
explicitly as well as implicitly, to the educative role of public
political and social institutions. In a rational state the coercive
power of political and social institutions rests on their explicit
rationality and not on their monopolization of physical power. The
universal interests of the state which are so essential to the
actualization of human freedom emerge through social and political
discourse and are recognized as necessary by an informed and involved
public, or citizen body.
This "education" of the public is not the sole preserve of
official social and political institutions. It is also carried on in
semi-official or completely unofficial ways. This "public sphere"36
is constituted by public discussion of social and political issues.
Such discussion may be carried on in the press or in public forums.
It certainly extends into the relatively private world of discussions
between acquaintances at work, during leisure time, in the work-place,
public house and private home. Through such discussion the public
becomes informed about and educated into the social and political
issues which are the concern of the state. The public sphere also
serves as a useful arena for the airing of differences and disputes
which ought to be the concern of elected representatives, the civil
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service and the monarch but which they may have been ignorant of or
thought unimportant.
Hegel defends the idea of a vigorous public sphere. He
argues for a free press and for the right to free speech. When, above,
I referred to "semi-official" modes of public discussion I had in
mind Hegel's strictures against absolute freedom of speech and press
comment. His strictures although established and administered by the
State, are remarkably liberal for the Prussia of his day. They include
laws against libel, slander, and incitement to protect both the freedom
of the individual from unwarranted persecution and the health of the
body politic which is poorly served by infringements of that sort.
Hegel is aware that such laws are abstract, but he adds that the
application of such laws, although potentially oppressive, is justified.
The judicious use of those laws depends on the degree of political
maturity attained by the ruling organs of the state as well as by the
citizen body.
Hegel's respect for and support of the public sphere is not
based on a respect for the actual content of contemporary public
opinion and debate. On the contrary, he states that it is usually
appallingly bad and ill-informed. Nevertheless, he defends its
expression, and justifies his defense in several ways. First, the
opinions may be bad, but they are genuinely held and deserve a
hearing. Second, the expression of opinions in public is educational.
The citizen is forced to examine his opinions when he chooses to make
them public, and this aids the refinement and articulation of opinion.
Third, the clash of opinions in the public sphere indicates the
complexity of social and political life and, if that complexity is
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understood correctly, leads to tolerance and respect for others. There
is no way to ensure that this will be the case; once again it is a
measure of political maturity and cannot be legislated. Fourth, the
public sphere works in two directions; private citizens may use it to
influence political decisions but politicians may also use it to
explain and defend their actions. This contributes to political
education and maturity, for it is no bad thing when elected represen¬
tatives feel obliged to defend themselves before an informed public.
Finally, a vigorous public sphere provides an outlet for the pent-up
frustrations of private citizens. Hegel is well aware of the need to
have access to a public forum and of the political consequences of
denying a public forum to the citizens. This is not a cynical view.
Hegel would be cynical if he believed that the social and political
order described in the Philosophy of Right served only a limited
interest group and therefore had to be foisted on a suffering
public. He has no such belief. Instead I think it is truer to say
that he genuinely believed in the educative role of the public sphere
and honestly welcomed its existence as a sign of political maturity.
Relations between States
After discussing the constitution of the state "on its
internal side" Hegel turns to the "external side" or the relations
between sovereign states. His general approach appears conventional
enough, and there is no need to examine his ideas in detail.
Although Hegel divides relations between state into two sections -
"sovereignty vis-a-vis foreign states" and "international law" - I
propose to treat the two sections together.
As a sovereign state, each state looks to its own national
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interests. Hegel believes it is right that a state operate in the
international sphere on the basis of "realpolitik" considerations
and not for the sake of abstract moral notions. A government is wise
to the extent that it furthers the particular interests of its own
state and people; there is no "universal providence" which determines
the actions of particular governments (PR. No. 337). This does not,
of course, mean that governments should act narrowly; a state's
long-range interests may be best served if certain short-term
advantages are foresaken. The skill available for determining the
genuine interests of the state is a measure of the political wisdom
of the leaders of the state.
Treaties and international agreements are negotiated and
concluded on the basis that all parties will benefit in some measure
from them. The parties to a treaty will continue to honour the terms
of the treaty if it is to their advantage to do so. The customs of a
nation will, to a considerable extent, influence its international
behaviour including whether it honours its treaties with other
countries. Despite the many attempts by the states to honour their
international commitments and behave peacefully and respectfully
towards other states, the international system does break down on
occasion.
Within a state there exists a system of laws which order
the activities of the citizens of that state. The laws are backed
up by the courts, the police, the penal system and, most importantly,
the recognition by the citizens that the laws are authoritative and
binding. A breach of the law brings down upon the wrong-doer the
entire system of justice and law enforcement. This, unfortunately,
is not the case in the sphere of relations between sovereign states.
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There is no one authoritative system for enforcing treaties and ensur¬
ing that states respect each other's sovereignty. Each state perceives
all other states as pursuing particular interests, and yet there is no
international authority capable of ensuring that those interests are
harmonized in some way. The situation is analogous to the "state of
nature" examined in Abstract Right; each state appears to all other
states as a national "personality" pursuing particular interests with
no absolute and authoritative institution to limit the pursuit of
particular interests to those areas where they do not adversely affect
the interests of other states. When the collision of interests of
competing states reaches a critical level, the only alternative to out¬
right capitulation by one state to the demands of its rival(s) is war.
Hegel's comments on war are, on the surface, not very remak-
able. He notes that, even in a war, states still retain some notion of
the statehood of the other parties to the conflict. This recognition
is found in the "rules of war" which forbid states, for example, to
wage war against civilians of the other state. Even at the height of
war, the parties to a conflict retain the possibility of securing a
peace and this implies the recognition that war is not an absolute end
in itself (PR. No. 338). Hegel also has a few comments to make on the
nature of courage; those comments should be understood in the context
of his remarks on patriotism discussed at the beginning of this
chapter. Although Hegel has been criticized for glorifying war his
comments, when viewed in the context of his times, are not terribly
37
outrageous or bloodthirsty.
There are, however, a few points in Hegel's discussion of
war which are confusing when compared to the general line of develop-
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merit described in the Philosophy of Right. In his discussion of war,
Hegel appears to drop all references to the rational state. Suddenly,
we are examining the international role of states (albeit, modern
nation-states) in general. There is no distinction made between the
international conduct (including the waging of war) of a rational and
a deficient state. This underlined by Hegel's belief that, in war, a
citizen rediscovers the substantial nature of his state; an attack on
the state is perceived as an attack against the substantive grounds
of his individual freedom. The citizen perceives the defense of the
state as a duty which must be met, even to the point of risking his
life for the sake of the state's defense and survival. Indeed, Hegel
takes this point about as far as possible; he argues that the
occasional war revives the spirit of a nation and, if wars do not
occur from time to time, the nation becomes corrupted as a result of
the 'ethical lethargy' induced by prolonged peace.
Hegel's thoughts on war appear almost conventional; historically,
wars have often been imbued with great ethical significance not only in
the sense of "just wars" against a terrible enemy but also as a means
of rediscovering the latent vitality of a nation. The comments are
remarkable, however, because they are so inconsistent with what Hegel
has already said about the rational state. As we have seen, an
essential moment of the rational state is the recognition of the state
as the substantial embodiment of human freedom. Is Hegel now saying
that the moment of recognition and, therefore, the rational actuality
itself of the state is transitory and requires occasional injections
of patriotism to revive it? When he speaks of the inevitable corruption
of prolonged peace is he referring to the corruption of the legislators,
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the civil servants, the monarch, the citizens? There is a fundamental
ambiguity in Hegel's discussion of war and it serves to bring out some
of the fundamental problems in Hegel's political philosophy. The next
chapter will critically examine those problems.
World History
The concluding section of the Philosophy of Right is titled
"World History", and it contains an extremely condensed version of
Hegel's philosophy of world history. In contrast to his section on war
and international relations, Hegel now is back firmly on the terrain of
Spirit's development and the actualization of freedom in the modern
rational state. Hegel presents a potted version of his four-fold
division of world history into historical realms - the Oriental, the
Greek, the Roman and the Germanic - corresponding to the major historical
stages of Spirit's development. The development is progressive and the
last stage - the Germanic realm - marks the actualization of Spirit.
Hegel here uses "state" in the sense discussed in chapter 6 of the thesis,
viz. as a totalizing form of human association.
I believe Hegel introduces world history at the conclusion of
the Philosophy of Right to demonstrate that his discussion of the rational
state is not abstract and Utopian. By connecting the rational state to
his philosophy of world history Hegel hopes to show that the rational
state is a historical actuality which must be understood within the
terms of philosophical world history. This is much more in the nature
of a reminder to his audience rather than a proof; Hegel is reminding
the reader of the arguments of his philosophy of world history in order
to maintain the connection between reason and history which he describes
therein. I reversed Hegel 's order in the Philosophy of Right because I
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thought it aided the examination of the arguments of the book. By dis¬
cussing the philosophy of world history before the state I hoped to
establish two main points: first, I wanted to give an outline of
Hegel's concept of Spirit in order to facilitate the comprehension of
the "spiritual" nature of the rational state and second, I wanted to
explain the potentially confusing transition from the abstract individ¬
ualism of Abstract Right and Morality to the spiritual collectivism of
Ethical Life. I believe my approach is justifiable and there is nothing







1. "Modern state" here refers to the Western European "liberal"
model which Hegel regarded as the zenith of rational develop¬
ment.
2. Hegel appears to reject Kant's description of desire as
necessarily heteronomous, although it is arguable that Kant
never intended his moral theory to be as severe as both his
critics and his followers sometimes make it.
3. See e.g. Plato, Gorqias, 517 B-C.
4. Aristotle, Politics, 1276 b 16 - 1277 b 33.
5. Aristotle, Politics, 1252 a 24 - 1253 a 38.
6. Hegel's term in German for the third stage of the Philosophy of
Right is "Die Sittlickeit" which is translated as "Ethical Life".
The distinction between die Sittlichkeit and das Sittliche
(although both are clearly connected to Sitte) is that the former
denotes a realm or a sphere of objective existence in which it is
possible to lead a rational (ethical) life while the latter denotes
the activity or conduct of an individual who is rational and lives
in a rational, objective sphere (the rational state). Although
both terms are translated by Knox as "ethical life" we should
bear in mind the different aspects of the English phrase.
7. We can, of course, refer to the "ethos" of a people but this
doesn't quite capture the customary nature of such beliefs nor does
it connect readily to "ethics", or the "ethical" since these latter
terms tend increasingly to refer to a special branch of knowledge.
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"Norm", or "normative", and "normal" may be closer to Hegel's
meaning but this would be stretching our common-sense under¬
standing of these terms. "Mores" and "morals" may be closest,
cf. Knox's note on paragraph 151.
8. We must not forget that Absolute Spirit - Art, Religion, and
Philosophy - lies beyond Objective Spirit. The problems this
raises will be discussed in the next chapter.
9. K.H. IIting, "The Structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" in
Pelczynski, op.cit. p. 98.
10. Aristotle, Politics , 1252 a 1-6.
11. Harry V. Jaffa, "Aristotle", History of Political Philosophy,
ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago, 1963), p. 68.
12. Aristotle, Politics, 1252 b 27 - 1253 a.
13. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094 a 1 - 16.
14. ibid, 1160 a 9 - 30.
15. Aristotle, Politics, 1261 a 10 - 1264 b 25.
16. Aside from the obvious monetary obligations enshrined in the
notion of contract, philosophers have tried to portray marriage
as a sexual contract. In this light, Hegel's insistence on
love as the true ethical basis of marriage was not as obvious
in his own time as it is in ours. On this point see the quotes
on marriage from Locke and Kant in IIting, art, cit. p. 94, n.9.
17. This includes his rather crude sexual stereotyping. The picture
of the rational man and the feeling, emotional woman, even though
we may reject it as outrageous, is not central to Hegel's arguments
concerning love, and can be hived off from the main line of
analysis.
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18. cf. PR^. #189 Remark. See also Paul Chamley, Economie Politique
et Philosophie chez Steuart et Hegel, (Paris, 1963) for a detailed
study of Steuart and Hegel. This work includes a very useful
study of the major impact made by Steuart's work (as well as
that of other Scottish economists) on German intellectual life.
Georg Lukacs, The Young Hegel (London, 1975) is an extensive treat¬
ment of the role political economy as a discipline played in the
formation of Hegel's thought.
19. We saw this most explicitly in the discussion of Kant's rejection
of heteronomous freedom, a rejection which Hegel applauded and
adopted. Also cf. PhG. pp 407-413; PhM. pp. 590-598.
20. cf. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1968), pp.
81-165 for an excellent treatment of classical natural right
theory.
21. Cases of civil disobedience need not involve natural law theory.
It is possible to accept the positivist view of law and then to
break a specific law with the intention of creating public
discussion about the justice or injustice of the law. The hope
here is that public pressure will force a change in the positive
1 aw.
22. See PR^. #3, Remark, cf. Hegel's remarks on English common law,
PR_. #211, Remark.
23. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1137 a 30 - 1138 a 5.
24. This does not conflict with the formula whereby freedom is the
concept which underlies all of objective life. The free, rational
life, in Hegel's view, requires a reasonable degree of material
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welfare. This idea is clearly Aristotelian and conflicts with
certain Stoic and Romantic notions of freedom. Therefore, civil
society, as one moment in the whole, can be regarded as informed
by material welfare which is itself one moment in the whole.
This demonstrates Hegel's intention, often misunderstood, to
develop a pluralistic view of objective life, i.e. to preserve
some measure of autonomy in principle for the various institutions
of the public realm.
25. See Knox's note on this term in his "translator's notes" to the
Philosophy of Right, p. 360, note 83.
26. See PR_. #244 and, especially, Hegel's "addition" to this paragraph.
27. See Shlomo Avineri, "Labor, Alienation, and Social Classes in
Hegel's Realphilosophie" as well as the comment on this article
by Otto Pdgeler in the Legacy of Hegel; Proceedings of the
Marquette Hegel Symposium 1970 (The Hague, 1973), pp. 196-220.
28. The standard work is Otto Gierke, op.cit. Section 18. cf. G.
Heiman, "The Sources and Significance of Hegel's Corporate
Doctrine", in Pelczynski (ed.) og_. cit., pp. 111-136. Heiman
correctly identifies the mediating role of the corporations.
He treats this in terms of the harsh division between private and
public law dating back to Roman law and sees this division
reflected in the modern philosophical opposition between
individual and society. I agree with all of this. My focus,
however, leads me to treat this division in the more abstract terms
of universal and particular, or objective and subjective.
29. See PhG. pp. 330-342; PhM.pp. 483-499. cf. Judith Shklar,
"Hegel's Phenomenology: an Elegy for Hellas" in Pelczynski, (ed.)
op.cit. pp. 73-90.
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30. PR. #258, Remark. Hegel here refers briefly to his famous
argument that the French Revolution represents the political
practice which follows upon Rousseau's theoretical principles,
even though the "terror" would have been abhorrent to Rousseau
himself. The main discussion of this point is in the PhG. pp.
413-423; PhM. pp. 599-610.
31. Z.A. Pelczynski makes this point in his essay "The Hegelian
Conception of the State" in Pelczynski, op.cit. pp. 1-30.
He does not, however, treat the question historically and I
think this makes the question of the relation of ethics (seen in
terms of freedom and self-consciousness) and politics more
problematic than if the two are treated together in terms of an
historical dialectic.
32. Hegel was uncharacteristically generous to Montesquieu in
acknowledging his intellectual debts. See e.g. PR_. #273, Remark.
33. See PR. #276-278.
34. This, of course, is reminiscent of Aristotle who always maintained
that the whole is logically prior to its parts although, in questions
concerning matters of political development it may arise temporally
after its parts have appeared.
35. My discussion of the role of the monarch is based on PR. #281-286.
36. I am using "public sphere" in the sense described by J. Habermas
in his works. I do not wish to engage in a long analysis of this
concept nor to point out my differences from Habermas' treatment.
I do believe the term is useful to indicate a level of mediation
between private, economic interest and the interests of the state
as a whole, a level which is not organized officially and yet
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exhibits its own dynamic structure. See J. Habermas, Strukturwandel
der Oeffentlichkeit (Neuwied, 1968). There exists an English
translation of an encyclopaedia article written by Habermas which
summarizes his views, "The Public Sphere", New German Critique
(Boston, 1974).
See S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge, 1972).




In the first seven chapters of this thesis I have been
concerned primarily with the exposition of Hegel's mature political
philosophy as contained in the Philosophy of Right. For the most part
I have suspended criticism of Hegel, although I realize the risks
involved in such a procedure. Although I am sympathetic to Hegel's
approach to political philosophy I believe it contains serious
problems - problems which Hegel never resolved. In this concluding
chapter I shall address myself to those problems.
Before embarking on this critical analysis I would like to
make a few brief, general remarks. I believe that Hegel's political
philosophy marks perhaps the single most profound attempt to develop a
philosophy of the modern nation-state. When I use the term "modern"
in this context I am relying implicitly on Hegel's understanding of the
term. Indeed, it is the philosophy of Hegel which has been so important
in formulating our concept of modernity. Without wishing to
recapitulate the Philosophy of Right I think it is important to review
some of the major themes which have dominated modern political history
and, in consequence, modern political philosophy.
I do not think it would be misleading to group most of these
important themes together under the general demand for a legal system
which secures the rights of the individual both with respect to other
individuals and to the social and political institutions of public life.
The demand for personal rights is articulated into an entire system of
demands which, taken together, constitute the modern concept of freedom.
Thus we talk of the right to worship as we please, to speak freely, to
assemble freely, to a reasonable standard of health and welfare.
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Despite the fact that the modern concept of the rights of the individual
may often be more honoured in the breach than the observance, we
cannot deny its force in the political movements of the modern age.
Similarly, the translation of the concept of rights into practice is
often the subject of heated controversy, even in nations where there is
a long-standing tradition of observance of individual rights. These
rights, whatever their specific details, must be regarded as rights
predicated of all men qua men if they are not be regarded merely as
privileges. In summary, it is the problem of the rights of the
individual, conceived in the broadest possible terms, which has dominated
modern political thought and action.'
Hegel clearly understood the importance of this fundamentally
modern issue. Not only is this reflected in the very title of his major
political work, but that work itself begins with an examination of the
concept of personal rights. But Hegel pushes his analysis much further
than any other political philosopher. He unites all the different notions
about personal rights into one universal demand, viz. the right to live a
free life. The universal demand provides the perspective from which he
can examine specific claims about the nature of right and determine whether
they advance the cause of human freedom or undermine it despite their good
intentions. I have examined Hegel's procedure in some detail and, I hope,
demonstrated the way in which he attempts to establish a coherent
philosophy of human freedom.
The concept of individual right is grounded on the idea of an
independant, rational individual. Hegel's analysis of the "atomistic"
individual demonstrates the inadequacy of this starting point, since any
subsequent attempts to develop a coherent political philosophy remain
trapped within the limits of atomistic individualism. We know from his
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earliest writings that Hegel was consistently opposed to the social
fragmentation which resulted from unrestrained individualism. In his
youth the German Romantic movement was marked by a yearning for a
renewal of the spiritual community, and the young Hegel shared many of
the Romantic aspirations. The usual touchstone of political Romanticism
was the ancient Greek polis, with its explicit ideals of the substantive
ethical community. Unlike his contemporaries, however, Hegel soon
recognized the illusory nature of such musings.^ The task for modern
philosophy, as Hegel conceived it, was not to point to some long-passed
ideal but rather to examine coolly the realities of the present age.
When Hegel finally reaches the stage of Ethical Life in the Philosophy
of Right he does so as a result of a rigorous examination of individualistic
philosophies of freedom. The ethical community is not merely posited in
opposition to alternative concepts of freedom; rather it emerges as the
conpletion of the quest first begun by those alternatives.
The analysis of individualisticphilosophies of human freedom
is one of Hegel's greatest achievements. So much of the criticism of
Hegel is based on a fundamental misreading of what he actually does in the
Philosophy of Right. To focus on Hegel's discussion of the state and
then to abstract out of that discussion some of his more hyperbolic
statements about the majesty or power or divinity of the state is to do
Hegel less than justice. I believe that my approach to Hegel's political
philosophy avoids the errors inherent in such an approach. I believe
that Hegel's critical analysis of atomistic or abstract individualism
is correct in its general outlines. Further, I think Hegel consistently
sticks to his stated intention of explicating a coherent philosophy of
human freedom and that the demand for this coherency justifies his
analysis of the rational community as the true locus of human freedom.
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if Hegel is "anti-1iberal" it is because his analysis of the pre¬
suppositions of liberalism (understood in its classical sense) dem¬
onstrates that the developed political philosophy of liberalism is
inadequate to its stated claim to be a philosophy of human freedom.
Finally, a careful reading of what Hegel actually says reveals that,
even in his description of the constitutional powers of the rational
state, he is very far from being a philosopher of political
authoritarianism, much less of fascism or totalitarianism.
Despite his great achievements, I believe Hegel ultimately
fails to accomplish the task he set himself. His failure results more
from the general thrust of his analysis than from specific defects
although there are many contentious points in the Philosophy of Right.
For example, a Locke scholar might argue that Hegel's analysis of
contract theory does not really apply to Locke's notion of a fiduciary
trust. Even if it could be shown to apply to Locke the portrait of
contract theory is, it might be argued, little more than a caricature.
Arguments such as this could occur over almost every paragraph of the
Philosophy of Right. If I have not taken sufficient account of the
possible objections to Hegel on every point then I can only offer the
excuse that my primary objective was to explicate Hegel's rather dense
and compact text. To have played the devil's advocate would have added
greatly to what is already a long thesis. I must also add that possible
counter-arguments to Hegel were considered by me and, after considering
them, I still believe that Hegel's main points are correct in their
essential features - at least with respect to his sections on Abstract
Right and Morality.
The correctness of Hegel's analysis of Ethical Life, however,
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is far more dubious. One immediately thinks of his tortured "deduction"
of constitutional monarchy, of an upper legislative house constituted
by heredity alone, and primogeniture. Hegel is not saved by referring
to modern constitutional monarchies which are some of the most stable
and mature political orders of our age. Hegel manifestly fails to
demonstrate clearly the logical reasons for this historical fact, although
he may be admired for identifying constitutional monarchy as a potentially
stable form of government. Further, the style of monarchy which Hegel
advocates can be seen to bear little relation to the constitutional
monarchies of the present, although that view may be unfair to Hegel.
More disastrous for Hegel, however, is his portrayal of the
rational state as a sphere of harmonized interests smoothly working
together in an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect. To accomplish
this end Hegel erects a hierarchy of corporations, public authorities,
political institutions, a civil service and so on, all intended to curb
the anarchy of unrestrained pursuit of personal wealth. But that entire
edifice is based on his naive analysis of classes in civil society, an
analysis which is most charitably described as wishful thinking. In
particular, his grouping together of capitalists and industrial workers
in one class is farfetched. We need not subscribe to the Marxist analysis
of classes and class warfare to accept a very real division of interest
between those two major industrial groups. Nor can we simply adapt
Hegel's analysis to incorporate the view of a class division between
capitalist and worker in an effort to retain the rest of the mediating
structure. Hegel's notion of harmony within corporations requires a
prior harmony between the capitalists and workers within an industry
which together constitute a corporation. In turn, the elected
representative of a corporation must, if he is to fulfil Hegel's
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expectations, represent fairly the interests of all the members of his
corporation. Ultimately the lower house of the legislature must seek
to harmonize the interests of the various corporations of civil society.
This possibility is greatly enhanced by Hegel's neglect of perhaps the
most important division within civil society, viz. that between
capitalists and workers. Indeed Hegel does not even address this problem
since he abolishes it by means of his definition of classes according to
economic sector rather than relation to the means of production. We
might also add here Hegel's naive assessment of the "classlessness" of
the rational bureaucrat. Although he admits that civil servants will
be drawn primarily from the middle class (a new term since, heretofore,
we have not met with a "middle class" in civil society) nevertheless he
feels that their training and the demands of their job will ensure the
even-handedness and universality which demonstrates their freedom from
any particular class bias. This is only possible if we accept Hegel's
prior definition of class and class interest since he ignores questions
of class conflict over the distribution of wealth.
There are other points in Hegel's analysis which are equally
suspect. I certainly would not want to argue that the general thrust of
Hegel's discussion of Ethical Life can withstand such detailed criticism.
Nevertheless, I do not wish to engage in this type of point-by-point
critical enterprise. Hegel's masking of the very real divisions of
modern bourgeois society is well known and documented. To date, perhaps
the most imposing and influential detailed criticism of Hegel is Karl
Marx's Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', written in 1843. I
agree with many of the arguments Marx raises against Hegel, and I have
no desire to reproduce those arguments here. Further, Marx's critique
has generated a huge secondary literature which analyzes Marx's critique
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both in terms of Hegel's political theory and in terms of its role
in the development of Marx's own thought. I do not wish to add to
this literature.
There is one point, however, which I would like to raise in
connection with Marx's critique. I believe Marx is very successful in
revealing the contortions which Hegel undergoes in order to "deduce"
some of his more obviously dubious points. I also believe Marx is
essentially correct in his wider claims that Hegel's rational state is
an ideal construction which only serves to obfuscate the irrationality of
the economic system. Finally, I agree in general with Marx's statement
that Hegel correctly perceived the necessity of a strong, coercive
centralized political state to maintain an essentially anarchic economic
system. Those last two claims do not necessarily impute to Hegel any
"bad faith" or self-conscious ideological mystification; despite Marx's
vituperative language he always regarded Hegel as a genuine philosopher
and never as a mere ideologue or apologist. Hegel, more than most, saw
clearly the divisive elements of bourgeois economic activity; unlike
Marx, however, he believed those elements could be controlled in a
rational state without having to abolish the economic system itself.
Despite my general appreciation of Marx's critique I believe
it fails to address itself to some of the most important and fundamental
questions which arise from a close reading of the Philosophy of Right.
Marx successfully explodes the universal claims of Hegel and demonstrates
the overwhelmingly bourgeois bias of Hegel's state. From this analysis
of Hegel's state it is but a short step for Marx to the searing condemna¬
tion of all coercive political authority as, ultimately, class-based.
This second step is usually singled out as decisive in Marx's intellectual
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development from radical democrat to communist revolutionary. I do
not wish to attack Marx himself for what I think are serious defects
in his analysis. Rather I wish to develop my own critique of Hegel's
political theory. In doing so I will, by implication if not explicitly,
criticize Marx's view of Hegel as well as his perception of the status
of political theory in general. I have invoked Marx primarily to
indicate the existence of a detailed critique of particular points in
the Philosophy of Right and, thereby, avoid having to write such a
critique myself. Secondarily, I think Marx's critique is significant
because, as I hope to show, it demonstrates the dangers of reading Hegel
in a too narrow sense, viz. as the ultimate philosopher of bourgeois
society. I believe that my own line of attack examines more fundamental
problems - problems which continue to trouble political philosophy.
Let us begin with the most obvious weak point in Hegel's
hierarchical chain of political forms, viz. his attempts to overcome the
defects of civil society through explicitly rational political structures.
Hegel, more than most of his contemporaries, recognized the profound
challenge posed by bourgeois society to the traditional concerns of
political theory. It was not merely that bourgeois society could unleash
anarchic socially fragmenting forces; bourgeois political economy
challenged directly the expressed goals of rational public political
activity. Since its origins in classical Greek thought, political
theory has been concerned with the idea of a unique public realm which
could not be reduced to any other sphere, whether theological or otherwise.
Challenges to this idea of a public realm were usually based on either
contingent circumstances or rival concepts of the source of public
authority, such as the church. But now, with bourgeois political economy,
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the public realm is challenged by the economic sphere of material
production. The political economists argue that the economic sphere
has reached a stage of development where it could function most
efficiently and beneficially if it is left alone by the public,
political sphere.
We should not underestimate the seriousness of this challenge.
Hegel, as I have noted before, was consistently attracted by the idea
of a substantive public realm in which meaningful political discussion
could be held and important political decisions affecting the community
as a whole could be reached. Bourgeois political economists in Hegel's day
did not argue that polticians should be replaced by economists, or any¬
thing else similarly trivial: they maintained that the traditional
concerns of good government - great wealth for the nation as a whole as
well as adequate material welfare for all its citizens - could be best
achieved if the forces of a market economy were allowed to proceed
unchecked by political activity. Public institutions should restrict
their activities to the protection of the private property of individual
citizens and to the protection of the nation as a whole from its external
enemies. The economic sphere was considered substantive while the
traditional political sphere became contingent on the existence of the
enemies of private property within the nation and of foreign enemies
outside it.
In opposition to the complex classical notion that man's
highest capacity„. for rationality was actualized through participation
in the public political life of the nation, the new bourgeois political
economists posited the relatively simple idea that nationality was best
expressed in the maximization of personal welfare in a free market
- 370 -
economy. Political activity is rational only to the extent that it
serves and facilitates the smooth functioning of the market. This
underlines the essentially modern view that politics is essentially
subsidiary to economics. The ends of political activity except in times
of crisis, are determined by the demands of economic prosperity, develop¬
ment, trade,and so forth.
We know that Hegel rejects this challenge to the public realm.
We might, reasonably, ask why he does so. We know that he steadfastly
refuses to indulge himself with Romantic yearnings for a bygone age. Is
he merely trying to fuse certain Romantic notions about the classical
age with the harsh realities of his own?
I think the answer to this question is best discovered by
recalling the discussion of Kant's moral theory in Chapter 5 of the
thesis. There I outlined Kant's analysis of material and formal principles
of freedom and of heteronomous and autonomous modes of freedom which
follow upon the prior distinction. I also pointed out that Hegel agreed
with Kant's attack on material principles and heteronomous activity as
inadequate to a true concept of freedom. Hegel's agreement on those
points can be separated from his attack on Kant's concept of autonomous
activity. Hegel's analysis of Ethical Life can be read as an attempt
to supplant Kant's concept of autonomous activity with a more concrete
concept. Hegel's entire philosophical system is directed against
contingency. The Philosophy of Right sets out to describe the Idea of
freedom as a rational necessity for all men. Like Kant, Hegel could
not rest content with a notion of freedom which was contingent on
subjective caprice and which differed from one person to another accord¬
ing to personal inclination.
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It was precisely this idea of autonomy, of a rational
objective freedom predicated equally of all rational men, that the
new political economists challenged. They argued that freedom consists
in allowing people to do as they wish within certain wide limits, such
as respect for the private property of other persons. If a man wishes
to be wealthy, and is capable of realizing his ambition, then it is no
business of ours to dissuade him or otherwise prevent him from doing so.
Equally, if a man chooses to live modestly, then we should allow him to
do so. Relying on the empirical fact that most people choose to maximize
their material welfare, they established the scientific study of
economics. Thus they pointed to the heteronomous activity of the free
market society as the true locus of freedom, and denied the possibility
of establishing a positive and rationally obligating set of constraints
which advance the cause of freedom. Bourgeois political economy, there¬
fore, does not merely passively study economic life or describe a mode
of activity which is egoistic and, hence, potentially in conflict with
communal interests; rather it sets out, in very clear and comprehensible
terms, a system of freedom grounded in the heteronomous activity of a
free market society.
Hegel could not let such a challenge go unanswered. What is interest¬
ing is the way in which he tries to meet it. We have already seen how
Hegel regards the political community as the locus of individual self-
consciousness. We have also examined his analysis of individualistic
theories and his efforts to demonstrate that even the most atomistic
theories ultimately point to the necessity of a positively ordered,
rational community. Despite this, however, he at no time even considers
the possibility of overthrowing the bourgeois mode of economic activity
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in favour of an economic system less antagonistic to explicitly public
and communal concerns.
There are various possible explanations for why Hegel chose to
follow the course that he did. One, which is perhaps most satisfying to
modern commentators who have read Marx and yet retain sympathy for Hegel,
is that Hegel did not point to an alternative economic system because he
had no concrete examples before him of such a system. By implication,
had Hegel the opportunity to investigate a "better" system he would have
seized it. While there may be some truth to this view of Hegel resign¬
ing himself to an unsavoury "given", I think it ignores several important
points. First, Hegel like so many of his generation, witnessed the
genuinely liberating effects of the bourgeois revolution in Europe. The
fetters of the old aristocratic social and political system were being
shattered for all time. The general level of productivity was rising
at an astounding rate. The "wealth of the nation" was increasing
rapidly. (Of course, Hegel did not turn a blind eye to its defects, as
we know from his section on the police.) Second, Hegel defends the
principle of private property absolutely. He even sought, as we have
seen, to ground it ontologically. In his defense, Hegel sought to
protect private property and not unlimited wealth; the two can be
distinguished.^ In short, I believe Hegel defends the bourgeois economic
system because of what he sees to be its great merits rather than out of
a sense of resignation.
Rather than call for its overthrow, Hegel seeks to "civilize"
the new economic order. By means of the corporations and the indirect
election of representatives of the business class (the quintessential
class - capitalist and worker together - of bourgeois society) Hegel
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hoped to educate the bourgeois beyond his own egoistic concerns to the
wider concerns of the community as a whole. In this way he hoped to
preserve the achievements of bourgeois economic activity while overcom¬
ing its obvious (to him) defects. But Hegel's attempt is, I believe, a
failure.
Not only are the interests of the community wider than those
of the individual bourgeois but also they are (for Hegel) different in
kind. That is, Hegel sees the public political realm as a substantive
ethical realm which differs in principle from the economic one.
"If the state is confused with civil society, and
if its specific end is laid down as the security
and protection of property and personal freedom,
then the interests of the individuals as such
become the ultimate end of their association,
and it follows that membership of the state is
something optional. But the state's relation to
the individual is quite different from this. Since
the state is mind objectified, it is only as one
of its members that the individual himself has
objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical
life. Unification pure and simple is the true
content and aim of the individual, and the
individual's destiny is the living of a universal
life. His particular satisfaction, activity, and mode
of conduct have this substantive and universally
valid life as their starting point and their result."
(PR. No. 258, Remark.)
This supports my contention that Hegel intended to enforce a
sharp distinction between the principles of civil society and the state.
But his intention is never realized. The bourgeois becomes a corporation
member because he realizes that it will, in the long run, further his
own particular interests. He does not join because he desires the fellow¬
ship and quasi-spiritual community feeling of the corporation. If he
finds such things and enjoys them, so much the better for him, but they are
only of secondary importance. This is underlined by Hegel's electoral
system. Elected representatives are elected precisely because they are
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pledged to protect the interests of their corporation. A representative
who neglects his corporation's interests will not remain a represen¬
tative for long. What is especially fascinating here is that Hegel makes
the elected representative more narrowly bourgeois than need be. Indirect
elections through corporations ensure that representatives vote as
corporation members only. Now, a corporation is founded because it
serves the economic interests of its members. In other words, it is
only as materialistic Homo Economicus that a man counts as a voter. Hegel
does not consider the possibility that a man may have other interests
which, on balance, outweigh his concern for his material welfare. A
man's interest may be divided between his direct economic interests and
his interest in education policy, town planning, art or something else
which he considers more important to him than simple advancement of his
material interests. Rather than educate the bourgeois beyond his narrow
interests, indirect elections tie him even more closely to them than
direct elections would.
Hegel here is guilty of the same error as that for which he
faults Rousseau. He argues that Rousseau mistook what is "common" for
what is genuinely universal in his concept of the general will.4 But
here Hegel is doing the same thing. The lower legislative house enacts
legislation after consideration of the differing points of view expressed
by its members. But the members, as we have seen, represent explicitly
bourgeois, materialistic interests. The political process does not
produce a new set of values grounded on different principles; rather it
produces a consensus among the representatives whose primary aim is the
material welfare of the members of their respective corporations. When
Hegel talks of how, in the legislature the particular is raised to the
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universal he is, at best, self-deceived. There is no genuine universal
in the sense described in the passage quoted above. The specific end
of this state, except for times of national crisis, is precisely the
"security and protection of property". The legislature seeks, to the
extent possible, to protect the common interests of all its members.
Similarly, Hegel's invocation of the aristocratic upper house
as a (universal) check on the activity of the lower house is ill-
considered. The land-owning class does not represent more universal
interests as such than the bourgeoisie. Hegel presents the two classes
as being, somehow, on the same continuum from particular to universal,
with the agricultural class a little further along towards universality.
In truth, the land-owners have different interests, based on different
principles than those which underlie the activity of the bourgeoisie.
If Hegel wants to set them in some form of legislative opposition, that
is fine. But he should do so on the grounds of protecting agricultural
interests, and not on the pretense that the agricultural class in some
ways has greater insight into the real, universal interests of the business
class than the bourgeoisie themselves do. If, in fact, the agricultural
class and the business class merely bring different perspectives on
fundamentally similar issues, then Hegel would have been far wiser to
include elected representatives of the agricultural class in the lower
legislative house.
I believe it is important to understand Hegel's positive
attitude towards the achievements of bourgeois society. But even if
this belief is allowed to stand, it does not explain away the various
contortions Hegel undergoes in his description of the state. I believe
we must look further afield if we are to understand the disturbing features
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of Hegel's analysis. In describing what I take to be the source of
much of the confusion I will, by implication, deny the frequently
raised charge that Hegel was merely attempting to rationalize an
irrational system because it was politically expedient for him to do so.
Not only do I think that there are sufficient examples in Hegel's work
which successfully refute that charge^ but I also believe my interpreta¬
tion is both more satisfactory and has wider consequences for political
theory in general.
In the first chapter of the thesis I discussed Hegel's efforts
to describe a complete and coherent system of knowledge. We can properly
describe Absolute Knowledge as Hegel's attempt to close out the search
for complete and coherent philosophical self-knowledge. The Hegelian wise
man is completely self-conscious in Hegel's sense of the term. We also
saw, in the chapter on history and Spirit, that Hegel believes it is
possible to demonstrate the same order of development in the actual,
historical world, viz. an end to the historical progress towards a
rational state in which freedom is actualized.
Examination of Hegel's mature philosophical works indicates an
incessant drive towards completeness; this is certainly true of the
Philosophy of Right. When Hegel describes the state, in its widest
possible ethical sense, as the Idea of freedom we must not ignore the
tremendous implications of this statement. As with Absolute Knowledge,
the Idea of freedom can tolerate no remainder, no "yes but...". Hegel
means nothing less than that, in the rational state, freedom is actualized.
Man has achieved his destiny which, historically, has always remained but
a potentiality. In Ethical Life Hegel sets himself the task of describ¬
ing the complete and coherent social and political order in which the
concept of freedom is actualized as the living Idea of freedom.
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I have frequently referred to Hegel's use of the logical
concepts of universal, particular and individual. In his treatment of
syllogistic reasoning Hegel treats the different forms of syllogism as
more or less adequate attempts to grasp those three logical concepts
concretely.6 In the Philosophy of Right those logical concepts find
their expression in the political concepts of: 1) the state, government
and positive law (universal); 2) the particular needs and capacities of
the individuals within the community (particular); and 3) the free active
will of the self-conscious, rational citizen (individual).7 The free,
self-conscious rational citizen is the embodied unity of the two prior
moments. We should not think of this in mechanical terms, since all
three terms inter-relate and, in their truth, are seen to presuppose the
others. The free citizen of a rational state is a differentiated totality,
a unity in which difference find its place without either losing itself
in an unmediated, abstract unity or destroying the mediated unity which
is its ground.
The task of the philosopher, according to Hegel, is to penetrate
the world of appearances and lay bare the ideal structure which is its
ultimate truth. I have already discussed in an earlier chapter the relation
between actual historical development and the revelation of the truth by
philosophy. Hegel, therefore, seeks to reveal the rational truth which
is contained in the historical present. He writes:
"The teaching of the concept, which is also
history's inescapable lesson, is that it is
only when actuality is mature that the ideal
first appears over against the real and that
the ideal apprehends this same real world in
its substance and builds it up for itself
into the shape of an intellectual realm."
(PR. Preface.)
It is through the labour of philosophy that the "ideal first appears".
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Not only does Hegel maintain this but he also argues, as we have seen
that his unique position within the history of the world (and of the
history of Philosophy) allows him to bring the entire development of
Spirit in history to completion. This is not due to a special act of will
on Hegel's part but rather on a sober analysis of real history.
The "ideal" which lies within the reality of Western European
civilization in the early 19th century is the completed Idea of freedom.
Hegel, the philosopher who comprehends this in its absoluteness, reveals
the ideal in his philosophical writings. If the idea is present in the
real, and if it only awaits the revelation of its presence by the
philosopher, then Hegel must do so without altering the basic political
and cultural structures before him. The revelation of the ideal by the
philosopher allows the audience for philosophy to view these real
structures through new eyes. But the recognition of the ideal in the
present does not alter the objective structure of the present; it only
allows us to see that which is already present within it. It is the
task of the philosopher to open our eyes to this latent presence. Hegel
must demonstrate, within the political structures of his time, the presence
of the completed Idea of freedom.
If freedom is properly predicated only of the concrete
individual, then the Philosophy of Right presents the development from
abstract conceptions of individuality to free individuality. Hegel's
analysis of the problem of freedom^ points to the necessity of a
rationally organized community if freedom is to be actualized. The
famous master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology is perhaps the most
notable setting for this problem. The ultimate resolution of the
problem examined in the master-slave dialectic consists in the
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philosophical statement that the freedom of the self is only possible
in and through the explicit recognition of the self as free by an
"other" who is recognized by the self as free. The full consequence of
this dialectic is that true freedom is only possible in a rationally
organized community of free men. To be truly free, man must be a citizen
of a rational community in which all men are free.
Against this background it is all the more surprising to follow
Hegel's actual procedure in the Philosophy of Right. He presents the
state as the final unity of universal, particular and individual. But
each of those concepts is represented by a constitutionally secured
political institution. Universality, particularity and individuality no
longer are embodied in the forms we have examined in the Philosophy of
Right; they now exist only as specific political institutions.
We can understand this "switch" better if we examine Hegel's
analysis of monarchy. I have already expressed my dismay over Hegel's
clumsiness on this subject. But there is a very significant consequence
of Hegel's discussion of monarchy. Throughout the Philosophy of Right
genuine individuality points towards the concept of the free citizen.
But in his section on the state, Hegel describes the monarch as the true
individual, the living embodiment of the rationality of the political
community. Individuality is no longer predicated of the free citizen
but of the monarch. If freedom is properly predicated only of concrete
individuality, then the monarch alone is free. The idea of the free
citizen has been supplanted by the idea of the monarch embodying in
his majesty the political freedom of the state.
The citizen of Hegel's state is not, in and for himself, free.
True freedom exists only in the majesty of the monarch. But this renders
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impossible the mutual recognition among self-conscious free men which
Hegel advances as the resolution to the problem posed in the master-
slave dialectic. Indeed, in a subtle way, it brings us back to the
problem of the relation of master and slave. The citizen is not a
concrete individual, a free man; rather he looks to the monarch as the
true individual, as the living embodiment of his (the citizen's)
potential or implicit freedom. As in the example of the slave, the
citizen must look beyond himself to an "other" (the monarch, the master)
to discover the freedom which ought to be his.
Three possible ways out of this problem may be advanced by
Hegel's defenders. The first is that the monarch only represents
individuality; that is, he is only a figure-head for the true individuality
of his citizens. I do not think this explanation will work. In the discu¬
ssion of sovereignty I raised the ambivalence inherent in Hegel's treat¬
ment of the monarch as both the representative of political sovereignty
and its substantial embodiment. At best, I think we can agree that the
same ambivalence is present in his description of the monarch as living
individuality. Even if we grant that the monarch only represents
individuality it still does not let Hegel off the hook. We still have
the right to demand why such representation is necessary. If all the
citizens are themselves embodiments of concrete individuality, then
it is difficult to see why they would need to have this individuality
represented for them in an other (the monarch). Since individuality, as
the unity of universal and particular, presupposes self-consciousness,
then the self-conscious citizen who knows himself to be free does not
require his freedom to be represented for him. Such representation in
no way enhances his sense of freedom and, indeed, may plausibly be
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regarded as offensive to it.
The second line of defense could argue that the political
constitution - the monarch, the executive and the legislature - together
embody the universal moment in the totality of Ethical Life. The monarch,
therefore, embodies only the integrity of this differentiated universal.
This might appear to gain supoort from Hegel's contention that each term
in his logic - universal, particular and individual - contains within
itself the other two. I do not think this defense works either. If the
political institutions of the state taken together only constitute the
moment of universality, then we must look for a similarly developed
moment of particularity as its opposite moment. This is nowhere to be
found. It could, perhaps, be argued that civil society is the moment
of particularity, since Hegel frequently refers to it as the sphere of
particularity. But in our discussion of civil society we saw that the
dialectic of civil society points beyond itself precisely because it is
unstable. The unity of the state - embodied in the individuality of the
monarch - is a stable one; there is no corresponding stability in civil
society. If the monarch represents the unity of the universality
(limited) of the executive and the particularity (limited) of the
legislature, then a similar unity must be present in civil society if
the argument is to work. The most universal moment in civil society is
the corporation, although this is only a posited universality. The
moment of particularity is the single bourgeois. The member of the
corporation is the only possible individual of civil society who mediates
the two antecedent moments, thereby embodying the integrity of civil
society (as the moment of particularity within the whole).
The notion of the corporation member as the mediated unity of
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the antecedent moments of universal and particular is unsatisfying. In
the state the monarch is a distinct moment and is not reducible to either
the executive (universal) or the legislature (particular). In contrast,
the corporation member is reducible to the single bourgeois. As I
pointed out earlier, membership in the corporation does not entail the
abandonment of particular interests; rather it demonstrates the fact that
the bourgeois must join a corporation if his particular interests are to
be satisfied. What is abandoned is his former reliance on himself as
the sole agent necessary for the realization of his own particular
interests. He now realizes he must join the corporation to be success¬
ful, even if that entails a partial alteration and modification of
some of his particular needs and interests. (In this sense, Hegel's
corporations accord more closely with the tenets of liberal contract
theory than does the state.) For that reason, it is not really possible
to regard the corporation member as a distinct third moment (individuality)
in civil society. Also, that notion of individuality ignores completely
the other two classes of civil society. While Hegel states each class
has its own moment of universality the universal content of each class
is different: 1) the posited universality of the corporation (business
class); 2) the immediate universality of the family and the rhythms
of nature (agricultural class); 3) the explicit universality of the aims
of the state (class of civil servants). The other two classes similar
to the business class, must be capable of producing persons who, like
the corporation member, embody the individuality of their respective
classes. Hence we get three different embodiments of individuality in
civil society ranged against the single embodiment of individuality in
the state - the monarch. If the free, self-conscious citizen is the
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ultimate unity of the two antecedent moments of state and civil society,
must we then accept the notion that there are three distinct kinds of
rational and free citizen, corresponding to the three distinct individ¬
uals of civil society? I believe this conclusion is inconsistent with
the principles which Hegel defends throughout his mature philosophical works.
The attempt to save Hegel by this argument raises more problems than it
resolves.
Finally, there is no third stage beyond the state in the
Philosophy of Right which embodies the unity of the two prior moments -
universality (the state) and particularity (civil society). Such a
moment - the moment of genuine individuality - would be necessary if the
argument presented here in Hegel's defense were to stand.
The third line of defense argues that the state is the mediated
unity of its two antecedent moments - the family and civil society - and
that unity is embodied in the person of the monarch. The family (universal)
and civil society (particular) are both raised to a higher level in the
state which is their unity. In the state universality and particularity
appear in the form of the executive and the legislature respectively.
This explanation, however, amounts to sleight-of-hand. The two antecedent
moments, if we are to regard them as somehow transformed in the state,
must retain some connection to their new political form. The family as
an immediately universal institution is the central point in Hegel's
discussion of the family, while the bourgeois is the central point in
Hegel's discussion of civil society. When we turn to the state we see
that both antecedent moments are represented - albeit in a different
form - in the one institution of the legislature; the interests most
closely connected to the immediate universality of the family are
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represented by the hereditary peers of the upper house, while the
interests of the bourgeois are represented by the indirectly elected
representatives of the corporations. The executive - although composed
of members of the universal (civil service) class first introduced
in civil society - in truth comes from out of nowhere. Hegel
introduces the universal class in civil society, but it is not really
of civil society and cannot be regarded as representing in a new form
interests which were first introduced in the family or civil society.
Further, in the family and civil society true individuality
(free, rational self-consciousness) is impossible because of the
abstractness of each stage. The child can only escape the abstract
universality of the family when it becomes an adult with particular needs
and interests. The bourgeois only moves beyond abstract particularity
when he realizes that there is no necessary conflict between his
particular material welfare and the material welfare of other members
of the community. The family member and the bourgeois each develops
towards greater self-consciousness but cannot become fully self-conscious
(a rational and free individual) within the limits imposed by the concept
of the family and civil society. When we turn to the state, however,
the "incomplete" family member or bourgeois has disappeared; there is
no longer a (limited) individual actor whose progress to complete self-
consciousness and freedom we can follow. Instead, the only individual
is the monarch. The attempt to save Hegel by describing the state as the
mediated unity of the family and civil society fails because the actors
in the antecedent stages have disappeared and only the monarch is left at
the end. We are back to the original problematic which the three "lines
of defense" were to resolve.
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It is possible to argue that Hegel is simply careless about
individuality and that had he reconsidered the problem of individuality
more carefully he would have treated it quite differently. I think
this is misleading. It credits Hegel with sufficient insight to grasp
that the logical conclusion of his analysis was the radical reform (at
least) of the political institutions of his time. I do not think
Hegel, by temperment as well as by philosophical conviction, would have
been able to do such a thing. It conflicts with his adamant statements
that philosophy has no prescriptive role to play in human affairs.9 It
also denies Hegel the opportunity to complete the history of political
philosophy, of bringing to a close the historical project to discover
the final, rational state. To prescribe for the future is to step
outside the realm of necessity into the world of what "ought-to-be".
I have argued that Hegel's analysis of the monarch as
individual has more profound implications for his political theory than
is suggested by the usual treatment of it as either an unfortunate lapse
or a sign of his conservative, ideological bias. If Hegel had not
attempted to treat the monarch as the embodiment of true individuality
while still pursuing his efforts for "systematic closure" he would have
been forced to discover an alternative locus of individuality.
Repeatedly I have argued, in the previous chapters of this thesis, that
the proper embodiment of concept of individuality is the free citizen
of the rational state. I believe Hegel's analysis throughout the
Philosophy of Right points in this direction. His failure to provide a
satisfactory description of the complete individual owes more, I believe,
to the nature of the division he was trying to overcome than to any
particular bias or defect in his philosophy. Civil society and the
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state - on Hegel's own analysis - embody rival conceptions of freedom.
Marx's statement that Hegel wants every man to be both bourgeois and
cito.yen may also be read as a statement that heteronomous and
autonomous principles of freedom can never be satisfactorily reconciled.
The two concepts are not complementary; they are inalterably opposed.
Hegel sought to reconcile them by making the former a moment in the
actualization of the latter; that is, he makes civil society a moment
in the actualization of the state. Hegel's critique of Kant may be
accurate and judicious, but it is also possible that Kant, for all his
"errors", saw more clearly into the nature of the conflict between
opposed principles of freedom.
Kant, however, saw the conflict as primarily a moral one.
Each man, within himself, struggles to control his passion by his reason.
Hegel tries to widen the problem by treating it in social and political
terms. I think he was essentially correct to do so because, as Hegel
demonstrates, Kant's analysis ultimately regresses to a social and
political foundation with a determinate (and unexamined) content. Kant's
analysis owes much of its power to the existence of a social and
political order in which heteronomous principles are not only pursued
but are encouraged. That is, material acquisition has been freed from
many of its traditional ethical and religious constraints and is firmly
established as a legitimate principle of the social and political order.
Kant's ethical philosophy presupposes, I believe, the modern "liberation"
of material acquisition from religious and other controls.
By transforming Kant's moral dilemma into a political one,
Hegel may have opened up the possibility of its resolution. If
heteronomous activity is opposed to rational, autonomous freedom then
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the overcoming of this dichotomy requires a social and political order
which banishes heteronomy as a legitimate principle of activity. The
implication of this is clear; if bourgeois society enshrines heteronomous
principles then the bourgeois mode of economic production must be
substantially altered or overthrown as a first step to actualizing
autonomous freedom. Although Hegel himself never advanced so radical
a proposition, it is one possible consequence of the analysis of the
social and political world which he initiated. It is to Karl Marx that
we must turn if we wish to discover a full development of this line of
thought which is only suggested by a close reading of Hegel.
I would like to discuss another set of problems which arises
out of my discussion of the Philosophy of Right. The discussion of
individuality in this chapter of the thesis has focused on Hegel's
inability to point to the citizen as the embodiment of individuality, and
his concomitant shift from the citizen to the monarch as the rational,
free individual. I would now like to look at this problem from a
different angle, one which I believe raises issues of wide concern to
modern political philosophy in general.
In the first chapter of the thesis I discussed Hegel's
analysis of finite and infinite thought. To be finite was to be bounded
by a limit imposed from without. The only thing which could escape such
limits was the "thought which thinks itself", which has itself as its
own object. Hegel, contrasting the infinite of his own philosophical
system with the finitude of other systems, writes:
"Thought, as thought, therefore in its unmixed
nature involves no limits; it is finite only
when it keeps to limited categories which it
believes to be ultimate. Infinite or specu¬
lative thought, on the contrary, while it no
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less defines, does in the very act of limit¬
ing and defining make that defect vanish."
(Enc. No. 28.)
An example of the distinction between finite and infinite modes of
thought is Hegel's analysis of universal, particular and individual.
Viewed abstractly as "self-identical" concepts, each is finite or
bounded by the other concepts. But Hegel's analysis demonstrates
their dynamic relationship and overcomes the external limits imposed
upon each concept by finite modes of philosophical thought.
Individuality, for example, is the concrete unity of
universality and particularity and is, therefore, not limited in an
external way by either. The "logic of the understanding", separates
these three concepts and oppose them to each other; on Hegel's analysis,
however, each contains within itself the other concepts which are
constitutive of its essential nature. The concept of infinite
individuality contains within itself the concepts of universality
and particularity and they are essential to its integrity as a concept
of philosophic thought. This way of thinking Hegel regards as his major
contribution to the history of philosophy. Indeed, it is his philosophical
comprehension of the nature of philosophical thought which allows Hegel
to regard his philosophical system as the completion of the history of
phi 1osophy.
The discussion of the concept of infinite individuality has
been restricted to its role as a category of Hegel's logic. As we know,
Hegel is not content to treat logical categories as simply formal rules
of thought; he intends his Logic to be read as a work on ontology, in
which the categories of the Logic provide the ontological structure for
the complete knowledge by man of himself and the world. In Chapter Two
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of the thesis I described the relation between the categories of the
Logic and the examination of the natural and human worlds which succeed
the Logic within Hegel's Encyclopaedia. It follows from this that
Hegel's analysis of individuality must point to its embodiment in the
actual human (non-natural) world. If this is not the case then the
categories of the Logic are abstract and formal and cannot be regarded
as providing the ontological structure of the actual human world. I
hope that, by now, I have provided sufficient evidence to support my
view that Hegel would have regarded this conclusion as unacceptable.
Where does this analysis of individuality lead us? Briefly,
if the logical analysis of the dialectical concept of individuality
demonstrates its infinitude, then the actualization of individuality in
the world must be equally infinite. If this is not the case then
infinite individuality must always remain a conceptual possibility only.
The analysis of the Philosophy of Right points to the self-conscious
citizen of the rational state as the concrete embodiment of infinite
individuality. The self-conscious citizen - the actual individual -
knows himself as rational and free and knows that his rationality and
freedom is nothing other than the concrete unity of universal (the
institutions and laws of the state) and particular (his own particular
needs, capacities, desires).
But this is precisely the point where Hegel's analysis founders.
The citizen of his rational state does not have such a highly developed
self-consciousness. He does not know himself as the concrete embodiment
of the philosophical concept of individuality. He appears to himself
in a much more limited way. This is particularly true with respect to
the role he fulfils in civil society. Hegel acknowledges as much when
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he posits mediating institutions such as the corporations which attempt
to widen the perspective of the members of civil society. While those
institutions may accomplish this end, they do not transform the
bourgeois into the rational and completely self-conscious citizen. We
could argue, in a manner not unlike that employed by Hegel against Kant's
concept of the holy will, that if they did achieve such a result their
usefulness as mediating institutions would end and they would simply
wither away. That is, the corporations are introduced as an institu¬
tional check on the excessive particularity of civil society; the fully
self-conscious individual (the citizen) requires no such check since it
is a presupposition of his infinite individuality that particularity has
received its due and nothing more and, further, that he knows this as a
presupposition of his own freedom and rationality. Finally, the
discussion of monarchy earlier in this chapter applies equally to the
question of finite and infinite here; the monarch becomes the locus of
individuality because the citizen remains trapped within the finitude
of his experience.
Thus we see that in his philosophical exposition of the
rational social and political community Hegel is unable to provide an
adequate resolution of the problems he has brought to our attention.
Rational, autonomous freedom is properly predicated only of the individual.
Individuality, in turn, is in its most developed (complete) form an
infinite logical category. In the social and political world the only
satisfactory locus of individuality is the self-conscious citizen. But
the citizen is incapable of the degree of self-consciousness necessary
for the actualization of infinite individuality. The only conclusion
which can be drawn from all this is that rational, autonomous freedom -
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as Hegel develops the concept - is incapable of actualization.
It might be objected that I am pushing Hegel much too hard on
this point. In the Encyclopaedia he does, after all, state that
"Objective Mind" is the sphere of finite spirit. In this same passage
he characterizes finitude as a "reality that is not adequate to its
concept" and contrasts this with the contention that it is "only in
mind that we find absolute unity of Concept and reality, and hence true
infinitude". (Enc. No. 386 and Remark). I do not think this saves
Hegel: in fact, I shall argue that it only heightens the ambiguity in
his approach to political theory.
Hegel unequivocally argues that the state is "the actuality
of the ethical Idea". (PR. No. 257). We know that the Idea for Hegel
signifies the actualization of the Concept. In other words, the Idea
describes that moment when the reality of a thing is adequate to its
concept. From the passage quoted above we can infer that the Idea is,
therefore,infinite. In his introduction of the section on the state
Hegel certainly does not suggest that the Idea could be thought of as
anything less than infinite, describing it as a "substantial unity",
an "unmoved end in itself", and a "final end" (PR. No. 258 and Remark).
But he also describes "Objective Mind" - which corresponds to the
territory covered in the Philosophy of Right - as a sphere of finitude.
We are, therefore, in the position of having to accept that the state
(finite) is the actuality of the ethical Idea (infinite). Clearly
Hegel is in some difficulty here.
This is further complicated by Hegel's claim that the state
(the ethical Idea) exists "...mediately in individual self-consciousness,
knowledge and activity, while self-consciousness in virtue of its
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sentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its essence and the
end and product of its activity, its substantive freedom." (PR_. No.
257). This accords well with what I have consistently argued concern¬
ing the direction of Hegel's argument; the Idea exists only in individual
self-consciousness while self-consciousness itself can be complete only
within a rational state. But now we must demand of Hegel; who is this
individual who is self-conscious? We know on Hegel's own account that
it cannot be the individual citizen, since the citizen is so trapped
within finitude that he cannot participate directly in the political life
of the state. It could be the monarch but that is unsatisfactory, not
least because it reproduces in a subtle form the dialectic of the master
and the slave. There is one other possibility, viz. the individual
self-consciousness of the absolutely wise philosopher.
This is suggested by the structure of the Enc.ylopaedia of the
Philosophical Sciences. "Objective Mind" is succeeded by "Absolute
Mind". "Absolute Mind" reaches its highest development in philosophy.
It is in the thought of the philosopher that the absolute structure of
human knowledge is revealed. Clearly, the philosophical comprehension
of the social and political world is part of this structure. But this
comprehension is the achievement of the philosopher. Adapting Hegel's
own terms we can describe the Idea of freedom, the truth of the
political world, as existing for the philosopher and not for the
citizens of that world. We are, therefore, presented with a rather
curious paradox. The Idea of freedom is actualized in the rational,
ethical state. The Idea finds its existence only in the "self-
consciousness, knowledge and activity" of the rational individual. But
this individual is not the ordinary citizen of the rational state;
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rather it is the absolutely wise self-conscious philosopher who is
alone capable of having the Idea as his object, of knowing the Idea as
the actualized unity of rational political reality and philosophical
concept. The Idea of freedom - initially identified with the "coming-
to-be" of the rational state-finds its true existence only in a realm
of experience which lies beyond the state, viz. the thought of the
absolutely wise philosopher.
Once again, it is possible to object that I am pushing
Hegel too hard on this point. On analogy with the philosophical scheme
of the Phenomenology of Mind, it could be argued that the self-conscious
recognition of the Idea of freedom need not be universal. In the
Phenomenoloqy, the absolute structure of knowledge which Hegel calls
Absolute Knowledge is the proper object of the philosopher alone. Even
if that structure is completely grasped by only one philosopher (Hegel)
it does not alter the absolute status of this knowledge. Similarly, in
the Philosophy of Right the Idea of freedom need only be comprehended
by the self-conscious philosopher (Hegel again) if its status as Idea
is to be secured. In other words, the non-philosophical citizens of the
rational state need not attain the level of self-consciousness evidenced
in the thought of the philosopher as a precondition of the actualization
of the concept of freedom as Idea. The recognition that political
reality is finally adequate to the concept of freedom can, it is
argued, legitimately be restricted to the self-conscious philosopher.
I do not think this argument works, and its failure can be
demonstrated by referring back to the Phenomenology. In the opening
chapter of the thesis I argued that Absolute Knowledge was equivalent
to a self-conscious knowledge of the complete and coherent structure
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of knowledge. Within this structure, specific modes of knowledge -
such as scientific, moral, political, religious modes - receive their
due. Hegel does not try, for example, to supplant scientific knowledge;
rather he demonstrates its limits, argues that it cannot go beyond those
limits and yet, within those limits it can continue to carry out its
investigation of the physical and natural worlds. Absolute knowledge
does not attempt to either replace science or to provide it with
"proper" answers to its genuine inquiries. I believe this is a valid
distinction. The philosopher may set the philosophical limits to
specific forms of inquiry (for example, demonstrate why the methods of
natural science are inappropriate to the investigation of moral problems);
he oversteps his boundary, however, when he tries to provide the
answers to questions appropriately asked within specific forms (for example,
to dictate to physics the "proper" answers to questions raised in the
course of the investigation of the physical world).
For the most part Hegel demonstrates, at least implicitly,
his respect for this distinction. Even though he attempts to arrange
the different modes of knowledge into one complete and coherent structure,his
attempt does not, as such, contravene the distinction I have made. At
those places in the Phenomenology where he does appear to ignore the
distinction it is usually because he feels that philosophy can shed
some light on the matter. I believe his treatment of religion, for
example, maintains that the questions raised by religion are ultimately
seen to be best answered by philosophy. But this is because Hegel
argues that religion asks questions about man and his relation to the
world and to the absolute which are best dealt with by philosophy.
For those capable of doing so, philosophical speculation is a higher
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form of inquiry than religion. For those unable to do so, religion
provides the answers at a level suitable to their stage of self-
consciousness, although it must be acknowledged that those answers are
less complete than those discovered through philosophical reflection.
In other words, although Absolute Knowledge in the Phenomenology may
be infinite in Hegel's sense of the term, with respect to the specific
activity appropriate to specific modes of knowledge the infinite
structure of Absolute Knowledge must remain formal.
This is precisely where Hegel makes his mistake in the
Philosophy of Right. The philosopher may be competent to describe the
place which political knowledge occupies within the hierarchic
structure of knowledge. He may be able to establish the proper limits
of political enquiry and to describe its proper subject matter. He
may bring his critical skills to bear on specific political theories
and demonstrate their inadequacies (as Hegel does in Abstract Right and
Morality). His learning and skill may shed a great deal of light on
specific political problems and may point the way forward towards their
solution. But he cannot provide the final and complete set of answers
to all the questions raised by political enquiry.
I believe I can justify this claim on the basis of Hegel's
own description of political reality. The only satisfactory
"completion" or "end" to political development is that historical stage
at which freedom is actualized. On Hegel's own analysis, the only
freedom which can be completely rational presupposes the unity of
universal and particular within the "self-consciousness, knowledge
and activity" of the individual. But the completely self-conscious
individual can only be the philosopher. Hence if freedom is to be
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actualized in the rational state, all citizens must be philosophers
or exhibit the developed self-consciousness appropriate to the
absolutely wise philosopher. I would argue that this condition can
never be met. This is so not merely because philosophy is difficult
and beyond the intellectual reach of most people, but also because the
highly differentiated structure of modern society requires a degree of
occupational specialization on the part of its citizenry which militates
against the possibility of all citizens (at the very least) sitting
down, reading, and digesting the absolute wisdom of philosophy.
Although it may not be possible a priori to demonstrate this absolutely,
it is certainly possible to argue that Hegel did not demonstrate how
this could come about. Indeed, he would have found the suggestion
ludicrous,^ even though it is a consequence of his own attempt to
describe a complete political world. Hegel applauds modern political
philosophy because it seeks to describe freedom for all; his own
philosophy forces us to abandon that search if we accept his analysis.
Further, if only the philosopher is capable of the required
degree of self-consciousness then the Idea of freedom exists only for
him. The philosopher alone is truly free. But the state still exists
and its rational (for the philosopher) organization is necessary if
political reality (the state) is to be adequate to the concept of
freedom. The state, therefore, exists for the philosopher since it is
the philosopher alone who is capable of the freedom which, Hegel claims,
is the true end for the state. Equally, the citizens - each contributing
in his own small way to the organization and welfare of the state as a
whole - exist for the philosopher. The citizens are not truly free,
but their labour does make possible the freedom of the philosopher.
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This is clearly the opposite of what Hegel intends, and yet it follows
from his analysis. Hegel's own analysis of the dialectic of master
and slave provides the refutation of such a political system as a system
of freedom. Also, if the citizens do not know themselves to be free,
they may demand political changes in an effort to further their own ideas
about freedom. Clearly, political change works against the interest of
the philosopher, since the status quo provides him with the reality
necessary for the actualization of his own freedom. Therefore, his
freedom is either contingent on the political activities of the
(ignorant) citizens or he forces the citizens to maintain the status quo.
In the latter case, the philosopher becomes a tyrant.^ This is, I
believe, unacceptable to Hegel as a final resolution of the problems
he has raised in the Philosophy of Right.
What, then, can be done if we are to save some of the most
important points established in the Philosophy of Right without ending
up in the impasse I have described above? If we reject Hegel 's final
resolution (the actualization of freedom in the rational state) as
impossible, need we throw out all that has gone before? I believe the
answer to this question is no. Indeed, I would argue that, implicit
in Hegel's own analysis is a solution to the problem which is of great
value for modern political theory. I believe that this can be brought
out by reference to the work of Aristotle. In what follows, I shall
make no effort to present a systematic analysis of Aristotle's political
theory; I shall limit myself to a brief mention of some points in
Aristotle's theory which shed light on Hegel's dilemma.
Aristotle always intended the Nicomachean Ethics and the
Politics to be taken together as two distinct but inseparable treatments
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of the same problem, viz. the good for man. The type of knowledge
appropriate to the study of this problem and the ways to secure the
good for man is called "practical wisdom" or phronesis by Aristotle.
Practical wisdom is contrasted with both "productive wisdom" and
"theoretical wisdom"; the former is concerned with the wisdom necessary
for the making of things while the latter is concerned with the
contemplative study of those things which cannot be otherwise than
they are (the eternal objects of metaphysical inquiry).
We know that Aristotle's theory of natural right holds that
there are standards of human conduct which are "right by nature". But
the discovery of man of such standards in no way guarantees he will act
according to them. Even if we accept that such "natural" standards
exist, we may not know how to act appropriately in the real (and
confusing) world. Practical wisdom, therefore, does not merely
dangle standards of conduct before us as some eternal goal; rather,
it is Aristotle's intention in the Ethics and Politics to describe the
practical wisdom necessary for us to be good men, to live a life that
is "right by nature". Practical wisdom is concerned with human
practical (as opposed to productive and theoretical) activity which
might not be what it ought to be.
In the Ethics Aristotle establishes that the true end of
human activity is the happiness which is achieved in and through the
life lived in accordance with virtue (practical and/or theoretical
virtue).^ The main subject of the Ethics is the practical wisdom
necessary for the actualization of happiness. But Aristotle acknowledges
that the discussion of the good for man in the Ethics is abstract.
Every man, unless he be "a beast or a God", must live in a polis.
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This is so not merely for reasons of utility (food, protection and
so forth) but because, as discussed in the previous chapter of the
thesis, Aristotle maintains that the polis exists by nature. The
analysis of the Ethics is abstract because man as such is an
abstraction. All men are citizens and, as such, are subject to the
customs and positive laws of the polis in which they live.
Now, there may be some men who are so noble that they will
choose to act virtuously regardless of the practical consequences.
In a bad regime, virtuous activity may very well conflict with what is
expected of a good citizen. For example, in the Ethics Aristotle
argues that excessive wealth is not virtuous. In an oligarchy
respect for, or at least obeissance to, men of great wealth is expected.
The good man may choose to ignore such demands because it conflicts
with his idea of virtuous conduct. He may, therefore, incur the
enmity of the rulers of the oligarchy and be made to suffer for his
virtue. But in such a case, the good and noble man does what he does
not because he is, in some way, not a citizen of the oligarchy, but in
spite of his citizenship. He is a good man precisely because he chooses
not to be a good citizen. With most people, however, obedience to the
customs and positive laws of the regime (whether good or bad) is
relatively straightforward and almost automatic, whether from cowardice
or ignorance is really a matter of indifference to most rulers.
In both cases - the self-consciously good man and the good
citizen - the nature of the regime is important. In the former case,
it is far better to lead an openly virtuous life in a good regime which
promotes and protects good ends than to live in a regime which forces
the good man to be "subversive". In the latter case, Aristotle argues,
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it is far better to secure the good for many people than for just one.
A good regime encourages its citizens to be virtuous and this educates
them into the nobility of the life of virtue. In a sense, the better
a regime, the greater the awareness of virtue on the part of its
citizens.
But the Ethics does not merely provide abstract standards
of conduct against which the achievements of specific poleis may
be measured. In the Politics Aristotle ranks regimes from the best to
the worst. Every regime is a substantive political community ordering
the activities of its citizens. Aristotle is concerned to examine the
internal logic of different forms of regime, not only with respect to
the ends which they embody but also with respect to the possibilities
which exist within each for meaningful political activity. The
discussion in the Ethics certainly aids his classification and analysis
of specific regimes, but Aristotle is a sufficiently realistic political
thinker to admit that the ideals of the Ethics may have only limited
application to actual regimes. Although a good man will always aim at
doing the best he can, this "best" may, in certain regimes, appear
woefully inadequate compared to the possibilities for virtuous action
possible in a good regime. Rather than lapse into irony or the
anguish of the "beautiful soul" Aristotle argues that the good man must
still try to improve political conditions. Often this may appear to be
little more than wholesale capitulation to degenerate rulers, but
Aristotle is always concerned to demonstrate that improvement of the
political order is at least possible, and is certainly worthy of the
attentions of a good man.
In this way Aristotle constructs a complex picture of ethics
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and politics. In the Ethics he describes the good for man, a good
which is complete and self-subsistent. He also discusses the
virtuous conduct necessary for the actualization of the good.
Aristotle's discussion of conduct is remarkably broad in scope and
demonstrates his awareness of the many hazards which lie in the way
of living a good life. While the final good for man may be thought
of as analogous to Hegel's discussion of infinity - an end which is
complete in and for itself, unbounded by externally imposed limits -
Aristotle's description of the conduct appropriate to this end is
notable for his sympathy for the difficulties created by the finitude
of actual human existence which beset the man who attempts to live
a good life. Similarly, in the Politics Aristotle describes the
regime which is "right by nature" or, in the Hegelian language I
have been using, infinitely rational and free. But Aristotle then
proceeds to analyse regimes which are deficient in comparison to this
absolute standard. If the best regime is "right by nature" then
deficient regimes must exhibit greater or lesser degrees of "convention",
of deviation from the "natural" standard. Deviations result from
human ignorance, caprice, malevolence and other contingent factors.
In a sense, Aristotle is more concerned with the political realities
and possibilities of deficient regimes than he is with those of the
best regime. Indeed, he even argues that the mixed constitution -
the third best regime titled "polity" - may be the best regime one
can realistically hope for. This is not cynicism nor even resignation;
it is based on a realistic assessment of the actual human world, with
all its ineradicable faults and limitations.
Thus we see that Aristotle is able to develop a complex
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picture of ethics and politics which includes within it both
"infinite" and "finite" possibilities. I could list many distinctions
within practical life which Aristotle's treatment gives rise to, but I
will limit myself to mentioning just a few. The first is that between
the good man (ethics) and the good citizen (politics); the second is
that between the best regime (right by nature) and degenerate regimes
(conventional); the third is between perfect justice (distribution of
goods according to the relative virtues of the recipients) and
deficient justice (distribution of goods according to a principle
other than virtue). These distinctions are most important, creating
as they do a constant tension between what is infinite and what is
finite. There can be no man who is not also a citizen of a specific
regime, whether it be a good or bad one. There can be no polis which
is not co-extensive with a specific regime, either good or bad. There
can be no justice which is not political justice, even though the
political principles which order distributive justice may be either
good or bad. There exists always the possibility that the best regime
will emerge, thereby creating the possibility of perfect justice as
well as the opportunity for a good citizen to be a good man. This
possibility informs the activity of all noble-minded men, even if
they live in a degenerate regime where the possibilities of perfection
are most remote. Practical wisdom both establishes the polarities
described above as well as seeks practical ways to lessen their
radical opposition. The practical activity which is informed by
practical wisdom is political praxis. The ethical and political
distinctions which Aristotle elucidates between "natural" and
"conventional" - or "infinite" and "finite" - make possible practical
wisdom and political activity.
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When we turn to the Philosophy of Right we see that Hegel
has followed a very different course. The distinctions which
Aristotle develops create the tension which nourishes political
activity; those distinctions have been overcome in Hegel's rational
state. The first two sections of the Philosophy of Right demonstrate
the necessity of a rationally organized community. But in the third
section, this community becomes identified with a particular regime,
the liberal bourgeois state. Aristotle preserves the notion of the
polis qua polis in order to demonstrate the variety of forms it can
assume while still retaining its essential features as a specific
form of human association. Hegel does no such thing; he gives us a
rational state which is to be regarded as complete in and for itself,
as infinite. There is no need to distinguish between the political
community as such and the variety of its possible forms. Still less
does Hegel distinguish between good and bad forms. The distinctions
which Aristotle makes allow us to retain the distinction between
infinite and finite practical political possibi1 ties. Hegel does
away with this by addressing himself to the infinite form alone of the
community. The other distinctions which Aristotle makes crumble away
once Hegel has ignored this particular distinction. The good (free
and rational) man is the citizen of Hegel's rational state.'3 Since
Hegel considers no other political forms the distinction Aristotle
makes between the good man and the good citizen is irrelevant.
Similarly, the justice of the rational state is perfect and no further
reflections on justice are necessary.
Were Hegel able to demonstrate that his rational state does,
in fact, actualize the Idea of freedom then these objections may be
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considered unimportant. I am not contrasting Hegel with Aristotle
for the sake of contrast alone. Since Hegel manifestly fails to
demonstrate this satisfactorily, the contrast does, I believe,
become significant. I have tried to demonstrate that the very
distinctionswhich Aristotle deliniates create the possibility of
political action. Another way of saying this is that the recognition
of the finitude of human experience must be the foundation upon which
rational political activity is based. Aristotle's approach makes
possible a theoretically informed political praxis aimed at substantive
ethical and political ends.
In contrast, Hegel's rational state is remarkably de-
politicized. The legislators hammer out positive laws with which they
can be comfortable. The substantive ends of legislative activity are
given, as I have tried to show, by the demands of civil society, viz.
material prosperity and growth. The rational bureaucrats then execute
those laws. The whole is presented as harmonious and smoothly-
functioning. If we regard politics, or "the political", as a human
activity which has as its end the actualization of the good for man,
then Hegel's state is non-political. This concept of "the political",
which goes back to Aristotle, would be agreed upon by Hegel. For
Aristotle, however, "the political" can never be eliminated, it can
never become aufgehoben. For Hegel, it is aufgehoben in the rational
state. There is no longer any need to struggle for the good, or for
freedom, since the good is actualized. The state, therefore, merely
administers the good, and politics as a search for the good (freedom)
ceases to be. Politics, for Hegel, is essentially a feature of the
history of Spirit, a history which is completed in the rational state.14
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In an interesting passage, Hegel writes:
"But if we ask what is or has been the historical
origin of the state in general, still more if we
ask about the origin of any particular state, of its
rights and institutions, or again if we inquire
whether the state originally arose out of patriarchal
conditions or out of fear or trust, or out of
Corporations etc., or if finally we ask in what light
the basis of the state's rights has been conceived
and consciously established, whether this basis has
been supposed to be positive divine right, or contract,
custom, etc. - all these questions are no concern of
the Idea of the state. We are here dealing exclusively
with the philosophic science of the state, and from
that point of view all these things are mere
appearances and therefore matters for history."
(PR. No. 258, Remark).
It is most important to note that Hegel says these historical matters
are of no concern to the Idea (Idee) of the state; he does not mention
their relation to the concept (Begriff) of the state. Now, were he
referring to the concept of the state, the passage would be unobjectionable
to me. The concept of the state is similar to Aristotle's concept of the
polis. But Hegel says "Idea", and the Idea is the concept actualized
in its perfection. It could be argued that this is only a terminological
slip on Hegel's part but I think not, especially since this passage
introduces his discussion of the rational state - the Idea of the state.
Had Hegel restricted himself to a discussion of the concept of
the state, the passage could stand unchallenged. The concept of the state,
like the concept of a polis, is independent of particular contingent -
historical or otherwise - details which distinguish this state from that
one. But when we examine particular states (regimes), these matters
become vitally important. The way a state has developed historically,
the perceptions by its citizens of this history, of the source of
political legitimacy, legality and authority is of great importance.
Without labouring the point, I would argue that these matters are vital
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to our understanding of political activity as it exists in the real
world. By consigning these matters to history and declaring them
irrelevant to the rational state, Hegel is serving notice that the
substantive practice of politics has no place in his rational state.
Politics - the struggle to achieve certain substantive human ends - is
a matter for the history or, perhaps, the "pre-history" of the rational
state.
For Aristotle, the practice of politics can never cease
because the finite can never be eliminated. Even in the best regimes,
there may exist men who seek to replace rule for the sake of virtue with,
for example, rule for the sake of wealth. Thus, even in the best
regime substantive political activity - as opposed to the mere
administration of the good life - is necessary. Since Hegel attempts
to eliminate such finitude in his rational state, he does not develop a
theory of the "political", except as an aid to historical understanding.
Hegel's political theory thus ends in a double failure; first, his
rational state is incapable, on his own terms, of actualization and
second, his failure to discover the basic reasons for this first failure
prevent him from developing a theory of politics adequate to the needs
of the modern world.
We should be wary, however, of dismissing Hegel too quickly
in favour of Aristotle. There are several reasons why Hegel's political
theory exhibits the defects it does in comparison with that of Aristotle.
First, Aristotle is concerned with the good for man which he defines as
the life lived in accordance with virtue, including where possible the
contemplative virtues of philosophy. Aristotle has no hesitation in
restricting this good to only a relatively small proportion of the polis.
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It is clearly beyond the reach of slaves, tradesmen and other "lower
orders". Hegel, in contrast, defines the good in terms of freedom and,
as he so often states, freedom in the modern world cannot be restricted
to only a few. Quite aside from other issues, this one major
difference complicates Hegel's task enormously.15 Second, Hegel has
to confront the realities of the new economic order. Those factors have
consequences which take us far beyond the scope of Aristotle's political
theory. I have already referred to the modern elevation of heteronomous
principles of freedom to the level of a "totalizing" social order.
Equally important is the fact that the goals of bourgeois political
economy - material prosperity and growth-are liberated from political
controls. That is, the goals of economic life supplant explicitly
political goals, especially the political goals described by Aristotle.
Aristotle could distinguish clearly between productive wisdom (techne)
and practical wisdom (phronesis). The former was the proper concern
of those groups who were incapable of achieving the level of development
necessary to live the good life according to virtue. As noted above,
Hegel is unwilling to enforce such a harsh distinction. Indeed, the
modern world has witnessed the gradual supplanting of practical wisdom
by productive wisdom (the wisdom necessary for the promotion of material
welfare). Political argument is increasingly restricted to the best
methods of securing material prosperity. (I might add that this feature
does not appear to be restricted to modern bourgeois society, socialist
countries often parade socialism as a better way of achieving material
welfare). I believe it is possible to claim that, in the modern world,
meaningful political activity is often suppressed by the demands imposed
upon the political realm by economic considerations.16
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Do these considerations lead to either cynicism about the
possibility of meaningful political activity in the modern age or
romantic yearning for a classical age long dead, an idealized vision
which ignores so many of its more base realities? Although much of
what I state here is based on my reading of Hegel I believe, perhaps
paradoxically, that implicit in Hegel's political philosophy are several
features which may point the way out of a seemingly inescapable impasse.
What follows is a brief sketch and not a full treatment of the
problems. A full treatment would amount to a large-scale analysis of
the relation between political theory and political practice. This is
quite beyond the scope of this thesis.
I have tried to demonstrate that Hegel's rational state is a
failure. It fails because it attempts the impossible - the actualiza¬
tion of a perfect freedom which is complete in and for itself. One of
the implications of this failure is that Hegel does not leave us with
a modern theory of political activity, since such activity is aufgehoben
in the rational state. But in this failure, there are many elements
which point beyond the specific failure of the rational state to the
possibility of a genuine theory of political activity.
Hegel correctly identifies human freedom as the goal of modern
political activity - theoretical as well as practical. But he goes
much further than this. In Abstract Right and Morality he demonstrates
the inadequacy of the leading "pre-Hegelian" concepts of freedom,
concepts which still exercise a powerful influence on "post-Hegelian"
thought. Hegel's critical accomplishment is informed throughout the
logical terms developed in his Logic. We can restrict this discussion
to one set of these terms - universal, particular and individual. I
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believe Hegel is correct in his analysis of true individuality as the
concrete unity of universal and particular. His analysis of "atomistic"
theories of freedom demonstrates their inadequacy in light of this
logical premise. More importantly, he shows that those theories
themselves regress to the concept of an ordered social and political
community. His great achievement, then, is to demonstrate that true
individuality - of which alone rational freedom can be predicated -
presupposes as its ground the concept of the rational social and
political community.
These points are certainly abstract. When we turn to the
analysis of the rational community the going becomes much more difficult.
Hegel does, however, establish certain important points. The community
must not be regarded as the servant of individualistic material interests
alone (this despite Hegel's failure to describe such a community). It
is not reducible to the heteronomous wills of men conceived as
economic actors alone. The community embodies spiritual or cultural
values which are necessary for freedom (conceived as autonomous rather
than heteronomous, to borrow from Kant). It could be argued that
Hegel demonstrates the merit of some measure of private property, of
having "one's own", if not of unchecked personal wealth. He argues
for the community assuming responsibility for the care of those who
cannot care for themselves (this is regarded primarily as an economic
problem but it could easily be extended into other areas, even in a
society where poverty has been eliminated). In short, the community
is necessary for the autonomous freedom of the individual, and the
individual secures his freedom only to the extent that the political
community of which he is a citizen is healthy.
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These points have theoretical import. By this I mean they
are the proper objects of that type of thinking which Aristotle called
practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is the necessary presupposition of
political activity if that activity is to be directed at securing the
good for man (human freedom). Reflections of this sort on the nature
of the political community, of the relation between the individual and
the community or, in Hegel's language, between individual self-consciousness
and the spiritual totality inform wise political activity. Political
activity which refuses to consider such questions remains blind if not
positively harmful. It is not the least of Hegel's achievements that
he demonstrates that even the most self-consciously "pragmatic"
political positions presuppose (at least implicitly) some metaphysical
or theoretical propositions. Political thought has the responsibility
to lay bare and examine those propositions about the nature of freedom
and the political community.
I have argued that finitude can never be eliminated completely
in the real political world. Political activity is not, thereby,
rendered impotent. The theoretical statements I have referred to above
inform our knowledge of this finite reality. Theoretically informed
activity can have meaningful results. In turn, the reality of
political practice forces us to reconsider some of our most cherished
theoretical political propositions. The relation between theory and
practice is dialectical, in which each activity is seen to mediate the
other as well as itself in and through the other. Because the
political world is ineradicably finite, it must always remain, in a
sense, immediate. There will always be new problems which were
unforeseen as well as old ones which reappear unexpectably. A
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theoretically informed practice can be regarded, then as a state of
mediated immediacy. The finite political present is mediated by
theoretical reflections on abstract political questions, by our
historical knowledge as well as by our reflections on possible political
futures.
This leads to the last point I want to make. The ineradicability
of finitude is not something to be lamented. Aristotle argues that
man is a political animal. Nowadays, we are all too ready to
substitute "social" for political in this statement. It is sometimes
argued that Aristotle didn't really have a proper concept of "social",
but that this was what he really meant when he used the term "political".
I believe this is a mistake. Practical wisdom, the wisdom appropriate
to matters of normative human conduct, is a noble human achievement.
Aristotle's teleology demands that we look to the best of a thing if
we are to understand its nature. The polis is the highest form of
human association. It is at its best when it is guided by practical
wisdom. The exercise of practical wisdom is most noble when it is aimed
at the true good, and when it is so aimed man exercises some of the
greatness and reason which is implicit in him. In other words,
practical wisdom is not merely valuable because it is useful if we are to
secure the good; it is noble because the exercise of practical wisdom
and the political activity which it informs is valuable for its own
sake, as the explicit actualization of man's capacity to pursue the
good for all.
I think this can be recast in Hegelian terms. Philosophical
speculation about "the political" - the mode of activity aimed at
actualizing human freedom - can never "close out" or complete practical
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political activity. This latter is necessary finite and open-ended
(this clearly implies that political history - as opposed, perhaps,
to the history of metaphysics - can never be completed). Alexandre
Kojeve has written that in Hegel's rational, universal, homogeneous
state there will be nothing left to accomplish. Kojeve, neither (it
seems) lamenting nor applauding this state of affairs, believes it to
be an historical possibility. For the reasons I have given, I do not
think this is possible, although I agree with Kojeve that, were
the rational state to become actual, political activity would cease.
If I am correct, then political activity will always be necessary. To
this, I would add the caveat that meaningful political activity aimed
at freedom will persist only so long as men long for and value
freedom. There can never be absolute and infinite freedom, but there can
be advances in political life.^ Hegel's analysis of freedom points
out some of the areas in which political activity can secure meaningful
results. Similar to my statement about Aristotle, I believe that a
theoretically informed political activity aimed at advancing human
freedom is itself an exercise of freedom, a realization of the human
capacity for rational action. For me, these convictions arise out
of my reading of Hegel 's Philosophy of Right, a work which crystallizes
so many of the problems which confront modern political philosophy as





1. Of course, we should not forget that some political movements and
theories are aimed directly against the spread of individual rights.
The fact that we regard such movements in terms of their attitudes
towards such rights only underlines the centrality of this concept
to modern political thought.
2. For an excellent analysis of the ideas which were influential on
the young Hegel and of Hegel 's struggle to move beyond their
limitations see Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 3-76.
3. Hannah Arendt has a facinating treatment of this distinction in
The Human Condition (Chicago, 1958), pp. 58-68. While we can only
speculate about what Hegel's reaction would be to her analysis, I
do think that some of the points she raises accord quite well with
some of Hegel's statements about private property.
4. PR. #258, Remark.
5. On this point see S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State
(Cambridge, 1972), pp. 115-131.
6. See Eno #181 - 193.
7. cf. Enc. #198.
8. "Problem" here refers to the problem of discovering a real content
adequate to the concept of freedom.
9. This is a constant theme in Hegel. See, for example, the Preface
to PR.
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10. Hegel consistently opposed attempts to "water-down" philosophy for
mass consumption. A famous example of this attitude is his discu¬
ssion of the "royal road" to philosophy in his Preface to the
Phenomenology.xLkZ_
11. Leo Strauss reaches a similar conclusion in his debate with
Alexandre Kojeve on the implications of modern political philosophy.
Hegel's philosophy is very much at issue between the two, although
Strauss' comments are intended to embrace all modern political
thinking. Strauss reaches his conclusion by a rather different
path than I and draws different consequences from it than I. See
Leo Strauss, On Tyranny Rev, and ENL. ED., (Ithaca, 1968), pp. 189-
227.
12. I shall avoid entering into the debate about the relative value
of practical and theoretical virtues for the attainment of
happiness. See Nicomachean Ethics, Book vi, ch. 12-13and Book X,
ch. 6-9.
13. cf. Hegel's characterization of virtue as an outmoded concept
really appropriate only to states in their infancy, PR^. #150 and
Remark.
14. I realize this appears to contradict my statements in the previous
chapter concerning Hegel's respect for a vigorous "public sphere".
I believe it can be said now that the "public sphere" is not
vigorously political. The ends of the state are given, includ¬
ing the fundamental economic structures of the state. Public
debate, therefore, centres on means and not ends.
15. I believe that modern political theorists, such as Leo Strauss,
who regard the teachings of classical political philosophy as
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greater and truer than modern political philosophy are less
than candid about the implications of the classical tradition.
This point applies especially to the role of slavery in ancient
thought and the life of noble leisure which is based on it.
16. This "eclipse" of the political is the subject of some of the
most interesting political theorizing of recent years. This is
only a very partial list: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition,
(Chicago, 1958); Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (London,
1974), pp. 1-41 and 253-283; Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision
(Boston, 1960), pp. 286-435; Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct
(Oxford, 1975); Eric Voegelin The New Science of Politics
(Chicago, 1952); Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston,
1968).
17. Implied in this statement is the belief that we can steer a
middle course between historical relativism on one side and the
Hegelian absolute on the other. That is, I believe we do not
have to be rational and free (infinite) individual citizens of
Hegel's rational state before we can condemn with certitude the
iniquity of slavery. A philosophical position which can be shown
to be self-contradictory is false; we may sometimes cling to
notions which we know to be false because we are afraid of what
the alternatives may hold for us. Nevertheless, we can point to
advances in political history which are significant for the
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